27 August 2025
Stanley Bannerman
[FYI request #31827 email]
Reference: OIA-2025/26-0060
Dear Stanley Bannerman
Official Information Act request relating to the Emergency Mobile Alerts issued on 30
July and 31 July 2025
Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) request received on 31 July 2025.
You requested:
“1) Decision-Making Meetings and Attendance
a) Was a formal or informal meeting held to decide whether to issue the EMAs?
b) If no meeting was held, what form of communication occurred between decision
making parties to issue the EMAs?
c) Please provide:
i) The date and time of any meeting(s) and/or communications
ii) The names and roles of those present or involved (in person or remotely)
iii) Any minutes, notes, briefings, or agendas from these meeting(s)/communications,
including records of any decisions made.
2) Authorisation and Approval
a) Who ultimately gave the authorisation or approval to issue the EMAs?
b) Please provide any documentation, including emails, text messages, signal
messages, slack messages (or other messaging systems) or internal communications
relating to this authorisation.
3) Timing of the Alert
a) Why was the time of approximately 6:30am chosen for the alert on 31 July 2025
b) Please provide any documentation that informed the decision regarding the timing.
4) Digital Communications
a) Please provide all internal communications (including but not limited to emails,
Microsoft Teams messages, Signal chats, or SMS) regarding the decision to issue this
EMA.
b) If any messages have been redacted or withheld for privacy or security reasons,
please provide the reason for each redaction under the relevant section(s) of the Act.
5) Assessment of Impact and Threshold Criteria
a) What consideration was given to the potential disruption caused by sending the 31
July 2025 alert at 6:30am?
b) What processes or frameworks exist to assess whether an alert’s benefits (e.g.
public awareness) outweigh potential downsides (e.g. disruption, desensitisation)?
Level 7, TSB Building, 147 Lambton Quay | PO Box 5010 | Wellington 6140 | New Zealand
Tel: +64 4 830 5100 | [email address] | www.civildefence.govt.nz
c) Please provide any relevant internal policies, procedures, criteria, or guidelines used
to determine when an EMA should be issued.
6) Alert Fatigue Consideration (“Boy Who Cried Wolf”)
a) What internal or external advice has been received, or studies reviewed or
commissioned, regarding the long-term public trust and effectiveness of the EMA
system (i.e. avoiding desensitisation through frequent or low-urgency alerts)? Please
provide copies of any reports, memos, communications, or research relating to this
topic for the alerts issued on 30 and 31 July 2025.
b) What consideration is given to alert fatigue in making the decision to issue an EMA?”
Part 1 and 5 – decision-making
The Emergency Mobile Alert (EMA) system is governed by strict protocol on its use. The
Emergency Mobile Alert Protocol for User Agencies document covers the criteria for sending
Emergency Mobile Alerts to New Zealanders. The National Emergency Management Agency
(NEMA) will only send alerts when there is a severe, urgent and likely threat to life, health or
property. Dangerous tsunami activity generated by the Kamchatka earthquake affecting New
Zealand’s coastline clearly met these criteria, and the decision to use it was informed by
scientific advice and consultation with Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups.
In respect of emergency management, NEMA has a statutory responsibility to alert the public
to tsunami risk. Every decision to alert the public is based on best advice available including
scientific evidence, international best practice, the observable conditions, and the life safety
risks.
When NEMA received notification that a powerful earthquake had occurred and generated
tsunami waves that were travelling across the Pacific, it was a straightforward decision to
alert people to help them stay safe.
Based on advice from Earth Sciences NZ that tsunami activity would arrive at our shores
around midnight on Wednesday evening (30 July), NEMA issued a National Advisory and
sent an Emergency Mobile Alert. As always, we carefully selected who should receive it - in
this case, the alert was only sent to phones connected to a mobile tower near the coastline.
The first alert was sent at 4.13pm as it was critical to issue it before nightfall, because many
people live on boats, or plan ahead for early fishing trips or a dawn surf.
Overnight, we received confirmation that tsunami activity was impacting New Zealand’s
coastline and would continue to do so well into Thursday (31 July). We weighed up the risks
and concluded that we needed to inform the public that the threat was present and ongoing.
We sent the alert at 6.30am to ensure we did not wake large numbers of people up in the
middle of the night, while informing those planning morning activities in beach or marine
areas while dangerous tsunami activity was happening.
Parts 2, 3 and 4 – Authorisation and internal communications
I am refusing your request for who authorised the alert under section 9(2)(g)(ii) of the Act, to
prevent improper pressure or harassment.
I am releasing to you all internal communications relating to the alerts of 30 and 31 July
2025. Some information is withheld under section 9(2)(g)(i) of the Act, to maintain the
effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion and
section 9(2)(g)(ii) of the Act as highlighted above.
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In addition, I am releasing a summary of the discussions with the Tsunami Expert Panel
relating to this event. This includes discussion around the timing of the alert on 31 July 2025.
In making my decision, I have considered the public interest considerations in section 9(1) of
the Act. No public interest has been identified that would be sufficient to override the reasons
for withholding that information.
Part 6 – alert fatigue
Below is an excerpt of the relevant parts of an internal advice document titled “
HRM Briefing
Note – Early Warning Best Practice May 2025” which relates to alert fatigue:
There are several key factors to consider when determining how, and when to issue
warnings. One of these is the risk of warning fatigue, often called the ‘cry-wolf
effect’. Warning fatigue is the loss in credibility of a warning system and
subsequently, the warning agency, due to false alarms. The risk of warning fatigue
may need to be considered alongside the consequences of perceived ‘missed
alerts’, which occur when the public believe they should have been warned for an
event and did not receive a warning.
Recommended mitigation techniques for decreasing the risk of warning fatigue
include raising the trigger level for issuing warnings to decrease the number issued,
transparent communication of any uncertainty relating to the event and, if required,
communicating clearly why a false alarm occurred[1].
Position
Aotearoa New Zealand is continuously working to improve its early warning
systems, and public education arrangements that maximise the effectiveness of
warnings. NEMA encourages cautious and considered approaches to improving
early warning systems that will help to protect communities during events when
there is a risk to life, property or infrastructure. Aotearoa New Zealand supports
international principles for EWS and NEMA has identified areas where we can
improve our EWS, such as increasing our focus on multi-hazard warning systems
and ensuring that both the messaging and dissemination methods are useable for
everyone.
NEMA’s connections with the technology sector enable us to stay informed of, and
advocate for, technological innovations that could improve our ability to disseminate
warnings for events. Additionally, NEMA’s networks with the science and research
communities provide opportunities to inform, and maintain awareness of, the
projects and research programmes that will underpin advancements in monitoring,
forecasting and warning for hazard risks.
Regarding the use of EMAs, NEMA maintains the position that the EMA system
should only be used to issue High-Priority Alerts. In accordance with the New
Zealand Common Alerting Protocol (CAP-NZ), High-Priority Alerts are at level (a) or
(b) within each of the following three criterion:
1. Certainty
a. Observed: Determined to have occurred or to be ongoing
b. Likely: Probability of its occurrence greater than 50%
2. Severity
a. Extreme: Extraordinary threat to life, health or property
b. Severe: Significant threat to life, health or property
3. Urgency
a. Immediate: Responsive action should be taken immediately
b. Expected: Responsive action should be taken soon.
[1] Canary Innovation (2025). What do we know about warning fatigue?
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The criteria is set at a high threshold because of the risk of warning fatigue, as noted
in Background, resulting in a lower likelihood of public response, and a reduction in
level of trust in warning agencies. This risk presents a serious concern for
emergency managers, as trust in both the warning agency and the technology is an
important factor in ensuring any warning is effective[2][3]. In the case of an imminent,
high impact threat where EMA is the only effective warning mechanism available, a
low response rate poses an increased risk to life.
If agencies are looking to implement significant changes to their warning systems,
often prompted by a major event and subsequent reviews, it is recommended that
the warning agency first assesses the risks associated with changing the system.
Key risks include increasing warning fatigue if the warning threshold is lowered,
causing public confusion if education on the new system is insufficient, or
misaligning with national standards and consistent approaches. Alternative solutions
should be considered, such as enhancing public awareness and preparedness by
increasing hazard risk and impact messaging on communication channels, as widely
and early as possible, or investigating possible alternative alerting methods, to
complement existing systems.
Regarding the frequency of the alerts, we acknowledge that some people’s phones sounded
multiple alerts in the middle of the night, even though NEMA had only issued two alerts. We
are still investigating the cause or causes of this. To date, our investigations have confirmed
the multiple alerts were highly unlikely to have been generated at the NEMA sender end, as
NEMA only issued alerts at two times – 4.13pm on Wednesday 30 July, and 6.30am on
Thursday 31 July.
Emergency Mobile Alerts are issued to a multitude of different devices, and we are aware
that some devices may occasionally behave differently despite receiving the same message
at the same time. NEMA apologises to those impacted by the multiple alerts for the
inconvenience and disruption this caused.
More information on what caused the various alert issues reported are available on the
following website:
NEMA identifies what caused emergency alert issues during Kamchatka tsunami event »
National Emergency Management Agency
Information on the M8.8 Kamchatka Russia earthquake and tsunami prepared by GeoNet is
available on the following website:
https://www.geonet.org.nz/news/4O1zMlf5rXqq8mFCJOfcEq
More information on civil defence emergency management alerts and warnings are available
on the following website:
Civil Defence Emergency Management Alerts and Warnings » National Emergency
Management Agency
[2] Tan, Vinnell, Valentin et al. (2023). The public’s perception of an earthquake early warning system: A
study on factors influencing continuance intention.
[3] McBride, Bostrom, Sutton et al. (2020). Developing post-alert messaging for ShakeAlert, the earthquake
early warning system for the West Coast of the United States of America. Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101713
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You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under
section 28(3) of the Act.
This response wil be published on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s
website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as
otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be
removed for publication.
Nāku noa, nā
Sarah Holland
Chief Advisor to the Chief Executive
National Emergency Management Agency
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