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TAS - Glenn Lewis, Ruth McArdle
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ACT - Bettina Konti
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NT - Kathleen Robinson, Maria Mohr
Discussion points
Discussing cross-cutting issues
COVID-19 contact tracing
• The New Zealand government commissioned a rapid audit on our contact tracing in
April 2020, with a follow-up to the report delivered in May. The report (by Dr Ayesha
Verrall) concluded contact tracing is central to eliminating COVID-19 in New Zealand.
The report also said that "rapid case detection and contact tracing, combined with
other measures has over 90% efficacy against COVID-19 at the population level,
making it as effective as many vaccines."
• This Wednesday, we released ‘a digital diary’ helping users when they are out and
about to keep a log of their movements. It's for individuals and businesses, sits on
their device, and it remains their data.
• This is designed to aid and support physical contact tracing efforts, not to replace
them.
• New Zealand is paying close attention to the uptake of COVIDsafe in Australia, and
whether or not it is meeting public expectations.
• We are also currently assessing the feasibility of using Bluetooth-enabled cards to
assist with manual contact tracing. A decision on whether to progress this option is
currently expected to be taken by Ministers in June 2020.
‘COVID-card’ details
9(2)(g)(i)
• The proposed COVID-cards would not collect the personal information of New
Zealanders. 9(2)(g)(i)
. Each card would only record the ID
numbers of other cards that it comes into close contact with. The key benefit would
be that an individual’s card would hold an accurate record of close contacts while not
relying on members of our population to be digitally-included.
• It is envisaged that use of the cards would be voluntary. Information about a
cardholder’s close contacts would be stored on the card, and Health officials could
only access this information with the consent of the cardholder. Health officials
would only request this data if a person tests positive for COIVID-19 and if the
information is specifically required for contact tracing. Information could not be
used for other purposes, e.g., law enforcement.
• We are still assessing these cards to ensure whether they would be effective and safe
to use if Ministers confirmed that they wanted to implement this approach.
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