Attention: Darren Edwards (Chief Executive), Sean Mallon (Group Manager), Steve Cody (Acting Consenting Manager)

Dear Darren, Sean and Steve,

Thank you for your letter dated 21 April 2026.

I am writing to formally challenge the Council’s dismissal of my concerns regarding fire safety, water infrastructure, and the lack of secondary containment for toxic run-off at the newly developed Commercial Vehicle Safety Centre (CVSC) near Mackay’s Crossing, Paekākāriki. I also challenge the Council's assertion that environmental discharge and toxic run-off are solely the responsibility of the Greater Wellington Regional Council under the Resource Management Act.

Please consider this as a Formal Notice of Deficiencies and Statutory Non-Compliance at the Commercial Vehicle Safety Centre, currently being constructed near Mackay’s Crossing on State Highway 59, Paekākāriki.

I am placing Kapiti Coast District Council on notice that based on technical data and site observations, detailed within this document, the current as-built state of this facility fails to meet the mandatory C/AS2 "Acceptable Solution" pathway requirements for safe operation.

This formal complainant is based on technical evidence confirming that the facility, as consented and constructed, is fundamentally unsafe and fails to meet mandatory performance criteria under the Building Act 2004 and the C/AS2 “Acceptable Solution” pathway. Specifically, the site lacks a functional fire fighting water supply, which, according to the analysis, will enter a vacuum state under high fire load water requirements, such as a hazardous materials fire.

Additionally, as required when using the C/AS2 “Acceptable Solution” pathway, what is consented fails to provide necessary secondary containment for the high-risk hazardous materials that this facility is intended to process.

By misclassifying the facility's “Risk Group” and ignoring mandatory regulatory requirements, ironically, the Council has permitted the development and operation of an unsafe commercial vehicle safety centre, that presents an unacceptable and foreseeable risk to the local aquifer, public safety, and the environment.

This letter also contains a formal request for documentation under the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act (LGOIMA) to address these systemic failures. I will be tabling this through www.fyi.org for transparency.

The CVSC C/AS2 Consent Pathway inconsistencies.
I acknowledge that the development utilises the C/AS2 Second Edition pathway to establish an acceptable solution for fire safety. However, this choice remains perplexing given that the Kapiti Coast District Council’s own Land Development Minimum Requirements explicitly cite the New Zealand Standard PAS 4509:2008 as the primary basis for consent to develop land in the District. By choosing the C/AS2 Pathway, the new development has circumvented the requirements of New Zealand Standard PAS 4509:2008 and the substantial infrastructure costs that likely would have been mandated to comply under the PAS 4509:2008 Standard.

Non-functional infrastructure.
One of the primary objectives of the C/AS2 “Acceptable Solutions” Pathway is to facilitate firefighting and rescue operationsE1. The C/AS2 “Acceptable Solutions” Pathway must meet the NZS 4510:2022 StandardsE2.

The fire fighting water supply infrastructure that has been put in place will never meet the required NZS 4510:2022 Standard as the source water pressure is below the required 850kPaE3.

It is underspecified, and as a result, effectively a non-functional firefighting resource, offering no meaningful protection if a hazardous materials fire was to occur at the new development.

I consulted with Chris at the Kapiti Coast District Council to establish the maximum source pressure for the newly installed water main, which he confirmed as 550 kPa, based on the 55 meter reservoir elevation. Applying friction coefficient data from the Marley manual for the 180mm (144.5mm ID) PE100 series polyethylene pipe over the 880 meter distance to the development’s nearest [new] hydrant, I calculated the cumulative friction losses at flow rates necessary for a high fire load hazardous materials incident. By incorporating the pressure drops associated with an inline backflow valve and approximately 73 fusion-welded butt joints, effectively rendering the hydrants non-functional for there intended purpose.

The single hydrant, located 175 meters from the inspection shed entrance is connected to a main that enters a vacuum state well before it can deliver the volumes required to manage a high fire load hazardous materials incident.

At a flow rate of 1,970L/min, the calculated realistic friction and restriction losses total 196kPa, leaving a residual pressure of only 354kPa, which is non-functional for structural firefightingE3.

At the 3,000L/min flow rate, the friction loss reaches 427kPa, resulting in a residual pressure of 123kPa, which is also non-functional for structural firefightingE3.

At a 3,436L/min flow rate the water main enters a vacuum and becomes a liability.

A single fire appliance running two Blitzfire water monitors and a single Low Pressure Delivery exceeds this flow rate. During a high fire load incident, like a hazardous materials truck fire, it’s likely there would be at least four fire pump appliances all requiring fire fighting water.

As already mentioned, this water main is not a means to deliver water for structural fire fighting. What is in place does not provide a means to deliver water for firefighting to all parts of the building, it impedes firefighters ability to effectively fight a hazardous materials fire within the building, or anywhere on the hardstand, and will undoubtedly delay fire fighters response times.

The operational reality for first responders is that the provided hydrant infrastructure fails to maintain the positive pressure necessary for the effective delivery of water required for structural fire fighting. As a result, the installation fails to meet Building Code Performance Clause C5.5E4 and meet the required NZS 4510:2022 Standard as the source water pressure is below [the unsprinklered building required] 850kPaE3.

The Building Code Performance Clause C5.5 mandates that the building be provided with a functional “means to deliver water for firefighting.”E4 A hydrant system that drops into a vacuum state under the flow requirements of a high fire load hazardous materials incident, such as a truck fire within the Inspection Shed, does not satisfy this performance requirement; it acts as a mechanical impediment to effective fire suppression and creates an unacceptable safety risk to personnel.

C/AS2 Pathway and Secondary Containment.
The Council has consented to a development that endangers the local aquifer by providing a direct pathway for toxic run-off, approving the use of Wisconsin SwalesP1 and uncontrolled soak pitsP2 that discharge directly to ground.

I acknowledge the Council’s assertion that the management and consent of the environmental run-off is the responsibility of the Greater Wellington Regional Council under the Resource Management Act; however, the requirement for secondary containment is a mandatory consideration for the Consenting Authority as part of the C/AS2 Consent PathwayE5. Because the Council acted as the issuing authority for this C/AS2 Consent Pathway, it holds the statutory responsibility to ensure that all associated regulatory requirements are met, including the mandatory secondary containment systems as dictated by the Health and Safety at Work (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2017E6.

Correct classification of Intended Use and Risk Group.
The Council was obligated to consider the intended use of this facility as provided by the Developer, in this instance NZTA, under Section 14D of the Building Act 2004E7. By approving the C/AS2 Consent Pathway, the Council invoked mandatory requirements that it has subsequently ignored.

The Scope and Limitations section of C/AS2 Second Edition explicitly states that compliance with the Health and Safety at Work (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2017 is required in addition to the requirements of the acceptable solutionE5.

These requirements, given hazardous substances, specifically Class 3 and Class 8 will be present, or are reasonably likely to be present, at the development at any time, necessitates a secondary containment systemE6 that is capable of retaining 110% volume of a worst case scenario.

A 3YE petrol tank typically carries 35,000 litres of petrol, this is classified as a Class 3 Hazardous Material, and is the type of vehicle that will undoubtedly be present at the Commercial Vehicle Safety Centre. Based only on this example, 110% of the tanker volume would require 38,500 litres of impermeable secondary containment.

Arguably, this is a low containment volume, as it does not account for any fire fighting measures applied to contain an incident, which ultimately combines with the hazardous materials and impacts the total volume of toxic run-off.

By classifying this facility as a simple Working Business (WB) Risk Group, the Council has authorized a design that fails to address the site's actual use, which includes but is not limited to, the inspection of heavy vehicles carrying Class 3 and Class 8 Hazardous Materials.

I believe this incorrect classification facilitated the avoidance of necessary expenditure for a compliant fire fighting water supply and resources, and, the subsequent mandatory secondary containment system. Had the site been correctly categorized according to its actual risk group, a significantly more robust “Acceptable Solution” would have been required, and, would have included on-site hydrants, large quantities of stored tank water and a secondary containment system.

Using Appendix D of the NZS 4510:2022E8, as required to be met by the C/AS2 PathwayE2, the Inspection Shed would be considered a “High Fire Hazard Risk”, as a workshop and its supported activities are considered a “High Fire Risk Hazard”.

Failure of statutory obligations and financial exposure to Ratepayers.
The approval of this development, which lacks adequate provision for hazardous material fire suppression and mandatory secondary containment measures, constitutes a failure to uphold the Council's statutory obligations under the Building Act 2004. By failing to account for the site’s intended use as a “High Risk” facility where hazardous materials will be present, the Council has created a foreseeable environmental and fiscal risk to the District.

The potential for catastrophic contamination of the local aquifer and the subsequent financial burden on Ratepayers for remediation is a direct result of the Council's failure to enforce mandatory safety and environmental standards as part of the consenting process. The mitigation of these risks is a mandatory requirement under the Council’s regulatory functions.

Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act requests.
Under the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act, I request the following evidence:

1. The Council’s hydraulic modelling report proving the 180mm (ID144.5mm) water main can deliver fire fighting water at a positive pressure exceeding minimum NZS4510:2022 residual requirements at 880 meters from the 550kPa source.

2. Evidence of the hazardous substances risk assessment performed by the Council to justify the current building classification and fire safety design.

3. All communication between the Council and Waka Kotahi (NZTA) regarding the decision to pursue the C/AS2 pathway instead of the SNZ PAS 4509:2008 standard, as called out as the primary method in the Councils own Land Development Minimum Requirements.

4. All communication between the Kapiti Coast District Council and Greater Wellington Regional Council regarding hazardous materials at the site and requirements for secondary containment as part of the C/AS2 Consent Pathway.

5. All communication regarding compliance with the Resource Management Act relating to the management of discharge, run-off and/or hazardous materials into the environment at the new development.

6. All documentation relating to the commissioning and final verification of the fire hydrant servicing the Commercial Vehicle Safety Centre, situated near the entrance to the development on SH59.

More specifically:

6a. The Hydrant Acceptance Test Report(s), including the empirical flow test data (L/min) and residual pressure results (kPa) recorded at the time of commissioning.

6b. Documentation verifying that these flow tests were conducted in accordance with NZS4510:2022 and confirmed that the system meets the performance requirements required for the site's Intended Use.

6c. If no such commissioning flow-test report exists, I request a formal explanation as to how the Council satisfied its obligations under Section 94 of the Building Act 2004 to confirm that the fire fighting infrastructure complied with the building consent prior to approval.

Under Section 94 of the Building Act 2004, a Building Consent Authority must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that building work complies with the consent. Given these quantified failures, the Council cannot legally be satisfied that this project meets all the required Standards.

Withholding a Code of Compliance.
Once again, I therefore remind the Kapiti Coast District Council that a Code of Compliance Certificate must be withheld until the fire fighting water supply is upgraded to meet flow requirements as dictated by NZS 4510:2022, enabling appropriate fire fighting water to all parts of the building, and until an appropriate (certified) environmental (secondary) containment system has been constructed, as would have been required to satisfy the C/AS2 Consent Pathway.

Conclusion.
If the above requested documentation does not exist, then the Council has issued a consent based on a fundamental misapplication of The Law. Subsequently, if the above [documentation] does not exist; I will be escalating this matter to the Ombudsman, which will bring the development and the consenting process under further external scrutiny.

As it stands, there appears to be systemic failures in the Consenting process. The method of Consent is inconsistent with the Kapiti Coast District Council’s own Land Development Minimum Requirements and the mandatory provisions required as part of the C/AS2 Consent Pathway. Additionally it does not meet the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2017 for secondary containment, or does it meet the New Zealand Standard NZS4510:2022 for functional fire fighting waters supply.

This development poses an unacceptable risk to the environment, the local aquifer, and the safety of both fire fighting personnel and the wider Paekākāriki community. Collectively, these inconsistencies, oversights and multiple non-compliances constitute a significant failure to uphold the Council's statutory obligations as the Consenting Authority.

I look forward to your prompt response.

Regards,

Dave Mills
Paekākāriki Resident and Volunteer Firefighter