H2022015932 Response.pdf

133 Molesworth Street
PO Box 5013
Wellington 6140
New Zealand
T+64 4 496 2000
28 November 2022
P Taylor
By email: [FYI request #20989 email]
Ref:  H2022015932
Tēnā koe
Response to your request for official information
Thank you for your request under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) to Manatū Hauora
(the Ministry of Health) on 31 October 2022. You requested:
“Al  communications between any member of the Disinformation Assessment and
Response Team (DART) and Netsafe during the period of 01 August 2022 and 30
September 2022”
Manatū Hauora has conducted a search and identified four email chains and an attachment
within scope of your request. The emails and relevant attachment are itemised in Appendix 1 of
this letter and copies of the documents are enclosed. Please note, where information is withheld
under section 9 of the Act, I have considered the countervailing public interest in releasing
information and consider that it does not outweigh the need to withhold at this time.
The COVID-19 Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART) was initially
established as part of the Manatū Hauora National Immunisation Programme. DART transferred
into the Manatū Hauora Communications and Engagement Group on 1 June 2022.  Following
that transfer, the work was rescoped to fit with the communications focus. The team itself no
longer exists: the two contractors and the Senior Advisor all finished work at the Ministry within
the last two months.
When it was in operation, DART acted as a clearinghouse for reporting on disinformation. DART
received reports of disinformation through a variety of forms, including leaflets, digital items,
weblinks and reports from social media. While most instances were brought to the attention of
Manatū Hauora by members of the public or external parties, some were generated internally
through monitoring by the Social Media team. For example, if the Social Media team noted
disinformation on a post on our channels, this was reported to DART.
DART did not collect personal information and used only open-source data to assess
information and could not assess items that may be private. During its operation, the team made
referrals to the Medical Council, the Department of Internal Affairs, Netsafe, Worksafe and the
New Zealand Police. Referrals were made to other parts of Manatū Hauora, as well as to Te
Whatu Ora Health New Zealand (formerly the district health boards). DART also worked with
Netsafe to bring to its attention examples of sites and other social media sources where
disinformation is reported to platforms like Facebook.

I trust this information fulfils your request. Under section 28(3) of the Act, you have the right to
ask the Ombudsman to review any decisions made under this request. The Ombudsman may
be contacted by email at: [email address] or by calling 0800 802 602.
Please note that this response, with your personal details removed, may be published on the
Manatū Hauora website at: www.health.govt.nz/about-ministry/information-releases/responses-
official-information-act-requests.
Nāku noa, nā
Sarah Turner
Deputy Director General
Government and Executive Services | Te Pou Whakatere Kāwanatanga
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Document 1
From:
Daniel Dominey
Sent:
Thursday, 8 September 2022 9:37 am
To:
Sean s 9(2)(a)
Subject:
RE: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.
Hi Sean
Thanks for that.
In regards to banned actors smurfing back on there are a few offenders we know of (VFF being one under their own
names springs to mind) so this may be an opportunity to see if we can use the newly created code of practice to
nudge them along (perhaps in the same way one uses a rolled up newspaper to nudge a wayward canine along).
Week of 19th works for me so I will send an invite through soon. I will make sure it’s an ongoing one this time.
Happy for the CEO to touch base, we are always happy to help regarding disinformation.
Sincerely
Daniel
Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]
From: Sean s 9(2)(a)
Sent: Thursday, 8 September 2022 9:27 am
To: Daniel Dominey <[email address]>
Subject: Re: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.
Hi Daniel,
I've had quite a bit of back and forth with the platform on this one. A little bit frustrating actually.
under the Official Information Act 1982
I'll let you know as soon as I have something more concrete.
Not sure how our regular catch-up fell off the schedule, But lets put it back in. How is the week of
the 19th for you (I'm away next week)
Also, our CEO Brent Carey would like to touch base with you regarding some Misinfo reports we
are concerned might have floated around the system somewhere, hope you are ok if I give him
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your contact details?
Speak soon,
Sean.
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Sean
| Netsafe Online Safety Operations Centre | s 9(2)(a)
s 9(2)(a)

| Netsafe | www.netsafe.org.nz

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From: Daniel Dominey <[email address]>
Sent: Tuesday, 6 September 2022 9:06 am
To: Sean s 9(2)(a)

Information
Subject: FW: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.

Hi Sean

Just following up on this.

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Sincerely


the
Daniel

Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]

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From: Daniel Dominey
Sent: Monday, 29 August 2022 10:53 am
To: Sean s 9(2)(a)

Cc: Disinformation Assessment and Response Team <[email address]>
Subject: RE: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.

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Hi Sean

Apologies for the delay here, was off sick the end of last week.

If possible we would like to know the outcome of this as the ability of an individual or group to “smurf” their way
back into the system is probably a bigger issue than taking them off.

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Also, its probably time for our monthly catchup, I checked my calendar as I thought we had a standing monthly but it
appears not so how are you looking for this week?

Quite a lot to discuss.

Sincerely


Daniel

Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]
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From: Sean s 9(2)(a)

Sent: Wednesday, 24 August 2022 2:36 pm
To: Daniel Dominey <[email address]>
Subject: Re: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.

Cheers Daniel,

Information
We have had reports around this little "ecosystem" and, as part of that, have made a report to
Meta based on their subverting a ban from the platform criteria. I can let you know the outcome of
that process if you'd like?

Sean

Sean s 9(2)(a)
Netsafe Online Safety Operations Centre | s 9(2)(a)

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| Netsafe | www.netsafe.org.nz

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From: Daniel Dominey <[email address]>
Sent: Tuesday, 23 August 2022 2:02 pm
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To: Sean s 9(2)(a)

Cc: Disinformation Assessment and Response Team <[email address]>
Subject: Chantelle Baker on back on Facebook with Operation People.

Hi Sean

Just wondering if you (and Facebook) are aware of this.

After her Facebook account being suspended, it appears Chantelle Baker has moved to another Facebook page,
Operation People.

https://www.facebook.com/operationpeoplenz

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Sincerely


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Daniel

Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]


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recipient, then any distribution, reproduction or other use of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this communication in error, please immediately destroy/delete it and telephone or email us at our cost to let us know. Thank
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Document 2
From:
Daniel Dominey
Sent:
Thursday, 8 September 2022 10:44 am
To:
Brent Carey
Cc:
Sean s 9(2)(a)Disinformation Assessment and Response Team; Priya Munro
Subject:
RE: Misinfo incident reports
Hi Brent
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Thanks for your email and congratulations on the new role, very exciting work.
Your question touches on an issue that I have been thinking about for a while now so I can probably provide some
degree of answer as DART has been collecting and processing reports form CERT since the start of the year and we
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have been analysing all the data from CERT reports (which date back to around Jan 2021).
The short answer on this questions would be that the majority of reporting of disinformation over the last year or so
was physical items such as flyers and leaflets (such as those put in letterboxes or handed out in public by the anti‐
vax group Vices for Freedom) who have accounted for approximately 70% of all reporting and that physical items
get reported while digital do not (I will elaborate further below). I have attached a table from our data set to help
illustrate this.
Information
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The green line that dominates that table is for reports of offline (or physical) disinformation content (like the afore
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mentioned flyers) with digital content being that brown line down in the mix of data on the table.
Why the public reporting of physical disinformation is much higher is not exactly known but we are fairly certain
that its due to the fact that while digital disinformation tends to only spread in the digital echo chambers (like
minded groups and networks etc) so the majority of people who see (and consume it) are not going to see (or
recognise) it as disinformation as they are accepting of its message/ideas so they would have little or no motivation
to report it as disinformation as they would not see it as such.
However, physical information, such as VFF leaflets, breaks out of the echo chambers and into spaces well beyond
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so they prompt a greater response from members of the public (i.e. those who are not inside the echo chamber and
recognise it as disinformation content).
So, if you look at the table you see a massive spike of reporting towards the end of 2021 which coincides with VFF
running a major campaign of leaflets (VFF claimed to distribute over 4 million leaflets in 2021) and billboards in
November, December and January 2021 (the period which immediately presaged the occupation and riots at
parliament). Digital reporting for the same period was almost zero.
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So if there are physical items of disinformation out there (and VFF are the only group who seem to have the high
level of funds to pay for mass distribution of physical disinformation content) then reporting goes up, if not it drops
back down and is almost all digital. And coincidentally, VFF have just started another round of flyers in letter boxes
so we expect to see reporting go back up (as its has started to do through non CERT channels).
However, its important to note that digital spaces are where most of the disinformation we are seeing lives and that
public reporting is only one part of our collections space, its an important one but we do our own scanning and
collections to maintain awareness.
That is the immediate answer to your question but there are some other factors which need to be unpacked to fully
account for the drop off.
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The first is that the loop for public reporting is not closed as an important factor in what motivates people to report
things to any organisation or authority etc is the want/need to know that their report has been received and often
that something has been done.
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In this case there is a disconnect here as while DART has received these reports and in cases responded to them we
have not had the information (or the authority) to report back to the individual that made it and as far as I am aware
CERT (who collects the reports) does not do this either (both in regards to acknowledging receipt of the report or in
reporting back that any action has been taken).
And when the loop is not closed the person who made the report does not know if their report was received or if
any action taken there is no motivation to make any further reports. I know this as with my work in compliance
spaces for both INZ and DIA ensuring feedback to that those who provided info or reported things to us was vitally
important as it ensured that the effort taken by the person was acknowledged and thanks given but also in some
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cases we would follow up and simply say that action had been taken (we would not disclose any further details but
an indication that something had been done was usually enough). Thus the loop was closed and it often encouraged
further reporting or at least helped people inform others of what to do if they had an issue they wanted to report.
The next issues is that there had been no real promotion that there even was a means (or agency) to report
disinformation to so unless someone had an inkling that such a thing existed they would get disinformation in the
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letterbox but simply not know what to do about it. For example DIA handles reports of spam in NZ
(https://www.dia.govt.nz/Spam), has a webpage on it and runs promotions to raise awareness of it. CERT had a
section on one of their pages with info for reporting but it was never promoted except by other agencies (such as
the
DPMC or MOH) in regards to specific situations. But, to be fair I do not blame CERT for this situation as they took the
work on when no one else would and it was very much on the edge of their mandate so they may have been
constrained in doing so.
So public awareness of what to do (such as reporting it) if they see disinformation is very low. Additionally there are
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no third parties organisations (such as CrimeStoppers) who currently act as a possible third party catch all for
reporting of this kind (but DART has discussed this with CrimeStoppers in embryo but such has not progressed).
The final issue is that no government agency really has disinformation on its mandate (or they only deal with very
specific aspects of it – such as the security services do look at the violent extremist aspects of disinformation but this
is only a very small part of the larger disinformation ecosystem) and DART is the only team dealing with the full
scope of the issue at an operational level and we are a small team (3 staff) who primarily deal with health disnfo (as
it is one of the bigger aspects of the whole and due to MOH wanting us to focus on it). Current legislation is not
really fit for purpose and as you would undoubtably be aware there are issues of free speech etc which make entry
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into this space problematic without a firm mandate to do so.
These three factors/issue are part of the large issue in regards to reporting as DART had hoped to be able to take
over the reporting from CERT (and we had scoped responses to the issues noted above) but Health decided not to
progress this aspect.
So hopefully that helps explain things and apologies for the verbiage of my response.
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If you have any further questions or thought please don’t hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely

Daniel

Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]

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From: Brent Carey s 9(2)(a)

Sent: Thursday, 8 September 2022 9:46 am
To: Daniel Dominey <[email address]>
Cc: Sean s 9(2)(a)

Subject: Misinfo incident reports

Hi Daniel,

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Brent here, NetSafe’s new CEO.

Sean kindly forwarded me your details.

I am reaching out to enquire as to what the reason might be for what looks to be a drop off in reporting to Netsafe
around misinformation complaints ‐ which gives rise to potential breaches  of our false allegation principle under the
HDCA.
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My interest in the area was peaked after reading two OIA replies
at: https://fyi.org.nz/request/15411/response/58916/attach/2/DOIA%202021%202247%20Eurisko%20Bowden.pdf
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and https://fyi.org.nz/request/19579/response/76009/attach/4/H202208157%20Response%20Letter.pdf

In the second fyi there is reference to roughly 1,200 reports which appear to have been ‘dead ended’ as in not
referred to us for assessment.
I am keen being new in the role to understand the referral out to agencies process if there is one.
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I’ve included an extract from an email below from Ben Cross over at CERTNZ as I asked him the same question and
you will see from his reply he thought the answer might lie at MOH?

If it is easier to jump on a call with Sean would be keen to understand how better to coordinate on these matters.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards
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Brent

Begin forwarded message:
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From: Bens 9(2)(a)

Date: 6 September 2022 at 2:45:21 PM NZST
To: Brent Carey s 9(2)(a)
Leanne s 9(2)(a)
Andrea s 9(2)(a)
s 9(2)(a)
Michael s 9(2)(a)
Sean s 9(2)(a)
s 9(2)(a)

Cc: Sam Leggett <[email address]>
Subject: Follow‐up on CERT NZ/Netsafe meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia ora koutou



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Finally, I’ve been digging into the drop off in HDCA reports that CERT NZ sends through to
Netsafe. It may be worth having a conversation with our IR team to address what the
process was previously so that we can get this back up and running. I’ve CC’d Sam Leggett,
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who was the Senior Analyst working in this space and would be a good point of contact for
getting some of the future reporting sorted. I will also chase up the Ministry of Health as they
were meant to be forwarding on reports to the appropriate places once CERT had referred
them through.

Ngā mihi
Ben

Benjamin s 9(2)(a) (he/him)
Senior Advisor, Engagement and Partnerships
s 9(2)(a)

Information

CERT NZ – Responding to cyber security threats in New Zealand
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

For information on COVID-19 vaccine-related scams visit www.cert.govt.nz/covidscams
Follow us on Twitter: @CERTNZ | Like us on Facebook: @certnzgovt | Follow us on
LinkedIn: @certnz
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www.cert.govt.nz

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Document 4
From:
Daniel Dominey
Sent:
Wednesday, 21 September 2022 1:18 pm
To:
Sean s 9(2)(a)
Subject:
DART Monthly Report-VFF DRAFT September 2022
Attachments:
DART Monthly Report-VFF DRAFT September 2022.docx
Hi Sean
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Thanks for meeting yesterday.
As noted here is a draft copy of DARTs first monthly report and as you can see the first cab off the rank is Voices for
Freedom (VFF).
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We have gone for light and easy to read despite the heavier data that sits behind a lot of the analysis. Any feedback
or comment is appreciated.
We are still developing the charts and tables so those are basically Version 1 and the final reports will probably have
more developed ones but the words are pretty much what we will say.
Also I have added in below a quick summary that will be in the final report but is not in the version attached:
 This group (VFF) is the most prolific spreader of disinformation in Aotearoa. Utilising a mix of disinformation
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false information created with the intent cause harm or for profit and malinformation true information
which is manipulated or distorted to suit a particular narrative or agenda.
 VFF is unique in that it is well funded, well branded, and more sophisticated than other disinformation
groups by portraying itself, and its content, in a less confrontational manner.
 Figures show that VFF’s engagement appears to be waning:
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o website monthly traffic has significantly decreased from 114,000 visits in January 2022 (during the
occupation at Parliament) to a low of 21,000 in June 2022.
o VFFs posts on Telegram had high engagement (audience levels) from mid‐2021 until in January 2022
the
(between 70% and 99%) before rapidly declining over the next few months to lows of only 22% and
29% per post in July to August 2022.
 DART assessed the group’s content on their website and telegram for credibility and transparency finding
that the website severely violates journalistic standards.
 VFF has a record of anti‐authority behaviours encouraging mask and vaccine exemption, using shell website
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that redirect the user to the group’s website, encouraging participation in the Parliamentary occupation and
attempting to ‘skirt’ bans on platforms such as Meta/ Facebook.
 The groups material has been the subject of repeated (over 100) complaints to the Advertising Standards
Authority (ASA) and despite most rulings going against them VFF have repeatedly ignored findings against
them.
 COVID‐19 restrictions have now been lifted, VFF is pivoting to anti‐authority sentiments and messaging to
‘make New Zealand ungovernable’ advising it’s run members in local body elections.
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Finally, in regards to DART and its portability between agencies etc I would note the following:
 DART was built to be modular (which breaks down to mean that a) it’s not system/software specific ‐ its OS
in nature and we are not dependant on stuff in any agency to do our work (we are off‐the‐shelf in almost
everything we do and use); and b) DART is primarily based around its staff (as with point a) there is nothing
that ties DART to any agency, we go where we can. I am a big believer in OS intel work but I don’t limit that
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to just OS data but also OS software and systems and staff etc. In essence we act and operate as a tech
start‐up would until we get to a certain size/level. It means we are nimble and flexible to pivot in the early to
mid‐phase when functions, products and practices are still being developed. After the mid phase we can
embed properly and codify what we do more comprehensively (work out our Op Pol and such);
  This means that DART can set up anywhere and do what it does quickly (with some caveats); with basic
systems and some extra software and access to some online APIs etc DART can pretty much be in business
as quickly as we can plug those in’
  All DART staff are on contracts until 23 December only, but if the situation developed we are still able to give
notice as per the norm and if the situation was right we may be able to discuss it with MOH to go earlier. At
this time there is no indication of what happens after Dec 23 (however that is the same for a lot of the
people where I work in MOH) so as noted we are beginning to look for new roles,

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  My scoping for DART was a minimum of 6 people to make it viable (this is primarily as an intel function
(including a data analyst) but with a dedicated Comms/engagement person as well; the next size up is
approximately double that with an expanded comms/engagement function and a more educative aspect (ie
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we are not just providing analysis but we are also doing some of what we are doing now in MOH with
training on things like pre‐bunking/debunking and counter narrative stuff as well as critical thinking etc. The
big difference between the 6 person and 12 person version is that the six is basically just raw intel while the
12 is intel and deeper analysis set into work streams and then allowing for a broader/bigger scanning
function and the afore mentioned comms and engagement staff (who I think are what will really make a
difference in the long run by teaching critical thinking and explaining the harms).

I would also note that while NZ is behind in its response overall, there is still the incredible opportunity to get in and
make a real difference in this space a well as develop a comprehensive approach to the problem and harms of
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disinformation and while a lot of money has been thrown at this in some countries its not necessarily dollars that
will make the difference but a keen focus on key issues and addressing those. Having a super big budget and being in
a large org would help in some ways but really just as the nature of the space is fluid and flexible so does DART have
to be, and I ensure that we embed that in our work so I think once we get ours down we can learn form others but
also teach others what we have done, go the full DIY thing and show that its not about one agency fixing it as this is
an all‐of‐society problem, it needs an all of society solution and we can work with others, bring people in and
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leverage those things into real solutions.

If you have any questions or comments please don’t hesitate to contact us.

the
Sincerely

Daniel

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Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]

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Sincerely

Daniel
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Daniel Dominey l Senior Advisor
Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART)
To contact us email: [email address]

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Document 4A
Voices For Freedom
[DRAFT]
Disclaimer
All conclusions and interpretations in this report are made on the balance of probabilities and with the
information available at the time of assessment.
Only open-source data and the content found on the website/s indicated are used in this assessment.
No personal or private information is collected and no assessment of any individuals, or the
organisation/s they belong to, are done but in some instances such details may be noted.

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Document 4A
Voices For Freedom
[DRAFT]
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