UNCLASSIFIED
New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade
Manatū Aorere
195 Lambton Quay
7 May 2025
Private Bag 18−901
Wellington 6160
New Zealand
T +64 4 439 8000
F +64 4 472 9596
Dan Moskovitz
OIA 30013
[FYI request #30373 email]
Tēnā koe Dan Moskovitz
Thank you for your email of 11 March 2025 in which you request the following under the
Official Information Act 1982 (OIA):
“The following briefings and advice provided to your ministers:
1.
US development funding freeze - initial impacts
2.
Aide Memoire - Executive Council: Russia Sanctions tranche 30 and extension
of regulations
3.
US Tariff Announcements
4.
Scott Base Redevelopment – 6-monthly update
5.
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025”
On 7 April 2025, the timeframes for responding to your request were extended by an
additional 20 working days due to the consultations necessary to make a decision on
your request (section 15A(1)(b) of the OIA refers).
Response to your request
Please see the following table for a list of documents in scope of your request:
# Title
Date
Decision
1.
US Tariff Announcements
3 February 2025
Released with some
redactions
2.
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in
7 February 2025
Released with some
2025
redactions
3. A
ide Memoire - Executive Council:
11 February 2025 Released in full
Russia Sanctions tranche 30 and
extension of regulations
4. U
S development funding freeze - initial 14 February 2025 Released with some
impacts
redactions
Some information is withheld under the following sections of the OIA:
•
6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the
international relations of the New Zealand Government;
•
6(b)(i): to protect the passing of information from another government on a
confidential basis;
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of 2
•
9(2)(a): to protect individuals’ privacy;
•
9(2)(b)(ii): to avoid prejudice to the commercial position of another party;
•
9(2)(f)(iv): to protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the
Crown and officials;
•
9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments;
and
•
9(2)(j): to avoid prejudice to negotiations.
The briefing titled “Scott Base Redevelopment – 6-monthly update”, dated
5 February 2025, is withheld in full under the following sections of the OIA:
•
6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the
international relations of the New Zealand Government;
•
9(2)(f)(iv): to protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the
Crown and officials; and
•
9(2)(i): to enable a Minister, public service agency or organisation to carry out,
without prejudice or disadvantage, commercial activities.
Where the information has been withheld under section 9 of the OIA, no public interest
in releasing the information has been identified that would override the reasons for
withholding it.
Please note that it is our policy to proactively release our responses to official
information requests where possible. Therefore, our response to your request (with your
personal information removed) may be published on the Ministry website:
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses/
If you have any questions about this decision, you can contact us by email at:
[email address]. You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the
Ombudsman of this decision by contacting
www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone
0800 802 602.
Nāku noa, nā
Sarah Corbett
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade
IN CONFIDENCE
US TARIFF ANNOUNCEMENTS
Key media messages
• The United States is one of our longest standing, and closest relationships.
• We have a strong trading relationship with the US and want this to continue.
• We have good connections in Washington DC and our high-quality, safe exports
continue to be desired by US consumers.
• New Zealand’s exports to the US are complementary and evenly balanced. We look
forward to working with the new administration to continue to increase our trade and
grow returns for both countries.
• We’ve taken note of the American President’s announcement on tariffs
[and the
responses of others].
• New Zealand is best served by a world in which trade flows freely governed by rules.
the
1982
Additional points if required:
s6(a)
Act
• This is one of a number of global economic headwinds. We need to take the time to
assess what it means for New Zealand. Escalating tariffs could add to global inflation,
lower demand in some countries, and suppress economic growth.
under
s9(2)(g)(i)
• Our goods trade is well-balanced. The United States enjoys full access to the New
Zealand market.
o s9(2)(j)
o New Zealand currently has a small goods trade surplus with the US, but
whether we run a surplus or deficit changes seasonally. s9(2)(g)(i)
Information
o s6(a)
Released
s9(2)(g)(i)
• New Zealand’s prosperity, standard of living, and resilience are underpinned by
international trade and investment. New Zealand supports and advocates for free
and open trade and an effective rules-based global trading system to enable
sustainable and inclusive economic development – in New Zealand, our region, and
Official
the world.
• s9(2)(g)(i)
we remain focused on driving our own growth agenda,
including improving trade access for New Zealand businesses around the world. We
are doing this by negotiating, implementing, and strengthening free trade
agreements, and defending access rights secured under existing agreements.
• USTR nominee Jamieson Greer was chief of staff to former USTR Lighthizer. s6(a)
POLI-412-5294
IN CONFIDENCE
IN CONFIDENCE
Page 2 of 3
s6(a)
• Our priority is to look to develop good relationships with members of the new
administration and new Congress.
s9(2)(j)
For Background Only:
What has been announced?
On the afternoon of 1 February 2024 EST President Trump signed Executive Orders (EOs)
proposing to levy additional tariffs on Canadian and Mexican exports to the US of 25
percent, with Canadian energy targeted with a lower rate of 10 percent. Chinese exports
would also incur an additional tariff of 10 percent.
the 1982
s6(a)
Act
The tariff rates would take effect at 12:01am on Tuesday 4 February
EST / 6:01pm on Tuesday 4 February NZT. s6(a)
under
Canada wil impose retaliatory 25% tariffs on CA$155 billion of goods in two phases. Tariffs
on CA$30 billion will be imposed on 4 February, with the second phase on CA$125 billion
on 25 February to allow Canadian businesses time to find alternatives. s6(a)
Information
Released
s9(2)(b)(ii)
Official
New Zealand Engagement with the US –s9(2)(g)(i)
• The Minister of Foreign Affairs had a positive phone call with Secretary of State Rubio.
We await confirmation of dates for a visit by MFA to Washington DC. We have sought
a date in March.
• s9(2)(f)(iv)
POLI-412-5294
IN CONFIDENCE
IN CONFIDENCE
Page 3 of 3
• We propose that MTI writes to his USTR counterpart, Jamieson Greer, after the latter
is confirmed (date for his Senate hearing is still tbc). This letter would outline the
strength and opportunities of the New Zealand / US trade relationship.
• The New Zealand Embassy in Washington continues an active programme of
engagement with US Congressional offices.
Trump Administration Objectives s9(2)(g)(i)
There are likely to be differing objectives for the various tariff announcements already
made, and any to come. US objectives include:
• Revenue gathering. President Trump has noted publicly that US treasury coffers were
once filled by revenue from tariffs, not taxes.
• Getting US businesses to return production to the US – i.e. reducing the extent of “off-
shoring” – in order to create more US jobs and wealth.
• s6(a)
the 1982
Act
under
• s9(2)(g)(i)
s6(a)
Released
Information
Official
Americas Division / Trade Policy Engagement and Implementation Division
3 February 2025
POLI-412-5294
IN CONFIDENCE
RESTRICTED
7 February 2025
Minister of Foreign Affairs
For action by
14 February 2025
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
BRIEFING
Decision Submission
PURPOSE
To provide an overview of plans in 2025 for New Zealand to provide assistance
the 1982
to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself against Russia’s ongoing war of
aggression.
Recommended referrals
Act
Prime Minister
For information by
21 February 2025
under
Minister of Defence
For information by
21 February 2025
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs
For information by
21 February 2025
Contact details
NAME
ROLE
DIVISION
WORK PHONE
Dom Walton-France
Unit Manager
Europe Division
s9(2)(a)
David Gaston
Senior Policy Officer
Europe Division
Released
Information
Minister’s Office to complete
Official
Approved
Noted
Referred
Needs amendment
Declined
Withdrawn
Overtaken by events
See Minister’s notes
Comments
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PAGE 2 OF 6
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
Key points
•
s6(a), s6(b)(i)
•
In any of the possible scenarios that Ukraine faces in 2025 (e.g. ceasefire; diplomatic
negotiations; continued fighting), a well-trained and equipped Armed Forces will
strengthen Ukraine’s hand and remain of primary importance to Ukraine and European
partners.
•
Of icials therefore propose s6(a)
for Ukraine s6(a)
timed to coincide with: the three-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
(24 February); s6(a)
•
For
24 February, officials propose the announcement of: the 1982
−
a contribution of NZ$3 million to the World Bank-administered Ukraine Relief,
Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), which supports the
Government of Ukraine to conduct relief efforts and to plan and implement its
recovery, resilient reconstruction, and reform agenda; and
Act
−
a sanctions package designating 52 individuals and entities providing support to
Russia’s war against Ukraine. under
•
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
•
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Information
•
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Released
Official
Paula Wilson
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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PAGE 3 OF 6
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
Recommendations
It is recommended that you:
1
Note that the
three-year mark since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on
Yes / No
24 February 2022 provides an opportunity to demonstrate New Zealand's
solidarity with Ukraine;
2
Agree to announce a further contribution of NZ$3 mil ion to the World
Yes / No
Bank’s Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund
as part of the three-year anniversary package;
3
Agree to announce a new round of New Zealand sanctions under the
Yes / No
Russia Sanctions Act as part of the three-year anniversary package;
4
Note that your office wil be provided with a draft press release relating to
Yes / No
the February announcements;
the 1982
5 s6(a)
Yes / No
Act
6 s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Yes / No
under
7 s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Yes / No
8
Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence,
Yes / No
and Associate Minister of Foreign Af airs for their information.
Information
Released
Official
Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Date: / /
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PAGE 4 OF 6
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
Report
s6(a)
the 1982
Act
under
s6(a)
5.
Russia’s 2022 invasion was a breach of international law. New Zealand has a strategic
interest in ensuring that respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is maintained, and
breaches of international law do not go unchallenged. s6(a)
6.
Ukraine continues to look to New Zealand (and other partners) to do what it can, as
Released
Information
emphasised to Ministers and officials by Ukrainian Ambassador Vasyl Myroshnychenko
on his visit to Wellington on 30-31 January.
7.
As well as public and multilateral statements of support for Ukraine, and participation in
various diplomatic initiatives, New Zealand has pledged assistance valued at
NZ$130 million in response to Russia’s ongoing war of aggression. No new assistance
has been announced since 10 July 2024, when Prime Minister Luxon announced a
NZ$16 million package (NZ$10 million humanitarian and $NZ6 million military) at the
NATO Summit in Washington DC.
Official
8.
Of icials propose s6(a)
for Ukraine s6(a)
,
timed to coincide with: the three-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
(24 February); s6(a)
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PAGE 5 OF 6
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
February: Three-year anniversary package
9.
An announcement at the three-year mark since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on
24 February 2022 would demonstrate New Zealand's continued solidarity with Ukraine.
10. Following relentless bombardment by Russia of its civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has a
continued high need for assistance with recovery and reconstruction. Officials propose a
second International Development Cooperation (IDC) contribution of NZ$3 mil ion to the
World Bank-administered Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust
Fund (URTF), building on the NZ$3 mil ion contribution in 2024. s6(a)
11. The Government of Ukraine relies heavily on international support for the state’s
administrative and service delivery so that it can direct domestic resources into its military
defence. The URTF provides such targeted support, enabling the Government of Ukraine
to conduct immediate relief efforts and to plan and implement its recovery, resilient
the
reconstruction, and reform agenda. The URTF has broad support from a number of
1982
likeminded international partners.
12. As advised separately on 29 January by submission:
Russia sanctions: Three years on
from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
officials have made preparations for a
Act
sanctions package designating 52 individuals and entities providing support to Russia’s
war against Ukraine. This wil be New Zealand’s 30th tranche of sanctions, s6(b)(i)
under
for announcement around the anniversary date.
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Released
Information
Official
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PAGE 6 OF 6
New Zealand assistance to Ukraine in 2025
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Resourcing
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
18. Al other assistance proposed in this submission can be funded from within MFAT
baselines.
the
1982
Act
under
Released
Information
Official
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
Aide Memoire — Executive Council: Russia Sanctions tranche 30
and extension of regulations
Summary
•
The Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations 2025 amend the Russia Sanctions
Regulations (the Regulations) 2022 and will:
1) Implement a new package of sanctions under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022
(the Act); and
2) Extend to 17 March 2028 the current Russia Sanctions Regulations.
Background
•
The new package of sanctions will designate:
the 1982
• Entities which have contributed to Russia’s broader military-industrial complex
through the production, purchase, distribution, and/or research of technology
and equipment used by Russia against Ukraine;
Act
• Senior members of the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division of the
Russian Aerospace Forces, identified as having been involved inter alia in the
under
bombing of the Okhmadyat National Children’s Hospital in Kvin in July 2024;
• Senior officials or political figures who have contributed to the forced relocation
and re-education of Ukrainian children;
• Key participants in Russia’s energy sector including gas companies, an oil
company, and a maritime transport company exporting Russian oil and gas;
and,
• Russian and DPRK actors facilitating North Korean support for the war.
Released
Information
•
The Regulations as a whole were due to expire on 17 March 2025. Given that Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine is ongoing and the original need for sanctions remains, the
Regulations wil now be extended until 17 March 2028.
Next Steps
•
The new package of sanctions will enter into force at 12.01am on Friday 20 February.
Official
The extension of the Regulations will enter into force on 12.01am Monday 17 March.
New Zealand Sanctions Unit
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
17 February 2025
RESTRICTED
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14 February 2025
Minister of Foreign Affairs
For information by
26 February 2025
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
BRIEFING
Overview Submission
PURPOSE
To update you on the impacts of the US administration’s 90-day freeze of
the 1982
development funding on New Zealand’s interests and to outline the Ministry’s
intended approach to manage the risks and implications of this decision.
Recommended referrals
Act
Prime Minister
For information by
5 March 2025
under
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs
For information by
5 March 2025
Contact details
NAME
ROLE
DIVISION
WORK PHONE
Sarah Walsh
Principal Adviser
Office of the Deputy Secretary,
s9(2)(a)
Pacific and Development
Sarah Lee
Divisional Manager
Pacific Regional Division
Released
Information
Minister’s Office to complete
Official
Approved
Noted
Referred
Needs amendment
Declined
Withdrawn
Overtaken by events
See Minister’s notes
Comments
RESTRICTED
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Page 2 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
Key points
•
The US Administration’s decision to freeze development funding while conducting an
internal review has caused major disruption to development operations globally, including
in the Pacific. The pause, and any subsequent reduction in overall US development
funding, s6(a)
•
In the Pacific, the majority of bilateral US development funding flows to the Compact
States1. It is not yet clear how much the freeze wil impact the Compact States, s6(a),
Elsewhere in the Pacific, the freeze will
s6(b)(i)
impact both US bilateral and co-funded initiatives and will have a flow-on impact on UN
development agencies and NGO activities in the region (and globally).
•
s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
the 1982
Act
•
In addition to the direct impacts of the funding freeze, changes in US development policy
under
are being felt in the governance of multilateral development agencies, some of which
receive a large percentage of their funding from the US. Funding that supports sexual and
reproductive health, gender equality, inclusion for marginalised groups, responses to
climate change, and anti-corruption initiatives is under particular scrutiny.
•
New Zealand wil continue to implement our International Development Cooperation (IDC)
Programme in line with established government priorities. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
Released
Information
•
s6(a)
Official
Bernadette Cavanagh
f or Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade
1 Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau
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Page 3 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
Recommendations
It is recommended that you:
1
Note that the US funding freeze and potential withdrawal of
Yes / No
development funding, and changes in US development policy
positions, s6(a)
2
Note that the freeze directly impacts the delivery of a small number of
Yes / No
New Zealand’s development activities that are co-funded with the US,
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
3
Agree that New Zealand should continue to implement our IDC
Yes / No
Programme in line with established government priorities, s6(a)
the 1982
4
s6(a)
Yes / No
Act
under
5
s9(2)(f)(iv)
Yes / No
6
Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister and Associate
Yes / No
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Released
Information
Rt Hon Winston Peters
Official
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Date: / /
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Page 4 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
Report
1. President Trump signed an Executive Order on 20 January 2025 implementing a 90-day
freeze on United States (US) development assistance.2 The stated rationale is that USAID
“has long strayed from its original mission of responsibly advancing American interests
abroad and it is now abundantly clear that significant parts of USAID funding are not aligned
with the core national interests of the United States”. Secretary of State Rubio has been
appointed Acting Administrator. The US is the largest provider of global humanitarian and
development assistance by a significant margin.3
2. Secretary Rubio introduced a waiver for some “life-saving humanitarian assistance”,
including delivery of “core life-saving medicine, medical services, food, shelter, and
subsistence assistance”. Approximately US$8.2 bil ion in undisbursed humanitarian
assistance is anticipated to be covered by waivers. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
the 1982
3. Future changes in US funding are subject to the findings of the review, s6(a),
s9(2)(g)(i)
Act
4. The freeze, and any subsequent reduction in US development assistance, s6(a)
under
5. The US is a significant donor in the Pacific. In the period 2018-22, it provided US$1.1 billion,
making it the fourth largest bilateral donor to the region.4 Its bilateral support is heavily
Information
focused on the Compact states (Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of Marshall
Released
Islands (RMI), and Palau): these three countries received approximately 80 percent of direct
US development funding to the Pacific region over this period. It is unclear whether Compact
of Free Association (COFA) funding is impacted by the Executive Order, s6(a)
6. Southeast Asia is the second priority region for New Zealand’s IDC Programme. The US is
the largest donor in Southeast Asia, and the funding freeze is causing widespread disruption.
Official
For example, the Asia Foundation, a large US-based NGO that is the implementing partner
2 This includes funding from USAID, the State Department, the US Trade Development Agency (USTDA), US
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Mil ennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Treasury, Department of
Health and Human Services, Department of Defence, and others.
3 In 2023, the US provided US$64 bil ion in Official Development Assistance (ODA), almost twice as much as the
next largest donor, Germany.
4 The largest donor was Australia (US$4.8b), followed by Japan (US$1.6b) and New Zealand (US$1.4b). China
(US$1.1b) was the fifth largest donor, slightly smaller than the US.
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Page 5 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
s6(a)
7. The US is the largest donor to many of the multilateral agencies to which New Zealand
provides core funding. The freeze is impacting the operations of these organisations, which
can have a flow-on effect to projects that are not funded by the US. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
New Zealand response to immediate impacts of the 90-day funding freeze
8. Activities that the Ministry co-funds with the US have been immediately impacted by the 90-
day funding freeze. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
the 1982
Act
9. s6(a)
under
Released
Information
Official
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Page 6 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
s6(a), s6(b)(i)
10. A wider set of IDC Programme activities are impacted by the US funding freeze where the
implementing partner also receives US funding, but the US funding is not directly linked to
New Zealand’s activity. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
.
the 1982
11. We intend to maintain our business-as-usual approach to engagement with Boards of UN
Funds and Programmes, and other multilateral development agencies. s6(a)
Act
under
s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
s6(a)
Released
Information
Official
s6(a), s6(b)(i)
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Page 7 of 7
US development funding freeze – initial impacts
s6(a)
16. s6(a)
We wil provide a further update after the US funding
review has been completed.
the 1982
17. s6(a), s6(b)(i)
Act
.
under
18. s6(a)
Released
Information
Resourcing
19. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
. We
foresee ongoing work for the Ministry to respond to the funding freeze for the first half of
2025. We wil meet this from within baseline resources.
Official
20. We wil manage any changes to development activities affected by the US funding freeze
within existing baselines and delegations.
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Document Outline
