2026-01-09 Brown OIA
PO Box 12209, Wel ington 6144
P +64 4 472 6881,
F +64 4 499 3701
www.gcsb.govt.nz
31 March 2026
Sam Brown
[FYI request #33424 email]
Tēnā koe Sam
Official Information Act request
I refer to your OIA request to the Prime Minister’s office received on 12 January 2026,
seeking information about national security assessment of satel ite communications
infrastructure dependencies.
Questions 1, 2 and 3 of your request were transferred to the GCSB for reply on 30 January
2026. I apologise for our response not meeting the statutory deadline due to reduced
capacity while we recruit to fil vacancies in our official correspondence team.
Response
I would like to provide some context about the role of the GCSB when providing national
security risk assessments and advice to policy and decision makers.
Under Part 3 of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013, the
GCSB undertakes national security risk assessments to provide advice to decision makers to
keep New Zealand’s public telecommunications network secure. Any network operator
providing telecommunications services in New Zealand, when they meet the prescribed
thresholds, must engage with the GCSB for this purpose.
Similarly, the GCSB provides national security advice to decision makers in relation to issuing
licences for satel ite ground stations under the Radiocommunications Act 1989.
My responses to your questions are as fol ows.
1. Any risk assessments, threat analyses, briefings, or advice provided to Ministers or senior
officials regarding national security implications of New Zealand's increasing reliance on foreign-
controlled satellite communications systems (specifically Starlink/SpaceX operated by Elon Musk)
for critical infrastructure, emergency services, or government communications. GCSB holds no information in scope of this question. Your request is therefore refused
under s18(e) of the OIA, as the information does not exist.
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2. Any analysis of data sovereignty concerns related to satellite internet providers routing New
Zealand internet traffic through foreign jurisdictions, including whether this creates signals
intelligence vulnerabilities or compromises New Zealand's Five Eyes obligations.
GCSB holds no information in scope of this question. Your request is therefore refused
under s18(e) of the OIA, as the information does not exist. I note Statistics New Zealand is
the lead agency on data sovereignty.
3. Any correspondence with Five Eyes intelligence partners regarding security assessments of
commercial satellite communications providers, or discussions about standardising security
requirements for satellite services used by government agencies or critical infrastructure
operators. A guidance publication titled
Securing Space – Cyber security for low earth orbit satellite
communications is publicly available here: https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/protect-your-
organisation/low-earth-orbit-satellite-communications/
The document was authored by the Australian Signals Directorate and co sealed by GCSB’s
National Cyber Security Centre and other international partners. It is relevant to both
Network Operators and Internet Service Providers.
Review
If you would like to discuss this response with us, please feel free to contact
[email address].
You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman of this decision.
Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz
or freephone 0800 802 602.
Ngā mihi
Andrew Clark Te Tumu Whakarae mō Te Tira Tiaki
Director-General, GCSB
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