Dear GCSB,

Under the Official Information Act 1982, I request (noting that some information may be appropriately withheld under relevant security provisions):

1. Any unclassified or partially declassified threat assessments, risk analyses, or security evaluations regarding:
- New Zealand's increasing dependency on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems for essential services, government operations, or critical infrastructure
- Signals intelligence vulnerabilities when New Zealand internet traffic is routed through satellite systems controlled by foreign entities
- Data sovereignty implications of satellite internet providers routing traffic through foreign jurisdictions
- National security considerations of critical infrastructure (emergency services, healthcare, education, business operations) depending on single foreign-owned connectivity provider

2. Any unclassified guidance, standards, or recommendations provided to government agencies regarding:
- Appropriate use cases for satellite internet versus terrestrial connectivity for handling sensitive information
- Security requirements for connectivity used by government agencies or critical infrastructure operators
- Risk mitigation measures when using foreign-controlled communications infrastructure
- Whether satellite internet services meet Government security requirements for official purposes

3. Any assessment (at unclassified level) of scenarios where:
- Foreign government threatens to, or directs satellite provider to limit, terminate, or monitor New Zealand communications
- Satellite provider experiences technical failure, service withdrawal, or degradation affecting New Zealand essential services
- Entire communities or regions lose connectivity simultaneously due to single-provider dependency
- Geopolitical tensions affect availability or integrity of satellite communications services

4. Any correspondence with other government agencies or Ministers regarding:
- Security implications of policy decisions that increase dependency on foreign-controlled satellite communications
- Whether security considerations have been incorporated into rural connectivity policy or funding decisions
- Concerns about infrastructure resilience when terrestrial alternatives are eliminated
- Whether GCSB security assessments or recommendations have informed telecommunications policy development

5. Any coordination with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding:
- Security posture or threat assessments of commercial satellite communications providers
- Recommendations for security standards or usage restrictions for satellite services
- Intelligence sharing implications when allied nations' communications route through foreign-controlled satellite networks

I understand much information will be classified and appropriately withheld under s6 or s7 of the OIA. However, I request any unclassified assessments, general security guidance, or high-level threat characterisations that inform government policy on satellite communications, as this serves clear public interest in understanding whether security considerations are incorporated in connectivity policy decisions.

Context: New Zealand's rural areas increasingly depend on foreign-owned satellite communications as terrestrial infrastructure is withdrawn. In some communities, essential services including healthcare, education, emergency response, and cellular towers depend on a single foreign satellite provider with no backup options. I am seeking to understand whether security implications have been assessed at technical level and whether those assessments inform policy decisions at political level.

Yours faithfully,

Sam Brown