TEL +64 4 473 0111   FAX +64 4 494 1263
Level 11,1 Grey Street, PO Box 25620, Wel ington 6140
New Zealand

22 April 2024
Marie
[FYI request #25856 email]
By email

Our ref: F34351

Dear Marie

Request for information regarding investigations
I refer to your request of 23 February 2023 via the FYI site for the following information:
1.  The policy/manual used to “triage” MTA s31 incident reports and any associated
procedure manuals. I understand there is a 1-4 scale for this. Include the explanation
of what each stage would entail.
2. Please provide the previous “triage” documents/policy manuals used prior to
implementing this new system.
3. Please advise what triage ranking (1-4) that the July 2022 Riverton accident was
given. MNZ said this incident didn’t meet the threshold for them to investigate.
4. Please provide investigation manual/policy and procedures documents outlining
each step of an investigation, including preliminary initial enquires by a Maritime
Officer. Ie Would a Maritime officer talk to the skipper before recommending to his
superior to investigate.
Response
1.  The policy/manual used to “triage” MTA s31 incident reports and any associated
procedure manuals. I understand there is a 1-4 scale for this. Include the explanation of
what each stage would entail.
Attached is a document which provides guidance on Maritime NZ’s triage process. The
document is in draft, but is available for staff to use.
2.  Please provide the previous “triage” documents/policy manuals used prior to implementing
this new system.
There was no previous policy prior to the attached guidance, therefore we are refusing this
question under section 18(e) of the Act on the grounds that the information does not exist.
3.  Please advise what triage ranking (1-4) that the July 2022 Riverton accident was given.
MNZ said this incident didn’t meet the threshold for them to investigate.
The initial information we received led to us making a decision to send a Maritime Officer to
make initial enquires to determine what happened. Once our initial enquires were complete
we determined this was in the level 4 category, that no further action was required from
Maritime NZ, and that the most appropriate action was for the harbourmaster to investigate
the incident.

4. Please provide investigation manual/policy and procedures documents outlining each step
of an investigation, including preliminary initial enquires by a Maritime Officer. Ie Would a
Maritime officer talk to the skipper before recommending to his superior to investigate.
Maritime NZ does not have investigation manuals or policies outlining each step of an
investigation. We are therefore refusing this question under section 18(e) of the Act because
the information sought does not exist.
We hire suitably qualified Investigators with the experience to conduct investigations. Our
Specialist Investigators have strong investigation backgrounds. They then train Maritime
Officers in investigation – several of whom also come from a regulatory background and have
conducted investigations in previous roles. All Investigators attend courses and ongoing
training to ensure their methodology and skills are current and relevant to our sector.
In regards to whether a Maritime Officer would speak with the skipper prior to making a
recommendation to their superior – this is managed on a case-by-case basis. In certain
situations, the Maritime Officer may speak with someone involved to obtain more information
before making a recommendation on any further action.
I trust this fulfils your information request. Under section 28(3) of the Act, you have the right to
ask the Ombudsman to review any decisions made under this request. The Ombudsman may
be contacted by email at: [email address] or by calling 0800 802 602.
If you wish to discuss this request, please do not hesitate to contact
[Maritime New Zealand request email]

Yours sincerely

Christine Ross
Manager, Communication and Ministerial Services

Maritime Memo
Template
Purpose
1.
Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) is responsible for developing and monitoring maritime safety
and protection rules, and investigates maritime incidents to determine:
1.1.
Causes of an accident or incident.
1.2.
Actions needed to avoid reoccurrence.
1.3.
Actions needed to secure compliance with the law.
1.4.
Actions needed to deliver safety messages from lessons learnt.
1.5.
The response appropriate for any breach of the law.
2.
The Incident Triage Guidance (the Guidance) provides high level triage principles, and a
triage matrix and process to use when making decisions on whether or not to investigate
incidents that have been brought to our attention.
3.
The Guidance is intended to support good decision making, in support of better outcomes in
respect of our focus on safe, secure and clean seas and waterways. It has been designed to:
3.1.
Facilitate transparent decision making and prioritisation of incidents/cases in line
with MNZ responsibilities.
3.2.
Deliver consistency and clarity around the decision to investigate and the approach
that wil be taken.
3.3.
Provide a level of flexibility to account for changes in priorities and the uniqueness of
each incident/case.
3.4.
Provide information to drive proactive and consistent activities.
4.
We must remember that reducing harm, putting the greatest focus on the biggest risks, and
using an intel igence-led process are the three important elements of our approach to
compliance (and to preventing non-compliance).
under the Official Information Act 1982
5.
Our monitoring, investigation and enforcement activities help to make sure that people who
are not inclined to meet their obligations wil do so, and we hold them to account, if they do
not.
Released
Version 1.0 – updated XX August 2021

link to page 4 MNZ Policy on Decision Making & Compliance Strategy (including Compliance
Intervention Guidelines
6.
The Guidance complements and should be read in line with MNZ’s Policy on Decision Making
and Compliance Strategy including the Compliance Intervention Guidelines.
7.
The Policy on Decision Making states:
As a regulatory, compliance and response organisation, our “business” involves receiving
information, considering that information, making decisions and taking action. [Para 1.1]
Decisions are made, and actions taken, by people according to their job responsibilities and
accountabilities, and in many cases delegations, under the laws that provide authority to
Maritime NZ and its staff”. [Para 1.2]
Making good decisions is as much an art as a science in many cases, as we often deal with
matters that are ambiguous and/or multi-faceted and/or requiring professional judgement
and/or involving the balancing of risks. [Para 2.1]
This [Policy on Decision Making] is applicable to all decision making relating to job
responsibilities, accountabilities and delegations. [Para 3.1] 1
8.
The Compliance Intervention Guidelines ensure a risk- based, transparent, consistent, fair,
and robust decision-making process is fol owed in addressing compliance issues.
Triaging Principles
9.
We aim to undertake our triage decision making responsibilities in accordance with the
following principles.
Principle
What this means
Proportionality
We aim to ensure our decisions/responses are proportionate to the
issue/incident being considered and the outcome/impact that can be
attained.
We also aim to ensure our resources are responsibly managed so that work
is assigned as proportionately as possible taking into account the capability
and capacity of our staff.
This means that:
under the Official Information Act 1982
- matters involving serious conduct/harm wil  be likely always be
investigated unless good reason exists not to;
1  Policy on Decision Making Version 3. [insert link to Policy]
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-  we wil  actively manage the workloads of our staff to ensure they
are not overloaded but that we stil  able to progress high priority
and urgent matters.
Transparency
We understand that we are a public agency. Our goal is to be as open and
1982
transparent as we can be taking into account the nature of our work.

This means:

Act
-  our processes, assessment criteria and decisions (where possible)
are transparent so that our stakeholders know what to expect when
they engage with us; and
-  staff know what is expected of them and are able to seek to
guidance when needed.
Consistency  /
We approach each incident in a consistent, fair and impartial way.
Fairness
This means:
-  our stakeholders can be confident and comfortable with the process
of our decision making;
Information
-  al  communications are professional, both internal y and external y;
the people who engage with Maritime NZ have a right to be treated
fairly, with respect, and to be kept informed (where possible)
-  staff know what they have to do and how to do it.  They also know
that workloads wil  be managed appropriately and that they wil  be
supported to do the job expected of them.
Official
Note: Consistency in approach does not mean the same decision wil  be
made every time. Fairness does not mean treating every person/situation the
same way. the
Flexibility
We are an evidence based, risk focused and intel igence led organisation.
We must be able to adapt to changes in our environment to ensure we can
address the matters with the highest priority and account to the uniqueness
of each incident/case.
This means:
under
-  we may need to re-prioritise and/or re-categorise our planned
investigative work or specific investigation files if the situation calls
for it (e.g. changes to resources, new information, emerging issues,
matters of higher seriousness arising);
-  the Priority rating assigned to an incident may change as further
information/evidence comes to ;
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-  staff understand and acknowledge that their work and workload
may change depending on the needs of the organisation at any
given time.
Accountability
We are a public agency and must be accountable for our actions and
1982
decisions.
This means:
Act
-  our staff know they wil  be accountable for their decisions and
therefore must commit to fol owing the principles and processes
provided to them;
-  our decisions must be based on evidence available, be robustly
considered and we must document the rationale for the decisions
we make (this includes decisions to investigate and decisions not to
investigate). It might take a little more time to do a thorough job,
but doing a ‘once over lightly’ can take a lot more time in the long
run, not just for CSD but the wider organisation;
-  if our staff are unclear on what they should do – they wil  be
accountable and seek out the information they require to do the
job.
Information
Triaging Criteria
10.
Triaging involves making a decision as to whether or not to investigate and the depth to
which the incident will be investigated (at least initially).

11.
After initial triaging, some matters will move on to be investigated and some may not.
Official
Matters can be re-triaged at a later date, for example following additional information being
received. This means the incident file can re-opened for investigation and other matters
subsequently de-prioritised/closed.

the
12.
In line with the Compliance Intervention Guidelines, when deciding whether to investigate
an incident consideration must be given to:
12.1.  The seriousness of the conduct including repeat offending.
12.2.  The extent / severity / scale of actual or potential harm including to individuals,
assets, organisations, and/or industry.
under
12.3.  The public interest to investigate including the practicality of achieving a positive
outcome/impact with our intervention.
12.4.  The attitude to compliance including the knowledge and past performance of the
subject/s.
13.
In addition, we will consider:
13.1.  MNZ priorities and risk appetite
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13.2.  Wider relevance of the event
14.
These criteria are incorporated into our triage matrix as ‘key consequence areas’ below.
Triaging Roles & Process
1982
Triaging roles
Incident recipient (DCM or other)
Act
15.
The Incident recipient is the person who first receives the incident notification and is
responsible for making a decision on whether or not to investigate. This wil  typical y be a
DCM or Principal Investigator.

16.
The Incident recipient will initially triage the incident using the evidence available at the time
and the triaging matrix found in this guidance. If further information is required to inform a
decision the triaging process can be put on hold temporarily whilst this information is
sought.

17.
If in doubt assign for fact finding and reassess as further information is gathered. In this case
update file notes in ETG file until decision made whether to open INV file.

Information
18.
If the Incident recipient cannot decide whether the incident should be investigated, or wants
further assistance in making that decision, they should contact a member of the Triaging
Group.
Triaging Group
19.
The Triaging Group is made up of the Regional DCMs and the Principal Investigator. A
member of the Triaging Group wil  likely be the Incident recipient when an incident is
received.
Official

20.
The Group act as a resource for the Incident recipient if and when needed.

21.
The Group also meets on an as needed basis to moderate and discuss triaging decisions that
the
have been made over time. The purpose of these meetings is to develop consistency of
decision making and to share learnings. These meetings can also be used to re-triage or re-
prioritise incidents.

under
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link to page 8

Triaging process2
START
Incident received by
Incident recipient
1982
Use Matrix as guide
to determine action
Act
Decision
NFA
Investigate
Unclear
The incident should be
The incident decision could
investigated at this time
benefit from additional
*Triage Group consists
(e.g. Priority 1)
consideration.
Cal  a member of the *Triage  of Regional DCM’s and
Group for assistance.
Principal Investigator
Incident wil  not be
Provide case to DCM’s
investigated at this
Information
and/or Investigations
Investigate
Decision
NFA
time
Manager for al ocation
(e.g. Priority 4).
Close the incident.
END
Record the decision and
rationale in Triton
Official
Additional
information is
received on a NFA
decision

the
Triaging Matrix
22.
The Matrix below allows an initial priority to be assigned to an incident based on an
evaluation of key consequence areas.

23.
The matrix assesses each consequence against the likelihood of reoccurrence. The numbers
are not added; rather the Priority Rating is based on the highest score selected for any one
under
of the criteria. For example where a matter rates as a 3 when considering the ‘people’
factor, but rates as a 2 when weighed against the ‘severity potential’ the matter wil  be a
Priority 2. Definitions for each consequence area are provided in Appendix 1.


2  As part of the Investigations process, investigations are reviewed at regular status update meetings. These meetings can
result in re-prioritisation of investigations as a result of the triaging process.
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1982
Act

24.
Note that matters may be elevated:
24.1.  where there is a concerning trend of incidents
24.2.  where the incident involves a PCBU that is already under investigation, or there is a
pattern of recurring notifications from the PCBU
Information
24.3.  on a case by case basis with reference to the MNZ Compliance Intervention
Guideline
Triaging Matrix – Priority level actions
25.
There are some general actions that wil  likely occur for each Priority level. These are
outlined below.
Official
Priority 1
26.
At Priority level 1 the fol owing actions are general y expected:
the
•  MNZ wil  investigate and attend the scene as soon as possible, unless there are
extenuating circumstances
•  DCM and Principal Investigator to discuss which team wil  take the lead and what other
resources required for initial scene examination
under
•  Scene should have been secured / preserved immediately however PCBU / Master to be
reminded of this when MNZ notified
•  If for any reason MNZ unable to attend the scene this must be documented and
alternative arrangements made to access evidence as soon as possible
•  PCBU / Master of vessel to be promptly advised on likely timing for MNZ to attend the
scene and what other actions required in the interim
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•  If MNZ attendance wil  be delayed for any reason (i.e. location of incident, travel
limitations, available resources, etc) then a HSWA Non-Disturbance Notice should be
placed on the scene, and/or the vessel detained under MTA s.59 in the interim
•  WorkSafe to be notified in accordance with HSWA s.198
1982
•  TAIC to be notified (if not already via receipt of s.31 online notice)
Priority 2
Act
27.
At Priority level 2 the fol owing actions are general y expected:
•  MNZ likely to investigate
•  DCM and Principal Investigator to discuss which team wil  take the lead and what other
resources required for initial scene examination
•  Scene should have been secured / preserved immediately if meets threshold of a
‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, however PCBU / Master to be reminded of this when
MNZ notified
•  If for any reason MNZ unable to attend the scene this must be documented and
alternative arrangements made to access evidence as soon as possible
Information
•  PCBU / Master of vessel to be advised as soon as possible by an appointed HSWA
Inspector whether scene should remain preserved and not disturbed, or if can be
released where decision has been made not to investigate
•  If in doubt, the scene should not be disturbed whilst further decisions are made within
CSD re attendance / scene examination
•  If MNZ attendance wil  be delayed for any reason (i.e. location of incident, travel
Official
limitations, available resources, etc) then a HSWA Non-Disturbance Notice should be
placed on the scene, and/or the vessel detained under MTA s.59 in the interim
•  If incident meets the threshold of a ‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, WorkSafe to be
the
notified in accordance with HSWA s.198
•  TAIC to be notified (if not already via receipt of s.31 online notice)
Priority 3
28.
At Priority level 3 the fol owing actions are general y expected:
under
•  MNZ may investigate subject to level of harm, specific circumstances and available
resources. Any investigation likely to be handled at the Regional / MO level rather than
through the Investigations Team
•  Scene should have been secured / preserved immediately if meets threshold of a
‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, however PCBU to be reminded of this when MNZ
notified. If for any reason MNZ unable to attend the scene this must be documented
and alternative arrangements made to access evidence as soon as possible
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•  PCBU to be advised as soon as possible whether MNZ wil  be investigating
•  Where the incident meets the threshold of a ‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, and MNZ
is not investigating, an appointed HSWA Inspector from MNZ to authorise the PCBU /
Master that the scene is released
1982
•  If incident meets the threshold of a ‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, WorkSafe to be
notified in accordance with HSWA s.198
•  TAIC likely required to be notified (see Appendix 1 below)
Act
•  May require MNZ attendance or further enquiries to ful y inform a decision whether to
investigate or not
•  Incident may be referred to other Agency, Regional Council, VAL, PSC Inspection, etc in
line with Triton Review Outcome options
•  In reality a Priority 3 incident will likely require a more detailed analysis of the event
details, and possible discussion with the Tier 3 manager, to inform the decision whether
to investigate or not
Priority 4
Information
29.
At Priority level 4 the fol owing actions are general y expected:
•  MNZ unlikely to investigate at this time
•  Incident may be referred to other Agency, Regional Council, VAL, PSC Inspection, etc in
line with Triton Review Outcome options
•  If incident meets the threshold of a ‘Notifiable Event’ under HSWA, WorkSafe to be
notified in accordance with HSWA s.198
Official
•  TAIC unlikely to require notification (see Appendix 1 below)
•  May require MNZ attendance or further enquiries to ful y inform a decision whether to
the
investigate or not
Triaging Matrix – Priority level scenario examples
•  Stevedore on a foreign ship has fal en 4 meters when a hold access ladder failed, resulting in
broken leg / spinal injury suspected
o  Major severity potential / likely to occur again – Priority 1
under

•  Crewmember on foreign ship working at edge of log stack on deck without fal -arrest gear.
Has fallen onto wharf suffering fatal injuries
o  Fatality / likely to occur again – Priority 1

•  Near grounding of container ship during pilotage into port. Potential for major
environmental impact. Navigation under Pilotage on TAIC Watchlist
o  National impact / could occur again – Priority 1

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•  Near miss in NZ waters between a NZ commercial ship and recreational vessel. No injuries
o  Significant severity potential / could occur again – Priority 2

•  Crewmember slips and falls overboard from mussel barge whilst underway. Not wearing a
lifejacket at time, serious injuries
1982
o  Significant severity potential / could occur again – Priority 2

•  Crewmember on foreign ship hospitalised after losing consciousness working in a cargo hold
(non-fatal)
Act
o  Significant severity potential / could occur again – Priority 2

•  Smal  fuel spil  into water during bunkering of MOSS vessel. Tier 2 spil
o  Minor environmental impact / could occur again – Priority 3

•  Report from MPI Fisheries Observer Services of commercial F/V crew discharging garbage
captured in trawl net back into sea
o  Minor environmental impact / could occur again – Priority 3

•  Pilot ladder trap-door arrangement not complying with MR Part 53. Pilots have notified
Master of issues and educated on NZ maritime rule requirements
o  Moderate severity potential / could occur again – Priority 3

Information
•  Gear failure loading logs onto ship. Logs have fal en into hold. No persons exposed to any
risk of harm
o  Minor severity potential / likely to occur again – Priority 3

•  Complaint of speeding close to shore on a lake by un-known recreational vessel
o  Minor severity potential / could occur again – Priority 4

•  Recreational vessel col ides with navigation aid during darkness (no injuries / minor damage)
o  Slight asset damage / minor severity potential / could occur again – Priority 4
Official

•  Recreational vessel grounding during hours of darkness (no injuries or pol ution)
o  Slight asset damage / could occur again – Priority 4

the
•  NZ commercial ship engine failure requiring tow back to shore
o  Minor severity potential / could occur again – Priority 4
Related Policies and Guidance
•  Maritime NZ’s Code of Conduct
under
•  Maritime NZ Compliance Strategy (including Intervention Guidelines)
•  Maritime NZ Investigation and Prosecution Procedure (Draft in progress)
•  Policy on Decision Making
•  Approach to decision making
•  What Does Good Regulatory Decision Making Look Like?
•  Case Assessment & Prioritisation model
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Appendix 1 - Terminology used in the Triaging Model
1982
Act

People
This relates to the people actual y involved in the matter and is focused around the level of harm
Information
caused. In situations where there are several injured persons with a variety of injuries, the higher
level of harm should be used in the assessment.
Examples:
•  First Aid – a sticking plaster, ice pack, non-professional care
•  Medical Treatment – a visit to Accident and Emergency, physiotherapist, doctor
Official
•  Serious Harm –
•  Fatality – one deceased person
the
•  Multiple Fatality – more than one deceased person
Assets
It is anticipated that this would general y cover the amount of damage concerning a vessel, but could
extend to include such things as wharves, cargo or for example a mussel farm destroyed by a diesel
spil . The dol ar figures are only a guide and do not necessarily have to be read in conjunction with
under
the level of damage.

Examples:
•  Slight Damage – a scratched hul , a bent hand rail
•  Component level replacement or repair – replacing a fuel pump, fixing a broken lever or handle,
an occasion where part of something is fixed or replaced.
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•  Equipment replacement or repair – a new engine, repairs to a life raft, somewhere an entire thing
is required to be fixed or replaced.
•  Unit level damage – a vessel is sunk and destroyed, an entire wharf is destroyed
1982
•  Multiple Unit Capability Damage – Two vessels are sunk, an entire fleet of commercial vessels is
destroyed by fire.
Environment
Act
This relates to the physical environment in which an incident occurs.
Examples:
•  Negligible – engine oil from a small recreational outboard engine leaks when the vessel is sunk
•  Minor – diesel from a larger commercial fishing vessel leaks when it is grounded and requires an
initial assessment, but no fol ow up action.
•  Localised Effect - A diesel spill in a small lake where the spill is contained.
•  National Effect -  a vessel leaking a bio toxin as it travels from port to port or a large drifting oil
spil  that cannot be easily contained.
Information
MNZ Reputation
This addresses the ‘so what if we don’t do anything’ issue as wel  as the ‘how bad does this/will this
make us look’ not only in the media, but amongst industry, the IMO or other interested parties.
•  Negligible – one or two individuals are disgruntled and think poorly of MNZ.
Official
•  Limited Impact – may cause some repercussions, but these wil  not really affect MNZ
•  Local Area Impact  –  cray fisherman in a smal  fishing vil age become unhappy with MNZ and
complain
the
•  Provincial Wide Impact – a larger community of people lose faith with MNZ, a provincial MSI
becomes the focus of numerous complaints
•  National Impact  –  something that is likely to make the front page of newspapers across the
country.
Severity Potential
under
This should be determined directly from the information known and weighed on a balance of
probabilities. This marries with the people, assets and environment columns but assesses these on
what could have occurred not what actual y occurred. For example, a large passenger ferry rol s
over; there are no passengers on board and the five crew all survive. The test is not ‘what if it was
ful  of passengers’, the test is ‘what is the worst that could have happened, which in this case is the
five crew being kil ed.  Had that happened, it would rate as a ‘Multiple Fatality’ so the correct
corresponding severity potential rating should be Major. In other words, the ‘that was lucky’ or ‘al
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but’ test should be kept to the facts as they were at the time. This definition is intended to cover
‘near-miss’ situations.
Likelihood
1982
The likelihood definitions are somewhat subjective and there is some discretionary scope on how they
can be applied. The test may be directly related to the incident or where appropriate it may take a
broader approach.   For example, a fisherman loses his hand in a piece of machinery. As a result,
guards are added to the piece of machinery making it practically impossible to ever occur again. It
Act
could be left at that however; these types of machines are known to be common and there have been
two other similar accidents reported in the last year, so the view could be taken that this is known or
likely to occur again.    In this instance it is recommended that the higher safety standard is adopted.
Practical y Impossible
In other words, it is most likely physical y impossible to occur and covers situations where the primary
hazard causing the accident on longer exists.
Not likely to occur
Where it is physical y possible but not probable.   For example, a yacht col ides with a barge at night
because the barge is not displaying the correct lights, the yachts radar is set incorrectly and the yacht
skipper was wearing the wrong prescription glasses. It is not impossible that this could never occur
Information
again, but a replication of the same circumstances would be required and this is highly unlikely.
Where the circumstances and contributing factors of an accident could physical y occur without any
stretch of the imagination. The broadness of the test and the discretion on how to apply it is highly
relevant to this situation. For example, the exact situation where a dinghy with two drunk fisherman
sinks on the Waitemata Harbour and they both die, could never actual y happen again, because the
dinghy has sunk and the two fishermen are dead. However, the circumstances of the accident could
be replicated by two other drunk fishermen in another dinghy in any harbour and the decision on how
Official
this should be assessed would have to be on a case by case basis.    Again, it is recommended that the
higher standard is adopted in the first instance.
Known or likely to occur
the
Where something, given the common occurrence of the same or similar circumstances, makes it likely
to occur again. Take for example, a semi-submerged rock in a channel of water used by hundreds of
recreational boaters that has been left off a chart and is not marked.    The matter may also be known
to occur.  This is rather broad and again there is some scope for discretion. Again, it could be viewed
on the actual accident, such as Waiheke Shipping hitting the wharf, or it viewed in a wider context of
passenger vessels in general hitting wharves. The application of this discretionary view would depend
on the nature of each case.
under
Occurs frequently
This is where a specific incident or incidents with common causative factors occurs with regularity, or
on numerous occasions.

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link to page 16

Appendix 2 - WHEN TO NOTIFY TAIC
30.
TAIC should be notified in the fol ow instances:
•  Any loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a vessel (SOLAS, fishing and other
1982
commercial)
•  Death, or person missing, presumed dead (SOLAS, Fishing, and other commercial
vessels)
Act
•  Multiple serious injuries on board SOLAS, Fishing, and other commercial vessels
•  Any severe damage to the environment caused through the operation of a vessel
•  Collision, grounding or fire involving a SOLAS vessel or large fishing vessel (typically over
20 metres in length) or domestic passenger vessel.
•  Death of a person on board a recreational vessel resulting from the operation of the
vessel
•  Multiple serious injuries on board a recreational vessel resulting from the operation of
the vessel
Information
•  Serious structural failure of a major shipboard component (such as a ships crane for
example)
•  Failure of a shipboard system that requires the ship to be assisted to a port of refuge
(SOLAS ships)
MNZ & TAIC OVERLAP

Official
Key points on the MNZ and TAIC overlap3:

•  MNZ does not need TAIC’s permission to independently investigate an incident that is also
being investigated by TAIC, but if TAIC is also conducting an investigation we do need
consent from TAIC to complete a site examination or to examine anything removed from the
the
site.  This consent cannot be unreasonably withheld by TAIC.

•  TAIC consent is not needed to interview witnesses or take statements.  However, the timing
of their consent to access the site, uplift exhibits, or examine exhibits (if it is given) wil  affect
when MNZ investigators wil  be able to access the site and may also affect timing for
interviews.

under
•  Under the MTA the Director and TAIC are required to co-ordinate – under the TAIC
legislation and the MTA - the Director and TAIC must “take all reasonable measures to
ensure that the investigations are co-ordinated”.  This means that there is an obligation on
both MNZ and TAIC to work together to the extent possible to each achieve our individual
outcomes.  Where it comes to down to accessing a site or exhibits though, this wil  largely be
at TAIC’s discretion.


3  Email from L. Fel ows to P. Dwen on 14 November 2018. Subject MNZ & TAIC Overlap
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•  TAIC undertakes safety investigations that might result in recommendations, whereas MNZ’s
investigations can potential y result in criminal proceedings.  While it is unlikely the MNZ’s
investigation would prejudice TAIC’s investigation, theirs could wel  prejudice ours as the
standards around evidence are that much higher for a court proceeding, and the time
requirements are different.  This can lead to issues in relation to matters such as chain of
1982
custody for evidence and timing for MNZ to complete an investigation in order to make a
decision within the 12 month limitation period.  A way of addressing some of these issues
could be for MNZ to access the exhibits first before providing them to TAIC, which might
al ow both of us to achieve our purposes.  But again, this would be subject to TAIC’s  Act
agreement, and they may see this issue from an entirely different perspective to
us.  Ultimately, the call will always be theirs.

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