IR-01-26 10805
12 June 2026
Lance D. Lavery
[FYI request #34246 email]
Dear Lance
Request for information
Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) request received on 25 March
2026, which sought information on six matters related to the Policing Amendment Bil .
Please find below a response to each part of your request.
Request 1: All Cabinet papers, policy advice, and ministerial briefings relating to
the Policing Amendment Bil (No. 268-1), including any analysis of alternatives to
legislation.
The information you have requested has been refused under section 18(d) of the
OIA, as the material is publicly available. The Cabinet papers minutes and relevant
advice have been proactively released and can be found here
https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/proposed-changes-policing-act-2008.
This includes policy related briefings, Cabinet papers and minutes, legislative
development material, and the Policing Amendment Bil itself.
Request 2. All correspondence between New Zealand Police and the Privacy
Commissioner regarding the decision in Tamiefuna v R [2025] NZSC 40 and the
proposed Policing Amendment Bil .
There has been no correspondence between Police and the Privacy Commissioner on
these matters. As such, this part of your request is refused under section 18(e) of the
OIA, as the information requested does not exist. However, Police has received
correspondence from the Deputy Privacy Commissioner on two occasions, that may be of
interest to you:
•
A feedback note from Liz MacPherson, Deputy Privacy Commissioner, received
on 23 January 2025, provided at
Attachment A.
• A letter from Liz MacPherson, Deputy Privacy Commissioner, received on 28 July
2025, provided at
Attachment B.
Request 3. Data on the number of photographs taken by Police for intel igence
purposes (not connected to a specific investigation) in the 12 months prior to, and the
12 months following, the judgment in Tamiefuna v R [2025] NZSC 40.
Request 6. Data on the use of temporary road closure powers under section 35 of the
Policing Act 2008 for each of the last five years, including: number of closures,
grounds relied on, duration, and any complaints or referrals to the Independent Police
Conduct Authority
Such specific information is not readily available and as such, these parts of your request
are refused under section 18(g) of the OIA, as the information requested is not held by
Police.
Request 4. Al internal policy documents, general instructions, or standard
operating procedures issued to Police employees regarding photography and
recording of members of the public following the judgment in Tamiefuna v R
[2025] NZSC 40.
This part of your request is refused under section 18(d) of the OIA, as the relevant
internal guidance is publicly available:
https://www.police.govt.nz/about-
us/publication/photographing-and-videoing-members-public-police-manual-chapter.
Request 5. Any risk assessments or human rights impact assessments prepared
in connection with the Policing Amendment Bil (No. 268-1).
Such assessments are detailed and summarised in relevant sections of the Police
Regulatory Impact Statement, the Police Departmental Legislative Disclosure Statement,
and corresponding sections in CAB-25-SUB 0333 and LEG-26-SUB-0041 – al of which
are already in the public domain.
The Attorney General’s Human Rights Bil of Rights vet letter, which is an external
independent risk assessment of human rights impact, is available publicly:
https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Consistency-with-the-New-
Zealand-Bill-of-Rights-Act-1990-Policing-Amendment-Bill.pdf
Please note that Police proactively releases some information and documents that may
be of interest to the public. An anonymised version of this response may be publicly
released on the New Zealand Police website.
You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to review my decision if you are not satisfied
with my response to your request.
Yours sincerely
Jenny Cross
Manager Policy
New Zealand Police
Office of the Privacy Commissioner
PO Box 10094, Wellington 6143
Level 11, 215 Lambton Quay
Wellington, New Zealand
P +64 4 474 7590 F +64 4 474 7595
E [email address]
0800 803 909 Enquiries
privacy.org.nz
Kia ora Jenny
Thank you for your early engagement on proposals to amend the Policing Act.
Summary of OPC feedback
OPC understands that intelligence gathering and analysis is an integral part of policing that
directly contributes to the functions required of New Zealand Police under section 9 of the
Policing Act 2008. We have supported and continue to support Police’s objective to provide
additional clarity and guidance to front-line officers and other staff involved in these activities.
It is our strong view that the proposals contained in the draft Cabinet paper will not achieve
this clarity and will instead undermine the privacy and democratic rights and freedoms of
everyday New Zealanders. This wil in turn undermine their trust and confidence in the
Police and its ability to gather information, including through new technologies to support its
primary functions.
Given this, our key feedback is that the Privacy Commissioner:
•
strongly opposes the current Cabinet paper approach and proposals and has serious
concerns about the potential impacts that these changes wil have on the privacy of
everyday New Zealanders and by extension their democratic rights and freedoms. The
Commissioner has not seen a clear problem definition or evidence-based policy rationale
for these changes nor any options analysis. It is critical that changes of this nature are
subject to robust public consultation to ensure the public maintain trust and confidence
with the Police.
• is of the view that Police are currently able to carry out intelligence gathering and
analysis activities and
remains ready and committed to further support Police to develop
operational rules and guidance to provide clarity on information gathering for intelligence
purposes under the existing statutory frameworks.
•
would, however, be prepared to work with Police, Justice and other officials to develop
an alternative robust, transparent bespoke authorising framework for police intelligence
gathering and analysis activities as a secondary function to support a Section 9 function
should this be seen as necessary to provide additional clarity to the Police and
assurance to the public that these activities are being undertaken in a lawful, necessary
and proportionate way.
•
requires assurance Police information management systems are capable of safely and
securely managing the volumes of data proposed given our understanding of their
current state and the investment required to make them fit for purpose.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide initial comment on the pre-consultation Cabinet
paper and wil have further comments throughout the process. Should the proposals go
forward as currently drafted we will want to include a Privacy Commissioner comment (along
the lines of the first bullet point above) in the agency consultation draft Cabinet paper.
We also stand ready to work with Police, Justice and other officials to develop a robust,
transparent, bespoke authorising framework for intelligence gathering and intelligence
activities that supports public trust and confidence.
Feeback on pre-consultation Cabinet Paper and RIS
We have both initial generic and more specific comments on the pre-consultation Cabinet
paper and RIS. The more specific comments are tracked into the attached drafts.
We understand the primary objective to be clarifying the ability of frontline Police to collect
information (intelligence gathering) to inform Policing functions and decision making. Our
comments are directed to information collection, and we have not commented on the road
closure powers.
We strongly oppose the proposed approach and have serious concerns that the proposals
themselves have not been sufficiently developed to incorporate the necessary checks and
balances. We also have significant concerns about the problem framing in the Cabinet
paper, the lack of options put forward in the RIS, and the lack of public consultation on a
constitutionally important issue. We do not believe a case has been made for these changes
as they stand and have serious concerns about the potential impacts that these changes
would have on the privacy of everyday New Zealanders and by extension their democratic
rights and freedoms, unless further work is undertaken to develop the necessary safeguards.
The proposals are overly broad, and the specific problem definition is unclear
The proposed changes are excessively broad and, in our view, go further than providing
clarity to current operational practice. By making intelligence a primary function, rather than
a support to a primary function, Police are creating a circular lawful purpose that permits the
collection of information about everyday New Zealanders for its own sake rather than in
pursuit of the primary functions of Police. This is further amplified by providing Police with
the power to collect “anything” anywhere they are lawfully present.
The exact problem definition and what evidence exists to support such extensive changes is
unclear. The paper appears to justify the proposals by inferring that the framework would
align the legislation with BAU practices. As above, we disagree with the framing of the
proposed changes as clarifications or reaffirming existing operational practice. Further,
aligning to BAU operational practice is not an adequate policy case, and we expect to see an
evidenced-based policy rationale sitting behind all proposals.
No adequate evidence is given to il ustrate how the
Tamiefuna decision and IPCA/OPC joint
report has led, or wil lead, to Police being unable to prevent and/or respond to crime. At
para 16 there is a reference to uncertainties restricting data collection specifically
“photographing a suspicious vehicle or person in a public place”. This is very misleading.
The Privacy Act, and the findings in the joint report, would allow this if there was a
reasonable possibility that the individual or car could be relevant to a specific, existing or
likely future investigation and an officer could articulate this. The
Tamiefuna decision, which
this example may be based on, considers a particularly niche situation. Mr Tamiefuna was
only in a public place because Police had exercised powers under the Land Transport Safety
legislation and ejected him from a vehicle. This is distinguishable from an individual being in
a public place by their own choice. The argument that
Tamiefuna constrains Police from
taking photographs in public place and therefore Police need an unrestrained information
collection power is not supported factually. You wil need to provide other examples to clearly
il ustrate the problem.
Analysis of impact of proposals on the privacy of everyday New Zealanders is inadequate
The analysis of the privacy impacts and the justification for an exemption of certain IPPs are
not adequate. It is not enough for Police to say that these are BAU processes, we expect to
see the paper explicitly reference what the privacy impacts are on individuals and make a
case for a justified intrusion. The paper acknowledges that the proposals wil include an
exclusion from IPPs 1-3 and 10. We also note that these exclusions wil have flow on effect
which may significantly limit or completely override other IPPs, specifically IPPs 9 and 11.
Displacement of the IPPs would require new statutory safeguards to be developed to provide
guardrails for broad information collection and mitigate the risks of unregulated surveil ance
(as identified in the joint IPCA/ OPC inquiry report).
The power of new technologies to collect and analyse vast quantities of personal information
requires more checks and balances, not less
As noted in the RIS (para 51), the way Police collects personal information has changed
because of technological developments. While this may be a reason for updating the
framework around the intelligence gathering function, it is also a reason for ensuring there is
a robust framework around Police’s information gathering activities and powers. The nature
of the technological tools now at the disposal of law enforcement mean that the extent of
personal information that the Police can collect in the course of their everyday duties has
increased significantly and there is a high risk that the proposed operational settings could
lead to widespread and pervasive surveil ance (both general surveil ance and surveil ance of
particular sectors of society) across both public and private spaces, unless proper criteria
are developed.
We note that para 15 of the paper and para 22 of the RIS states that the current regulatory
framework is likely to limit the use of new technologies. There is no evidence supporting this
claim. For example, we believe it would be possible for body-worn cameras to be deployed
in a way that is consistent with the Privacy Act. While we acknowledge that a statutory
authorisation framework may provide greater certainty for operational policing, the current
option proposed does not put forward the necessary checks and balances that would be
required to support it.
The proposal as currently drafted would facilitate the automated collection of personal
information via technology, with no human oversight, relevance threshold, or safeguards.
New and emerging technology that can automatically collect, analyse, use and disclose
personal information gives rises to additional specific consideration from a risk and impacts
perspective. If additional statutory guardrails are necessary to provide clarity, we are happy
to work with Police to develop a bespoke statutory framework for the use of new
technologies. This could be enabled through primary legislation and implemented through
secondary regulations to allow Police to respond to operational needs and the pace of new
technological opportunities with suitable justification, transparency and oversight.
Impact on democratic rights and freedoms
The nature of these proposals requires significant public consultation to ensure the public
maintains trust and confidence in Police. We would expect to see engagement with civil
society and human rights concerns, including full assessment of NZBORA implications,
which would likely include sections 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21.
Police information management systems are inadequate for their current task, significant
investment would be required before broader information gathering could be possible
We also want to reiterate our concerns about the information management implications
associated with these proposals. Paragraph 30 states that there wil be no direct financial
implications from the proposed changes but para 31 implies that these proposals are
dependent on further investment into Police’s information management systems. As Police
have cited financial constraints as the reason why they cannot fully comply with the
Compliance Notice issued in 2021, it is not clear how current systems wil be equipped to
manage additional volumes of information safely. If these proposals wil require further
investment to safely manage the greater quantities of information, this should be explicitly
noted. It is inevitable that greater quantities of personal information wil be collected. How it
will be collected, stored, identified and used is critically important and is currently missing
from the papers.
OPC remains ready to support Police to develop operational rules and guidance to
provide clarity to frontline decision-making under the existing statutory frameworks.
As stated in the OPC/IPCA Inquiry, it is our view that Police are currently able to carry out
the intelligence gathering activities they need in support of their section 9 functions within
existing statutory frameworks.
Following the OPC/IPCA Inquiry, the Of ice of the Privacy Commissioner worked with the
Police to develop training and guidance to frontline staff on the lawful collection of personal
information for investigative purposes with a particular emphasis on digital images and
recordings. In our conversations regarding the initial “change narrative” we were told that as
a result, lawful collection for investigation purposes was now clear.
We remain committed to working with Police on operational protocols and procedures to
provide the same clarity for intelligence gathering to support their other Section 9 functions
with a particular focus on collection in public places and of publicly accessible information.
Support for policy development to design a robust, transparent bespoke authorising
framework for Police intelligence gathering as a secondary function
As discussed, the Privacy Commissioner strongly opposes the current approach in pre-
consultation Cabinet paper.
As noted, we are of the view that Police are currently able to gather intelligence in support of
their Section 9 functions and that additional clarity can be provided through operational
protocols. However, we would be supportive of the development of a bespoke authorising
framework for intelligence gathering as a secondary function if it provided appropriate
transparency, thresholds and safeguards. This could have the benefit of providing Police
with the clarity they desire and more transparent assurance to the public that their use was
lawful, necessary and proportionate.
We would expect such a framework to include amongst other things:
• Appropriate thresholds and safeguards that build in the concepts of necessity and
proportionality
• Maintenance of records to facilitate auditability/assurance reporting
• Robust independent oversight of Police intelligence activities
We have discussed this concept and possible options and safeguards with Ministry of
Justice officials and support the approach that we understand they are providing to you in
their feedback. We stand ready to work with Police, Justice and wider of icials to develop
and test such a framework.
Conclusion
We appreciate the early engagement on Police intelligence-related proposals. Please let us
know if you have any questions about our feedback. As noted, we wil have further
comments to give once these documents are out for agency consultation. We stand ready to
work further with Police and other officials on these matters.
Ngā mihi
Liz MacPherson
Deputy Privacy Commissioner
2025-01-23
OPC feedback on draft Policing Amendment Bill and LEG
paper (received 15 Jan)
Relationship of new provisions to the IPPs – IPP 1 likely impacted
Reflecting where we landed in discussions last year, it is good to see no express
disapplication or modifications of the IPPs, and the intention outlined in the LEG paper that
Police wil continue to operate within the Privacy Act framework and maintain the OPC’s
jurisdiction.
However, having had the opportunity to review the drafting of the Bil , we think it is likely that
the effect of the new provisions wil be to disapply IPP1 in practice.
Section 45A creates an authorisation for Police to collect information for policing purposes
and in public places or on private property, regardless of necessity. Section 24(2) of the
Privacy Act provides that other legislation authorising particular actions wil not constitute a
breach of the relevant IPP. The operation of this section means that where Police collect
information consistently with the authorisation in sections 45A, 45B or 45C – Police collect
information for one of the specified purposes – Police’s action cannot be found to breach IPP
1, including the IPP 1(b) necessity element.
As a result, OPC may not have any jurisdiction to assess Police’s compliance with IPP 1
when Police is operating under these new provisions. This conflicts with recommendations
4.1.3 and 8 agreed to by Cabinet.
The threshold for collecting information is unclear / low
Section 45A would likely create a lower threshold for collecting information than under IPP 1,
requiring only that the information be “for” one or more specified purposes i.e. some
connection or relevance to the purpose.
What OPC is concerned to avoid is the creation of an authorising framework that would allow
officers to record information about people based on conjecture. This is the thrust of the
IPCA/OPC Joint Report, officers taking photographers based on the officer’s perception of
the individual they want to monitor (risk of being influence by personal biases), rather than
necessity for taking photographs based on the particular circumstances. An overly broad
discretion for information collection creates a risk of unfair and unjustified surveil ance of
members of the public.
As currently drafted, it is uncertain whether section 45A provides any kind of objective
standard or threshold that would prevent this kind of broad discretion to collect information
with any slight relevance to a police function. The requirement to have objective grounds to
collect information about members of public is an appropriate legal safeguard to protect
individuals against unreasonable interference with their right to privacy.
While there is a specific threshold / restriction around intelligence collection in section 45D,
this is currently set extremely low (more on this below).
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Not defining intelligence purpose creates uncertainty
We think not defining “intelligence purpose” wil cause difficulties in applying and interpreting
this provision. We are concerned about the lack of an agreed-upon definition even within
Police and can see this leading to varied operational practices.
We wonder if this does not defeat the aim of the Policing Act amendment work – attempting
to increase clarity around Police’s ability to collect information for intelligence purposes. With
a disputed meaning it wil be more difficult to know when to apply the restrictions on
collecting/recording for intelligence purposes in section 45D, particularly the restriction on
continuous recording where solely for an intelligence purpose and increases the risk it’l be
subject to challenge in the courts.
As we have emphasised throughout this process, and in the
IPCA/OPC Joint Report, we are
of the view that Police are currently able to carry out intelligence gathering and analysis
activities they need in support of their section 9 functions within existing statutory
frameworks.
No provisions around the use or retention of intelligence information
Section 45A creates a positive power to collect information including for broad intelligence
purposes, but no commensurate limit (cf section 34 on storage and destruction of identifying
particulars).
Recommendation 3.2 records agreement that decision about collection, retention and use of
intelligence information must involve consideration of the possible or potential value of the
information to support a Police function.
We do not consider the drafting as provided to give full effect to recommendation 3.2, as
there are no safeguards or thresholds in relation to retention or use. Given the breadth of the
purposes for which information can be collected, safeguards to prevent inappropriate misuse
and retention are critical.
Threshold in section 45D(a) for intelligence gathering so low as to be
meaningless
In the version of the Bil we have been consulted on, the threshold / restriction in section 45D
is extremely low i.e. the bar would be met as long as a Police employee has turned their
mind to the potential value of the information to Police, even if the employee considers the
information is likely to have little to no value. We consider this does not meet the policy
intention as set out in recommendation 4.1.2.
We understand Police agrees that this restriction needs to be redrafted and assume this is
being amended before LEG.
We expect to see the next iteration of drafting so we can
consider updating the Privacy Commissioner comment. We suggest the threshold requires two elements:
• the employee considers the value of the information to Police’s functions / activities,
•
and the employee reaches a
positive conclusion on the above i.e. on balance,
likely to be of value or useful (even if only useful in the negative i.e. to disprove
something or rule something out).
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At the very least, requiring the employee to consider
how the information will support Police
performing its function or activity would be a higher standard than where the threshold sits
currently.
Drawing from the
IPCA/OPC Joint Report, another way to articulate a threshold: the Police
employee must consider there is a reasonable possibility, based on more than mere
conjecture, that the information wil be of value to support Police in performing its functions.
Issues with giving effect to restriction on continuous recording solely for
intelligence
We note the dif iculties Police have had with giving effect to recommendation 5.2 as
articulated in the Cab paper and possible operational difficulties with specifying a recording
length limit or defining ongoing continuous recording.
In our view, it is possible that the wording of recommendation 5.2 has not captured the exact
policy intent behind the recommendation. We understand the policy intent is to avoid section
45A(1)(c) authorising Police to undertake
broad, indiscriminate, and sustained surveil ance
purely because the information might be useful or valuable at a future date.
As discussed, we do not think removing section 45D(b) entirely and relying on the framework
of the IPPs would give ef ect to recommendation 5.2. The IPPs would not restrict continuous
ongoing recording of information solely for intelligence purposes, especially as intelligence is
now specifically clarified as a lawful purpose Police may collect information for in section
45A. Nor would relying on operational guidance give effect to recommendation 5.2, although
operational guidance wil be important part of the picture.
We understand Police are considering a principle-based restriction based on there being a
reasonable purpose and for a reasonable length of time.
Another alternative would be to specify a recording length but also provide for extension of
this length where justified and authorised by a more senior officer.
Given the issues with progressing the drafting of 45D(c), and noting that the real issue may
well be with the wording of recommendation 5.2, one way forward would be for Police do
further policy work on the intent of recommendation 5.2 and seek additional policy decisions
clarifying this recommendation in the upcoming LEG paper.
Specific comments
Section 45A applies more broadly than personal information
Section 45A
We note that this provision empowers collection of “information” which is
broader than personal information. The IPPs wil of course only be
engaged if the information collected is also information relating to an
individual (which wil often be the case, given the nature of Police’s
work).
Overly permissive
Section 45B
As currently drafted, the section authorises the recording of any images
and sounds that “can be observed from or heard in” a public place. This
appears to authorise recording on private property, and other private
spaces, as long as the of icer is doing the recording
from a public place.
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Is section 45B intended to allow recording of persons or things on
private property while recording from a public space e.g. roadside?
If Police are concerned about the issue of incidental capture of images
and sounds on private property (e.g. when using through the use of
BWC outside a residential home), then this should be clearer in the
drafting.
Relatedly, unlike section 45C, this section appears to authorise the
recording of images and sounds beyond that which can be observed or
heard by a person i.e. permit ing the collection of sounds and images in
public via technology that is more powerful than the normal vision and
hearing. For example, the use a powerful microphone to pick up the
conversation of two people at a park bench who would not expect to be
overheard.
Does Police intend this type of enhanced col ection to be
authorised under section 45B? Does Police consider this is
returning Police to its previously operating state?
Relationship to Search and Surveil ance regime
Section 46(1) of the Search and Surveil ance Act requires officers to
obtain a warrant to do visual surveil ance of private activity on private
premises. Would this section empower surveil ance of private premises
without a warrant? Has Police considered the interaction with the SSA
regime?
Meaning of public places
Public place is not defined and could be construed very widely. Does it
include a marae? A hospital? A rest home? A supermarket?
Is the intention that a public place is anywhere that is not private
property? Or is there a third category?
Definition of surveil ance device.
Section 45C
As Police wil be aware, Justice is progressing work looking at
amendments to the SSA, including considering updating the definition of
surveil ance device.
Insufficient time before commencement
Commencement We note that Part 1 would come into force 28 days after Royal assent.
We think these changes wil require updating operational policies,
changes to data management systems and training. This timeframe is
insufficient. We also note that there is no requirement in the Bil for the
operational guidance and non-legislative safeguards to be in place prior
to Police making use of the amendments. Incorporating such a
requirement, while less preferable than having greater safeguards in the
Bil , should be considered.
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We acknowledge we are not in the detail of Police operations; however,
Examples
we are not convinced that the examples Police raised in our recent
discussed in
meeting with them (or in previous meetings) are in fact examples of
meeting
collecting information solely for intelligence purposes.
• Monitoring a person suspected of being at high risk of carrying
out a terrorist act – connected to core policing functions such as
public safety, crime prevention, and national security.
• Monitoring a high-risk sex offender – connected to public safety
and crime prevention.
• Drone recording to provide bird’s eye view of large protest –
connected to public safety (crowd control, coordinate officers).
Further, the use of this information for a different purpose is broadly
covered by the maintenance of the law exception in IPP 10, allowing use
where needed to prevent, detect, investigate, prosecute, and punish
offences.
We also wanted to clarify that, in the example given of a helicopter
deployed for a particular police activity (e.g. following stolen car) and
recording footage for this purpose, this purpose does not ‘lapse’ just
because the recording may not
at every given moment be capturing
footage relevant to that policing activity. There seems to be some
confusion about the operation of IPP1 when Police take video footage.
Police do not need to repeatedly ask whether the collection of the
footage is necessary throughout the recording, but rather the question
“does Police need this footage for a lawful purpose” wil inform when
Police start and end the recording.
As we have raised throughout the Policing Act amendment work, in our
view, there do not seem to be many examples of pure intelligence
gathering that can’t in fact be closely linked to another core policing
function (one example may be taking an updated picture of a known
recent offender when they have changed their appearance).
• Has Police consulted with the IPCA on these changes?
Other questions
• Why do these provisions empower Police employees v
constables? We note that some other parts of the Policing Act
refer to constables (e.g. section 32 on taking identifying
particulars).
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