OIA24-0915
14 March 2025
Chris McCashin
[FYI request #29466 email]
Dear Chris,
Thank you for your email of 6 December 2024 requesting information relating to Bird Flu.
Your request has been considered under the Of icial Information Act 1982 (OIA).
On 21 January 2025, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) extended the time limit to
respond to your request to 24 February 2025. On 24 February you were advised that the
information you requested was being finalised for release to you. Please accept my
apologies for the delay in getting this information to you.
Avian influenza is a viral disease of birds found globally. Virus strains are described as low
pathogenicity (LPAI) or high pathogenicity (HPAI).
The H7N6 strain is closely related to LPAI strains present in wild birds in New Zealand.
When a low pathogenicity strain of avian influenza is introduced to chickens, it can mutate
into a high pathogenicity strain. We have strong evidence that this is the cause of the case in
Otago and may have happened after free-range laying hens foraging outside were exposed
to the low pathogenicity virus from wild birds, which then mutated in the hens to become
HPAI. This is the first time such an event in New Zealand has been documented, indicating
that it is a very rare event for New Zealand.
You requested the following:
•
The timeline of events from the initial reports, documentation submitted and approved
to inspect farm and test birds, personnel involved, including all relevant dates and
actions taken / warrants etc.
•
Who / what entity reported the initial il ness to MPI and any subsequent
communications with that individual or farm.
•
Al initial correspondence with farm involved or contemporaneous file notes of calls.
MPI received a notification via phone on the afternoon of 29 November 2024 from a technical
specialist for Mainland Poultry’s Hil grove farm, indicating that increased poultry deaths had
been noted over the past few days. The notification was passed to the incursion investigation
team and was investigated as per standard process.
Your request for correspondence related to the initiation of MPI’s response to this outbreak is
withheld under Section 9(2)(ba)(i) –
to protect information which is subject to an obligation of
confidence, where the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the
Biosecurity New Zealand
Biosecurity Systems, Intelligence & Response
Charles Fergusson Building, 38–42 Bowen Street
PO Box 2526
Wellington 6140, New Zealand
biosecurity.govt.nz
supply of similar information and it is in the public interest that such information should
continue to be supplied.
•
The total number of birds affected and culled as a result of this outbreak, including
details about the culling process and any and all approval processes gone through to
cull including disposal. Please provide all documentation outlining teams responsible
/ outsourcing culling and if external name of the company.
•
If an external company was culling the flock please provide the current arrangement
with MPI - is there an existing contract in place and if so when was it agreed to?
Testing by MPI’s Animal Health Laboratory (AHL) confirmed this mortality event as Influenza
A (H7N6) on 30 November 2024 and as highly pathogenic on 1 December 2024. MPI placed
the property under immediate biosecurity controls to restrict the movement of birds, poultry
products, feed, and equipment on or off the property.
Approximately 200,000 birds on the Hil grove farm were culled as a result of this outbreak.
The majority of the chickens were culled using existing industry standard practice of CO2
containerised gas. Birds were exposed to a minimum of three minutes of gas and then
viewed by vets for a further six minutes before being released from the chamber used for
depopulation. Gas concentrations were monitored in the gassing units, and birds were
observed during the process to ensure animal welfare obligations were met.
Mainland Poultry also engaged an independent vet to supervise and monitor the process of
the depopulation at Hil grove.
Al birds were confirmed dead at the end of the cul ing operation. Back-up culling methods,
primarily manual cervical dislocation, were available to ensure that any birds showing signs of life
after the initial method were humanely euthanised, following good practice and standard operating
procedures.
Manual cervical dislocation is an approved humane method of culling under the Animal
Welfare Act and Codes of Welfare and is used by poultry farms, using staff who are trained
in this technique.
Hil grove Farm staff conducted depopulation of the chickens on-farm, with additional casual
staff engaged as needed to assist. MPI was not engaged in the contracting or use of
additional staff, and subsequently your request for information regarding contract details with
any external companies involved with the depopulation effort is refused under section 18(g)(i)
of the OIA -
that the information requested is not held by the department or venture or
Minister of the Crown or organisation and the person dealing with the request has no
grounds for believing that the information is held by another department (for itself and for a
departmental agency hosted by it or an interdepartmental executive board serviced by it) or
interdepartmental venture or Minister of the Crown or organisation, or by a local authority
•
Information on any additional farms or facilities that have been placed under
surveil ance or restrictions due to proximity to the outbreak, including any
correspondence with these farms and / or any other "tip-offs" where the flu might
occur.
Surveil ance was carried out on 11 farms that were linked to the original property either by
common ownership or via the movement of feed, eggs, vehicles, or staff. This testing was
completed on 24 December 2024 with no further positive test results.
2
A Restricted Place Notice under section 130 of the Biosecurity Act was placed on one
additional property. This notice prevented the removal or introduction to or from the Property
without the permission of an Inspector or Authorised Person of any organism, organic
material or risk goods to prevent the spread of disease. This Notice was placed on the
property when signs of il ness and increased mortality was reported in the flocks. The Notice
was later revoked after testing confirmed the farm negative of HPAI.
A Notice of Direction under section 122 of the Biosecurity Act was also placed on the
Waikouaiti property also owned by Mainland Poultry Ltd to direct the owners to take the
specified steps to prevent the spread of an unwanted organism, namely HPAI. Directions
included cleaning and disinfection of vehicles and equipment (such as egg crates) moving
between facilities on the property, and leaving the property, and bio-secure disposal of single
use equipment.
•
An outline of testing procedures followed by MPI upon notification of sick birds,
including timelines for testing and results reporting and companies involved.
•
Information on any laboratory testing protocols used to confirm H7N6 in the affected
flock.
Handling and transport of high-risk samples followed standard biosecurity process, with
collected samples packaged securely in line with International Air Transportation Association
(IATA) regulations, and sent via urgent courier, or in the possession of Response personnel,
to the MPI AHL. Samples contained accompanying paperwork allowing tracing to the farm
and shed of origin. Samples were received by MPI AHL staff and were accessioned into
Laboratory Information Management Software (LIMS), and samples were processed
accordingly. Additional testing of opportunistic wildlife samples taken from paradise
shelducks, and deceased gulls was undertaken by MPI AHL, with negative results being
returned.
Low-risk samples collected as part of testing from associated properties were tested by a
commercial veterinary laboratory with International Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ)
accreditation for the testing undertaken.
Upon arrival at AHL, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing using generic Influenza A PCR
and H5 & H7 subtype-specific PCR assays was completed within six hours of samples
arriving. A representative subset of PCR-positive samples was then tested using Whole
Genome Sequencing (WGS). WGS analysis was completed within 34 hours of sample
receipt.
•
Any correspondence or communication with global organizations regarding this
outbreak.
•
Information on whether MPI has engaged in discussions with U.S. counterparts
regarding their role in the release of avian influenza viruses which they regularly do
and why they continue to manipulate viruses despite concerns for human and animal
welfare.
MPI reported the outbreak of HPAI H7N6 to the World Organisation of Animal Health
(WOAH) on 2 December 2024 and has provided weekly reports on the outbreak in line with
WOAH code requirements for managing disease outbreaks. MPI has not engaged with any
other global organisations concerning this outbreak of HPAI, including any U.S. counterparts.
Your request is subsequently refused under section 18(e) of the OIA.
•
Clarification on food safety concerns regarding poultry and egg products in light of
this outbreak.
3
New Zealand Food Safety (NZFS)’s guidance for poultry and egg products remains unchanged in
the light of this outbreak. HPAI does not pose a food safety risk as long as poultry and eggs are
cooked thoroughly. Food safety advice for consumers during bird flu outbreaks can be found on
the NZFS website:
https://www.mpi.govt.nz/biosecurity/pest-and-disease-threats-to-new-
zealand/animal-disease-threats-to-new-zealand/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza/avian-
influenza-food-safety-and-human-health/.
•
Information on any financial incentives to the farmer to cull the flock - how much is the
farmer paid when his flock is culled and / or does he also have an insurance claim.
•
What recourse is available to the farmer to challenge, complete his own testing given
trust in government institutions is out the window and every single agency engages in
provable lies.
Section 162A of the Biosecurity Act 1993 (the Act) provides that in certain circumstances a
person or business is entitled to compensation where MPI has exercised powers under the
Act, and a verifiable loss has resulted. For example:
•
if property is damaged or destroyed; or
•
if restrictions have been imposed on the movement or disposal of an applicant’s
goods, which have caused them loss. The restrictions might be through a
Restricted Place Notice, a Notice of Direction, or a Controlled Area Notice.
Losses must be verifiable, and reasonable steps must have been taken to mitigate any
ongoing losses. Where MPI exercises powers under the Act, it wil work closely with affected
stakeholders to determine the losses and compensate them as per the requirements of the
Act.
Where a claimant disagrees with the outcome of its claim, there are three options available
for submitting a dispute:
a.
Internal Review: If the claimant disagrees with MPI’s position and can provide further
explanation or evidence to justify its reasoning, then MPI can undertake an internal
review of its previous assessment, assigning the review to a dif erent Claims
Assessor.
b.
Independent Review: If the claimant disagrees with MPI’s internal review decision,
MPI may, at its discretion, establish an independent panel of suitable experts to
review the claim and provide recommendations to MPI’s Director-General.
c.
Arbitration: If on receiving a decision from the independent review, a claimant
remains dissatisfied, it retains the ability to seek arbitration under s162A(6) of the Act.
For reasons of commercial sensitivity, MPI cannot comment on the amount of compensation
paid to the affected farmer, nor provide any details related to any personal insurance
arrangements they may or may not have. Subsequently your request for this information is
declined under s9(2)(b)(i ) of the OIA -
to protect information where the making available of
the information would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position of the
person who is the subject of the information.
•
Copies of all communications with any and all media including before the outbreak. I
note the media have really been pushing the narrative for sometime that an outbreak
was "imminent" and just like that an outbreak happens.
MPI has been responding to media enquiries about HPAI since the current global outbreak began
several years ago. There has been a high level of media interest following international news
reports of outbreaks in the UK, Europe and the US, and the recent outbreaks in Australia of H7
strains.
4
In November 2024, MPI began a targeted, time-limited awareness campaign aimed at people who
own backyard poultry or pet birds. The aim of the campaign was to raise awareness of HPAI H5N1
and encourage bird owners to take steps to protect their birds. We developed detailed advice for
bird owners, available here:
https://www.mpi.govt.nz/biosecurity-in-nz/bird-flu-be-ready.
Minister of Biosecurity Andrew Hoggard issued a media release available here:
https:/ www.beehive.govt.nz/release/getting-ready-bird-flu. The campaign is part of a larger
programme of work being carried out by MPI and our One Health partners to prepare for the
possible arrival of HPAI, similar to our Foot and Mouth Disease readiness work, which you can
read more about here
: ht ps://www.mpi.govt.nz/biosecurity/pest-and-disease-threats-to-new-
zealand/animal-disease-threats-to-new-zealand/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza/avian-
influenza-newsletters-fact-sheets-and-other-resources/.
Following the detection of HPAI H7N6 at Hil grove Farm in Otago, MPI issued a media statement
advising of the detection and published information specific to the response available here:
https:/ www.mpi.govt.nz/biosecurity/exotic-pests-and-diseases-in-new-zealand/active-biosecurity-
responses-to-pests-and-diseases/a-strain-of-bird-flu-h7n6-in-otago/. This page also includes links
to all subsequent media releases on the detection. MPI staff also gave media interviews, and we
responded to a number of specific questions from reporters.
Your request for specific communications with media concerning HPAI at any time are
refused under section 18(f) of the OIA -
that the information requested cannot be made
available without substantial collation or research.
As per section 18B of the OIA, we have considered whether consulting with you would
enable the request to be made in a form that would remove the reason for the refusal.
However, we do not consider that the request can be refined in this instance.
•
Information regarding reporting requirements for farmers when culling flocks due to
avian influenza, including any protocols that must be followed post-culling.
Due to the highly infectious nature of HPAI, the culling of chickens was undertaken by
Mainland poultry staff and external parties under the supervision of MPI staff. The
depopulation process used accepted industry-standard methods and was carried out using
both business-as-usual depopulation by staff at Hil grove and cervical dislocation by trained
staff and external parties. MPI staff were onsite to assist and monitor depopulation from a
biosecurity and animal welfare perspective however no additional records of the
depopulation process were created or maintained by MPI.
Following depopulation, the farm is in the process of being thoroughly cleaned and
disinfected following specifications developed in consultation with the farm owners. These
specifications have been tailored to the property.
As noted above where applicable, some information requested has been withheld pursuant
to the relevant sections of the OIA. MPI is satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case,
the withholding of this information under Section 9 of the OIA is not outweighed by other
considerations which render it desirable in the public interest to make the information
available.
5
Should you have any concerns with this response, I would encourage you to raise these with
the Ministry for Primary Industries at
[email address]. Alternatively, you
are advised of your right to also raise any concerns with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Contact details are: Office of the Ombudsman, PO Box 10152, Wellington 6143 or at
[email address].
Yours sincerely
Andrew Spelman
Commissioner, Biosecurity, Intel igence Systems & Response
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