Critical communications resilience and emergency service dependencies
Sam Brown made this Official Information request to National Emergency Management Agency
Currently waiting for a response from National Emergency Management Agency, they must respond promptly and normally no later than (details and exceptions).
From: Sam Brown
Dear National Emergency Management Agency,
Under the Official Information Act 1982, I request information regarding emergency communications infrastructure and resilience planning:
1. Current emergency communications plans and protocols, including what percentage of critical communications capacity relies on satellite systems, and specifically, what proportion depends on foreign-controlled commercial satellite providers.
2. Any risk assessments, contingency plans, or advice regarding service continuity scenarios where satellite communications providers become unavailable, whether due to technical failure, withdrawal of service, foreign government direction to the provider, or geopolitical disruption.
3. Backup communications arrangements and redundancy planning for scenarios where primary satellite services are degraded or unavailable, including assessment of whether terrestrial alternatives provide adequate coverage for emergency response.
4. Any advice or analysis on the resilience implications of geographic concentration in critical communications infrastructure, or conversely the benefits of maintaining diverse technology platforms and multiple service providers.
5. Any review or assessment conducted following recent civil defence emergencies (such as Cyclone Gabrielle) regarding the performance and reliability of different communications technologies during extreme weather events or natural disasters.
6. Correspondence with telecommunications providers regarding service level expectations, prioritisation arrangements, or mandatory service continuation requirements during declared emergencies.
Context: I am seeking to understand whether emergency management planning adequately addresses resilience risks associated with critical infrastructure dependency on single providers or technology types, particularly foreign-controlled services.
Yours faithfully,
Sam Brown
From: Information
National Emergency Management Agency
Kia ora,
Our office is currently closed for the Christmas/New Year period this
inbox is not being monitored. We will be back on Thursday January 8th
2026.
Please note, 25 December 2025 to 15 January 2026 are not considered
working days for the Official Information Act.
Have a good break,
NEMA
From: Information
National Emergency Management Agency
Kia ora Sam
Thank you for your OIA request received on 5 January 2026 for:
Under the Official Information Act 1982, I request information regarding
emergency communications infrastructure and resilience planning:
1. Current emergency communications plans and protocols, including what
percentage of critical communications capacity relies on satellite
systems, and specifically, what proportion depends on foreign-controlled
commercial satellite providers.
2. Any risk assessments, contingency plans, or advice regarding service
continuity scenarios where satellite communications providers become
unavailable, whether due to technical failure, withdrawal of service,
foreign government direction to the provider, or geopolitical disruption.
3. Backup communications arrangements and redundancy planning for
scenarios where primary satellite services are degraded or unavailable,
including assessment of whether terrestrial alternatives provide adequate
coverage for emergency response.
4. Any advice or analysis on the resilience implications of geographic
concentration in critical communications infrastructure, or conversely the
benefits of maintaining diverse technology platforms and multiple service
providers.
5. Any review or assessment conducted following recent civil defence
emergencies (such as Cyclone Gabrielle) regarding the performance and
reliability of different communications technologies during extreme
weather events or natural disasters.
6. Correspondence with telecommunications providers regarding service
level expectations, prioritisation arrangements, or mandatory service
continuation requirements during declared emergencies.
This email confirms receipt of your request and advises that we will
respond to it as soon as reasonably practicable, and in terms of the
timeframes and requirements of the OIA. Please note that the OIA timeframe
might be impacted due to the holiday period between 25 December 2025 to
15 January 2026.
Please note that our response letter to you (with your personal details
redacted), and any enclosed documents, may be published on NEMA’s website.
Ngâ mihi
Emergency Management team
National Emergency Management Agency Te Rakau Whakamarumaru
[1]www.civildefence.govt.nz
Level 6, 23 Kate Sheppard Place | PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140, New
Zealand
Emergencies can happen anytime, anywhere. You can take steps to be
prepared.
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From: Information
National Emergency Management Agency
Tçnâ koe Sam Brown,
I refer to your request received 5 January 2026, as well as your request
transferred to NEMA on 30 January 2026 from the Prime Minister.
Your requests, as currently framed, may be at risk of being refused due to
the substantial collation and research that would be required to provide a
response. To avoid this, we propose refining your requests to be for:
* An overview of NEMA’s general approach to emergency communications
planning, including the key principles that guide how communication
systems are supported before, during, and after emergencies.
* A high‑level explanation of how resilience is built into
communications planning, including the role of redundancy, using a mix
of technologies, and ensuring alternative options exist if primary
systems are disrupted.
* Summary‑level insights from recent emergency events, focusing on
publicly available or already‑released lessons about how different
communication methods performed and what improvements have been
identified.
* A description of how NEMA works with telecommunications providers at a
general planning level, including the nature of ongoing engagement and
coordination during readiness and response.
* A high‑level description of any operational emergency‑management
advice NEMA has contributed regarding communications resilience, where
this is part of its standard functions.
* An outline of NEMA’s role in the broader emergency communications
system, clarifying what aspects of resilience planning NEMA is
responsible for and how this sits alongside other agencies’ national
security responsibilities.
* Information on how NEMA considers communications resilience in
general, including the importance of diverse systems and maintaining
continuity during disruptions.
Please confirm if you would like to proceed with this refinement by 10
February 2026. If we do not hear from you, we will proceed with your
original requests for information.
Ngâ mihi
Emergency Management team
National Emergency Management Agency Te Rakau Whakamarumaru
[1]www.civildefence.govt.nz
Level 6, 23 Kate Sheppard Place | PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140, New
Zealand
Emergencies can happen anytime, anywhere. You can take steps to be
prepared.
_____________________________________________
From: Information <[NEMA request email]>
Sent: 09 January 2026 10:55
To: Sam Brown <[FYI request #33428 email]>
Subject: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: Official Information request - Critical
communications resilience and emergency service dependencies
Kia ora Sam
Thank you for your OIA request received on 5 January 2026 for:
Under the Official Information Act 1982, I request information regarding
emergency communications infrastructure and resilience planning:
1. Current emergency communications plans and protocols, including what
percentage of critical communications capacity relies on satellite
systems, and specifically, what proportion depends on foreign-controlled
commercial satellite providers.
2. Any risk assessments, contingency plans, or advice regarding service
continuity scenarios where satellite communications providers become
unavailable, whether due to technical failure, withdrawal of service,
foreign government direction to the provider, or geopolitical disruption.
3. Backup communications arrangements and redundancy planning for
scenarios where primary satellite services are degraded or unavailable,
including assessment of whether terrestrial alternatives provide adequate
coverage for emergency response.
4. Any advice or analysis on the resilience implications of geographic
concentration in critical communications infrastructure, or conversely the
benefits of maintaining diverse technology platforms and multiple service
providers.
5. Any review or assessment conducted following recent civil defence
emergencies (such as Cyclone Gabrielle) regarding the performance and
reliability of different communications technologies during extreme
weather events or natural disasters.
6. Correspondence with telecommunications providers regarding service
level expectations, prioritisation arrangements, or mandatory service
continuation requirements during declared emergencies.
This email confirms receipt of your request and advises that we will
respond to it as soon as reasonably practicable, and in terms of the
timeframes and requirements of the OIA. Please note that the OIA timeframe
might be impacted due to the holiday period between 25 December 2025 to
15 January 2026.
Please note that our response letter to you (with your personal details
redacted), and any enclosed documents, may be published on NEMA’s website.
Ngâ mihi
Emergency Management team
National Emergency Management Agency Te Rakau Whakamarumaru
[2]www.civildefence.govt.nz
Level 6, 23 Kate Sheppard Place | PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140, New
Zealand
Emergencies can happen anytime, anywhere. You can take steps to be
prepared.
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From: Sam Brown
Dear NEMA,
Thank you for the clarification request. I appreciate the scope concerns and am willing to refine my request to focus on the most critical public-interest elements.
I propose the following refined scope:
1. Cyclone Gabrielle Communications Review (public interest priority)
Any assessment, review, lessons learned, or debrief documents regarding communications technology performance during Cyclone Gabrielle, specifically:
- Which communication systems failed or degraded
- Which systems proved most resilient
- Any identified gaps in communications redundancy
- Recommendations for improving resilience
2. Satellite Provider Dependency Risk Assessment
Any documented risk assessments, briefings, or advice regarding:
- Operational resilience if satellite communications providers become unavailable
- Dependency on foreign-controlled commercial satellite services for emergency communications
- Service continuity planning if primary satellite providers withdraw service
3. Current Emergency Communications Architecture
I accept your proposed "overview of general approach" for current planning, but request it include:
- What proportion of critical emergency communications relies on satellite vs. terrestrial infrastructure
- Whether redundancy planning assumes the availability of multiple technology platforms
4. Telecommunications Provider Engagement (narrowed scope)
Any substantive correspondence or agreements with Starlink/SpaceX or other LEOSat providers regarding:
- Service level expectations during emergencies
- Prioritisation arrangements for emergency services
- Service continuation commitments during disruptions
Exclusions to reduce scope:
- No routine administrative emails or meeting scheduling
- Timeframe limited to 1 January 2022 - present (4 years)
- Exclude information already proactively released (provide links instead)
- Accept redaction of operationally sensitive details (under s6/s7) provided the gist of risk assessments is preserved
Why this matters:
Cyclone Gabrielle killed 11 people and caused $13.5 billion in damage. Communications failures hampered rescue efforts. The public has a legitimate interest in understanding whether NEMA has assessed the resilience risks of critical infrastructure dependency on specific providers or technology types, particularly foreign-controlled services.
This refined scope focuses on documented assessments and major emergency reviews - not broad collation across all planning activities. If even this scope is unmanageable, please advise which elements could be provided within statutory timeframes, and we can prioritise accordingly.
Ngā mihi,
Sam Brown
From: Information
National Emergency Management Agency
Tēnā koe Sam Brown,
Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) request received on 5 January 2026, subsequently refined on 9 February 2025. You requested:
1. Cyclone Gabrielle Communications Review (public interest priority) Any assessment, review, lessons learned, or debrief documents regarding communications technology performance during Cyclone Gabrielle, specifically:
- Which communication systems failed or degraded
- Which systems proved most resilient
- Any identified gaps in communications redundancy
- Recommendations for improving resilience
2. Satellite Provider Dependency Risk Assessment Any documented risk assessments, briefings, or advice regarding:
- Operational resilience if satellite communications providers become unavailable
- Dependency on foreign-controlled commercial satellite services for emergency communications
- Service continuity planning if primary satellite providers withdraw service
3. Current Emergency Communications Architecture I accept your proposed "overview of general approach" for current planning, but request it include:
- What proportion of critical emergency communications relies on satellite vs. terrestrial infrastructure
- Whether redundancy planning assumes the availability of multiple technology platforms
4. Telecommunications Provider Engagement (narrowed scope) Any substantive correspondence or agreements with Starlink/SpaceX or other LEOSat providers regarding:
- Service level expectations during emergencies
- Prioritisation arrangements for emergency services
- Service continuation commitments during disruptions
Exclusions to reduce scope:
- No routine administrative emails or meeting scheduling
- Timeframe limited to 1 January 2022 - present (4 years)
- Exclude information already proactively released (provide links instead)
- Accept redaction of operationally sensitive details (under s6/s7) provided the gist of risk assessments is preserved
We are extending your timeframe for responding to your request by 15 days to 6 March 2026. This is because your request involves a search through a large quantity of information, and because the consultations necessary to make a decision on your request cannot be made within the original time limit (section 14 of the OIA refers).
You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman of this decision. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.
Yours sincerely
Emergency Management team
National Emergency Management Agency Te Rakau Whakamarumaru
www.civildefence.govt.nz
Level 6, 23 Kate Sheppard Place | PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140, New Zealand
Emergencies can happen anytime, anywhere. You can take steps to be prepared.
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Things to do with this request
- Add an annotation (to help the requester or others)
- Download a zip file of all correspondence (note: this contains the same information already available above).

