Trust and confidence are core to enabling both participation in democracy and the
Enterprise Deep Dive:
Environmental driver
social mandate for those elected. Some researchers are claiming that trust and
5 Sep
Managing disinformation
description
confidence in institutions is eroding. This is combined with increasing levels of mis and
disinformation.
2023
Disinformation is a systemic issue, and not all
International Idea study - overall increase in
• Lower participation rates
• Prevalence and type of mis-
of it is within EC’s control. The Board is likely
mis- and disinformation.
• Unless proportionate action
and disinformation.
t
o
x
e
t
to be interested in:
Most disinformation attacks are being
taken to manage impact of
l
e
h
or
s
• How we communicate and
1. How mis- and disinformation is impacting
t
?
launched during the electoral campaign (33%)
disinformation, EC won't be
nt
t
t
es
na
connect with the
need
our legislative responsibilities.
and voting operations and elections
seen as doing its job
y
ou
communities we serve.
Co
t
ll
b
2. How the Commission is ensuring that
ucc
day (24%).
• Lack of awareness of trend
a
a
is risk
a
isk tha
correct information re: voting and the
t
h
h
s
(inter
• How we react/respond to
ica
The Information Environment around Elections
act us?
and how it is impacting our
t
r
ng
e
y t
s
mis and disinformation
e r
election is being made available
| International IDEA
society means we won't be
ou
nal)
h
nedr
y da
e
shi
imp
pac
er
about the electoral process
i
t
pecif
3. In relation to the wider system, what
prepared or able to take
ctor
s
Ke
s
bl
is
nce
awareness and connections does EC
ue
Escalated by social fragmentation and
appropriate action to
ext
• Reputation of EC (as a
d
a
t
r
y fa
luenc
t
have to identify and mitigate the impacts
reduced trust in institutions of government.
How ma
iss
complete our mandate
trusted, neutral source of
s
oa
e co
Ke
inf
in this
and
truth).
E
Wha
B
b
on the system we operate within
effectively and efficiently.
Staff involved: ELT, Comms, Security Advisor, election
Key area 1
Key area 2
Staff involved: Comms, SEP, VS
Key area 3
Staff involved: Comms, Legal and
delivery leaders
Considered: not repeating misinformation when correcting,
Policy, ELT
Considered: Roles in system, intelligence sources, overall
ensuring accessible messages, ability to quickly respond,
Considered: passing on intel as well as
Understanding
Getting right
Ensuring
trends
proactively informing the public about integrity of system
receiving it, maintaining networks,
mis and
messaging
information
Goals: Despite dispersed accountabilities across the
Goals: The public rely on the information from the Commission as
clarifying our role
system, we will have a joined-up view of mis- and dis
and
gets to
es
disinformation
the 'source of truth'.
Goals: We work across the system to
information
where it
ti
information.
i
environment
Activities:
share information and support the
Activities:
needs to go
SEP – understanding community misunderstandings and
public.
ctiv
• Overall trust environment and participation with public
correcting.
Activities:
a
sector system partners i.e. DPMC trust working group
Accurate and accessible info on our services and how the
n Parts of business / • Links with academics and commentators
project involved,
process works
• Publishing information on our role
ssio what they have
• Strategy work (and others) look at global trends
Good data (ours) that’s substantiable
and who to contact for what issues
considered, and
• Monitoring themes across media and social media
Trust and security strategy is underpinned by a deliberate
• Broadcasters and publishers
the goals they wish
Electoral Integrity plan for the election:
mmi
• Senior Officials Committee and Risk and Security
guidance
to realise.
working group
• Proactive engagement with media to establish that EC is
Co Summarise key
• Networks of agencies across the
• Communication of key messages to the public and
source of the facts, correct any misinformation
activities being
sector
• Public engagement - including heavy social media focus
undertaken to
communities
• Social media company briefings
• Pre- bunking and information sharing about elements of the
prepare, address or • Discussion with other Electoral Management Bodies
respond.
electoral process- providing resources that can be shared
• Board meetings with CEs of related system agencies
• Pre-prepared FAQs
• Misinformation briefing – September 2022
• Intelligence from other system agencies
• News reporting
How does
What visibility
followed by trust framework updates and Trust
• Comprehensive plans and products
• Social media commentary
has the Board
and Security plans
management monitor
What key
prepared
• Complaints
• Overarching Communications Strategy and
had of key
and maintain
• Weekly discussions at ELT on risk and
information
• Reports from Community
Public Information and Education Strategy for
programmes
media/social media content
confidence in these
or
engagement teams or key partners
nitoring
the 2023 General Election
and how the
• Risk profile updates
areas?
milestones
• Alerts from other agencies
Mo
• Integrity communications plan (subset of the
risk is being
• Will be monitored through the GEDT and
How is success
will trigger
above)
through Risk and Security Operations
dealt with?
monitored?
action?
• Monitoring through the Commission's risk
group
profile
What is the trend?
w evi y n s?
er
a
1
gap
Ov
Document Outline
