Release document.pdf

Document 01
s9(2)(a)
From:
To:
Covid-19 System Assurance;s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:
Re: RFP Disinformation
Date:
Monday, 28 February 2022 12:20:55 pm
Attachments:
image001.png
Thanks s9(2)(g)(ii)  just keep me in the loop for a briefing session for Disinformation Project/TPM, I’ll
attend on behalf of the project.
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Project Lead, The Disinformation Project
Co-Lead, Equity and Diversity Community of Interest, Te Pūnaha Matatini
Principal Investigator  Te Pūnaha Matatini
Te Pūnaha Matatini PhD Candidate Centre for Science in Society
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From: Covid-19 System Assurance <[email address]>
Date: Monday, 28 February 2022 at 12:17 PM
Subject: RFP Disinformation
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Kia Ora Everyone,
Firstly, in the interest of fairness, we have to ensure that all the same information is given to
suppliers. Therefore please see attached  Q&A – we were asked for a sample of the report
required, however we are looking for options. This is just an example.
Re the respondent briefing session – we will aim to have this late this week (Thursday the 3rd)
under the Official Information Act 1982
We have decided to do individual briefings rather than a group - noting that any individual
briefings would have the same content and any additional Q&A’s would be distributed for
fairness.
It has come to my attention that the email address on the RFP was wrong. It is Covid-
[email address] (the .nz was somehow missed). If you would still like to
Released
attend the briefing session – please respond to this email and let me know.
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Senior Advisor
COVID-19 Group

Document 02
From:
s9(2)(a)
Sent:
Friday, 25 March 2022 8:08 pm
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]
Subject:
Fwd: Attached - RfP Online Harms
Attachments:
FW: Attached - RfP Online Harms
Looks like there is an issue with the email account. Let's touch base on Monday, presumably other respondents have
the same issue.
Get Outlook for iOS
From: [email address] <[email address]>
Sent: Friday, March 25, 2022 7:51:32 PM
To: [email address] <[email address]>
Subject: Undeliverable: FW: Attached - RfP Online Harms
Delivery has failed to these recipients or groups:
[email address]
Your message was rejected by the recipient email server. Please check the recipient's email
address and try resending your message, or contact the recipient directly. For more tips to help
resolve this issue, see DSN code 5.1.0 in Exchange Online - Office 365. If the problem continues,
contact your email admin.
Diagnostic information for administrators:
Generating server: W-EXCH01.hamlet.treasury.govt.nz
[email address]
under the Official Information Act 1982
Remote Server returned '554 5.1.0 < #5.1.10 smtp;550 5.1.10 RESOLVER.ADR.RecipientNotFound; Recipient not
found by SMTP address lookup>'
Original message headers:
Received: from W-EXCH01.hamlet.treasury.govt.nz (10.153.0.36) by
W-EXCH01.hamlet.treasury.govt.nz (10.153.0.36) with Microsoft SMTP Server
(version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id
15.1.2375.18; Fri, 25 Mar 2022 19:51:31 +1300
Released
Received: from W-MAILEDGE01.cass.govt.nz (202.36.173.237) by
W-EXCH01.hamlet.treasury.govt.nz (10.153.0.36) with Microsoft SMTP Server
(version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id
15.1.2375.18 via Frontend Transport; Fri, 25 Mar 2022 19:51:31 +1300
Received-SPF: Pass (domain auckland.ac.nz designates 103.96.21.117 as a permitted
sender),
s9(2)(a)
client-ip=<103.96.21.117>; identity
helo=<au-smtp-
delivery-117.mimecast.com>
1

From:
s9(2)(a)
To:
[email address]
Cc:
s9(2)(g)(ii)[DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii)  [DPMC]
Subject:
FW: Attached - RfP Online Harms
Date:
Friday, 25 March 2022 7:51:31 pm
Attachments:
Response Form RFP The Disinformation Project- online harms and threats against the COVID-19
response.pdf
Hopefully I have figured out the issue here – the cut and paste from the Response form has the
truncated version without .nz which is failing to send.

As you can see below, sent at 2.45 this afternoon.

Have a great weekend,

s9(2)(a)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Project Lead, The Disinformation Project
Co-Lead, Equity and Diversity Community of Interest, Te Pūnaha Matatini
Principal Investigator  Te Pūnaha Matatini
Te Pūnaha Matatini PhD Candidate Centre for Science in Society
s9(2)(g)(ii)

From: s9(2)(a)
Date: Friday, 25 March 2022 at 2:45 PM
To: "[email address]" <[email address]>
Subject: Attached - RfP Online Harms

Kia ora koutou:

Please find attached The Disinformation Project’s RfP for this important work; thank you for the
under the Official Information Act 1982
opportunity to tender for it.

Noho ora mai,
s9(2)(a)

Ngā mihi
Released
s9(2)(a)
Project Lead, The Disinformation Project
Co-Lead, Equity and Diversity Community of Interest, Te Pūnaha Matatini
Principal Investigator  Te Pūnaha Matatini
Te Pūnaha Matatini PhD Candidate Centre for Science in Society
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Instructions for Respondents
1.  Check that you have all the relevant documents, including:
•  The Request for Proposals (RFP) which outlines the procurement.
•  The Response Form (this one) to fill out your response.
•  The RFP-Terms. Read these carefully.
2.  Before filling out this form, read the RFP carefully, particularly Section 2 (Our Requirements) and Section 3
(Our Evaluation Approach). This helps you quickly decide if you are the right fit for the requirements.
3.  Please follow the layout of this Response Form:
•  Don’t change the section headings and sequence as this needs to be consistent across all Respondents.
•  Insert any extra images or graphs either as part of your answer or in a separate attachment (but make
it clear in the Response Form that you have done so).
•  Do not insert links to long documents if possible. They may not be viewed.
4.  Everything highlighted in PURPLE in this document is information for the Respondent (you). Delete these
PURPLE parts before sending the Response Form. Everything shaded in BLUE is customisable by you.
When you have completed these areas, please un-shade them.
The purple boxes are Supplier Tips. Delete these after reading.
Write your response in the blue sections. Un-shade the blue once you have filled these out.
5.  Remember to make a note of the Deadline for Questions. The Q & A section is really helpful for all
Respondents so feel free to ask us anything if it is unclear. Please send all questions to our point of contact.

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released
Request for Proposal Response Form – V2 June 2021

Page 1

Checklist for Respondents
Have you:
1. Filled out all sections of the Response Form.
2. Removed all the purple ‘Supplier Tip’ boxes from this Form.
3. Deleted the PURPLE instructions from this Form.
4. Un-shaded the BLUE highlighting where you fill out your answer.
5. File size: Your email attachment should be no greater than 20MB
6. Arranged for the declaration to be signed. If this is a joint or consortium Proposal make sure all
the consortium members sign separate declarations.
7. We require that you submit your response by sending a digital copy by email to our point of
contact;
COVID-19 Procurement
Email address: [email address]
8. Arranged for the Proposal to be submitted electronically before the Deadline for Proposals
4pm 25th March 2022.
under the Official Information Act 1982
[Attached completed response (25/03/2022) to Request for Proposal from
Released
The Disinformation
Project withheld in full under section 9(2)(ba) of the Act]
Request for Proposal Response Form – V2 June 2021

Page 2

Document 03
From:
s9(2)(a)
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:
Re: Contract for Services
Date:
Wednesday, 29 June 2022 11:33:30 am
Attachments:
.
The DIsinformation Project Contract for Services 22.06 (002) copy.pdf
Attached :)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)
Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)
On 29/06/2022, at 11:21 AM, s9(2)(g)(ii)  [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:
Hi s9(2)(a)
Good catch! Could you please re sign? I just updated it to todays date.
Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)

Sent: Wednesday, 29 June 2022 11:11 am
under the Official Information Act 1982
To: s9(2)(g)(ii)  [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Re: Contract for Services
Signed and attached though I note that the date for acceptance on page 2 of the
PDF is in July for my signature which I cannot change -  let me know if I need to sign
an accurately dated version. And apologies for missing your email on Monday - I am
not entirely sure what my inbox did there ...
Released

Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)

Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)

On 29/06/2022, at 11:00 AM, s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:

Hi s9(2)(a)

You can insert a signature on the PDF

Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)

Sent: Wednesday, 29 June 2022 10:58 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Re: Contract for Services
Importance: High

s9(2)(g)(ii)
Apologies
I didn’t see this email of yours from Monday. So legal
needs me to print the contract and sign it, or can I insert signature
into a PDF? Might as well ensure we get it right this time :).
under the Official Information Act 1982

Best,
s9(2)(a)
Released
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)

Principal Investigator

Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)

On 29/06/2022, at 10:52 AM,s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:

Hi s9(2)(a)

Just following up on my email below to see where you
got to with signing the contract.

Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Sent: Monday, 27 June 2022 9:52 am
To: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Subject: RE: Contract for Services

Hi s9(2)(a)

Unfortunately we cannot accept a copy pasted photo of
your signature inserted on the word doc.

Would it be easier for you to sign a PDF?

Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)

under the Official Information Act 1982
From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)

Sent: Thursday, 23 June 2022 11:28 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Re: Contract for Services

Released Large image of signature inserted here - sorry am already
away from desk for Matariki and without access to my
full computer suite.

Hope this suffices,

Best,
s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
On 23/06/2022, at 10:55 AM
[DPMC]s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:
Kia Ora s9(2)(a)
I just checked with Legal and we cannot
accept a typed name, we require a full
signature.
Thanks,
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Sent: Thursday, 23 June 2022 10:46 am
To: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Cc: s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Re: Contract for Services
Kia ora s9(2)(g)(ii)
Contract signed and attached. Please let me
know when this is executed as I will need to
invoice immediately as the team are
waiting payment.
Updated first 1/2 June report will be with
under the Official Information Act 1982
you on execution.
Noho ora mai,
s9(2)(a)
Released
On 22/06/2022, at 4:56 PM,
s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:
[Remainder of email trail withheld under section 9(2)(ba)]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

Reporting of online harms and threats against the COVID-19 Response
  The Parties
The Buyer:
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
NZBN 9429041904923
TSB Building, 174 Lambton Quay Wellington 6011

and
The Supplier:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
The Disinformation Project
  The Contract
under the Official Information Act 1982
Agreement
The Buyer appoints the Supplier to deliver the Services described in this Contract and the Supplier
accepts that appointment. This Contract sets out the Parties' rights and obligations.
Parts of this Contract
The documents forming this Contract are:
1.
Contract Details: This section
Released
2.
Schedule 1: Description of Services
3.
Schedule 2: Standard Terms and Conditions GMC Form 1 SERVICES | Schedule 2 (3rd Edition)
available at: www.procurement.govt.nz
4.
Any other attachments described at Schedule 1.
How to read this Contract
•  Together the above documents form the whole Contract
•  Any Supplier terms and conditions do not apply
1  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)
• Clause numbers refer to clauses in Schedule 2
• Words starting with capital letters have a special meaning. The special meaning is stated in the
Definitions section at clause 17 (Schedule 2).
Acceptance
In signing this Contract each Party acknowledges that it has read and agrees to be bound by it.
Signed for and on behalf of the Buyer:
Signed for and on behalf of the Supplier:
s9(2)(a)
_________________________________
(signature)
(signature) s9(2)(a)
Name:
Ruth Fairhall
Name:
Position:
DCE, COVID-19 Group
Position:
Director
Date:
Date

Contract Management and Personnel
Start Date
Date of execution
Reference Schedule 2 clause 1
End Date
29/07/2022
Reference Schedule 2 clause 1
Renewal
not applicable.
Reference Schedule 2 clause 1
Contract Managers
Reference Schedule 2 clause 4

under the Official Information Act 1982
Name:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(a)
Title / position:
Senior Advisor
Director
Address:
147 Lambton Quay
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Wellington
Phone:
s9(2)(a)

Released
Email:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Addresses for Notices
Reference Schedule 2 clause 14
2 [DPMC: 612396 updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

For the attention of:
s9(2)(g)(ii)

s9(2)(g)(ii)
Email:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
c.c. Contract Manager  s9(2)(g)(ii)
Delivery address:
Level 9 TSB
147 Lambton Quay
Wellington
Postal address:
Level 9 TSB
147 Lambton Quay
Wellington

Reference Schedule 2 clause 2.4

Approved Personnel
Name:
s9(2)(a)

Position:
Senior Research Fellow
Specialisation:
Social network analysis

Approved Personnel
Name:
s9(2)(a)
Position:
Researcher
Specialisation:
Plain language reporting

  Description of Services
under the Official Information Act 1982
Context
The current narratives of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation in New Zealand have mostly
related to vaccines, and COVID-19 Protection Framework (CPF) related health measures such as mask
wearing. Many of these narratives are woven into larger themes centred on mistrust of government,
international businesses; or concerns about side effects, medical safety, and long-term effects of the
vaccine and perceptions of COVID-19 restrictions.

While misinformation related to COVID-19 is still being circulated, and the general themes remain
Released
consistent, the volume of disinformation relating to the COVID-19 health measures has reduced
significantly in line with changes to mandatory public health measures.

It is anticipated that while COVID-19 public health measures remain in place, disinformation will
continue to be circulated to
COVID-19 response.
Understanding the shifts in the COVID-19 disinformation narratives posted on social media informs our
work on building public resilience and ensuring that people are aware of the misleading narratives and
have access to accurate public health information about COVID-19.
3  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

DPMC require snapshots of trends and changes in the Aotearoa New Zealand information environment
related to the Covid-19 protection framework and the broader Covid-19 response, and in particular,
mis/disinformation, in order to have access to actionable insights to inform decision-making and
strategic comms.
DPMC also seek a deep-dive report on issues widening anti-vaccination rhetoric and potential impacts,
unities

The reporting needs to draw objective evidence-based conclusions, and provide insights from that
evidence base.
Description of Services
The Supplier will provide:
1.  Fortnightly evidence-driven qualitative and quantitative analysis of the trends and signals in
the Aotearoa New Zealand open-source online landscape that indicate changes in the context
and nature of online content relating to COVID-19, particularly regarding mis/disinformation.
The parameters of this work includes the assessment of global trends and narratives, where
they intersect with observations made within the Aotearoa New Zealand landscape.

2.
ity for the Supplier to deliver a
report on a misinformation/disinformation topic of choice or critical emergent issues (agreed
with DPMC) related to Covid-19, health or public safety.

Additional requirements:
The Supplier will ensure:
3.  Methods for collecting data do not breach the Conditions of Use of the platforms from which
you draw observations, and that the collection of any data complies with the obligations in the
Privacy Act. In particular, this means that information that may identify an individual should
not be collected, or collected only if:
a.  It is for a lawful purpose connected to our (DPMC) functions and activities
b.  The information is necessary for that purpose.
4.  To ensure the reporting does not appear biased, a list of key terms and definitions along with
references clarifying where these terms are defined by other protocols must be included in
every report.
5.  Outside of the scope are any suggestions for government action, proposals for policy or
legislative measures. Any content that is cause for urgent or emergency action must be
under the Official Information Act 1982
referred to the appropriate agency i.e Netsafe or New Zealand Police.
6.  Where possible, the reporting must be succinct and concise when capturing emerging and
continuing narratives.
7.  Reporting can not contain any references of self-harm or harassment from groups or
individuals.
8.  The work conducted for DPMC (and any reports or analysis etc. that arise) is prepared only and
solely for DPMC. In practical terms this means that the work completed for the DPMC is not
shared with a
Released  ny other party in any other way. This includes on and offline public comment and
dissemination to other agencies.

How should the Services be delivered?
Services should be delivered in the form of succinct written reports.

4  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

Deliverables and Milestones
What are the key Deliverables or outputs?
Fortnightly Reports (2 reports total)
1X Out of Cycle Report (topic of choice)
*An index of key terms and their definitions must be attached to each report

The Supplier must email the reports to the [email address]

Deliverable/Milestone
Due date
Amount due (exc
GST)
9(2)(ba)
Month 1
1.  Report 1
15/06/22

2.  Report 2
29/06/22

3.  Out of Cycle Report (disinformation issues
13/07/22

Total (exc GST)  $27,187.50
Specific code of conduct / policies / health & safety / protective security / legislative
requirement
Privacy
The Supplier acknowledges its obligations under the Privacy Act, in particular the information privacy
principles, in providing the services to the Buyer. The Supplier will ensure that at all times during the
delivery of services to the Buyer that it is complying with clause 14 of Schedule 2 Standard Terms and
Conditions - Services.

Conflicts of interest
This clause is to be read together with clause 9 of Schedule 2.
The Supplier will make enquiries with all staff, including nominated personal, who are providing
Services pursuant to this contract, to determine whether they have any conflicts of interest related to
the Services being provided (this includes actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interests).
under the Official Information Act 1982
All persons must do his or her best to avoid a situation that may lead to a conflict of interest arising.
If a conflict of interest arises in relation to the Services, the personal must tell DPMC immediately (and
in writing). If a conflict of interest does arise the Parties must discuss, agree and record in writing
whether it can be managed and, if so, how it will be managed. Each party must pay its/his/her own
costs in relation to managing a conflict of interest.
Health & Safety
Released
The Supplier will:
a.  consult, cooperate and coordinate with the Buyer to the extent required by the Buyer to ensure that the
Buyer and the Supplier will each comply with their respective obligations under the Health and Safety at
Work Act 2015 as they relate to the Contract;
b.  perform its, and ensure that its Personnel perform their, obligations under the Contract in compliance with
its and their obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015;
c.  comply with all reasonable directions of the Buyer relating to health, safety and security; and
5  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

d.  report any health and safety incident, injury or near miss, or any notice issued under the Health and Safety at
Work Act 2015, to the Buyer to the extent that it relates to, or affects, the Contract.
e.  The Supplier has agreed to put additional Health, Safety and Security measures in place relevant to the
Services provided, and its staff as set out in Attachment 2.

Reference Schedule 2 clause 5.2
Report to:
Description of report
Quality measure
Due date
Contract Manager
Fortnightly analysis of
On time
Fortnightly
the trends and signals in  To the satisfaction
the Aotearoa New
of the contract
Zealand open-source
manager.
online landscape that
indicate changes in the
context and nature of
online content relating
to COVID-19

Out of Cycle Report
On time
13th of July
specific  To the satisfaction
topic of choice or critical  of the contract
emergent issues (agreed  manager
with DPMC) related to
Covid-19, health or
public safety.
  Charges
The following section sets out the Charges. Charges are the total maximum amount payable by the
Buyer to the Supplier for delivery of the Services. Charges include Fees, and where agreed, Expenses
and Daily Allowances. The Charges for this Contract are set out below.
Fees
Reference Schedule 2 clause 3

Fixed Fee
under the Official Information Act 1982
A fixed Fee of $$27,187.50 excluding GST.
Expenses
Reference Schedule 2 clause 3
Actual and reasonable   travel Expenses
If the Buyer expressly requires the Supplier to travel for any Services in writing, then the Buyer will pay
Released
the Supplier's actual and reasonable travel Expenses incurred in delivering the Services up to a total
maximum amount of $2000 excluding GST provided that:
•  the Buyer has given prior written consent to the Supplier incurring the Expense
•  the Expense is charged at actual and reasonable cost, and
•  the claim for Expenses is supported by GST receipts.
6  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)

Daily Allowance
Reference Schedule 2 clause 3
No Daily Allowances are payable.
  Invoices
Reference Schedule 2 Subject to clauses 3 and 11.7
The Supplier must send the Buyer an invoice for the Charges at the following times:
By the 20th of the month, for Services delivered during that month.
Address for invoices
Reference Schedule 2 clause 3

For the attention of:
s9(2)(g)(ii)

Address:
[email address]
cc: s9(2)(g)(ii)

Other instructions about invoices
The Supplier must include cost code [169-110] on each invoice, and the invoice must be in pdf format.
  Insurance
Reference Schedule 2 Clause 8.1
The Buyer does not require any specific insurance under this Contract other than the requirements
under clause 8.1 of Schedule 2.
  Changes to Schedule 2 and attachments
Attachments
Reference 'Contract documents' described at Page 1
•  The contracted personnel will complete Attachment 1: Declaration relating to a Contract for
Services with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
•  Attachment 2:
additional Health, Safety and Security measures
under the Official Information Act 1982

Released
7  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)
Attachment 1: Declaration relating to a Contract for Services with the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet
The Supplier must sign this declaration prior to commencing any work for the Buyer.
Name of
Contract for Service relating to Reporting of online harms and threats against the
Contract
COVID-19 Response
Supplier
The Disinformation Project
Relationship
Capitalised terms in this declaration have the meaning given to those terms in the
with Contract
Contract. Nothing in this declaration overrides or affects the terms of clauses 9 and
13 of Schedule 2 of the Contract and the Supplier must ensure it is familiar with those
clauses.
Confidentiality  The Supplier undertakes:
Reference
a. to be discreet in all matters relating to the Buyer and the New Zealand
Schedule 2
Government;
clause 13
b. not to read, copy, remove or access any information held on any Buyer
premises other than to perform its obligations under the Contract;
c. not to use such information to gain personal material advantage or for financial
benefit for any other person or organisation;
d. to comply with clause 13 of Schedule 2 of the Contract; and
e. to honour this declaration after the end of this Contract.
Code of
The Supplier undertakes during the period of this Contract to comply with the
Conduct
following documents:
a. Department of the Prime Minister and Ca
the Code of Conduct for the State Services (as updated from time to time by
the State Services Commission) relevant to the Services being provided;
b. All DPMC Policies relevant to Services being provided, including the Social
Media Policy.
Conflicts of
Circle the statement below that applies, after due enquiry by the Supplier:
Interests
The Party and its Personnel have no actual, potential or perceived Conflict
Yes
of Interest in relation to this Contract.
OR
The Party or Personnel have an actual, potential or perceived:
i.
financial interest, arrangement or affiliation; and/or
ii.
personal or fiduciary relationship; and/or
iii.
personal knowledge; and/or
iv.
other Conflict of Interest,
Yes
Relating to this Contract, details of which are below.
Name of Supplier or
Nature of conflict and how it will
under the Official Information Act 1982
Personnel
be managed
Signature
The Supplier makes this declaration after due enquiry and agrees to be bound by it.
For and behalf of the Supplier
s9(2)(a)
Released
(signature)
Name:s9(2)(a)
Title  Director
Date:  29/06/22
8  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

GMC Form 1 Crown for SERVICES (3rd Edition)


s9(2)(a), s9(2)(c)
under the Official Information Act 1982

Released
9  [DPMC: 612396   updated June 2020 ]

Document 04
s9(2)(a)
From:
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]
Cc:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Merran Cooke [DPMC]
Subject:
Re: Minor amendments to the contract
Date:
Thursday, 30 June 2022 4:27:51 pm
Attachments:
30.06Disinformation Project Contract for Services 30.06 copy.pdf
Importance:
High
Kia ora s9(2)(g)(ii)
No it was the date on page 2 for acceptance - but I have amended it to reflect today’s data,
resigned and annotated, signing any pages I have made changes to.
I hope this suffices.
Best,
s9(2)(a)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)
Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)
On 30/06/2022, at 3:19 PM, s9(2)(g)(ii)
[DPMC]
s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:
under the Official Information Act 1982
[IN-CONFIDENCE]
s9(2)(a)
Kia ora
Sincere apologies for this additional delay in completing the contract.
Our DCE has picked up a couple of things she would like changed in the contract
before she signs it. I have set these out below.
If you accept the changes, please resign the contract and return and we’ll get it
Released
signed asap.
Under Description of Services:
Point 7 – For clarification, we have replaced Reporting can not contain any
references of self-harm or harassment from groups or individuals with
7. Reporting cannot contain self-referenced accounts of self-harm or

harassment from groups or individuals.

Replaced typo in Fixed Fee (removed extra “$”)

Under Deliverables and Milestones:
Have changed the deliverable dates given the delay to execution dates.
·   Report 2 now due 06 July 2022
·   Out of Cycle report now due 20 July 2022

Attachment 2: under EAP Support for Staff
Unfortunately, we have referred to our Wellbeing Policy, and it appears that
contractors are not eligible to access DPMC EAP, regardless of what you have been
advised by other staff in DPMC. Could you please amend / strike out this clause.

Again, apologies
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Improvement
DPMC COVID-19 Group
M   s9(2)(a)
E   s9(2)(g)(ii)

The information contained in this email message is for the attention of the intended recipient only
and is not necessarily the official view or communication of the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet. If you are not the intended recipient you must not disclose, copy or distribute this
message or the information in it. If you have received this message in error, please destroy the
email and notify the sender immediately.

<4571779_The DIsinformation Project Contract for Services
30.06.DOCX><Disinformation Project Contract for Services 30.06.pdf>
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

s9(2)(g)(ii)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released
•
•

•
•
s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
30/06/2022
.
under the Official Information Act 1982
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(a)
Released
s9(2)(g)(ii)

s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

9(2)(ba)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released
•
•
•

s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(g)(ii)
•
•
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

under the Official Information Act 1982
s9(2)(a)
Released
s9(2)(a)
30/06/2022

s9(2)(a), s9(2)(c)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released
s9(2)(a)

Document 05
From:
s9(2)(a)
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]; s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]
Subject:
Reporting of online harms and threats against the Covid response - fortnightly report (1)
Date:
Monday, 11 July 2022 12:03:42 pm
Attachments:
DPMC report 11 July 2022.pdf
Kia ora s9(2)(g)(ii)
Please find attached the fortnightly report for the period 27/06 -07/07 in the revised format
which we propose will formulate future report structure. I note the feedback related to
length and perceived objectivity, which we have endeavoured to work within, noting that
requirements re evidence are described in the introduction in terms of the scope of the
landscape studied. If DPMC would like, we can provide numerical analysis over time of
the landscape which would sit alongside the reporting as a product to establish the grounds
for evidence base.
We propose that the next landscape report will be delivered 25/07, and the deep-dive in the
first week of August - does this timing work for you? Could you also provide me please
with the group email to deliver this material to?
I invoiced last week - I will resend and cc you s9(2)(g)(ii)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)
Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
s6(d)
Reporting of online harms and threats against the Covid-19 Response:
Fortnightly Update

SENSITIVE
11 July 2022
For the period 27 June to 7 July 2022

Kate Hannah, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Kayli Taylor
The Disinformation Project (TDP)

For further inquiries or should this report fall within the scope of an Official information Act
request, contact the Disinformation project Director, Kate Hannah
s9(2)(a)

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released
1

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
Executive Summary
•  The ever-changing mis- and disinformation landscape continues to evolve and shift, with
impacts on democracy, stable governance, and human lives.
•  Social media groups and channels studied have subscriber numbers in the hundreds of
thousands: 380,000 subscribers across 161 channels on Telegram; 956,685 followers
across 95 Facebook pages; 220,442 followers over 47 Instagram accounts.
•  The Ministry of Health’s communications are providing another tool for mis- and
disinformation producers to use to stir up fear and mistrust in public health institutions
and responses.
•  The overturning of Roe v Wade and unveiling of anti-abortion sentiment could have an
effect on the safety of abortion providers (both individuals and infrastructure), and to
those seeking abortion services in Aotearoa New Zealand.
•  QAnon rhetoric, further propelled by the recent re-emergence of Q, is present,
embedded, and growing in the ecologies we study.
•  s9(2)(c)

•  Mis- and disinformation subscribers rely on racism to blame and ostracize. This has
implications for social cohesion and contributes to a muddying of conversations about
‘free speech’.
•  Frames and themes of misogyny dominate ecologies we study – with effects on norm-
shifting and changing what is ‘acceptable’ in Aotearoa New Zealand.
•  Queerphobia and harms against the LGBTQ+ community are commonplace, with
religious and nationalist frames being used to scapegoat.
•  Sov-Cit rhetoric and the use of ‘paper terrorism’ are increasing in Aotearoa New Zealand
– which will have effects on frontline Police, and the way Justice and other agencies
operate.
•  The genuine cost of living crisis and fuel increases are having an impact on the way New
Zealanders feel and live – something that is being weaponised by mis- and
disinformation producers.
under the Official Information Act 1982
•  The belief that the Christchurch Terror Attack was a ‘false flag’ continue to grow in
prominence in the ecologies we study, with effects on whānau of victims, the Muslim
community, mistrust in government, and de-sensitisation to violence.

Released
2

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
Introduction
Disinformation is a threat to democracy,1 stable governance,2 and human life.3 Since the start of
the Covid19 pandemic and its associated infodemic,4 disinformation and its impact on people
and society in Aotearoa New Zealand has grown. The Disinformation Project (TDP) has analysed
this since February 2020, paying particular attention to the volume, velocity, and vector of
information. We use daily data collection and analysis (which form the basis of this summary
report), use computational and manual tools to scan open-source social media post and
commentary across a wide range of social media platforms, websites, and media/alternative
media organisations. The information landscape studied is developed using ‘snowball’
techniques, which means that we have expanded the inclusion of pages, groups, and channels
only when they are signalled by existing locations of study.

Within the social media ecologies studied, key individuals and groups producing mis- and
disinformation capitalise on growing uncertainty and anxiety amongst communities, related to
Covid-19 public health interventions, including vaccination and lockdowns, to build fear,
disenfranchisement, and division. Mis- and disinformation is also particularly targeting and
scapegoating already marginalised or vulnerable communities – for whom distrust of the state is
the result of intergenerational trauma and lived experience of discrimination or harm, which can
increase engagement with conspiratorial explanations and disinformation. Over the past two
and a half years of research, TDP has developed a thorough and balanced understanding of the
harms that mis- and disinformation and ‘dangerous speech’ present to social cohesion, freedom
of expression, inclusion, and safety. (See Appendix One for our definitions of these terms).

The landscape studied – Covid-19
The landscape studied originated as locations engaged in mis- and disinformation related to
Covid-19 and the Covid-19 response, and our study, the type of content produced and shared
within this landscape has shifted over time, so other narratives and themes within this
landscape now form part of our analysis.

For example, on September 26, 2021, the Telegram channels we studied totalled 44,267
subscribers; as of July 1, 2022, we analyse daily 161 Telegram channels with 380,000
subscribers. While there is no feasible ethical method for de-duplication, the growth – and
under the Official Information Act 1982
similar growth of both locations (pages, groups, accounts) and followers on Facebook and
Instagram – signals increasing interest in these ideas, and continued engagement with content
despite the shifts in narrative and theme we note above.

For the purposes of this reporting, we focus on online harms and threats against the Covid-19
response, including people and places associated with the Covid-19 response. This includes
covid denialism, covid minimisation, anti-vaccination messaging (which is increasingly spilling

Released
1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf
2 Ibid.
3 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/covid-misinformation-is-killing-people1/;
https://www.axios.com/2022/04/21/barack-obama-disinformation-social-media
4 https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic
3

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
from vaccination against Covid-19 into other types of vaccination, including vaccination for
tamariki), and anti-mandate/anti-public health measures messaging. These are the four
dominant types of messaging that TDP observes in its study of the mis- and disinformation
ecologies within Aotearoa New Zealand.

The landscape studied – shifts and developments
As the pandemic has, and continues to, shift and adapt; so too do the focuses of mis- and
disinformation producers and their subscribers. We outline these more thoroughly in our two
most recent public reports.5 A short summary below.
•  In our paper published November 2021, we warned about the way Covid-19 related mis-
and disinformation were being used as a kind of Trojan Horse to push followers and
subscribers towards far-right and extremist ideologies.
•  The Parliament Protest saw a large and ideologically diverse group of people brought
together to advocate for highly divergent causes. Protestors had highly divergent
understandings of the protest, its intentions, and its reception within non-protestors.
There is also a high chance that protestors were radicalised during the protest. For
example, they may have gone to protest one issue, e.g. vaccine mandates; and instead
find themselves exposed to a wide array of extremist ideology.
•  The causes advocated for and against by mis- and disinformation producers is constantly
shifting. Current concerns include Three Waters reform, abortion law (in the wake of the
overturning of Roe v Wade in the US), the rise of Sovereign Citizen rhetoric, support for
the invasion of Ukraine, and the rights of LGBTQ+ people in Aotearoa New Zealand. As
the media and social landscape of Aotearoa New Zealand continues to pivot and
highlight diverse issues, so too do mis- and disinformation producers and their
subscribers adopt new concerns.
•  The end of the Parliament Protest does not symbolise a neat ending to conspiratorial
thought in Aotearoa New Zealand. Such ideologies continue, adapting and growing at
pace. The responsibility falls to renewing our efforts for social cohesion, honouring Te
Tiriti o Waitangi, and reflecting critically on our past, shared present, and collective
hopes for the future.

under the Official Information Act 1982

5 Hannah, Kate, Sanjana Hattotuwa, and Kayli Taylor. "Mis- and Disinformation in Aotearoa New Zealand from 17
Released
August to 5 November 2021." 2021.: https://thedisinfoproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2021-11-09-FINAL-
working-paper-disinformation..pdf; Hannah, Kate, Sanjana Hattotuwa, and Kayli Taylor. "The Murmuration of
Information Disorders: Aotearoa New Zealand’s Mis- and Disinformation Ecologies and the Parliament Protest."
2022.: https://thedisinfoproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-murmuration-of-information-disorders-May-
2022-Report-FULL-VERSION.pdf
4

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
Health disinformation
Health disinformation, and the responses to Covid-19 and other disease, form the bulk of the
focus on mis- and disinformation producers within Aotearoa New Zealand – and thus TDP’s
research focus.

One narrative that proliferates within the ecologies studied by TDP is that Covid-19 isn’t as bad
as the media, public health officials, and Governments say. This narrative emerged in 2020 and
grew over 2021. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Delta outbreak from August 2021 and onset of
Omicron have fueled this narrative. This leads to the undermining of public health messaging
from MoH and UAC in attempts to get (1) children vaccinated against Covid-19, (2) getting
people, especially children, vaccinated against the flu, (3) getting adults boosted, and (4) getting
eligible adults boosted again.6

Public health commentary is consistently misinterpreted. For example, an interview from
Professor Michael Baker on increased mortality is repackaged by alternative media organization
Counterspin Media blaming harm related to the vaccine. This conceptualization is normative in
the landscape studied.

Against the backdrop of rising case numbers and the increase of deaths across the country,
Counterspin Media’s decontextualization is dangerous and completely at odds with the thrust of
the interview. This is sophisticated disinformation – using professional media productions in
service of Counterspin Media’s conspiratorial and disinformation narrative production. Such
disinformation production has consequences for how people interact with, and trust,
mainstream media, and public health messaging.

s9(2)(g)(i)
.
7 The wilful misinterpretation of this messaging is promoted by the most
influential producers, such as Voices for Freedom, with widespread social media and direct
under the Official Information Act 1982
marketing reach to over 200,000 New Zealanders, and likely impact on further vaccination
campaigns for childhood vaccines.

Newshub Journalist Michael Morrar’s piece on the poor estimation on testing capacity in the
early Omicron peak,8 and the claims of one union representative that the Ministry’s stance
amounted to ‘misinformation’ was flagged in the ecologies we study. This labelling is now
instrumentalised in a number of ways: (1) to deem the term meaningless, (2) that the
government was promoting misinformation (with negative effects on public trust), (3) and that
Released

6 For an example of this, see the section on harassment of Dr Jin Russell.
7 https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/470282/significant-second-wave-of-omicron-may-already-be-here
8 https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/06/omicron-testing-backlog-review-finds-ministry-of-health-
failed-to-accurately-estimate-nz-s-lab-capacity.html
5

SENSITIVE: Not for public distribution
research on mis- and disinformation (such as TDP) doesn’t look at such ‘misinformation’ because
of hidden agendas to silence mis- and disinformation producers and/or to silence truth.

Trust in institutions is important, particularly during a pandemic. We are observing across the
ecologies we study and from groups with previously high trust, that trust in Government, public
health institutions, and the Ministry of Health is waning. Continuation of the current erosion of
trust will have dangerous implications for the way the Ministry of Health and other public-health
related government organisations in Aotearoa New Zealand interact with its peoples.

International contexts
Roe vs Wade
Following the overturning of Roe vs Wade and the removal of constitutional right to abortion for
people with uteruses in the United States, mis- and disinformation ecologies studied by TDP
celebrated the decision, and pivoted attention to abortion laws in Aotearoa. This attitude is
widespread and consistent across the diverse groups and individuals represented in our location
of study. For example, a video posted to YouTube, critiquing the PM’s response9 to SCOTUS’s
decision by a prominent Christchurch disinformation producer has been viewed, at time of
writing, over 1700 times with 240 likes and over 100 comments. The video uses graphic and
inaccurate frames designed to antagonize and incite.
s9(2)(c)
under the Official Information Act 1982

Released
9 PM Jacinda Ardern slams US abortion ruling, but Chris Luxon avoids reaction,
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/129080107/pm-jacinda-ardern-slams-us-abortion-ruling-but-chris-luxon-avoids-
reaction
s9(2)(c)
6

QAnon
QAnon is a wide-ranging and baseless internet conspiracy with origins in the United States and
global influence.11 Broadly, adherents to the conspiracy theory believe that a collection of Satan-
worshipping political leaders, celebrities and billionaires rule the world – including engaging in
paedophilia, human trafficking, and the harvesting of blood from children. Supporters of QAnon
were involved in the attempting coup at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021.12

QAnon ideas are common in the mis- and disinformation ecologies studied. The return of
anonymous poster ‘Q’, instigator of the QAnon conspiracy theory the same weekend as the
overturning of Roe v Wade saw an increase in the discussion of QAnon discourses here. One local
disinformation producer posted celebrated the overturning of Roe v Wade, claiming that abortion is
one way the organ trade operated in the US.

The presence of QAnon ideas is of concern in Aotearoa New Zealand for several reasons:
•  QAnon, and the sentiment it encourages represents a militant and anti-establishment
ideology and is associated with declining trust in institutions in the United States.
•  Radicalisation, the erosion of trust in social and democratic institutions, and reductions in
social cohesion are some of the effects we may see as a result of the spread of QAnon
related ideologies and ideals across Aotearoa New Zealand.
•  QAnon frames align closely with Russian disinformation, queerphobia, misogyny; as well as
content that goes against democracy. Such content is aimed at public institutions in the
United States, but is toxic to domestic cultures, communities, and contexts.

QAnon is not just limited to social media (Telegram, but present across Meta and Twitter), but takes
place in offline settings, such as public meetings across the country called ‘Save the Children’, which
bring the QAnon conspiracy here and place it into a local context for the audience –framed around
abuse in state care, and specifically targeting Oranga Tamariki, Police, and other agencies as
perpetrators of the harms that the conspiracy focuses on.

QAnon social media content and frames, shared into and on NZ-based accounts, groups, and
channels is consistently the most violent content we discover in our research.

s9(2)(c)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

11 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/25/qanon-conspiracy-theory-explained-trump-what-is
12 https://www.bbc.com/news/53498434

7

National impacts
TDP is observing the effects of an information void as Covid-19 and its impacts are less focused on by
institutions, including government agencies. In the absence of narrative frames, an information void
develops, one that mis- and disinformation producers are now filling with alternative narrative
frames which rely on racism, misogyny, queerphobia, and pseudo-law. In an environment with less
counter-messaging, these are growing at pace.

Racism
Disinformation producers rely on frames that articulate, amplify, and normalise racism – and
establish the right to offend and be offensive as a pillar of free speech. Hate speech and harmful
speech are framed as free speech – allowing the generation of logic that any criticism is an attempt
to ‘cancel’ or censor them.

This is further emphasised by requests from disinformation producers to ‘chat’, ‘discuss ideas’, or
‘debate’ ideas with public figures. When their requests are denied or ignored, it can be framed as a
refusal to engage in ‘free debate’ or an attempt at cancelling.

One example of the anti-Māori racism that saturates mis- and disinformation ecosystems is the
response to Matariki. 24 June 2022, Aotearoa New Zealand’s first public holiday to acknowledge
Matariki, the Māori New Year, generated criticism and anti-Māori racism within the ecologies
studied by TDP. The public holiday saw common and widespread themes re-articulated, including He
Puapua, Three Waters, Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, co-governance, and
denial of Māori indigeneity. These themes target Māori (both collectively and individually, such as
Foreign Minister Nanaia Matuha) with harassment and violence. The widespread rejection of the
premise of the new holiday has impacts for social cohesion.

Misogyny
Themes and frames of toxic masculinity and misogyny are commonly and normatively expressed
mis- and disinformation ecologies studied by TDP. Critically, these frames are used to recruit further
subscribers and to target women’s participation in public life. Effects of these widespread frames are
already being felt by women and gender minorities, and resulting in norm-shifting, where the use of
misogyny and language of threats and violence is accepted in Aotearoa New Zealand. Misogynistic
framing – particularly around the roles of men and women in families and public life – is the most
common unifying frame we observe in the ecosystems studied. Examples during the period of
analysis focus on abortion rights, motherhood, and the role of men, and continue to provide both
under the Official Information Act 1982
tools for recruitment and for targeted harassment of women and gender minorities.

Released

8

Queerphobia13
The publicity around Bethlehem College in Tauranga14 and burning of Rainbow Youth15 continue to
provide narrative frames about LGBTQ+ people in Aotearoa New Zealand.

In the last fortnight, an Auckland-based misinformation producer whose main platform is Facebook
attacked the visibility of LGBTQ+ people in public life, saying:
“I am so glad that New Zealand has not stooped as low as the United States when it comes
to children and sexual ideology. This seems crazy to me that people are okay with children
being around hyper sexualised environments. I would love to have some LGBTQ members
on the podcast with me to talk about the difference between celebrating ourselves and
where the lines should be when it comes to children. If you would like to join me and chat
then let’s sit down for an open and honest conversation.”

Another Auckland-based producer, mainly present on Telegram, was motivated by Spark’s new
campaign aiming to create inclusion for non-binary people16 has attacked non-binary people. He
claims Spark’s campaign is “using [minorities’] stories to create falsehoods and distort social
realities” which will damage the “great nation”. His original post is shared into over 25 Telegram
channels.

A Christchurch-based disinformation producer active on Facebook and YouTube strategically and
intentionally misappropriates a Biblical passage (Pride goes before destruction, Proverbs 16:18), thus
targeting Pride and LGBTQ+ communities as ‘sin’. The PM’s attendance at a Pride festival from years
ago is highlighted, drawing her into the ‘sin of Pride’.

In June, ‘online’ harms and discrimination against the Queer community17 became a real display of
violence with the burning of Rainbow Youth offices in Tauranga.18  Safety, and feelings of safety, for
the LGBTQ+ community are placed at risk every time dangerous, hateful, and harmful rhetoric is
posited against them.19

Anti-establishment / sov-cit
Since 2021, TDP has analyzed the domestic growth of Sovereign Citizen (Sov-Cit) ideologies. The Sov-
Cit movement emerged in the United States in the mid-1970s. Adherents view governments as
illegitimate and corrupt and view themselves and living outside of the required confines of the law.20
Since the Covid-19 pandemic, Sov-Cits in the US have pivoted into sharing Covid-19 related mis- and
disinformation – including attending anti-vaccination and anti-mask events.21 One tool of Sov-Cit
rhetoric is ‘paper terrorism’, meaning when they get frustrated with the authorities or public
institutions they retaliate with bogus legal claims that waste time and resources.22 Sov-Cits have also
under the Official Information Act 1982
been known to use violence and threats of harm. TDP is observing Sov-Cit rhetoric in Aotearoa New
Zealand’s mis- and disinformation ecologies – which will have negative effects on public safety,
including that of frontline Police officers.

13 TDP is using ‘queerphobia’ as an umbrella term to describe harms against members of the LGBTQ+ community.
14 https://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/taurangas-bethlehem-college-criticised-for-discriminatory-
marriage-belief/ACKCSXMNTDGQ5CRCLF7AMTWZXY/
15 https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/469221/rainbow-youth-tauranga-drop-in-centre-destroyed-in-suspicious-fire
16 https://www.spark.co.nz/online/beyondbinarycode/about/
Released
17 https://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/taurangas-bethlehem-college-criticised-for-discriminatory-
marriage-belief/ACKCSXMNTDGQ5CRCLF7AMTWZXY/
18 https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/469221/rainbow-youth-tauranga-drop-in-centre-destroyed-in-suspicious-fire
19 For more, read TDP researcher Kayli Taylor’s short piece on hate speech: https://thedisinfoproject.org/2022/06/18/hate-
speech-in-aotearoa-new-zealand-reflecting-and-resisting/
20 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53654318
21 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement
22 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement

9

In the last fortnight TDP has observed repeated posting on Telegram by an individual regarding their
interactions with Police, and other content espoused by this person. In one visit, the individual
records an interaction with Police, who advise him to take down two videos which feature graphic
violence that were posted to his Telegram channel in April. The video shows two entirely separate
worldviews: one connected to domestic laws and policing, and one that is inextricably entwined with
and based on Sov-Cit vocabularies and beliefs.

A faux ‘sheriff’ van, inspired by the local ‘sheriff’ movement (which itself is inspired by Sov-Cit
rhetoric) is celebrated on Telegram. The van says ‘Stop 3 Waters’, and has pictures of Chris Hipkins,
James Shaw, Nanaia Mahuta, Trevor Mallard, Ashley Bloomfield, Chris Luxon, Andrew Little, Jacinda
Ardern, and Grant Robertson.

TDP also analysed a letter sent to a Judge of the Supreme Court23, and featured in the Nuremburg
NZ Telegram channel, featuring a range of pseudo-science links and urging them to support their
efforts to bring people in NZ who have been involved with the Covid-19 response to justice. This is
the perfect example of paper terrorism. Not only is the letter, in its harassing nature and with its
ridiculous demands a form of paper terrorism; but it makes reference to other behaviours that could
be interpreted as the same: repeated emails to government and public health officials.

Sov-Cit rhetoric and its dismissal of Police jurisdiction could have serious effects on social cohesion,
and the safety of individuals across police, government, elections, and public health. The rise in
‘paper terrorism’, and bombardment of law and other agencies with pseudo-legal claims will have
impacts on the way these agencies operate and function.

Christchurch Terror Attack
Content warning: Discussions of the Christchurch Terror Attack

The harmful and disturbing lie that the Christchurch Terror Attack was a ‘False Flag’24 is present
within the mis- and disinformation ecologies studied by TDP. The Three Faced Killer, a ‘documentary’
under the Official Information Act 1982
in three parts by Michael O’Bernicia trivialises the attacks and includes video footage from the attack
– which is classified in Aotearoa New Zealand as objectionable material.25 The second part has been
released and features extended cuts from the Christchurch killer's livestream - just like Part One,
which was also deemed objectionable by the Classification Office.26 Like Part One, Part Two of the

23 The letter is addressed to Chief Justice William Young, who left the Supreme Court in April 2022. The email address
Released
however, is for Chief Justice Helen Winkelmann, who is now the Chief Justice. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall
label as ‘a justice of the Supreme Court’.
24 https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/what-is-a-false-flag/
25 https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/news-items/christchurch-mosque-attack-livestream-classification-
decision/
26 Chief Censor Bans The Three Faced Terrorist, a ‘documentary’ about the March 15 Mosque attacks,
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/news-items/chief-censor-bans-the-three-faced-terrorist-a-documentary-
about-the-march-15-mosque-attacks/

10

‘documentary’ has been banned.27 While Part Two has been banned, like Part One and the original
video footage of the attack s9(2)(c)

While TDP and Te Mana Whakaatu – Classification Office brace for Part Three, we note that
subscribers to mis- and disinformation ecologies who posted the video will likely have observed it –
deeply disturbing material that displays, at least in part, the attack of 15 March. The impacts on
mental health, on perceptions of violence, and desensitisation28 are myriad.

The lie that the terrorist attack was a false flag is harmful to the communities and whānau most
affected by the violence, further generating harm against the Muslim community for an event that
has already caused significant harm. The continued accusation that the terrorist attack was
orchestrated by the Government serves only to cement distrust of the state and institutions. This
will have long-tail effects on the way subscribers to mis- and disinformation ecologies interact with
public institutions.

under the Official Information Act 1982

Released

27 https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/news-items/acting-chief-censor-bans-video-featuring-the-march-15-
mosque-attacks/
28 https://www.apa.org/topics/video-games/violence-harmful-effects

11

Appendix One: Definitions

Misinformation: “false information that people didn’t create with the intent to hurt others”
Disinformation: “false information created with the intention of harming a person, group, or
organization, or even a company”
Malinformation: “true information used with ill intent”29

Conspiracy theory: purported explanations which cite a conspiracy at the salient cause of some
event or phenomenon.30

Dangerous speech: “dangerous speech is any form of expression (e.g., speech, text, or images) that
can increase the chances that its audience will condone or participate in violence against members
of another group.”31

Hallmarks of dangerous speech:
• Dehumanisation
• Coded language
• Accusation in a mirror
• Threat to group integrity or purity
• Assertion of attack against women and girls
• Questioning in-group loyalty

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

29 Berentson-Shaw J and Elliot M. Misinformation and Covid-19: a briefing for media. Wellington: The Workshop; (2020).
30 Dentith MRX. Conspiracy theories and philosophy: bringing the epistemology of a freighted term into the social sciences.
In JE Uscinki (ed.) Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press; (2018).
31 The Dangerous Speech Project, Dangerous Speech: A Practical Guide: 19 April 2021 https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/

12

Appendix Two: TDP’s work to report and flag content to minimise harm to New
Zealanders
9(2)(ba)

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

13

Document 06
Reporting of online harms and threats against the Covid-19 Response:
Fortnightly Update
SENSITIVE
25 July 2022
For the period 8 July to 22 July 2022
Kate Hannah, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Kayli Taylor
The Disinformation Project (TDP)
For further inquiries or should this report fall within the scope of an Official information Act
request, contact the Disinformation project Director, Kate Hannah
s9(2)(a)

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

Executive Summary
-
Aotearoa New Zealand’s disinformation ecologies are a complex and shifting
phenomena that is having and will continue to have impacts on human and national
security.
-
Social media groups and channels studied have subscriber numbers in the hundreds of
thousands: 380,000 subscribers across 161 channels on Telegram; 956,685 followers
across 95 Facebook pages; 220,442 followers over 47 Instagram accounts.
-
Disinformation producers continue to target vaccinations as harmful, masks as
ineffective, and all public health measures as ridiculous.
-
Monkeypox has been imbricated into conspiratorial thinking and denialism.
-
The image of the PM, other senior government officials, and youth MPs unmasked is a
gift to disinformation ecologies and is an accelerant for worsening information disorders
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
-
Identity-based harassment, including racism and misogyny, continue to rise in the
ecologies studied by TDP.
-
TDP witnessed more Sov-Cit rhetoric this fortnight, including threats to bring the PM to
trial.
-
TDP is increasingly concerned about the threat of stochastic terrorism in NZ.
-
The white supremacist ‘Great Replacement Theory’ is referenced without critique in
domestic Telegram channels by NZ-based producers.
-
TDP notes how easy it is to move from domestic anti-vaccination and anti-mandate
Telegram channels to channels promoting violent extremism and other harms.
-
Sri Lanka’s unrest has captured the attention of mis- and disinformation ecologies
studied by TDP. The protest activity is held up as an example of how to revolt against
government – including in Aotearoa New Zealand.
-
Former Japanese President Abe’s assassination was reported on Telegram faster than
many mainstream media outlets picked it up, and later framed conspiratorially.
-
Mis- and disinformation producers oppose Three Waters reform, muddy the issue, and
protest visibly.
-
Russian disinformation continues to be shared amongst ecologies studied by TDP,
including domestically produced content in Russian.
-
Mainstream media has promoted misinformation, and thus bolstered its producers.
under the Official Information Act 1982
-
Schools are, as we have described over the past year, increasingly contested sites where
efforts to increase social cohesion such as the new history curriculum are poised to
become embattled.

Released

2

Health disinformation
TDP observes in studied ecologies health disinformation related to Covid-19 denialism and
minimisation, anti-public health rhetoric, and anti-vaccination messaging. The emergence of
Monkeypox has also drawn the attention of mis- and disinformation ecologies.

A large and popular disinformation group which focuses on women and families’ features
another disinformation narrator claiming “You can statistically show that the vaccines have been
increasing the deaths” and represents the Covid-19 vaccine as a “device that changes the way
our immune system works.” These represent explicit claims that what is being named as Covid-
19 related deaths are instead vaccine-related. Another high profile and popular woman
disinformation producer posts videos alleging that Covid-19 vaccines cause myocarditis, heart
issues, heart attacks and essentially, kill people. This denial of the effects of Covid-19 is highly
palatable as it offers a neat explanation for excess death.
s9(2)(g)(i)
Anti-mask discourses and the promotion of the misuse of mask exemptions are widespread.
Multiple disinformation producers appear to be building up to a crescendo that will be
unleashed in its full force if/when stronger mask mandates are announced by Government. Any
capitulation is also packaged as evidence of their power and influence – ie the strong advice to
schools that falls short of an actual mask mandate is understood within the location of study as
evidence of the fear of their growing movement.

Media reporting on Monkeypox cases in Aotearoa New Zealand1 has been recognised within the
ecosystems studied by TDP. Monkeypox has been immediately drawn into anti-public health
measures across mis- and disinformation ecologies studied by TDP. A poll on Telegram from an
alternative ‘news’ organisation which produces and promotes disinformation highlights
resistance to a lockdown, as well as the belief that the New Zealand government will introduce a
lockdown as a system for control (of both people, and virus). Broadly, Telegram’s reception to
under the Official Information Act 1982
Monkeypox is discourse is exclusively ridicule and rejection. The thrust of comment responses to
this poll includes anti-vaccination, anti-mandate, anti-government, Covid-19 denialism, and
Monkeypox denialism. Monkeypox has been drawn into the same operation of conspiratorial
thought in which Covid-19 is viewed.

This graph compares interactions of the Unite Against Covid-19 Facebook page against that of
the high-profile woman disinformation producer whose livestream content was the most
popular during the Parliamentary occupation.
Released

1 New Zealand's first case of monkeypox detected in Auckland, https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/300633595/new-zealands-
first-case-of-monkeypox-detected-in-auckland

3

As the graph shows, since January 2022 the
misinformation producer has received
nearly four times the number of
engagements than the Unite Against Covid-
19 page. While the majority of this was
over February-March 2022, this individual
remains slightly higher interactions in May
and June 2022.

A maskless Prime Minister
Against a backdrop of worsening
information disorders, rising Covid-19
infections and re-infections, and a health
system on the verge of collapse,2 an image
of a mask-less Prime Minister, Governor
General, other MPS, and youth MPs is a gift
to mis- disinformation ecosystems and an accelerant for worsening information disorders in
Aotearoa New Zealand.

TDP has written over 30 pages, summarising the response from both mis- and disinformation
ecologies and those not subscribed, including politicians – current and former – and academics.
In the interest of brevity, we will summarise a few points below.

Mis- and disinformation ecologies latched on immediately, and significantly, with a variety of
responses. Some labelled the Prime Minister hypocritical, others used it as an opportunity to
allege that masking is not effective, some highlighted other posts from Youth MPs in which
individuals are seen mask-less, and some labelled the PM’s rhetoric as “Do as I say, not do as I
do”. No mis- and disinformation producer has achieved the level of undermining of public health
measures as this image has. Within mis- and disinformation ecologies, it has further undermined
the government’s own public health guidelines, policies, and communications in ways that TDP
expects to have longtail effects.

under the Official Information Act 1982
Discourse on Twitter shows 221 tweets on the subject, reaching a potential 46,920 followers.
These tweets generated 2662 retweets (including quote tweets). TDP noted last week that trust
in government and public health organisations from those with previously high trust in these
groups is being eroded. This image further erodes this trust – with implications on how future
public health responses are likely to be received.

Disinformation ecologies already had anti-public health measure views, which manifested into
anti-masking rhetoric. TDP stresses that all future expressions of anti-mask sentiment will be
Released
appreciated by the PM’s maskless photo on social media. Thus, pushback against mask use is
strengthened by the PM’s own actions.

2 Covid-19 NZ: Why the rising tide of cases doesn't tell the whole story,
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/explained/129256918/covid19-nz-why-the-rising-tide-of-cases-doesnt-tell-the-whole-story

4

In sum, the image presents a serious and unprecedented issue in domestic information
disorders – the magnitude of which is yet to fully be seen. This image, alongside decreasing
public and official communication creates a new foundation for mis- and disinformation to
thrive.

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

5

Beyond health disinformation – other trends of the ecosystem
Identity-based targeting and harassment
TDP has repeatedly pointed to the ways in which Covid-19 mis- and disinformation ecosystems
are drawing people towards conservative ideologies, far-right views, and racism.

This fortnight, disinformation producers across Telegram and Facebook promoted an online
petition against calling this country Aotearoa, which was hosted on the anti-Māori Hobsons
Pledge website. Racism is deeply intertwined with the disinformation ecologies studied by TDP –
with impacts on all of Aotearoa New Zealand and its efforts for social cohesion. There has been
a notable increase in both antisemitic and Islamophobic content in commentary in the period of
study.

Additionally, themes and frames of toxic masculinity and the operations of misogyny are present
and highly volatile across the mis- and disinformation ecologies studied by TDP. For example,
the Freedom and Rights Coalition promotes “real men” joining a “Million-Man March” in
Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch with language such as “Men of this nation will gather up
their wives, sons and daughters and say, “Let’s make history and stand for our freedoms, our
rights and let’s get our nation back.” The language is heteronormative, erases gender diverse
identities, and frames a highly misogynistic expectation that men need to “fight” to save the
nation from its current “collapse”. Disinformation producers who are women are also involved
in the production and promotion of material with harms to gender equality and the lives and
safety of women and gender minorities.

Sovereign Citizen
Since 2021, TDP has borne witness to the domestic growth of Sovereign Citizen (Sov-Cit). The
Sov-Cit movement emerged in the United States in the mid-1970s. Adherents view governments
as illegitimate and corrupt and view themselves and living outside of the required confines of
the law.3 Since the Covid-19 pandemic, Sov-Cits in the US have pivoted into sharing Covid-19
related mis- and disinformation – including attending anti-vaccination and anti-mask events.4
One tool of Sov-Cit rhetoric is ‘paper terrorism’, meaning when they get frustrated with the
authorities or public institutions they retaliate with bogus legal claims that waste time and
resources.5 Sov-Cits have also been known to use violence and threats of harm. TDP is observing
under the Official Information Act 1982
Sov-Cit rhetoric in Aotearoa New Zealand’s mis- and disinformation ecologies – which will have
negative effects on public safety, including that of frontline Police officers. TDP notes that Sov-
Cit rhetoric is now strong enough offline to make mainstream media news.6

s9(2)(a)

Other disinformation producers continue to travel the
country promoting Sov-Cit ideas and spreading conspiratorial thought.

Released

3 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53654318
4 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement
5 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement
6 https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/129313220/trials-and-tribulations-during-mans-troubled-court-appearance

6

A high profile former mainstream journalist disinformation producer interviews another a fringe
disinformation producer who has been promoting Sov-Cit rhetoric and his encounters with
Police on his Telegram channel. This narrator and second speaker ‘interview’ technique provides
and powerful form of dangerous speech that validates fringe ideas through the medium of a
‘news’ style interview conducted by someone with status within that space.

In the post accompanying the video, the interviewer says “we must create change at a local
level… Take out your cameras, and make a lot of noise! Demand Change!” The video itself
amplifies Russian disinformation, vaccine related disinformation, and re-features previous
content from the interviewer alleging children are dying from the Covid-19 vaccine. Towards the
end of the video, the interviewee questions the Police, vaccine clinics, and anyone associated
with power. When asked to say something to PM Ardern, the interviewee says, “Resign and get
ready for trial.”

Methods of engagement and protest
TDP observes a variety of methods of engagement and protest within the disinformation
ecologies we study. Some of these are tools currently being implemented, like public protest
and use of the mainstream media. Some are hinted at – realities that TDP is increasingly
concerned we will witness in Aotearoa New Zealand. One example of this is stochastic terrorism.

On 8 July, following the release of a publication called ‘The Hard Reset’, the Counterterrorism
Group (CTG) in the United States released a flash alert warning that the publication would
“almost certainly” increase extremist violent attacks across the country.7 They noted that the
motive behind the publication was to encourage white supremacists and anti-government
individuals to take violent action.

s9(2)(c)
TDP
has read the document and agrees with CTG regarding the tone and thrust of the content. We
cannot make an assessment about potential offline consequences of the availability of the
document in a domestic context. However, given the content of the document and the irrigated
path dependencies established by prior TVEC content, s9(2)(c)


under the Official Information Act 1982

We are observing the very real threat of stochastic violence and terrorism. The ease of access to
‘The Hard Reset’ and other materials across s9(2)(c)
highlight that Aotearoa New Zealand is
reaching a point where kinetic harms including, but not limited to, stochastic terrorism are
inevitable.

The Great Replacement Theory in Aotearoa New Zealand
One disinformation producer, s9(2)(c)
signals The Great Replacement Theory’s
Released
central thesis: that the white population, suffering from declining birth rates, is being ‘replaced’

7 https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/flash-alert-high-risk-of-violence-with-the-publication-of-the-hard-reset-a-
terrorgram-publication

7

by immigrants. He names it in the context of the Dutch farmers protests, alleging he heard
about dropping birth rates amongst white people in the Netherlands, and high immigration
flows. The Great Replacement Theory (GRT) inspired the Christchurch terrorist and the Buffalo
mass-shooter. This disinformation producer’s rhetoric and framing is the same ideological
framework, and vocabulary, as the aforementioned terrorists.

Domestic Telegram ecologies are one step from violent extremist promotion
TDP’s study focuses on s9(2)(c)
who cluster around anti-vaccination and anti-
mandate messaging. These channels regularly link to, share, or direct people towards terrorist
and violent extremist content, violent extremist, child sexual abuse material, and The Great
Replacement Theory repositories. There is no guard, friction, oversight, or control over the
production and propagation of this material – and no geographical containment. What is
produced in the United States is instantly discoverable by those in Aotearoa New Zealand who
are imbricated within mis- and disinformation ecologies.

Sri Lanka
The socio-political developments in Sri Lanka have caught the attention of disinformation
ecologies studied by TDP. The events are held up as an example of how people could revolt
against the government in Aotearoa New Zealand, how food shortages in Sri Lanka preface the
same here, and how civil unrest in Sri Lanka will also be experienced in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Sri Lanka’s conundrums and issues are instrumentalised without context or historic framing to
suggest civil and political unrest could be achieved in Aotearoa New Zealand in the same way.

President Abe’s assassination, represented on Telegram
Former Japanese President Abe’s deadly shooting was captured quickly by ecologies studied by
TDP. The first post on Telegram was posted several minutes prior to any wire report seen by TDP
on Twitter, or before reporting from the New York Times. Consequently, TDP views Telegram as
a real time news network, reporting entirely independently from wire news reporting and
mainstream media. Later framing of the assassination is dominated by tropes that he was close
to Putin and opposed vaccine mandates, the World Economic Forum, globalists, and the World
Health Organisation, and that his assassination is therefore the work of pro-vaccine
conspirators.   under the Official Information Act 1982

Opposition to Three Waters
Multiple content producers within disinformation ecologies studied by TDP have strong
opposition to Three Waters reform. This includes organising physical protest outside the Local
Government New Zealand (LGNZ) meeting in Palmerston North – which was shared across
multiple clusters within our ecologies. Three Waters reform is almost exclusively framed as
concerns of Māori control or ownership over water – a sign of the racism present within
ecologies, as well as the way the debate about Three Waters has overshadowed the actual
Released
issue.8

8 https://thespinoff.co.nz/live-updates/21-07-2022/commentary-around-three-waters-has-
overshadowed-need-for-change-ardern

8

The spread of Russian disinformation
TDP has noted the spread of Russian disinformation and propaganda throughout Aotearoa New
Zealand’s information ecosystems, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In
a paper released in May, we described how, by the end of March 2022, every domestic
Telegram channel studied by TDP had pivoted to a nearly exclusive framing of the Ukraine war
through pro-Putin and pro-Kremlin frames. This reflects trends observed by Microsoft, who
reported in June that after December 2021, Russian propaganda consumption in New Zealand
increased by over 30% relative to consumption in Australia and New Zealand. Critically, pro-
Kremlin and pro-Putin content in the Russian language is being produced in New Zealand, via
open channels and closed groups such as
https://www.facebook.com/groups/VladimirPutinFanClubNZ/discussion/preview. This includes
content which seeks to fundraise for Russian causes, potentially in violation of sanctions and
terrorism laws.

s9(2)(c)
Mainstream media promoting misinformation
This fortnight, the mainstream media promoted a puff piece for a group of unvaccinated nurses
begging to return to work amidst the collapsing health system.9 The piece failed to recognise the
cluster was organised by a prominent disinformation group, which has conspiratorial ideas
about the New World Order, believes the vaccine will cull the population, and advocates for
Nuremberg trials for doctors, academics, and politicians. The group of nurses and its parent
network, following the success of the piece have scaled up rapidly, organising action plans for
unvaccinated nurses across the motu. s9(2)(c)

s6(d)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

9 https://www.stuff.co.nz/southland-times/news/129197272/plea-by-unvaccinated-nurses-to-return-to-
work

9

s6(d)
under the Official Information Act 1982

Released

10

Appendix One: The Disinformation Project and our field of study
Disinformation is a threat to democracy,10 stable governance,11 and human life.12 Since the start
of the Covid-19 pandemic and its associated infodemic,13 disinformation and its impact on
people and society in Aotearoa New Zealand has grown. The Disinformation Project (TDP) has
been analysing this since February 2020, paying particular attention to the volume, velocity, and
vector of information. We use daily data collection and analysis (which form the basis of this
summary report), use computational and manual tools to scan open-source social media post
and commentary across a wide range of social media platforms, websites, and media/alternative
media organisations. The information landscape studied is developed using ‘snowball’
techniques, which means that we have expanded the inclusion of pages, groups, and channels
only when they are signalled by existing locations of study.

Within the social media ecologies studied, key individuals and groups producing mis- and
disinformation capitalise on growing uncertainty and anxiety amongst communities, related to
Covid-19 public health interventions, including vaccination and lockdowns, to build fear,
disenfranchisement, and division. Mis- and disinformation is also particularly targeting and
scapegoating already marginalised or vulnerable communities – for whom distrust of the state is
the result of intergenerational trauma and lived experience of discrimination or harm, which can
increase engagement with conspiratorial explanations and disinformation. Over the past two
and a half years of research, TDP has developed a thorough and balanced understanding of the
harms that mis- and disinformation and ‘dangerous speech’ present to social cohesion, freedom
of expression, inclusion, and safety. (See Appendix One for our definitions of these terms).

The landscape studied – Covid-19
The landscape studied originated as locations engaged in mis- and disinformation related to
Covid-19 and the Covid-19 response, and our study, the type of content produced and shared
within this landscape has shifted over time, so other narratives and themes within this
landscape now form part of our analysis. For the purposes of this reporting, we focus on online
harms and threats against the Covid-19 response, including people and places associated with
the Covid-19 response. This includes covid denialism, covid minimisation, anti-vaccination
messaging (which is increasingly spilling from vaccination against Covid-19 into other types of
vaccination, including vaccination for tamariki), and anti-mandate/anti-public health measures
under the Official Information Act 1982
messaging. These are the four dominant types of messaging that TDP observes in its study of the
mis- and disinformation ecologies within Aotearoa New Zealand.

Released

10 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf
11 Ibid.
12 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/covid-misinformation-is-killing-people1/;
https://www.axios.com/2022/04/21/barack-obama-disinformation-social-media
13 https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic

11

Appendix Two: Definitions
Misinformation: “false information that people didn’t create with the intent to hurt others”
Disinformation: “false information created with the intention of harming a person, group, or
organization, or even a company”
Malinformation: “true information used with ill intent”14

Conspiracy theory: purported explanations which cite a conspiracy at the salient cause of some
event or phenomenon.15

Dangerous speech: “dangerous speech is any form of expression (e.g., speech, text, or images)
that can increase the chances that its audience will condone or participate in violence against
members of another group.”16

Hallmarks of dangerous speech:17
• Dehumanisation
• Coded language
• Accusation in a mirror
• Threat to group integrity or purity
• Assertion of attack against women and girls
• Questioning in-group loyalty

under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

14 Berentson-Shaw J and Elliot M. Misinformation and Covid-19: a briefing for media. Wellington: The Workshop; (2020).
15 Dentith MRX. Conspiracy theories and philosophy: bringing the epistemology of a freighted term into the social sciences. In JE
Uscinki (ed.) Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press; (2018).
16 The Dangerous Speech Project, Dangerous Speech: A Practical Guide: 19 April 2021 https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/
17 Ibid.

12

Appendix Three: TDP’s work to report and flag content to minimise harm to
New Zealanders
9(2)(ba)
under the Official Information Act 1982
Released

13

Document 07
From:
s9(2)(a)
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii) DPMC]
Subject:
Re: RE: Invoice due 10 august - TDP Vendor ID 38114902
Date:
Monday, 15 August 2022 1:12:13 pm
Thanks s9(2)(g)(ii) It seemed very important to have this in public domain.
s9(2)(a), s6(d)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director, the Disinformation Project
Principal Investigator Te Pūnaha Matatini
Te Pūnaha Matatini PhD Candidate Centre for Science in Society
s9(2)(g)(ii)
On Mon, 15 Aug 2022 at 1:06 PM s9(2)(g)(ii) wrote:
[UNCLASSIFIED]
s9(2)(a)
Hi
s9(2)(a)
I did approve the invoice. I have just double checked with finance when it
will be paid.
s9(2)(a)
under the Official Information Act 1982
s9(2)(a), s6(d)
Thanks,
Released
s9(2)(g)(ii)
From:s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Sent: Monday, 15 August 2022 12:19 pm
To: Finance Queries [TSY] <[email address]>
Cc: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject: Fwd: Invoice due 10 august - TDP Vendor ID 38114902

Importance: High

Re-upping this query as invoice was not paid in Friday’s pay run.
s9(2)(g)(ii)
s9(2)(a), s6(d)
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)

Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)

Begin forwarded message:

From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Subject: Fwd: Invoice due 10 august - TDP Vendor ID 38114902
Date: 12 August 2022 at 4:15:57 PM NZST
To: [email address]

Kia ora,

I have not yet had remittance advice for an invoice submitted to DPMC for
payment in today’s pay cycle - could you please confirm that this invoice is out
for payment in today’s run?
under the Official Information Act 1982

Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)
Released

Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini

s9(2)(a)

Begin forwarded message:

From: s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Subject: Invoice due 10 august - TDP
Date: 8 August 2022 at 10:51:09 AM NZST
To: [email address].nzs9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Cc: s9(2)(g)(ii) [DPMC]" s9(2)(g)(ii)

Ngā mihi

s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)

Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini

s9(2)(a)

The information contained in this email message is for the attention of the intended recipient only and is not
necessarily the official view or communication of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. If you are
under the Official Information Act 1982
not the intended recipient you must not disclose, copy or distribute this message or the information in it. If you
have received this message in error, please destroy the email and notify the sender immediately.

The information contained in this email message is for the attention of the intended recipient only and is not
necessarily the official view or communication of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. If you are
not the intended recipient you must not disclose, copy or distribute this message or the information in it. If you
Released
have received this message in error, please destroy the email and notify the sender immediately.

Document 08
From:
s9(2)(a)
To:
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Subject:
Re: Explanation of change of term to RFP
Date:
Wednesday, 14 September 2022 10:10:21 am
That sounds fine, s9(2)(g)(ii)  and you/Oliver will let me know prior to the OIA being released ?
Ngā mihi
s9(2)(a)
Director and Founder, the Disinformation Project
s9(2)(a)
Principal Investigator
Te Pūnaha Matatini
s9(2)(a)
On 13/09/2022, at 3:24 PM, s9(2)(g)(ii)  [DPMC] s9(2)(g)(ii)
wrote:
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Hi s9(2)(a)
Thank you for meeting this afternoon.
I drafted the following paragraph to accompany the RFP and explain the change in
term:
‘As part of the Tender outcome Recommendation for the RFP Reporting of online
harms and threats against the COVID-19 Response. The term of the contract
under the Official Information Act 1982
stipulated in the RFP was identified as extending beyond the COVID-19 Group’s
requirements.  For that reason, the term of the contract was modified to a 1-month
period for the disinformation landscape reports (June-August 2022).’
Let me know if you have any issues with the approach.
Ngā mihi,
Released
s9(2)(g)(ii)
Senior Advisor, Security and Intelligence Policy
National Security Group
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
M    s9(2)(a)
E   s9(2)(g)(ii)