30 January 2026
Sam Brown
[FYI request #33424 email]
Ref: PMO OIA 655-2025-26
Dear Sam,
Official Information Act request: Foreign-controlled satellite communications
Thank you for your request made under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), received
by this office on 12 January 2026. You requested:
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided to Ministers or
senior officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's increasing
reliance on foreign-controlled satellite communications systems (specifical y
Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk) for critical infrastructure, emergency services,
or government communications.
2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet providers
routing New Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions, including whether this
creates signals intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's Five Eyes
obligations.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding security
assessments of commercial satellite communications providers, or discussions about
standardising security requirements for satellite services used by government agencies
or critical infrastructure operators.
4. Any advice provided to Ministers on whether New Zealand has contractual
guarantees, kil -switch provisions, or service continuity assurances from satellite
communications providers during international conflicts, political disputes, or scenarios
where the provider's owner is directed by a foreign government to limit or terminate
services.
5. Any assessment of whether a single individual having operational control over critical
communications infrastructure used by New Zealand emergency services, government
agencies, or essential services creates unacceptable national security or resilience
risks, particularly where that individual has demonstrated wil ingness to disable
services in geopolitical contexts (for example, limiting Starlink service during the
Ukraine conflict or declining to provide service to Taiwan).
6. Any advice on whether current Telecommunications Act settings and the
Government's rural connectivity funding programmes adequately address national
security considerations when allocating public funds to foreign-controlled satellite
providers versus New Zealand-based telecommunications operators.
This office does not hold the information requested, but I believe information relevant to your
request is held by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment (MBIE).
Accordingly, I have decided to transfer parts of your request to GCSB, NEMA and MBIE
under section 14(b)(i) of the Act, as listed below:
• GCSB – parts [1], [2] and [3]
• NEMA – parts [1] and [5]
• MBIE – part [6].
As it is already outside of the ten working day time limit for transferring a request, I have
extended the time-limit available to make this transfer under section 15(A) of the Act. This
extension is required because of the consultation needed to make a decision on your
request.
GCSB, NEMA and MBIE have the usual time limits under the Act from receipt of this transfer
to make a decision on your request.
We have not been able to identify any agencies that may hold information relevant to part [4]
of your request, therefore this part of your request is refused under section 18(g) of the Act,
as the information is not held by the Minister of the Crown and I have no grounds for
believing that the information is either held by another department or Minister of the Crown or
organisation.
Yours sincerely,
Cameron Burrows
Chief of Staff
