Dear New Zealand Transport Agency,

Observation of the partially constructed Pito-one to Melling Cycleway (P2M) and the related website indicate the existence of multiple serious design failures. If the observations have been correctly interpreted, the outcome of design decisions will not comply with the Austroad Guide to Road Design Part 6A, Paths for Walking and Cycling, adopted by NZTA. These design decisions will create hazards to cyclists who will be expected to suffer death or serious injuries over the life of the asset, measured in decades. Observations indicate the P2M cycle way is dangerous-by-design.

This is the first of a set of 3 requests for information that seek to understand:
1. What processes should have been followed to arrive at a safe design,
2. What was actually done that resulted in design failures
3. What will be done to rectify the design failures

Given that details of the P2M design have not been made available to the public via any known channel, the information available to assess the design is limited. Rather than simply making a request for information under the Official Information Act, some effort has been made to explain the observations and the perceived deficiencies. It is entirely possible that other hazards remain unidentified making the P2M cycleway even more dangerous-by-design.

IDENTIFIED DESIGN HAZARDS
The currently identified hazards created by the design are:

CHAIN LINK FENCING AKA THE CHEESE GRATER
The design decision to use chain-link fence is expected to act like a cheese greater against the human flesh of any cyclist that makes contact. If a cyclist instinctively reaches out to push themselves away from the fence to avoid contact, they can expect injuries to hands and fingers that become entangled in the chain links. If a cyclist’s handle bars hook-into the chain links, a cyclist will be thrown onto the ground into the path of any on-coming and following cyclists. If the top bar is wire-wrapped to attach the chain link a cyclist who brushes against the top bar of the fence can expect torn clothing or flesh. A crash involving the chain link fence is expected to cause death or serious injury.

ZIG-ZAG UNDERPASSES
The design decision of making ~30 degree tight radius corners at the entrances to underpasses has created a blind zig-zag where there should be a gentle S-curve. Cyclists will naturally cut the corner and swing wide into the path of any on-coming cyclists. Pedestrians will naturally cut the corner and walk directly into the path of on-coming cyclists. These design decisions have created an accident black spot where death or serious injuries are predictable and expected.

PATH LIGHTING
The installation of path lighting is a great safety feature, but the installation of a safety feature should not itself create a safety hazard. The design decision to locate the poles too close to the edge of the cycle path creates a crash hazard for cyclists. Any cyclist unfortunate enough to collide with a heavy steel lighting pole can expect death or serious injury.

EFFECTIVE WIDTH
The combination of lighting poles and chain link fencing will reduce the effective and usable width of the cycle path, increasing the risk of head-on collisions between cyclists. Dogs, baby pushchairs, and pedestrians in general will force cyclists to the edge of the cycle way. This reduction in effective width greatly increases the risk of deaths and serious injury to cyclists and to pedestrians.

EXISTING CONSTRAINTS
It is acknowledged that some parts of the P2M cycle way route are physically constrained in width. In such situations, I would expect the design to apply reasonably practicable mitigation to treat the hazards and minimise residual risk. Some are identified in Austroad Guidance. To date, I see no evidence of any such mitigations on site.

SAFE SYSTEMS ?

The Safe System audit guidelines July 2022 states that a Safe System audit is not:
• a substitute for a quality control review, a design review or a peer review
• a judgement of the quality of a project (as the project will likely have other components)
• a compliance check with standards, guidelines or drawings and specifications (a separate review is required for this purpose noting that compliance with standards or other documents does not necessarily result in a safe system)
• a redesign of a project. Engineering standards and guidelines provide a sound starting point from which a good design can evolve. However, their application alone does not necessarily result in a safe road environment.

Based on simple observations made from a passing train, it appears there have been multiple design failures leading to the construction of a cycle path that will be dangerous-by-design. This request seeks information on what documented processes, manuals and guidance should have been applied and followed during the design process to create a safe design for the P2M cycle way.

INFORMATION REQUESTED
Specifically this request for information seeks:
Internet links to, or electronic copies of documents that define the quality assurance and quality control processes that are intended to prevent design failures and should have been applied to the P2M project. These may include manuals, procedures and guidance that define a:
• quality control review, a design review or a peer review,
• judgement of the quality of a project
• compliance check with standards, guidelines or drawings and specifications
• redesign of a project
• safe system audit.

Yours faithfully,

Darren Conway

Dear Official Correspondence,
Thank you for your response 2 Dec 2022.

I cannot agree with or condone the decision to join the 3 requests into one response. The questions asked of the Pito-one to Melling Cycleway project in relation to the identified design failures, summarised as:
1. What processes should have been followed to arrive at a safe design,
2. What was actually done that resulted in design failures
3. What will be done to rectify the design failures

were scoped and carefully framed to be stand-alone. Any one of the questions could have been asked without the others. The information sought is what I would expect to see as part of a routine design review defined in documented processes. That the NZTA is unable to provide the information requested with little effort and without an extension of time is itself information to me.

Yours sincerely,

Darren Conway

Hello Mark Kinvig

My request for information included the identities of key staff working on the P2M project. The identities of NZTA employees were provided. In the NZTA response (ref OIA-11407 dated 20 Jan 2023), the names of key contractors were withheld by you under section 9(2)(a).

You stated: “… I am withholding the identities of external contractors under section 9(2)(a) of the Act in order to protect the privacy of natural persons, including that of deceased natural persons. I do not consider there are any other factors which would render it desirable, in the public interest, to make this information available.”

I have read the OIA and the Ombudsman Guidance and it is clear to me that s 9(2)a is not applicable and does not justify withholding the identities of external contractors.

Neither the Act or Guidance define or refer to “external contractors” and so your response should read: . “… I am withholding the identities of contractors under section 9(2)(a) ..."

The Ombudsman "Guide: Names and contact details of public sector employees" includes the advice:
“The Ombudsman’s general position is that there is usually no basis for
withholding staff names if all that would be revealed is what they did
in their official capacity—‘New Zealand does not have a tradition of
an anonymous public service’ .”

And

“While this guide refers to ‘public sector employees’, meaning
employees of Ministers and agencies subject to the OIA or LGOIMA, it
is also relevant to public sector contractors who are individuals.”

The Act does not differentiate between different types of contract. I am seeking the names of key decision makers. It appears some are public sector contractors and identifiable individuals.

You also stated: “Waka Kotahi understands that there is a strong public interest in making this information publically available and has therefore decided to publish the design documents on its website” This single statement confirms passing the public interest test for the disclosure of the identities of all the key decision makers.

I await delivery of the outstanding information requested.

Yours sincerely,

Darren Conway