National security implications of foreign-controlled satellite communications
Sam Brown made this Official Information request to Christopher Luxon
Response to this request is delayed. By law, Christopher Luxon should normally have responded promptly and by (details and exceptions)
From: Sam Brown
Dear Prime Minister,
As Minister for National Security and Intelligence, I request the following information under the Official Information Act 1982:
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided to Ministers or senior officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's increasing reliance on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems (specifically Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure, emergency services, or government communications.
2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet providers routing New Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions, including whether this creates signals intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's Five Eyes obligations.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding security assessments of commercial satellite communications providers, or discussions about standardising security requirements for satellite services used by government agencies or critical infrastructure operators.
4. Any advice provided to Ministers on whether New Zealand has contractual guarantees, kill-switch provisions, or service continuity assurances from satellite communications providers during international conflicts, political disputes, or scenarios where the provider's owner is directed by a foreign government to limit or terminate services.
5. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational control over critical communications infrastructure used by New Zealand emergency services, government agencies, or essential services creates unacceptable national security or resilience risks, particularly where that individual has demonstrated willingness to disable services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting Starlink service during the Ukraine conflict or declining to provide service to Taiwan).
6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address national security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled satellite providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators.
Yours faithfully,
Sam Brown
From: Christopher Luxon (MIN)
Christopher Luxon
On behalf of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt Hon Christopher Luxon,
thank you for your email. Please accept this as acknowledgement that your
message has been received.
The Prime Minister’s Correspondence Unit will be closed over the Christmas
and New Year period until Monday 12 January 2026. Your email will be read
and actioned after this date.
While all emails are read and considered, due to the very high volume of
messages sent to the Prime Minister, it is not always possible to provide
a personal reply.
If the subject of your email is closely related to another ministerial
portfolio, we may refer you to the Minister who will be best placed to
review your message. If you have already included in your email the
Minister or agency responsible for the issue you have raised, your message
will be noted.
If you are a Botany resident writing about a local issue or a constituent
matter, or you are writing to Rt Hon Christopher Luxon in his capacity as
the MP for Botany, please contact the Botany Electorate Office at
[1][email address].
If your email is an invitation, a media query, or a request under the
Official Information Act, you will receive a further response in due
course.
Thank you again for taking the time to write. We wish you all the best
over the holiday season.
Kind regards,
Office of Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Minister for National Security and Intelligence
Minister Responsible for Ministerial Services
Leader of the National Party
Member of Parliament for Botany
References
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1. mailto:[email address]
From: Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Kia ora Sam,
Thank you for your email of 05/01/26 in which you submitted an Official Information Act request as follows:
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided to Ministers or senior officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's increasing reliance on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems (specifically Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure, emergency services, or government communications.
2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet providers routing New Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions, including whether this creates signals intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's Five Eyes obligations.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding security assessments of commercial satellite communications providers, or discussions about standardising security requirements for satellite services used by government agencies or critical infrastructure operators.
4. Any advice provided to Ministers on whether New Zealand has contractual guarantees, kill-switch provisions, or service continuity assurances from satellite communications providers during international conflicts, political disputes, or scenarios where the provider's owner is directed by a foreign government to limit or terminate services.
5. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational control over critical communications infrastructure used by New Zealand emergency services, government agencies, or essential services creates unacceptable national security or resilience risks, particularly where that individual has demonstrated willingness to disable services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting Starlink service during the Ukraine conflict or declining to provide service to Taiwan).
6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address national security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled satellite providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators.
Your request is being considered in accordance with the Act, and you can expect a response by 13/02/2026 (date determined by the OIA calculator).
Charlotte Horner
Roving Private Secretary - Executive Support | Office of Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Prime Minister
Minister for National Security and Intelligence
Minister Responsible for Ministerial Services
Private Bag 18041, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160, New Zealand
show quoted sections
From: Ministerial Services
Kia ora Sam Brown,
On behalf of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment I
acknowledge your request of 12 January 2026 sent to the Office of Rt Hon
Christopher Luxon requesting under the Official Information Act 1982, the
following:
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided to
Ministers or
senior officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's
increasing
reliance on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems
(specifically
Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure,
emergency services,
or government communications.
2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet
providers
routing New Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions,
including whether this
creates signals intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's
Five Eyes
obligations.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding
security
assessments of commercial satellite communications providers, or
discussions about
standardising security requirements for satellite services used by
government agencies
or critical infrastructure operators.
4. Any advice provided to Ministers on whether New Zealand has
contractual
guarantees, kill-switch provisions, or service continuity assurances from
satellite
communications providers during international conflicts, political
disputes, or scenarios
where the provider's owner is directed by a foreign government to limit or
terminate
services.
5. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational
control over critical
communications infrastructure used by New Zealand emergency services,
government
agencies, or essential services creates unacceptable national security or
resilience
risks, particularly where that individual has demonstrated willingness to
disable
services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting Starlink service
during the
Ukraine conflict or declining to provide service to Taiwan).
6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the
Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address
national
security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled
satellite
providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators.
Your request has been transferred to the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment from the Office of Rt Hon Christopher Luxon on 30 January
2026 and is being processed in accordance with the Official Information
Act 1982. A response will be sent to you in due course.
We will endeavour to respond to your request as soon as possible, and no
later than 2 March 2026, being 20 working days after the day your request
was received. If we are unable to respond to your request by then, we will
notify you of an extension of that timeframe. If you have any enquiries
regarding your request feel free to contact us via email
to [1][email address].
Nāku noa, nā
Ministerial Services
Strategy and Assurance
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment
15 Stout Street, Wellington 6011 | P O Box 1473 Wellington 6140
References
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1. mailto:[email address]
From: Information
Kia ora Sam Brown
We have received a partial transfer of your Official InformationAct (OIA)
request of 12 January 2026, to the Prime Minister related to
“Foreign-controlled satellite communications” .
The parts that have been transfer are:
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided
to Ministers or senior officials regarding national security
implications of New Zealand's increasing reliance on
foreign-controlled satellite communications systems (specifically
Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure,
emergency services, or government communications.
2. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational
control over critical communications infrastructure used by New
Zealand emergency services, government agencies, or essential services
creates unacceptable national security or resilience risks,
particularly where that individual has demonstrated willingness to
disable services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting
Starlink service during the Ukraine conflict or declining to provide
service to Taiwan).
This email confirms receipt of your request and advises that we will
respond to it as soon as reasonably practicable, and in terms of the
timeframes and requirements of the OIA.
Please note that our response letter to you (with your personal details
redacted), and any enclosed documents, may be published on NEMA’s website.
Ngā mihi
Emergency Management team
National Emergency Management Agency Te Rakau Whakamarumaru
[1]www.civildefence.govt.nz
Level 6, 23 Kate Sheppard Place | PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140, New
Zealand
Emergencies can happen anytime, anywhere. You can take steps to be
prepared.
References
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1. http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/
From: Ministerial Services
Dear Sam Brown,
Please disregard the previous acknowledgement email, which contained
incorrect details due to an administrative error. We apologize for any
confusion this may have caused.
On behalf of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment I
acknowledge your request of 12 January 2026 sent to the Office of Rt Hon
Christopher Luxon requesting under the Official Information Act 1982, the
following:
"1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided
to Ministers or
senior officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's
increasing
reliance on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems
(specifically
Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure,
emergency services,
or government communications.
2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet
providers
routing New Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions,
including whether this
creates signals intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's
Five Eyes
obligations.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding
security
assessments of commercial satellite communications providers, or
discussions about
standardising security requirements for satellite services used by
government agencies
or critical infrastructure operators.
4. Any advice provided to Ministers on whether New Zealand has
contractual
guarantees, kill-switch provisions, or service continuity assurances from
satellite
communications providers during international conflicts, political
disputes, or scenarios
where the provider's owner is directed by a foreign government to limit or
terminate
services.
5. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational
control over critical
communications infrastructure used by New Zealand emergency services,
government
agencies, or essential services creates unacceptable national security or
resilience
risks, particularly where that individual has demonstrated willingness to
disable
services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting Starlink service
during the
Ukraine conflict or declining to provide service to Taiwan).
6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the
Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address
national
security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled
satellite
providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators."
The below point of your request has been transferred to the Ministry of
Business, Innovation and Employment from the Office of Rt Hon Christopher
Luxon on 30 January 2026 and is being processed in accordance with the
Official Information Act 1982. A response will be sent to you in due
course.
"6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the
Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address
national
security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled
satellite
providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators."
We will endeavour to respond to your request as soon as possible, and no
later than 2 March 2026, being 20 working days after the day your request
was received. If we are unable to respond to your request by then, we will
notify you of an extension of that timeframe. If you have any enquiries
regarding your request feel free to contact us via email
to [1][email address].
Nāku noa, nā
Ministerial Services
Strategy and Assurance
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment
15 Stout Street, Wellington 6011 | P O Box 1473 Wellington 6140
References
Visible links
1. mailto:[email address]
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Sections transferred to GCSB, NEMA and MBIE under section 14(b)(i) of the Act, as listed below:
• GCSB – parts [1], [2] and [3]
• NEMA – parts [1] and [5]
• MBIE – part [6].
Link to this