20 March 2026
File Ref: 251174
Aidan Thornton
Via FYI
Dear Aidan
Thank you for your Official Information Act (Act) request received on 6 November 2025.
You requested:
•
Background
The Electricity (Safety) Amendment Regulations 2025 (ESAR25) were published 13
October 2025 and the amendments come into effect 13 November 2025.
Note: being an imminent public safety issue an accelerated processing time is
requested.
Issue: PEN Conductor Protections Removed
ESAR25 r12 amends Schedule 2 of the Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010 (ESR).
ESR Schedule 2 is amended to cite AS/NZS 3000:2018 (…Wiring Rules) subject
multiple modifications. The issue raised here is the deletion of clauses 2.3.2.1.2 (b) &
(c) from the Wiring Rules.
AS/NZS 3000:2018 clauses 2.3.2.1.2 (b) & (c) provide the only prohibitions
preventing the extremely unsafe action that is the installation of switches, fuses or
circuit breakers within an installation’s Protective Earth Neutral (PEN) conductor.
In the Multiple-Earthed Neutral system used by New Zealand, the neutral conductor
of consumer mains is a PEN conductor.
Important note: the presence of fuses or independent switches/breakers in a PEN
conductor can render the installation lethal under normal operating conditions (even
with no faults present).
•
Question 1:
Please provide details of the management of change (or equivalent) procedure
associated with this regulatory change (allowing a fuse, independent circuit
breaker or switch within the PEN conductor), including requirements for:
• initiation of the process
• requirements analysis (ie justification for the proposed change)
• consultation with industry, the public, and other government entities
• due diligence
• review (internal, peer, and expert)
• detailed technical analysis
• risk/reward and benefit-to-cost-ratio analysis
• required signoffs or gating
• other necessary steps
•
Question 2:
Please provide all documentation associated with this regulatory change,
including but not limited to the above items.
PO Box 165, Wellington 6140
Question 3:
During due diligence prior to the release of ESAR25, what overseas jurisdictions were
identified that allow the installation of fuses, switches, disconnects, and/or circuit
breakers within Consumer Mains Neutral, Protective Earth Neutral, or Protective
Earth conductors of equivalent or similar systems of supply?
On 11 December 2025, we extended the time limit for deciding on your request to 6
February 2025 and on 29 January we communicated that we had decided to grant your
request in part. Again, we apologise for the delay in communicating this decision.
WorkSafe response to Question 1:
In 2019, Government agreed to update references to standards cited in the Electricity
(Safety) Regulations (ESR). These standards are principally safety standards for
electrical equipment and installation practices. Primary drivers for this update were to
maintain currency with the evolving international standards and joint Australian/New
Zealand standards in line with our international commitments including trans-Tasman
recognition and, where possible, to address emerging safety issues. Public consultation
on updating those references took place in 2020.
One issue on which consultation sought feedback was which edition or editions of
AS/NZS 3000 should be cited in updated regulations. Feedback on this point favoured
citation of the 2018 edition and removal of citation of the 2007 edition.
Policy analysis on updating the references to standards took both the feedback from the
public consultation and how to ensure the safety of emerging technologies and practices
into consideration in order to provide detailed recommendations on the updated citation
of standards. As part of this analysis, it is normal practice for advisors, including
WorkSafe’s technical experts, to consider and advise on the way a standard is cited. This
is to ensure each standard meets the purpose for which it is cited in regulations and to
reflect any changes within a standard, the way the standard is used, or to accommodate
changes in technology or practices.
The recommendations came about during this process subsequent to the public
consultation. They arose from consideration of feedback and how best to update the
citation of AS/NZS 3000, and ongoing discussions amongst technical experts about
better providing for electrical safety to address outstanding issues. Specifically, neither
AS/NZS 3000:2007 nor AS/NZS 3000:2018 deal effectively or comprehensively with
providing for electrical safety in circumstances where there are acknowledged
weaknesses with the New Zealand MEN system, including those associated with:
• supply faults occurring during the charging and discharging of electric vehicles; and
• the resilience of the electricity supply of an installation in the face of a natural
disaster.
In the “EV” scenario, interruption of the protective earthing or the neutral (PEN)
conductor of an electrical installation is a foreseeable failure mode for MEN systems. It
has the potential to cause the metal bodywork of a connected EV to become enlivened.
Removal of the restriction stated clause 2.3.2.1.2 (b) and (c) allows for the introduction
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of techniques which better provide for the safety of EV charging under foreseeable fault
conditions.
In a “resilience” scenario, where an installation has the ability to generate electricity
independently from the grid, removal of this restriction enables solutions in which the
installation can be configured to operate safely if supply from the grid is lost without
putting the grid, including conductors of the grid, and other users, at risk from the grid
being re-enlivened inadvertently. The need to better provide for resilience of electrical
installations received added emphasis following cyclone Gabrielle in 2023, after which
WorkSafe issued guidance on how an electrical installation could be reconfigured for
independent operation on a temporary basis.
Noting that there are more general provisions for safety, removing the application of the
prescriptive clauses 2.3.2.1.2 (b) and (c) was proposed as an achievable preparatory
step to better provide for safety in these scenarios. The recommendation anticipated
that rules or guidance, setting out when and how ‘switching’ of these conductors would
be permitted to better provide for safety in specific scenarios, will be promulgated.
It has never been intended to permit ‘switching’ of these conductors without introducing
substitute controls to provide for safety.
In any case, removing the application of clauses 2.3.2.1.2 (b) and (c) did not remove all
controls which restrict switching those conductors, nor did it require that switching be
installed in any or all circumstances.
In developing the recommendations, WorkSafe technical experts carefully considered the
relevant scenarios and both the likelihood and consequence of the proposed changes,
given the characteristics of New Zealand’s electricity supply system which relies on
multiple earthing of the neutral conductor (MEN earthing). The scenario and risk analysis
considered and compared realistic failure modes and their likelihood and consequences.
This took the history of events which led to significant consequences into account.
Given the recommendation was proposed as a preparatory step, with the intention that
the restriction would be replaced by specific guidance relevant to each scenario, a formal
documented risk analysis or cost-benefit analysis was not necessary for this specific
change which merely removed a partial control. The anticipated guidance included
identification of scenarios in which ‘switching’ of either the main earth or PEN conductor
would be allowed and where it would not be allowed.
Each item was also considered for consistency with the policy mandate for the project
which was based around updating references to cited standards to be satisfied that it
was:
• consistent with overall goal of improving safety, and specifically safety of EV
charging and Government goals of improving EV charging infrastructure;
• not inconsistent with the policy mandate;
• necessary to address or prepare to address an identified risk that was not
adequately addressed; and
• did not create additional risk.
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WorkSafe response to question 2:
WorkSafe interprets this as relating to documents which make substantive reference to
or directly discuss making the recommendation related to clause 2.3.2.1.2, which was
accepted by Cabinet in October 2024.
Given the nature of the recommended change, there is little detailed documentation of
the recommendation and how it was formulated.
This was appropriate given the recommendation was made as a preparatory step, with
the intention that the restriction would be replaced by specific guidance relevant to each
scenario, and it was not intended to permit ‘switching’ of these conductors without
introducing substitute controls to provide for safety.
In any case, documents related to drafting the amendments are subject to legal
privilege. In any case, most of these documents do not make a substantive reference to
clause 2.3.2.1.2 or why the recommendation was made.
There are also documents in scope which are publicly available on the MBIE website
which need not be released.
There are also documents for release that are in scope for your request. Please refer to
the following table:
Requested Information
The following documents are publicly available:
electricity-safety-amendment-regulations-2025-and-gas-safety- Publicly available
and-measurement-amendment-regulations-2025-
on MBIE website
proactiverelease – dated 25 November 2025
updating-energy-safety-standards-citations-in-regulations-
Publicly available
minute-of-decision-proactiverelease – dated 26 March 2025
on MBIE website
The following documents are in scope of your request.
Item
Document Title
Decision
1. Email dated 23 June 2023 - RE_ Updates to citation of
standards in ESR and GSMR
Release in part
Extract from attachment - Copy of Copy of Copy of Release in part
2. Streamlined standards table for Cabinet paper CB
Comments to update to Dec 2022 new
Release in full
3. Email dated 27 February - Amendments to the regs 2024-
02-27
4. Extract from attachment - REgs review
Release in part
Release in part
5. Email dated 13 March 2024 - Scotts, Chris and my
comments combined - only harmonics to do
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Extract from attachment - Copy of Copy of Copy of Release in part
6. Standards tables from Energy Safety as at 7 March with LA
markup
Release in part
7. Email dated 14 March 2024 - FW_ Hopefully the last lot of
questions on the ESR schedules __
Release in part
8. Extract from attachment - Standards tables from Energy
Safety as at 7 March with LA markup
Further information about changes to standards included in Release in part
9. Energy Safety Standards Update - linked to email 2024-05-
25
I have decided to release the relevant parts of the documents listed above subject
to certain information being withheld under the following section of the Act, with
any information not relevant to your request removed and noted as “out of scope”:
9(2)(a) – to protect the privacy of natural persons
Information being withheld
The information below is covered by your request.
Item
Document Title
Decision
9. Email dated 25 September 2025 and attachments
9(2)(h)
10. Email dated – dated 13 August 2025 and attachments
9(2)(h)
11. Email dated – dated 16 September 2025 and attachments
9(2)(h)
12. Email dated 7 August 2025
9(2)(h)
13. Email dated 22 August 2025 and attachments
9(2)(h)
14. Email dated 22 September 2025
9(2)(h)
15. Email dated 4 September 2025
9(2)(h)
16. Email dated 20 May 2025
9(2)(h)
I have decided to withhold the documents listed above in full under one or more of the
following sections of the Act:
9(2)(h) – to maintain legal professional privilege
In making the decision to withhold information under section 9 of the Act it has been
considered that the public interest in release does not outweigh the reasons to withhold
it.
WorkSafe response to question 3:
The MEN or TN-C-S system is relatively uncommon globally, and different variants which
are not completely consistent with other variants are implemented. In each case, there
are variations in the balance in how aspects of those systems are assigned between the
network and consumer installations. The characteristics of networks and the range of
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installation types also influence how safety is achieved. Therefore, while it is useful to
consider other jurisdictions, each system should be considered unique.
WorkSafe experts routinely engage in informal technical discussions in standards
development fora as well as with local and international contacts. Discussions of this
nature are typically informal and involve shared concerns and insights regarding the
challenges of, and approaches to, achieving electrical safety as new applications arise
and technology evolves to address global challenges.
Guidance on providing for safety which relies on ‘switching’ the PEN or protective earth
conductor at consumer mains in a system which corresponds with the New Zealand
MEN system is therefore only relevant to similar systems which also seek to address
electrical safety in circumstances where there are acknowledged weaknesses with the
implementation of an MEN system.
In this case, at the time the United Kingdom was specifically identified as providing or
developing relevant guidance which includes ‘switching’ the PEN or protective earth
conductor to provide for safety.
This reply addresses the information you requested. You may ask the Ombudsman to
investigate and review this decision, and further information is available at
www.ombudsman.parliament.nz.
If you require further assistance, please contact
[email address].
Yours sincerely
Rob Pope
Head of Inspectorate
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