133 Molesworth
Street
PO Box 5013
Wellington 6140
New Zealand
T+64 4 496 2000
2 November 2022
Scott
By email: [FYI request #20627 email]
Ref: H2022013182
Tēnā koe Scott,
Response to your request for official information
Thank you for your request under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) to Manatū
Hauora (the Ministry of Health) on 21 September 2022 for:
“A copy of the review of "the processes underpinning the Ministry of Health's
ministerial servicing" produced by an external consultant for the Ministry referred to
here.
A copy of the "additional specific advice on how [the Pfizer information was released]"
produced by the external consultant for the Ministry referred to here.”
Since the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic, Manatū Hauora has played a central role
in leading the health response to COVID-19. As a result, the Ministry has seen a significant
increase in correspondence and the number of requests for information under the Act. The
Ministry has worked hard to meet the increased demand for information, including increasing
the amount of information that is publicly available through different channels, including
media stand-ups and data publication. The Ministry has also implemented process changes
and temporarily increased the number of employees in the Government Services group,
which manages responses to ministerial correspondence, Official Information Act requests,
parliamentary questions, and Select Committee requests. At its peak in the second half of
2021, the volume of Official Information Act requests tripled.
In December 2021, I contracted MartinJenkins to undertake a review of the Government
Services group (the Group). This review provided assurance of the Group’s efficiency and
effectiveness when compared to other Ministries and identified opportunities for
improvements. This review was completed in April 2022 and is titled
Review of the Ministry
of Health Government Services Group. A full copy is attached as Document 1.
While MartinJenkins was undertaking the review, the Ministry became aware of the
inadvertent release of information and asked MartinJenkins to specifically review this
incident. They found that the Ministry’s solution was wel -targeted to the risk. The complete
findings are included in the attached document on page 24.
You might also be interested in the Ombudsman’s recent publication of investigations into
the OIA practices of 12 core Government agencies, including Manatū Hauora. The final
report addresses some of the issues raised in the external review. The Ombudsman’s final
reports can be found at:
•
www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/resources/oia-compliance-and-practice-ministry-health-
2022
•
www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/resources/oia-compliance-and-practice-ready-or-not-
2022
I trust this information fulfils your request. If you have any questions about this response,
please contact us at
[email address]. Additionally, under section 28(3) of the Act, you
have the right to ask the Ombudsman to review any decisions made under this request. The
Ombudsman may be contacted by email at:
[email address] or by calling
0800 802 602.
Please note that this response, with your personal details removed, may be published on the
Manatū Hauora website at:
www.health.govt.nz/about-ministry/information-
releases/responses-official-information-act-requests.
Nāku noa, nā
Sarah Turner
Deputy Director-General
Government and Executive Services | Te Pou Whakatere Kāwanatanga
Page 2 of 2
Document 1
REVIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF
HEALTH GOVERNMENT
SERVICES GROUP
Report
6 April 2022
Document 1
link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 29 link to page 30 link to page 32 link to page 34 link to page 34 link to page 36 link to page 36 link to page 42 link to page 47 link to page 48 link to page 49 link to page 50
Document 1
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
Context for the review
1
Objective
1
Approach
1
Scope
2
Overview
3
The Government Services group
3
Current context for the group’s activity
3
Summary of findings and recommendations
4
Findings
10
Volumes of work and resources
10
Operating approach
21
Workflow efficiency
22
Avoidable error in OIA release
24
Capabilities
26
Structure and team design
26
Recommendations
28
Step 1: Setting the Ministry up to manage workloads and perform well now and in the future
28
Step 2: Establish a Centre of Excellence that is linked to the Ministry’s strategic objectives
34
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : Interviewees
39
Appendix 2 : Documents reviewed
40
Appendix 3 : GSaC staffing assumptions
41
Appendix 4 : GSaC team resourcing analysis
42
Commercial In Confidence
link to page 15 link to page 20 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 49 link to page 50 link to page 21 link to page 23 link to page 26 link to page 45
Document 1
TABLES
Table 1: Summary
7
Table 2: WPQ volumes for 2019 - 2021
12
Table 3: GSaC team summary resourcing analysis
16
Table 4: Summary of OIA data and assumptions
18
Table 5: Staff resources for the OIA team 2020-2022
19
Table 6: Assumptions for WPQ staff resourcing analysis
41
Table 7: GSaC team resourcing analysis
42
FIGURES
Figure 1: Volume of WPQs by month and directorate
13
Figure 2: Volume of WPQ caseload by FTE
15
Figure 3: Comparison of volumes of OIA requests by Ministry
18
Figure 4: High level apprenticeship model
37
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
PREFACE
This report has been prepared for the Ministry of Health by Richard Tait, Frauke Kruse and Sargam
Shah from MartinJenkins (Martin, Jenkins & Associates Limited).
MartinJenkins advises clients in the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. Our work in the public
sector spans a wide range of central and local government agencies. We provide advice and support
to clients in the following areas:
•
public policy
•
evaluation and research
•
strategy and investment
•
performance improvement and monitoring
•
business improvement
•
organisational improvement
•
employment relations
•
economic development
•
financial and economic analysis.
Our aim is to provide an integrated and comprehensive response to client needs – connecting our skill
sets and applying fresh thinking to lift performance.
MartinJenkins is a privately owned New Zealand limited liability company. We have offices in
Wellington and Auckland. The company was established in 1993 and is governed by a Board made up
of executive directors Kevin Jenkins, Michael Mills, Nick Davis, Allana Coulon, Richard Tait and Sarah
Baddeley, plus independent director Sophia Gunn and chair David Prentice.
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Document 1
INTRODUCTION
Context for the review
The Government Services group at the Ministry of Health has recently seen a large increase in work
volumes, a high turnover in staff with some recent new recruitment starting soon and has introduced
new SharePoint-based workflows.
While the leadership team feel there is no indication that current workflows and ways of working are
‘broken’, the team feels it is timely to:
•
seek external assurance of the group’s efficiency and effectiveness when compared to other
Ministries, and
•
identify opportunities for improvement and ‘quick wins’ to deliver the right outputs at the lowest
possible costs.
MartinJenkins was engaged to review how the Government Services Group delivers value to the
organisation and its stakeholders.
Objective
The objective of the review is to ensure the Ministry of Health has a high-performing Government
Services Group that is recognised for delivering high quality products for its internal and external
stakeholders, in an efficient and cost-effective way.
Approach
We have conducted the review in three stages.
1
Inception: We agreed the scope of the review and the timetable during an inception meeting in
January.
2
Information gathering: This stage included:
•
conducting interviews with managers of the different groups within the group and key
stakeholders to the group
•
reviewing key background documents
•
analysing relevant data (e.g., workflows and demand)
•
creating a high-level process map, and identifying processes with opportunities for
improvement
•
using external interviews to explore the Ministerial Services group of comparable Ministries
to understand their models and practices, and how this might suggest lessons and
opportunities for the Ministry of Health
1
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
•
discussing insights with the project sponsor.
A summary of reviewed documents and interviewees can be found in the appendices.
3
Present and discuss findings: We developed a draft report for discussion, refined and finalised
this document based on feedback.
Scope
The review has examined whether the Group has the right capabilities and resources, workflows,
prioritisation of work, and frameworks and approaches to engage with stakeholders and to deliver
outputs.
In scope for the purpose of the review were:
•
All functions and activities undertaken by the Government Services Group
•
The relation between the Government Services Group and other groups within the Ministry
•
Activities and key relationships with external partners in the government network.
Out of scope were:
•
A review of other directorates within the Ministry
•
A formal structure review and any formal consultation
•
Current assumptions in the model about the balance between centralised and decentralised
activities.
2
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
OVERVIEW
The Government Services group
The group serves as a centralised function for the Ministry’s government services products. It applies
the Official Information Act and oversees Ministerial Correspondence and Government Services. The
group is currently organised in three teams:
•
The Government Services and Coordination (GSaC) team is responsible for managing
responses to Parliamentary questions and supporting briefings related to Select Committee work.
It coordinates processes that see the Ministry respond to requests in a consistent and timely
manner and meet its statutory obligations. The team applies an impartial lens to responses and
helps shape the public image of the Ministry in the way it communicates.
•
The Official Information Act (OIA) team is responsible for managing OIA requests. The team
coordinates processes that see different business units contribute to the information gathering
and drafting of responses and ensures responses are made in a timely manner and meet the
Ministry’s statutory obligations. The team also assists the organisation in managing Privacy Act
requests.
•
The Correspondence Team is responsible for drafting and coordinating Ministerials and Direct
Replies. The team works with the different Directorates in the Ministry to support Ministerial
offices to respond to correspondence.
The group also includes Private Secretaries, which were excluded from this review.
Current context for the group’s activity
COVID-19 has driven a significant increase in demand for information
from the Ministry
The COVID-19 pandemic became a large-scale public health crisis around the world in early 2020,
prompting government action and dictating large changes in the lives of the public. Since the early
days of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health has been confronted with new challenges they could not
have previously imagined. This has required the Ministry to develop policies at pace, rapidly stand up
new digital and physical infrastructure, and track the performance of the public health system in
response to the unfolding pandemic.
As the wide-ranging impacts of the COVID 19 response have become apparent, the public has sought
information on a variety of topics impacting their lives. This has been mirrored in an increase in
requests for information and response through other, indirect channels, including oral and written
parliamentary questions (WPQs), and demand for Ministerial Briefings.
3
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Changing demand volumes
The Ministry of Health is one of several Ministries that have seen increases in the volume of
information sought through OIA requests. While the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of
Justice, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, and the Ministry of Social Development
have seen increases in OIA requests between 1% and 50% percent between 2020 to 2021, the
Ministry of Health has seen an increase in close to 140% percent during the same period.
Similarly, the volume of WPQs for the Ministry of Health in 2021 was three times that of 2020 (300%)
and over four times that of 2019 (415%).
Changing complexity of requests
Interviewees felt that not only had the number of requests from the public and members of the
Parliament increased, but their complexity had also grown, with many of the documents and guidance
that were sought being new and developed at pace.
Summary of findings and recommendations
A focus on continuous improvement
The group appears to have maintained reasonable levels of performance in the face of rapidly
increasing demand. Over the last two years, the group has developed and matured, with a focus on
streamlining processes and managing risks more effectively. The leadership of the group has
expressed a desire to continue that journey, focussing on strengthening the capability of the teams,
and enhancing the group’s role as a centre of excellence for government services products and
stakeholder engagement within the Ministry.
Recent structural measures
The group leadership has suggested several temporary changes to address the most pressing
challenges, which are set out in the OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 on “Proposed
temporary changes to Government Services Group management arrangements and work distribution”.
We endorse these measures and suggest making the temporary arrangements permanent. The recent
changes include:
•
Establishing two separate OIA Services teams, reporting to the current Manager OIA Services.
•
Establishing an Advisory Services team, with a Triage and Response stream and an Advisory
stream. This includes establishing six roles (three Senior Advisor Triage and Response, two
Advisors for Proactive Release and for Planning and Reporting, one Senior Advisor Ombudsman)
•
Establishing two additional roles in the Government Services and Coordination team.
4
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
The strain on processes and resourcing
The Ministry’s number of OIA complaints published by the Ombudsman has nearly doubled from 2020
to 2021 (25 additional complaints). Similarly, the Government Services and Coordination team seeks
extensions from the Ministers’ offices on a large portion of WPQs to ease the deadline pressures on
the Ministry. This is symptomatic of the strain the whole organisation as well as the Government
Services teams are under.
For the teams, the challenge is twofold: Responding to immediate pressure to improve performance,
while setting itself up for success going forward.
Recent challenges in the OIA response
In the OIA space, it is important to maintain a consistent and clear review and sign-out approach. In a
recent scenario, papers were released to a requester that were supposed to be withheld. The Group
Manager and the OIA manager felt a system of checks and balances was followed, and the process
failed at the last step. In the finalisation of the batch for the Minister’s office these documents weren’t
removed from the pack, and thus went out to the requester accidentally, including highlighting that
these documents were intended to be withheld.
The solution put in place to address this risk was:
•
to advocate for a consistent review approach with the Minister’s Office
•
to change the label on top of relevant pages. Pages will be ‘red box’ redacted in full when they go
to the Minister’s office for review. The advisor will then make sure it is redacted/removed before
sending it over – an automated process via the software which manages the redacting.
•
to suggest that the Minister’s office runs an additional check on it before sending it out.
This appears to be an effective mitigation for the risk that eventuated.
We note that the further digitisation through the workflow management tool and the establishment of a
triage function within the new Advisory team are expected to significantly improve the assessment of
risks, the adoption of best-practice approaches and the group’s ability to digital y track progress.
Breaking the reactive cycle and adopting a more strategic posture
Recognising the immediate pressure as well as the longer-term aspiration, we have divided our
recommendations into two areas of focus, to enable the Ministry to get on top of current pressure and
position for a more strategic and value-adding approach in future.
1
Right-size the group and review process inefficiencies
The immediate focus is to address immediate performance challenges and to create space to
take further steps along the maturity journey. To do this, the teams need to be resourced
appropriately to manage demand.
•
For written parliamentary questions, we suggest ensuring resourcing is at a level where
workload does not exceed an average 150 WPQs per advisor per month, or 75 WPQs per
senior advisor. The volume of WPQs is cyclical. We recommend not allowing the workload to
5
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
go beyond 175 WPQs per advisor per month for full time staff, or beyond 150 WPQs per
month for temporary support staff.
•
For OIA requests, we suggest resourcing the team to ensure each advisor responds to no
more than 15 OIA requests per months on average, and senior advisors respond to no more
than 8.
•
We recommend maintaining team sizes at a maximum of 10 direct reports per team leader
or manager.
The group needs to have assurance that workflows are robust and oversight arrangements are
appropriate for all standard processes. In addition to the current temporary structural changes, we
also recommend establishing the following roles:
•
Adding one Advisor and one Senior Advisor to the Government Services and Coordination
team, or making the temporary arrangements suggested to OLT in a memorandum in
November 2021 permanent.
•
Adding one Advisor and one Senior Advisor to the OIA team.
•
Adding a Team Leader role in the Ministerial Correspondence team. This role would support
the Manager Ministerial Correspondence and could have Coordinator and Advisors report to
them.
•
Adding a third Team Leader role to the OIA Services team. The Team Leaders are already
overseeing more than the suggested maximum span of 10 direct reports. With the suggested
additional Advisor and Senior Advisor roles, it is timely to establish a third team leader role.
2
Move into a more strategic space
The subsequent step is to focus on more nuanced and skilful communications. To do this, the
group needs to further increase seniority and expertise within the group, focus on improving
retention, and ensure senior leaders have capacity and opportunity to be informed of, and
contribute to, the strategic thinking of the Ministry. To not only meet its requirements, but also
further develop the team’s maturity, we suggest the group investigates:
•
Implementing an apprenticeship model for Learning and Development.
•
Reviewing the role design, ensuring sufficient senior capacity is dedicated to coaching and
supporting more junior staff, and overseeing high-risk responses.
6
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Table 1: Summary
Focus area
Findings
Recommendations
Step 1
Resources
• The current permanent resourcing of the teams
Suggested workloads and spans of control
managing Official Information requests and Government
• For written parliamentary questions, we suggest ensuring resourcing does not exceed an average
Services and Coordination is not sufficient to address
150 WPQs per advisor per month, or 75 WPQs per senior advisor. The volume of WPQs is cyclical.
current workloads.
We suggest not allowing the workload to go beyond 175 WPQs per advisor per month for full time
• Current temporary arrangements and changes set out in
staff, or beyond 150 WPQs per month for temporary support staff.
a recent memorandum to OLT from 12 November 2012
• For OIA requests, we suggest resourcing the team to ensure each advisor responds to no more than
address the most urgent staffing challenges.
15 OIA requests per months on average, and senior advisors respond to no more than 8.
• However, the group currently heavily relies on those
• We recommend maintaining team sizes at a maximum of 10 direct reports per team leader or
temporary staff that are “borrowed” from other teams
manager.
within the group. That is an appropriate response to
address peak demand. It is not appropriate to rely on
Suggested resource levels
temporary staff for more than half the time, as it does not
• We suggest:
give the group sufficient planning certainty. Temporary
- Adding one Advisor and one Senior Advisor to the Government Services and Coordination team,
arrangements limit the group’s ability to strategically
or making the temporary arrangements suggested to OLT in a memorandum in November 2021
develop their staff into more senior roles.
permanent.
- Adding one Advisor and one Senior Advisor to the OIA team.
- Adding a team leader role in the Ministerial Correspondence team. This role would support the
Manager Ministerial Correspondence and could have Coordinator and Advisors report to them.
- Adding a third team leader role to the OIA Services team. The team leaders are already
overseeing more than the suggested maximum span of 10 direct reports. With the suggested
additional Advisor and Senior Advisor roles, it is timely to establish a third team leader role.
Moving existing resource • To minimise the effect on the function’s bottom line, it should first be investigated whether existing
resource can be repurposed.
• Some interviewees assumed that some of those temporary resources provided by the Ministerial
Correspondence (MC) team could be moved permanently, without overly damaging the MC team’s
ability to deliver appropriate products for the Ministry. To confirm that assumption, we suggest
engaging in an activity review with the MC team.
• In addition to ensuring an appropriate level of full-time staff to handle the workload the majority of
the time (or eight out of twelve months), we suggest looking at the wider Ministry for temporary
support:
- We suggest exploring the option to second junior staff and career starters from other parts of the
Ministry for a period of four months to support the Function in working through peek work
volumes in the OIA and WPQ space.
7
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Focus area
Findings
Recommendations
- A focus should be given to second junior staff from the strategic communication function, as we
expect that staff would gain valuable insights into their target audiences from working with the
requests coming in.
Workflows and
• The group manages a complex set of stakeholders that
• The business groups should be encouraged to streamline and simplify their OIA sign-out processes,
efficiency
all have their own sets of expectations and preferred
with only the SME manager or the SME Group Manager approving the response before sign-out, but
ways of working. That system is making process
not both.
standardisation very difficult.
• Regular training and information provided by the Government Services function ensures Business
• The current workflow management system is outdated,
Units are well placed to appropriately identify and forward OIAs they receive directly.
and processes have many media discontinuity (moving
• The OIA process should establish a stronger focus on triage, with some clear guidance to enable
between different media without automated interfaces),
consistent judgements on complexity and risk.
increasing the likelihood of human error and creating
•
inefficiencies.
To best leverage of the introduction of the workflow management tool, we recommend appointing a
dedicated workflow management owner, who would lead continuous improvement efforts for the
• There is no dedicated role that oversees all continuous
group.
improvement efforts.
• Several recent initiatives are improving the efficiency of
operations and are addressing the most pressing
challenges interviewees have described, including
further digitising workflows. However, there are
challenges for the Group that are beyond its control.
• We heard that the efficiency of the OIA process is
impacted by the layers of review and sign-out in
business groups, causing delays and/or bottlenecks.
While it makes sense for SME to review, this should
perhaps be done by either the SME manager or the
group manager rather than both. Depending on the
complexity of the request, sign-out should be done by
the Group Manager or DCE.
Prioritisation of
• We heard that the managers of functions are expected to
• We expect that establishing the triaging function as set out in OLT memorandum from 12 November
work
oversee the sign-out of work. That holds particularly true
2021 on “Proposed temporary changes to Government Services Group management arrangements
for the OIA team where we hear the manager is
and work distribution” will significantly support the prioritisation and resource allocation of work.
expected to sign-out all responses.
• We suggest continuing to lead conversations with Minister’s Offices about the prioritisation of work
• This approach leads to very high workloads and not
and associated tolerances to risk. Those conversations could benefit from an agenda that facilitates
enough time for the manager to engage deeply with
a structured analysis, for example, a template that covers:
high-risk work.
- the thematic analysis of WPQ and Ministerial Correspondences coming in,
• In the Government Services and Coordination team, it
- an assessment of resources spent on each theme,
was noted that the Minister’s Offices have very diverging
- a discussion of key risks associated with responses for each theme, and
views on priority and urgency of work.
- a decision on approaches and risk appetites for each theme.
8
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Focus area
Findings
Recommendations
• It was noted that the Group Manager Government
Services has led some important work liaising with
Minister’s Offices on:
- strategic communication,
- risk assessment,
- how prioritising different aspects of work will create
value, and
- what that means for resourcing requirements.
Step 2
Capabilities,
• The individuals in the Government Services Team are
• Providing government services is a craft that is best learned by working alongside more senior
frameworks and
well connected across the Ministry.
analysts. We suggest developing a clear career progression framework for staff within the Ministry’s
approaches
• The group is respected as a centre of excellence for
Government Services function, so staff understand what opportunities for progression are available,
government products.
and how they can develop into more senior roles.
•
•
The maturity of the function is constantly improving. The
Managers could prioritise staff development to improve retention. That means rather than retaining
group manages a complex set of stakeholders.
staff within a single area to ensure immediate workloads are handled, they plan and design
•
employee journeys within the framework.
To address ever increasing workloads, the group has
•
responded by specialising and adopting agile practices.
As part of the career progression framework, it is proposed to implement an “apprenticeship” model
for developing advisors with senior advisors being accountable for coaching and mentoring more
• There is currently no shared career progression pathway
junior staff as a core expectation of their role. The model needs to include:
or capability framework in place, that would support
-
retention.
Changing the role expectations for managers and team leaders to engage in more strategic
thinking and priority setting.
• There is an opportunity to address the work of the group
-
at a more strategic level, and to link the function’s risk
Designing a leadership track that illustrates requirements for and pathways to leadership roles.
management to the Ministry’s strategic objectives and
- Developing a framework for coaching and mentoring by senior staff members, putting an
risks.
emphasis on on-the-job experience and rotation.
• Link the group’s risk management to the Ministry’s strategic objectives and risks, including:
- Liaising with Deputy Director Generals across the Ministry to understand what is considered
sustained high or emerging risks within their teams and what the business units would like the
Government Services group to consider when drafting and overseeing responses.
- Link in with other central functions and leadership meetings and disseminate knowledge about
Ministry-wide strategic considerations and risks across the group.
- Further systematise how the Ministerial Servicing group that is working with the Public Service
Commission on improving OIA Servicing analyses and responds to risks.
9
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
FINDINGS
This section summarises the findings from the interviews with internal
and external stakeholders and the review of relevant documents. The
findings cover an analysis of workload and resourcing, a review of
workflows and operating approach, an assessment of current and future
capability requirements, and insights into the structure and team design.
Volumes of work and resources
Overview
This section provides detailed analysis of work volumes and findings about the adequacy of
resourcing to meet demands for different types of government services products.
Higher Ministerial Services workloads across agencies
Overall, there are continued high Ministerial Services workloads across government agencies. OIA
and WPQ volumes are significantly increasing year on year, which is becoming a challenge for many
departments. Members of Parliament have a limitless ability to ask questions of Ministers, coupled
with a right under the OIA to request information and be given access to it (unless there is a reason
not to).
People we interviewed (internally and externally) expected the volume of information requests to
remain high. Ministerial Services managers agreed that this government term has seen an increased
number of Parliamentary Questions coming through. They also felt that the public appears to have an
increased need for information that is channelled through OIA requests. Both these trends were
expected to continue in the foreseeable future.
In addition, the pandemic has resulted in heightened expectations and demands on departments to
provide detailed information in times of uncertainty. These are real challenges which are compounded
by a tight labour market meaning more staff are not necessarily available even if the necessary funds
are available.
The numbers are not expected to return to pre-COVID levels
For the Ministry of Health, leading the support of the Government’s COVID response and the visibility
of the Ministry’s senior officials have led to a particularly high increase in work volumes across the
group. These volumes are not expected to decrease to pre-COVID levels in the medium-term. There
is a perception that the impact and magnitude of the COVID response has led to a growing number of
10
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
people learning how to request official information and becoming “regular inquirers” that they are likely
to continue to seek further or updated information.
It is currently unclear whether the establishment of Health NZ will change the volumes of requests the
Ministry will receive. It is the current assumption within the Group that the net effect of the
establishment of Health NZ will not have a large impact on the way the Group operates.
Agencies are working together to address joint resourcing challenges
Several agencies (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Development, Oranga Tamariki, Accident
Compensation Corporation and Ministry of Education) have been working with the Public Service
Commission to develop a joint approach to Ministerial servicing, especially in the OIA space– aligning
processes where possible, exploring joint recruitment, and looking at how staff may be transferred
across the system more flexibly to help with surges. There is a real desire among the agencies to
ensure Ministerial Services continue to deliver and improve despite the challenges they are all facing.
To mitigate immediate workload pressures, staff move across teams to support other
parts of the function.
Having standardised position descriptions across teams would allow flexibility to move staff across
groups and support staff to gain experience across teams.
Government Services and Coordination
Summary of findings
The Government Services and Coordination (GSaC) team is responsible for managing responses to
Parliamentary questions and supporting briefings related to Select Committee work. The rapid
increase in WPQs per month, especially over the past year, has meant the team has needed to grow
at pace. The team has put in place temporary arrangements:
•
1 Senior Advisor and 2 Advisors were added in June 2021 for the duration of one year.
•
A recent OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 suggested adding another Advisor and
Principal Advisor role to support the team.
After reviewing the actual and forecasted workloads, we believe the current and suggested temporary
arrangements are appropriate in responding to increased workloads. The temporary staff are expected
to be required until December 2022.
Further staff will also be required in 2023. We expect that sustained workloads will require extending 1
Senior Advisor and 1-2 Advisors in addition to the permanent staff.
Current state
Written Parliamentary questions (WPQs)
The volume of WPQs in 2021 has increased by 200% from 2020, and by 300% from 2019.
11
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Table 2: WPQ volumes for 2019 - 2021
2019
2020
2021
Average monthly WPQs
161
224
668
Total WPQs
1933
2687
8021
Oral Parliamentary questions
The average number of oral parliamentary questions per sitting day that the team leads the drafting of
replies for has increased from averaging 1-2 prior to March 2020, to 4-5 in October 2021.1
Supporting Select Committees
There was also a significant increase in the work the team undertakes to support Select Committee
functions including appearances for the Ministry and Ministers. The team went from supporting two
hearings a year (an Annual Review and an Estimates hearing) to 10 hearings in the last two years,
including several ad hoc Covid 19 update hearings in both 2020 and 2021.
Workloads and resourcing
The increase in demand has been met by running very high average workloads in the team, which is
unsustainable.
The team seeks extensions from the Ministers’ offices on a large portion of WPQs to ease the
deadline pressures on the Ministry to provide responses. This is not sustainable while numbers of
WPQs continue to increase and risks the Ministry damaging relationships with Ministers and their
offices if the Ministry continues to seek large numbers of extensions.2
It was suggested for OLT to establish a temporary Principal Adviser and a temporary Adviser to
manage workloads.
Driver of WPQ increases
Unsurprisingly, most of the increase in WPQs is driven by the work of COVID-19 related Directorates,
particularly COVID-19 Health System Response and COVID-19 Vaccine and Immunisation Response.
WPQs for these Directorates have been responsible for a total of 400 additional requests in 2020, and
3182 additional requests in 2021. The increases corresponded with timings of peak periods of change
during the pandemic starting in June 2020. Without those two Directorates directly related to the
COVID response, the requests would have still nearly doubled (or increased by 212%) from 2020 to
2021 (or increased by 2552 requests from 2020 to 2021).
We also note that COVID-19 requests have potentially trickled down to other connected Directorates
within the Ministry of Health (for example, Mental Health and Addiction).
1 OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 on “Proposed temporary changes to Government Services Group management arrangements and
work distribution”
2 OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 on “Proposed temporary changes to Government Services Group management arrangements and
work distribution”
12
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the volume of WPQs by Directorate.
Figure 1: Volume of WPQs by month and directorate
1400
Chief Medical Officer
Corporate Services
1200
COVID-19 Health System Response
COVID-19 Vaccine and Immunisation
Programme
1000
Data and Digital
DHB Performance and Support
800
DHB Performance Support and Infrastructure
Disability
600
Health System Improvement and Innovation
Health Workforce
400
Infrastructure
Māori Health
200
Mental Health and Addiction
National Health Coordination Centre
NHCC
0
Office of the Director-General
Population Health and Prevention
Public Health and Primary Care Transformation
System Strategy and Policy
Analysis
WPQs will be the main driver for resourcing requirements for the GSaC team
Figure 1 shows a steep rise in the volume of WPQs from 2020 to 2021. The current workload pressure
has been met with very high average workloads. If the Ministry of Health does not increase resourcing,
it will have to consider the risks of employee attrition and retention issues worsening over time.
To mitigate some of the risks of high workload pressure on employees, we have analysed likely
resourcing requirements for handling WPQs. For this analysis, we have followed a triangulation
approach with datasets, methods and assumptions laid out below.
We have also made some high-level forecasting assumptions based on interviewee responses to
calculate staffing requirements for the calendar years 2022 and 2023 to support the increase in
requests. We tested these high-level assumptions with the Manager of the GSaC team.
13
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Assumptions of the model
Before 2021:
•
Advisors with a full workload spent half their time (0.5 FTE) in 2020 on WPQs and the remainder
on other correspondences.
•
Senior Advisors were expected to spend half their time drafting and coordinating responses, and
half their time coaching, overseeing, and signing out work. In 2020, half of this drafting and
coordinating time was expected to be on WPQs. In summary, we assume each Senior Advisor
contributes 0.25 FTE to WPQ related work.
•
Managers do not spend time working on WPQs but oversee and give advice on the team’s work.
•
Coordinators do not spend time working on WPQs but support the coordination of workflows.
•
Through anecdotal information and insights, we have estimated that 2020’s average workload of
176 WPQs per FTE per month was at an “ambitious but manageable” level for staff members.
The same staff also oversaw oral parliamentary questions (OPQs). This is considered a very high
output and average productivity.
•
To provide a reference point, the Ministry of Social Development has estimated their manageable
workload is 150 WPQs per FTE per month in peak times, or up to 1500 requests per FTE per
year. In the assumptions, staff are fully dedicated to WPQs and do not also oversee OPQs.
From 2021 onwards:
•
Advisors and Senior Advisors added from 2021 onwards have been added to relieve growing
pressures from an increase in WPQs. For modelling purposes, we have dedicated their entire
writing time to WPQs.
Assumptions on the impact of a reduction in COVID-related questions over time
Given the substantial increase in WPQs as a result of COVID response work, we suspect that
eventually the pandemic-related requests will reduce and the WPQs will return closer to the baseline
at the start of 2020. However, this may take two to three more years. We note that given the volatility
of the numbers in the past, future workloads are difficult to predict. For the purpose of a high-level
short-term outlook, we have assumed:
•
2022 will have similar volumes of WPQs as 2021 in our forecast assumptions.
•
2023 will begin to see a reduction of COVID-related directorates such as Health System
Response and Vaccine & Immunisation Programme. We have estimated a reduction of 25% in
COVID-related requests to demonstrate the slowdown.
There might be other areas of increased WPQs in the years 2022 and 2023 that our approach
does not comprehensively cover
We note that our analysis does not consider:
•
the trickle-down effect of the pandemic resulting in an increase of WPQs (for example, in Mental
Health and Addiction)
•
any other unexpected public health crises
14
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
•
any effects of 2023 being a general election year.
An overview of all staffing assumptions can be found in appendix 3.
The average WPQ caseload by FTE has increased by approximately 60% from 2020 to
2021. The team was not set up to deliver on those caseloads.
Figure 2 shows the steep increase in workload pressure under different levels of staffing resources at
different points in time. The average number of cases per FTE per month increased from 176 in 2020
to 283 in 2021. The team has brought in three temporary roles, a Senior Advisor and two Advisors, to
manage the increased workloads.
We have illustrated the 2020 Ministry of Health benchmark of 176 WPQs per FTE per month in the
graph below.
Figure 2: Volume of WPQ caseload by FTE
1200
600
1000
500
W
800
400
P
Qs
Qs
p
P
e
W
600
300
r FTE
Total
400
200
176
200
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
-2
n
r-2
n
l-2
g
p
t-2
v
c
n
r-2
n
l-2
g
p
t-2
v
c
a
p
u
u
u
e
o
e
a
p
u
u
u
e
o
e
J
Feb
Mar
A
J
J
May
J
A
S
Oc
N
D
J
Feb
Mar
A
May
J
A
S
Oc
N
D
WPQs
MoH Baseline
Caseload per FTE
To calculate the appropriate resourcing going forward, we have looked into two scenarios:
•
Medium option: Going forward, we suggest targeting resourcing to fulfil caseload volumes with
permanent staff in the team at least two-thirds of the time (i.e., 8 of 12 months), with peak
demand covered by temporary additional resources.
•
Maximum option: The second option considered is staff resourcing to fulfil all the WPQs in a
timely fashion at any given point of time during all months of the year.
15
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
The maximum option scenario would potentially increase costs beyond what is required, by having
underutilised staff during less busy months.
•
For example, if the team were to adequately resource for any given point of time, it would have
needed approximately
6 FTE in September 2021 to work on 1030 WPQs (assuming 176 cases
per month per FTE).
•
Whereas, if the team were to resource comfortably for 8 of 12 months, in 2021 at the fifth highest
volume of 746 cases (shown in figure 2), the Ministry of Health would need approximately
4 FTE.
Table 3: GSaC team summary resourcing analysis
Assumptions
2020
2021
2022 [Forecast]
2023 [Forecast]
Volumes of WPQ
WPQ volume
2699
8144
8144
5723
Staff resources fulfilment numbers
Maximum option: Total FTE
3 FTE
6 FTE
6 FTE
4 FTE
required to fulfil WPQ with ease
at any given point of time
Medium option: Total FTE
2 FTE
4 FTE
4 FTE
3 FTE
required to fulfil WPQ
comfortably for 8 months out of
12
Comparison: FTE that were
1.25 FTE (Jan-Oct)
1.5 (Jan-June)
4.5 FTE
1.5 FTE
dedicated to WPQs (assuming
and 1.5 FTE (Oct-
3.5 FTE (from
(From Jan-June 2022,
temporary arrangements will not
Dec)
June 2021- June
assuming the additional
be extended)
2022)
advisor roles set out in
The OLT paper
1.5 FTE
(from July onwards,
when temporary
arrangements conclude)
1 Figures are rounded.
2 The manageable workload figures are calculated based on information provided in interviews and estimates provided by
MoH and MSD
Assumptions for this calculation are summarised in appendix 4.
Official Information Act requests
Summary of findings
The current permanent resources in the OIA team are not sufficient to manage current
demand.
The current permanent resourcing of the team managing OIA requests is not sufficient to address
current workloads.
16
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
The current permanent set up includes only one Team Leader and a high workload per person. The
team appears very stretched and often needs to apply for extensions for responses.
The team relies heavily on “borrowing” staff from other teams, but these staff can be withdrawn when
required elsewhere. It was noted in interviews that the temporary nature of the support of other teams
and the fixed-term contracts of many staff members contributes to planning uncertainties for the team.
To address some of the pressing challenges:
•
The Ministry increased the amount of information that is released proactively and improved the
Ministry’s coordination of Ombudsman complaints.
•
In addition to the recorded requests, the team introduced a quick response system for low-risk
requests to allow for timely replies and reduce the burden on the group.
The Ministry has reported to be able to manage 15-20 OIA requests per FTE per month. That would
indicate a requirement for 24-30 FTE dedicated to responding to OIAs, which is 2-8 FTE more than
the team’s current temporary arrangements.
Further suggested changes will change the way OIA requests are managed.
In addition to the measures described above, the OLT memorandum from November 2021 has
suggested temporary relief measures:
•
Establish two separate OIA Services teams, reporting to the current Manager OIA Services. This
will require establishing one Coordinator OIA Services.
•
Establish an Advisory Services team, with a Triage and Response stream and an Advisory
stream, which would require establishing six roles.
We believe that the suggested measure wil have a positive effect on the OIA team’s capacity to
manage its workloads. However, after reviewing the volumes, we believe the suggested temporary
arrangements are not sufficient to address the current increased demand and an additional minimum
of one Advisor and one Senior Advisor will be required to manage current workloads sustainably.
The development of volumes of OIA requests are hard to predict.
We suggest staffing requirements may remain high for the remainder of 2022. In the OIA space, we
have not attempted to forecast workloads in 2023, as they will be subject to too many unknown
variables. Points for consideration we have heard through our interviews included:
•
When public health measures in connection to the Government’s COVID response are dialled
back later this year, so will the public interest. COVID-related OIA requests are expected to
decrease.
•
Conversely, members of the public have learned more about their rights to information over the
past two years and appear more inclined to exercise those rights.
•
There was a perception that the establishment of Health NZ would not overly affect requests
directed to the Ministry of Health.
17
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Current state
The Ministry of Health has seen the steepest increase in OIA requests across all Government
agencies, growing by 140% between 2020 and 2021.
Staff resourcing numbers increased gradually to accommodate the increase in workload but did not
match the stark increase in workloads.
Table 4: Summary of OIA data and assumptions
MoJ 2021
MSD 2021
MBIE 2021
MoH 2020
MoH 2021
Total number of OIA
814
2185
2818
1593
3762
requests
OIA requests resourcing
15 OIAs per
8-10 OIAs per
[Unknown]
15-20 OIAs per Advisor (Senior
standards
Advisor (0.5
Advisor or
and Principal Advisors dedicate
FTE for Senior
Senior Advisor
0.5 FTE to caseload, the
and Principal
per month
remaining 0.5 FTE is dedicated to
Advisors)
coaching, training and quality
assurance)
Caseload per FTE (Yearly)
-
-
-
57
86
Percentage of OIAs
94%
99%
90%
94%
95%
completed within timeframe
Total number of
10
16
39
24
49
Ombudsman complaints
Figure 3: Comparison of volumes of OIA requests by Ministry
3000
2720
2500
2000
1510
1500
1099
1000
414
500
0
Jan- Jun '20
July- Dec '20
Jan- Jun '21
July- Dec '21
MBIE
MoH
MoJ
MSD
18
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Analysis
The team has experienced very high average workloads. The team’s current average Advisor
caseload is fluctuating at approximately 25-30 requests per person in the second half of 2021. This is
well above the accepted caseload levels for comparable agencies such as the Ministry of Justice and
the Ministry of Social Development, where the ideal load is seen as 8-15 OIAs per FTE per month.
Table 5: Staff resources for the OIA team 2020-2022
January –
July –
January – June
July –
January – June
June 2020
December
2021
December 2021*
2022
2020
OIA requests
662
931
1,042
2,720
completed
Team headcount
11
13
18
17
17
(not including
1x Principal
2x Principal
2x Principal
2x Principal
2x Principal
Manager)
Advisor
Advisors
Advisors
Advisors
Advisors
3x Senior
4x Senior
4x Senior
4x Senior
4x Senior Advisors
Advisor
Advisors
Advisors
Advisors
10x Advisors
7x Advisors
7x Advisors
11x Advisors
10x Advisors
• 3x COVID-
• 3x COVID-
• 3x COVID-
funded3
funded
funded
1x Coordinator
• 1x 3 month
1x Coordinator
(COVID-funded)
secondee
(COVID-funded)
1x Coordinator
(COVID-funded)
Allocated FTE
14
14
22
22
22
(including
temporary staff,
not including
Manager)
Average OIA per
8
11
8
21
-
month per FTE
FTE at an ideal
workload of 15
11.5 or 12
7 FTE
10 FTE
30 FTE
-
OIA requests per
FTE
month
When comparing the Ministry of Health numbers to those of other Ministries, it is clear that the Ministry
of Health team has very high target and actual productivity.
The Ministry of Health has managed to increase the headcount considerably in recent months using
COVID-funded advisors, secondees, and coordinators to fill the gap to keep workload levels relatively
the same. However, even with the additional temporary staff, the current number of 21 OIA requests
per FTE (for both permanent and temporary staff) is not sustainable.
3
From the end of January, MoH borrowed 3x Advisors within the Government Services Group to assist with the holiday backlog. This
arrangement was for a month and ended at the end of February.
19
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
An additional minimum of one Advisor and one Senior Advisor will be required to manage current
workloads sustainably.
Correspondence (Ministerials and Direct Replies)
Summary of findings
There is no reason to believe the team is currently under-resourced. We do not have sufficient
information to suggest the team is over-resourced.
Current state
This part of the Government Services Group has seen the least change in workloads
over the past year.
The correspondence volume managed within the Ministry has remained relatively static throughout
2021, with peaks occurring in response to Government announcements.
The OLG memorandum from November 2021 has noted that the correspondence that the Ministry has
supported Ministerial Offices to respond to, particularly the Office of the Minister for COVID-19
Response, has grown significantly as the public has questioned the impact of decisions that relate to
them. It was noted that it was not possible, however, to accurately report this volume.
It is difficult to compare the work of the team to that of other Ministries.
The Ministry of Social Development has suggested it assumes that one Advisor would be able to
manage about 30 pieces of correspondence per month. If that figure was used as a comparable
baseline, the Ministry of Health team would be expected to require about eight Advisors and four
Senior Advisors to manage all correspondence. However, when comparing the team to similar
functions, it was noted that the Ministry of Health team leads larger parts of responses centrally. This
makes it hard to benchmark staffing numbers against work to resource ratios of other organisations.
Staff members are currently supporting other teams to release immediate pressures
across the wider group.
In November it was recommended to the OLT to change the reporting line for two Advisors Ministerial
Correspondence positions, to temporarily report to the Manager Advisory Services. The Advisory
Services Team will include a Triage and Response team that will focus on quick responses across the
OIA and Correspondence services and work with the organisation to improve information available to
the public to respond to focus areas.
Analysis
We have seen no indication to suggest the team is not sufficiently resourced to manage current
workloads. Some interviewees have suggested that the team could potentially manage with fewer
staff, suggesting making temporary arrangements of staff supporting other teams permanent. The only
way to confirm this suggestion would be to conduct a more detailed activity review of the team,
estimating FTE based on the activities performed.
20
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Operating approach
The way the group is designed balances efficiency and a need to account for
complexity.
The Group follows a hybrid model, where government services are managed from the centralised
function, while coordinating the inputs into responses from experts across the Ministry. The central
coordination and oversight mean that the bulk of the increased workload is within the Government
Services group, but other parts of the Ministry feel the effects of the additional workload too.
To address ever increasing workloads, the group has responded by specialising and
adopting more agile practices. The maturity of the group is constantly improving.
The group has had to grow at pace, and the way the OIA team operates is relatively new. The group
has established three specialised teams:
•
OIA services
•
Ministerial Correspondence
•
Government Services and Coordination (covering both Briefings and WPQs).
The differentiation of the three functions allows for specialisation of each team and efficiency gains
that come from staff applying knowledge and repeatable processes to the work. To address acute
resource needs, teams “borrow’ staff temporarily to help manage peaks in workload.
There is an opportunity to add more value by moving beyond simply responding to
operational demand, but capacity is a constraint.
Interviewees felt that further resource would be required to go beyond managing the workloads of
daily operations and following templates, to tailoring responses to audiences and backgrounds to
information requests more.
There is an opportunity to link the group’s risk management to the Ministry’s strategic
objectives and risks.
We understand that the Ministry of Social Development has introduced a risk assessment process
based on the Ministry’s risk framework – which defines risk on a scale of very low to very high. There
is now a consistent definition of risk used in their Ministerial and Executive Services function and
across the Ministry, coupled with a clear authorisations/sign-out framework commensurate with the
level of risk associated with the request.
The Ministry of Social Development has also introduced revised guidance for WPQs, which follows
from conversations with the Minister’s’ offices around acceptable approaches.
Managers spend a large part of their time on sign-out processes.
Some interviewees felt that there was a lack of management oversight, with senior advisors signing
out high-risk responses. Other interviewees noted that the fact that the team manager is required to
sign-out all OIA responses for some DDGs leads to that role spreading their time too thinly, and not
spending enough time on high-risk responses. The wide range of demands on managers at the
moment (including through large spans of control) amplifies these risks.
21
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
There are challenges for the group that are beyond its control.
Interviewees have shared that the Ministry’s IT system, especially the use of the Lotus Notes system
and document management systems, leads to rework and churn because systems are not well
integrated or centrally supported. However, challenges related to the Ministry’s wider IT infrastructure
beyond the group are not within the sphere of control of the Government Services group.
Workflow efficiency
When reviewing workflow efficiencies, lean management principles suggest identifying opportunities to
•
minimise the time spent on support processes in comparison to directly value adding work
•
reduce ‘waste’ in the form of rework, delays and redundancies
•
reduce the amount of complexity and variation of work in key processes, enabling standardised
outputs to be delivered efficiently and effectively.
Support processes take up much of the group’s time.
Frequent turnover in staff means that the function spends a lot of time onboarding and training new
staff. This is particularly the case in the OIA team, which is reliant on temporary support staff.
However, processes for new starters have been reviewed and streamlined, which helps new staff
come onboard quickly. This mitigates some of the efficiency losses connected to the high staff
turnover.
The group is currently relying on manual processes and individual oversight,
increasing the likelihood of human error and making communication and oversight
inefficient.
We have heard that the function still relies on outlook reminders, emails, spreadsheets and templates
that are not integrated into one system, providing transparency and a ‘single source of truth’.
When compared to other Ministries with lower workloads, interviewees felt that the workflow
management was lagging and urgently needed to be digitised.
A key driver of rework for all processes reviewed are the numerous media discontinuities in the
Briefings, Ministerial Correspondence, WPQs and OIAs workflows. A media discontinuity occurs, when
staff must manually transfer data between systems, email or other Microsoft programs, and there is no
software interface.
Information is currently downloaded from websites, logged in Quill, summarised in emails with
manually attached documents, and sometimes uploaded onto websites again.
Each media break in a process is a source of both potential error, and inefficiency.
There is a lack of clear accountability for process improvement.
We have heard that team leaders and team managers are expected to lead process improvement
efforts, in addition to their day-to-day work. There is currently no central coordinating role that would
identify, oversee or facilitate continuous improvement practices. Area of rework, delay or general
process inefficiencies are thus identified by chance, rather than being the result of systematic process
improvement practice and mechanism.
22
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
A digital workflow system is being developed to improve the efficiency of operations
and to address the most pressing challenges of the group.
The Ministry is implementing changes to make workflows more efficient and effective. A workflow
management system is being developed to improve visibility over processes, reduce media
discontinuities and facilitate coordination.
This solution is expected to address concerns interviewees shared around visibility of process steps,
status, and deadlines as well as support continuous improvement practices, such as how feedback
gets reflected in templates and content management. It is also expected to reduce delays and
redundant processes and improve information management practices, providing the aforementioned
‘single source of truth’.
Stakeholders outside the group have identified opportunities to further strengthen
continuous improvement efforts.
Stakeholders have noted that they sometimes provide the same feedback to responses multiple times
(for example, the Ministry needs to apologise for delays). It was suggested for the group to:
•
review its continuous improvement efforts and ensure that feedback is received and reviewed,
and fed into standard processes and templates where appropriate, or discussed with the
submitter if there is a particular reason for not making the adjustment.
•
enable proof-readers of responses to have access to a regularly updated list of standard features
and best practice responses for different scenarios.
We also suggest that the workflow management system itself will provide a valuable tool to improve
the efficiency of workflows. For example, by actively reviewing areas of the workflow where work gets
‘stuck’ this may reveal patterns of issues relating to the design of the process, including those that
may be amenable to process improvement.
The group manages a complex set of stakeholders that all have their own sets of
expectations and preferred ways of working. That system is making process
standardisation very difficult.
The team manages many inputs, with various points of contact across the Ministry ‘holding the pen’ on
different answers. The teams liaise with five Minister’s Offices and thirteen Deputy Directors-General.
Each Minister’s Office can define response times and declare preferences for communication
materials. Each Deputy Director-General can design and delegate sign-off processes and roles within
their group as they see fit.
While there is constant coordination on good workflows and quality requirements for products which
will contribute to the establishment of best practice standards over time, there is no expectation that
workflows will ever be fully standardised.
There is an opportunity to streamline process flows and reduce delays and
bottlenecks.
Interviewees shared that there are delays in the process that make it difficult for the government
services group to deliver responses in time.
Delays commonly occur at transition points when work is handed from one individual or group to
another. The number of transition points or handovers that occur in each process vary across the
Ministry, as Directorates currently respond to requests in different ways.
23
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
By reducing the number of transitions or process steps and sharing standardised expectations around
response times, the Ministry could significantly reduce process delays.
Another potential source of process delays is unequal distribution of capacity or resource to work on
responses. This could include reviewing whether there is more resource required within Directorates,
to provide equal capacity at all steps within the process and eliminate delays.
Adding flexible capacity for potential changes in demand at only one step will lead to increasing delays
downstream later in the process. Any changes made to improve individual steps of a process, without
addressing the bottleneck are likely to fail to improve the process.
The Group Manager liaises with the Minister’s Offices to make workflows as efficient
and effective as possible.
In the Government Services and Coordination team, it was noted that the Minister’s Offices have very
diverging views on priority and urgency of work. It was noted that the Group Manager Government
Services has led some important work liaising with Minister’s Offices on:
•
strategic communication
•
risk assessment
•
how prioritising different aspects of work will create value, and
•
what that means for resourcing requirements.
It was noted that there was an opportunity to further strengthen the strategic engagement. One option
would be to explore how managers of the teams input the generation of insights and derivation of
strategic implications and recommendations.
Avoidable error in OIA release
Issue
In January 2022 some papers were accidentally included in a release of OIA materials by the
Minister’s office to a requester, when they were intended to be withheld.
The Ministry has described the situation as a ‘Swiss cheese’ case, in which there were some steps
which ordinarily have avoided the mistake but didn’t due to human error, exacerbated by a change in
personnel on the file over time.
The context
After material identified as included in the scope of an OIA request has been reviewed within the
Ministry it is sent to the relevant Minister’s office. The office reviews the material, and any proposed
withholdings, and provides comment on the proposed approach including the proposed withholdings
and the reason for these.
When the material is sent to the Minister’s office for review, the material is included in its entirety
without redaction. This is called the ‘red box’ version and includes visible highlighting indicating what
is within scope and to be withheld. After the Minister’s office provides comment the OIA team makes
revisions as required and finalises and returns the pack for release by the Minister’s office (in the case
of a request to the Minister, which this was).
24
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
What happened
Amongst the information to be released, there were some documents that were intended to be
withheld in full. This was indicated at the top of the page, which was the practice for documents to be
withheld in their entirety. In the finalisation of the batch for the Minister’s office to release, these
documents weren’t removed from the pack and were sent to the requester accidentally, including the
pages highlighting that these documents were to be withheld.
Several factors were assessed to lead to the mistake:
•
The OIA request at issue had been in the Ministry’s system for a while and gone through a
number of advisors. This meant that the person who took final action wasn’t familiar with the file.
•
There was a watermark on all pages that the material was to be released under the OIA, so it
wouldn’t have been immediately obvious that the material was to be withheld, apart from the note
at the top of the page.
The Ministry observed that there wasn’t an issue with the sign off layers, which consider what is to be
released or not, rather than the mechanical preparation of the pack to be sent to the Minister’s office.
All the right eyes had been over the decision-making prior to release.
The changes the Ministry has made
The Ministry has made the following adjustments to its release processes to avoid this problem in
future:
1
Instead of a ‘to be withheld’ label on top of pages that are to be withheld, pages will be ‘red box’
redacted in full when they go to the Minister’s office for review. The advisor will then make sure it
is redacted/removed before sending it over as part of a final batch for release. This redaction is
an automated process via the software which manages the redacting.
2
Working to standardise the review approaches across Minister’s offices, to avoid the application
of different ways of handling the review and release process at the back end.
3
Suggesting that Minister’s office does a final check it before sending it out.
The situation highlighted a vulnerability in the release process. Ultimately the mistake was due to
human error, but it is easy to see how it could have happened, without stronger visual cues that the
material needed to be removed prior to release.
Appropriateness of the changes
The Ministry’s solution to this issue appears well targeted to the risk, as it effectively uses the
redacting software to remove the risk of human error. This assumes that the material to be withheld is
red box redacted in the first place, but there is no suggestion that this earlier stage in the process was
deficient in this case.
This fix would also have avoided a similar situation where a Budget sensitive document was
inadvertently released in 2021. Following that incident an additional check by a senior member of the
team was implemented.
25
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Capabilities
The individuals in the Government Services Team are well respected.
Respondents felt that the function generally works well, given the high work volume and high stress
environment the team is operating in. Individuals are viewed as motivated, well trained and are
produce content that can be reused, allowing for efficiency gains to be realised. Informally, the strong
relationship skills of all team members allow the team to reach different parts of the Ministry and
facilitate timely responses to requests from the group.
There was a consistent view that people in the group are capable and resourceful, and the
management level agreed they wanted to make sure staff are well supported in their workloads and
professional development.
The group serves as a centre of excellence for government services products.
The group supports the rest of the organisation through training and central communication on
government services products, timelines and process requirements. Staff from the group often move
on to other roles across the Ministry, lifting the level of understanding about government processes
across the organisation.
This Ministry-wide capability-building is an important role of the group, but one that is dropped when
workloads mean that the group needs “all hands on deck”.
There is an opportunity to further improve the nuance and style of writing.
Interviewees shared that they found the quality of the Correspondence Team’s written products to be
variable, and there is room for improvement in both the content, tone and in presentation and flow.
Interviewees felt that Ministerials and Direct Replies could be better tailored to pick up on the tone,
background and information need of the audience.
There is currently no career progression pathway or capability framework in place,
that would support retention.
We have heard from internal and external interviewees that roles in most Ministerial Services Groups
are often a first career step for graduates seeking a career in government. Staff often move on when
career opportunities arise, often with short notice periods. Furthermore, some staff find the constantly
high workloads challenging.
There is an opportunity to design a framework that addresses different life stages and career
ambitions, that considers job variety, building expert tracks, allowing for more flexible workload
management, and aiming to improve longer term staff satisfaction and retention.
Structure and team design
It is timely to revisit the span of control, especially for the OIA team.
The group has reached the point where the current structure has come to its limits and the group
cannot add further resource to the existing structure, without revisiting the team and role design.
The way the teams are organised will allow for a span of control that is on the larger end of the
spectrum. Those features include a comparatively high degree of standardisation, a high similarity of
tasks across staff, and a moderate level of training required to perform (basic) tasks.
26
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
However, large spans of control mean that managers’ time is spread thin across managing staff and
their development, driving and supporting improvement, and overseeing delivery. This means that one
or more aspects of the management role could be compromised depending on the immediate
demands.
A typical span for a manager that primarily acts as this type of supervisor is eight to ten direct reports.
The managers OIA Services and Ministerial Correspondence currently each have about 20 direct
reports. The OIA team must additionally oversee the work of several temporary staff, borrowed from
other teams.
The temporary arrangements suggested in the OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 address
the challenging managerial oversight arrangements, by recommending:
•
Establishing a fourth Manager role, overseeing Advisory Services.
•
Establishing two team leader roles for OIA Services, reporting to the Manager OIA Services.
•
Establishing a team leader role for triage and response, reporting to the Manager Advisory
Services.
27
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
RECOMMENDATIONS
We have identified areas of focus that have the potential to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness in the way the group operates. We suggest
the Ministry addresses the recommendations of this review in two steps,
to address the most pressing challenges first.
Step 1: Setting the Ministry up to manage
workloads and perform well now and in the future
Appropriate case loads
As part of the review, we have discussed appropriate caseloads with stakeholders within the Ministry
and in similar functions in other Ministries.
The main driver of workloads in the past two years were OIA requests and written parliamentary
questions. We thus suggest monitoring caseloads in both categories closely and respond by adding
additional resources as required.
•
For written parliamentary questions, we suggest ensuring that caseloads do not exceed an
average 150 WPQs per advisor per month, or 75 WPQs per senior advisor. The volume of WPQs
is cyclical. We suggest not allowing the workload to go beyond 175 WPQs per advisor per month
for full time staff, or beyond 150 WPQs per month for temporary support staff.
•
For OIA requests, we suggest resourcing the team to ensure each advisor responds to no more
than 15 OIA requests per months on average, and senior advisors respond to no more than 8.
Advisor, Senior Advisor and Principal Advisor roles
There is no “one size fits all” answer to resourcing the group. To make
recommendations on right-sizing it, we have made assumptions and built on
experiences of the Ministry and others.
We have conducted a high-level exercise in modelling the resourcing required to deliver sustained
very high workloads over this year, and high workloads in 2023. We have built scenarios based on:
•
The resourcing required based on assumptions of achievable workloads per person that the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development have shared.
•
The resourcing the Ministry of Health had to handle the workload in 2021, assuming this would be
a reasonable baseline for a high-performing team.
We have not heard any indications the Correspondence team requires further permanent resources.
28
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Make current temporary roles in the Government Services and Coordination team
permanent.
Based on the workload-to-staff ratios and a suggested span of control of no more than 10 direct
reports, we suggest making the currently approved temporary roles (one Senior Advisor and 2
Advisors) permanent.
In addition to these roles, we have identified a need for 1 to 1.5 FTE to support the team with its
current workload. We suggest establishing two roles:
•
One of those roles should be an
Advisor role, working on WPQs full-time.
•
One of those roles should be a
Senior Advisor role, with 0.5 FTE dedicated to working on
WPQs, dealing with trickier requests. The other 0.5 FTE would support the learning and
development, coaching and oversight of the team’s Advisors.
This staffing scenario would see the team comfortably able to cope with workloads in most months. In
the four months of peak work volumes, the team should be supported by one or two temporary staff
from across the Ministry. We suggest making one of the Advisor roles temporary until the end of 2022,
as we expect WPQ workloads related to the COVID response to decrease in 2023.
We note that the recent OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 came to similar conclusions,
suggesting an additional Principal Advisor and an Advisor position. We suggest reviewing whether an
additional Principal or Senior Advisor role is best suited to support the team.
The advantage of the Principal Advisor role is that the role could act as an ‘Editor in Chief’, working to
lift the team’s quality of writing and supporting the team’s strategic orientation (working on the
system).The advantage of a Senior Advisor role would be that the role would directly contribute to
developing responses and easing the workload (working in the system).
Increase OIA team resource levels to match workloads.
The way that OIA requests are addressed is largely non-negotiable. It is important to right-size the
team and seniority mix to acknowledge increased work volumes and complexity. When compared to
other Ministries, the team appears very lightly resourced which creates a risk of delays and not
meeting expected timeliness standards, as well as creating risk of lower quality responses. There is no
indication that the sustained high workloads will decrease in the short- to medium-term future. An
investment in more permanent capacity in the team does not carry a significant risk of overbuilding the
capacity in the event demand drops, due to the high ongoing turnover of staff in the group.
We suggest establishing one Advisor and one Senior Advisor role.
It should be reviewed if some of the seconded staff could join that team permanently or be transferred
into a pool of flexible staff whose primary role is to support the OIA Services team, and secondary role
is to support other teams with non-time-critical work when workloads allow.
Reducing the number of shorter term contracts.
Predicted workloads are expected to stay high for Ministerial Services functions across government.
The Ministry of Health is competing for resource in a limited labour market, and advertising temporary
roles will see the Ministry at a disadvantage in comparison to other agencies.
Providing the team with permanent staff al ows the team to better invest in people’s learning and
development and support an apprenticeship model to increase the group’s maturity (as set out in the
capability section of the report).
29
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
There is an opportunity to explore secondment options from across the Ministry
We suggest exploring opportunities to second staff from outside the group for its busiest months. In
addition to ensuring an appropriate level of full-time staff that could handle the workload comfortably in
off-peak months, we suggest looking at the wider Ministry for temporary support:
•
We suggest exploring the option to second junior staff and career starters from other parts of the
Ministry for a period of four months to support the group in working through peak work volumes in
the OIA and WPQ space.
•
A focus should be given to second junior staff from the strategic communication function, as we
expect that staff would gain valuable insights into their target audiences from working with the
requests coming in.
Management structure, capability, and capacity
Create additional management and team lead roles to reduce the span of control.
This would free up the management resource for more strategic, oversight and risk management work.
This could be achieved by either:
•
Adding managerial roles to the group, or
•
Adding a level of team leaders with direct reports, responsible for the direct people leadership
and Principal Consultants that support the oversight and sign-out of straight-forward responses.
A reduced or redesigned span of control would al ow the managers to work “on the system” instead of
being caught up with operation within the system.
Based on the workload-to-staff models and a suggested span of control of no more than ten direct
reports, we suggest making permanent the temporarily approved roles set out in the OLT
memorandum from 12 November 2021 on proposed temporary changes to Government Services
Group management arrangements and work distribution. This includes:
•
Establishing a fourth Manager role, overseeing Advisory Services
•
Establishing two team leader roles for OIA Services, reporting to the Manager OIA Services
•
Establishing a team leader role for triage and response, reporting to the Manager Advisory
Services.
In addition to those roles, we suggest establishing:
•
A team leader role in the Ministerial Correspondence team. This role would support the Manager
Ministerial Correspondence and could have Coordinator and Advisors report to them. The role
would report to the Manager, Ministerial Correspondence, who would also still have Principal and
Senior Advisors reporting to them.
•
Adding a third team leader role OIA Services. The team leaders are already overseeing more
than the suggested maximum span of 10 direct reports. With the suggested additional Advisor
and Senior Advisor roles, it is timely to establish a third team leader role.
Proofreading and editing skills need to be featured in all roles.
Diligent editing and proofreading of responses determine the quality of the products produced by the
team.
Editing involves going over the writing of yourself or others, ensuring that responses are presented as
clearly as possible, structured appropriately, and have a suitable tone and style. It reviews the content,
30
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
clarity and structure of responses. Proofreading ensures correct spelling, punctuation and fixes
grammatical errors.
We suggest ensuring that editing and proofreading skills are featured in all newly recruited roles. We
also suggest for Principal Advisors to lead the way in setting up appropriate systems, trainings, and
standards to ensure the group’s outputs are of high quality.
High-level workflows
We support current proposals to establish an Advisory Team that would operate in a
strategic and tactical space.
We have identified the need to strengthen a risk- and complexity-based view of prioritisation of work
and senior oversight. This team will ensure that the right eyes are across the right challenges. It also
allows for pairing up senior and more junior advisors to support learning and development on the job.
Given the importance of this step for the group’s outcomes, we do not think it is appropriate for
rotating Senior Advisors to perform this task as part of their job.
We support the establishment of a triage function, set out in the OLT memorandum of 12 November
2021. The memorandum described how a newly established Advisory Services team would be
instrumental in improving the way the Government Services group manages the triage, proactive
release and Ombudsman service lines.
The Advisory Services Team will include a Triage and Response Team that will focus on quick
responses across the OIA and Correspondence services.
The team will also work with the organisation to improve information available to the public to respond
to focus areas, and manage the relationship with the Ombudsman.
We suggest the Advisory Services Team would also act as a first point of contact for the Strategic
Engagement and Communication functions in the Ministry to liaise on communication focus areas and
share strategic insights.
Process design and efficiencies
We suggest addressing all three aspects of lean management:
•
reducing waste
•
streamlining support processes
•
standardising key processes.
A key part of this will be using the insights provided by the workflow management tool to inform
continuous improvement practices.
Increase efforts to standardise sign-out processes.
The Group works with different Directorates that all have a preferred way of working. That variety
increases complexity and can lead to inconsistent practices that in itself reduces efficiency. There is
an opportunity to further standardise templates, for example, around delegations or commissioning
templates.
The team would benefit from revisiting the delegations, clarifying roles and ensuring management
attention is appropriately applied to oversight. For example, this might look at whether sign out
processes in directorates need to go through multiple layers (SME manager, group manager, GM,
31
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
DDG), and the right balance between risk management and efficiency. It is worth noting that
streamlining the sign out process might reduce delays in the process. It might also improve the
efficiency in sign outs for the directorates. It might not of itself save much time for the Government
Services group.
We understand that this will be a journey and that processes will unlikely be fully standardised and
consistent across all directorates. However, we suggest the team leadership engages in a series of
structured discussions across directorates with a view to standardising sign-out processes, roles and
responsibilities, and creating further trust in the group’s capability to draft and oversee high-quality
outputs.
Reduce delays by reducing process steps and enabling an equal distribution of
capacity
We suggest reducing the transition or hand-over points of processes and encouraging the Directorates
to standardise practices and to reduce steps in the sign-out process where possible.
We also suggest for the government services group to adopt practices of communicating expected
changes in workloads early, allowing the Directorates to account for additional resource requirements
in their work programmes and facilitating a more equal ramp-up in capacity across the different
process steps. Addressing the bottlenecks in the process will increase the speed of individual requests
moving through the process.
Enhancing the continuous improvement process
The group has demonstrated the ability to adapt and improve its ways of operating. We recommend
reinforcing this by establishing a continuous improvement practice that is linked in with the new
workflow management system and:
•
Ensures that feedback on mistakes on standard responses is picked up systematically, and the
same comments are not made repeatedly (for example, adding an apology when responses are
delayed).
•
Ensures that improvements are reflected in templates.
We suggest Principal Advisors lead the thinking on how insights gathered through continuous
improvement practices will feed into standards and templates.
Identify a workflow management owner to leverage the workflow management system
by capturing insights and initiating process changes.
We suggest identifying a workflow owner who ensures that information, data and insights inform the
evolution of the workflow management system and support continuous improvement. That role could
sit within the newly formed advisory team, and focus on:
•
Gathering insights: Identifying common areas of delays and steps with long wait times,
identifying inefficiencies, identifying which workflows have the most variation across Directorates
and tracking which version is the quickest and leads to the least mistakes. Typical inefficiencies
we would expect this role to pick up are:
-
the owner of steps changing repeatedly
-
steps with high needs of back-and forth communications
-
or teams developing redundant systems or templates outside of the workflow management
system (e.g., Excel sheets to track progress, templates that are not embedded in the
system)
32
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
•
Informing process improvement: Chairing quarterly meetings with the group manager, team
managers, principal advisors, and team leaders to examine patterns of issues - combining data
and insights and the experience of people. This person would lead the discussion of areas of
inefficiency and waste and the identification of solutions. They would also provide information on
best practice processes to the group manager, to facilitate the manager’s standardisation efforts
across Directorates.
•
Overseeing process optimisation efforts: Overseeing adaptions of workflows, updating
workflows within the management system and developing digital templates.
•
Centralise and coordinate improvement efforts: Being the point of contact for stakeholders
across the Ministry for process improvement suggestions.
33
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Step 2: Establish a Centre of Excellence that is
linked to the Ministry’s strategic objectives
At the core of a high-performing Government Services group is its people. Responding to Ministerial,
Parliamentary and public requests requires skill, tact, and an understanding of underlying concerns.
These skills can only be learned over time, by doing the role, being exposed to a variety of issues, and
observing the approach of more experienced practitioners.
To consolidate the group as a centre of excellence for government products, it is important to continue
to lift the capability and subject matter expertise of the group. This includes improving the competency
to make judgement calls and reducing mistakes in sign-out processes and final dispatch of a
packaged product.
An “apprenticeship model” would al ow staff that are looking to progress their careers within the team
to understand the nuance of the work with a combination of formal and supported on-the-job learning.
In addition, tailoring the approach to development and career pathways could lead to longer retention,
with an impact on knowledge and experience in the group, and reduced management time spent on
recruitment and onboarding.
Prioritisation of work
There is an opportunity to address the work of the Group at a more strategic level.
A strategic view is needed to build a stronger focus on the outcomes and points of leverage that truly
matter.
The Group currently functions at a mostly reactive operational level. It was noted that a next step in
the Group’s maturity would be to take a strategic approach to how (official) communication shapes the
public image of the Ministry. That includes further work with Ministers’ Offices around proactive
release, liaising on a risk-based approach to responses and reflecting the Ministry’s strategic
objectives and key messages in the way responses are worded. We suggest this work be led by the
group’s management team, with the Advisory team being the main arm for execution and oversight.
Rather than leaving the strategic thinking around key messages to a separate Communication and
Engagement function in the Ministry, we suggest the Government Services group take a more
proactive role in shaping and reflecting the narratives of the Ministry, complementing the work of other
central functions.
To support a strategic focus in the way the group is set up, we suggest the management team
prioritises:
•
Ensuring that the Government Services Group has a base of skilled advisors to enable it to work
across the Ministry and wider sector to identify and prioritise areas of focus for improving the
Government engagement approach and outcomes. Secondments to the Communications and
Engagement function from the Government Services group could be an expectation to support
this approach and ensure that questions and concerns from the public and from Parliament
inform thinking about strategic communications, and vice versa.
•
Creating a clear expectation that Principal Advisors and Team Leaders will play an active tactical
role, including reviewing the approach to bundling up work and finding an appropriate tone to
responses on an ongoing basis to ensure that it aligns with overall strategic priorities and risk
assessments, and is focused on addressing the issues and opportunities that matter most.
34
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Creating projects out of the regular management line to carry out strategic thinking on particular
questions that are important to the performance of the Government Services system. This should be
aligned with the peer group of government agencies, working with the Public Service Commission to
lift government capability and capacity.
Capabilities and progression pathways
Improve retention by tailoring role design to different career stages or needs.
Interviewees shared that they did not have the expectation that staff would stay in the group forever,
but that they should ideally stay at least one year, to reduce the management time spent on constant
onboarding, and to improve the quality and nuance of responses.
In addition, it was noted that it would be good to keep some staff in the role for an extended period,
building a pool of trusted Senior Advisors that more junior staff can seek guidance from. Those trusted
advisors could support peer learning and ensure that institutional knowledge is maintained.
The ideal role design for both desired scenarios would vary:
•
In the first case, the role would be designed to maximise opportunities for a career starter that is
curious to learn more about the group’s operations and wants to explore different parts of the
system. On that ”career starter track”, staff could move through the teams and learn a defined
skill set. After one year, that person could decide whether to:
-
move into a next step of an apprenticeship system, preparing to develop their skill set and
advance their career within the group (see outlined below), or
-
move into another role within the Ministry. The managers in the Government Services group
would facilitate the move and career progression.
Verbalising the desire to retain the role for at least one year and offering to actively support
career development as part of that track, would make it easier to plan with and for staff.
•
In the second case, staff need to be supported to perform their role in the long run and become
experienced and trusted advisors. A focus should be put on wellbeing and stress reduction,
ensuring manageable workloads.
Employing an apprenticeship system to support learning and development.
It is proposed that generic government services skills continue to be strengthened through the
adoption of a mentoring model, commonly used by successful policy groups and professional service
firms. Under this model, the expectations on different roles would be as follows:
•
Entry level/ Advisors would focus on learning the basics of government services product
development. Advisors would be expected to work across multiple teams to increase their
breadth and depth of knowledge, skills and experience. In a first year, they would be expected to
learn the basics in the OIA team, supporting the team in managing its high workloads. In a
second year, entry level Advisors could choose whether they prefer seek opportunities elsewhere
in the Ministry or continue their progression pathway within the Government Services group. In
case they remain within the group, they would be expected to learn and move through the wider
group. They would be expected to develop strong networks with all colleagues inside the Ministry.
•
Senior Advisors would be expected to take increased responsibility to supervise and mentor
advisors. They could be encouraged to undertake a 3-month secondment to the strategic
communications function prior to their appointment, learning more about strategic dimensions,
35
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
priorities and risks associated with the Ministry’s public communications. The secondment would
be expected to happen in the ‘downturn’ of work volumes between December and February.
-
Senior advisors would be expected to have a good understanding of risks associated with
the publication of information and have an ability to provide nuanced and appropriate
answers to requests for information.
-
Senior advisors would be expected to have a minimum of 2.5 years’ experience in the group
(or other relevant) role during which time they would have led triaging or risk assessment
activities.
-
Senior advisors are expected to have well-developed networks with all stakeholders, and
regularly explore long term strategic solutions with these groups.
•
Principal Advisor positions would reflect a need for specific skills in the development of
products. These specialist roles would report to Managers. They would be responsible for leading
the response to high-risk requests, understanding the wider and long term implications, and
engaging all relevant stakeholders at an early stage. They would be involved in ensuring the right
skills are sourced for each task and oversee the development of the response to ensure that it
delivers to the required standard, engages more widely, and follows the right processes.
Principal advisors would be responsible for supervising and mentoring the learning and
development of senior advisors, by drawing them into the responses generated for high-risk
requests, explaining their thinking and decisions along the way.
The role would provide an alternative career path for staff who have the aspiration and capability
to develop into an expert practitioner rather than a people manager. It is expected that Principal
Advisors and Team Leaders would sign-out medium-risk responses. In the Ministerial
Correspondence team, this role could provide quality control and professional development for
staff, acting as a an “Editor in Chief”. Ministerials and other Ministerial products, including
briefings and Cabinet papers, will pass through this position.
As systemic or capability problems are identified, the editing Principal Advisor would work with
the management team and staff to address these.
•
Team Leaders would be expected to provide support to Managers in considering the broader
strategic work programme of the group, and forge synergies and relationships with the
Government Services Peer Group and other stakeholders. This role would report directly to the
Manager of a team. They would exemplify the behaviours, innovation and efficiency that the
Ministry expect the teams to work with. It is expected that Principal Advisors and Team Leaders
would sign-out medium-risk responses.
•
Team Managers would primarily focus on people management and development, ensuring their
team was running effectively and efficiently, managing relationships with key stakeholders, and
‘owning’ the outputs. Managers would also be required to have sufficient knowledge of the
pipeline of work and be across high risk responses It is expected that managers would sign-out
high-risk responses.
•
The General Manager plays a key role in setting and monitoring the strategic direction of the
group, ensuring that capability across the group is being built in the right way, and that resources
are being deployed flexibly onto the priority areas of focus. They would collectively own the
prioritisation of work with the managers, along with the DDG, and would ensure that the
programme is aligned with wider Ministry and sector priorities.
36
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Figure 4: High level apprenticeship model
Year 5
Year 5 onwards:
onwards:
Principal
experienced
Advisor
Senior
Year 2:
Advisor
move
Transitioned
•
• Become a
• Become “Editor in
Support
mentor to more
Chief”
transition to
Year 1: Entry
junior staff.
• Lead high-risk
other parts of
Level Advisor
• Lead more
responses
Start
the Ministry.
No
Expert
complex or
• Oversee learning
apprenticeship
risky work.
and development
track or move
of senior advisors
into other parts
Year 2:
of MoH?
Year 3 – 4:
Advisor
Senior
Year 5
Advisor
onwards:
Team Leader
• Learn the
“Basics” of
yes
People
government
Mo
M ve
v into
Expert career
Leader
services,
leadership
rsh
ip
or people
ideally as part
track?
leadership?
stay
•
•
of the OIA
Move through
Become a
• Manage teams
team
function.
Senior Advisor.
• Get a ‘mentor’
• Aim for
of Advisors
•
in GS team of
secondment to
Support
choice.
Communicatio
strategic work
n and
and
Engagement
stakeholder
function.
engagement
37
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
Further strengthen the learning and development framework for the wider Ministry
To complement the apprenticeship model, the Group should develop an in-house learning and
development programme for staff in other Business Units to understand the statutory requirements,
objectives, risks and priorities of work within the group. The model can build on the good work the
Government Services Group has been acknowledged for and offer refresher sessions as well as
information tailored for different seniority levels across the business units.
This will allow the team to have richer engagements with senior leaders of business units, and create
shared understanding of roles and responsibilities, contributing to a standardisation of response
workflows and sign-outs.
The apprenticeship model should be included in a wider Ministerial capability
framework, to ensure an all-of-Ministry approach to career development.
We suggest the Group’s leadership engage with the people experience side of the Human Resource
function to ensure the apprenticeship model feeds into the Ministry’s direction of travel and maximises
opportunities for Learning and Development established in other parts of the Ministry.
Link the group’s risk management to the Ministry’s strategic objectives and risks.
We suggest that the group leads discussions with various stakeholders to understand current risk
profiles and respond accordingly. Concrete steps could include:
•
Liaising with DCEs across the Ministry to understand what is considered sustained high or
emerging risks within their teams and what the Business Units would like the Government
Services Group to consider when drafting and overseeing responses. Central insights should be
captured in a central dashboard for all staff within the Group to access.
•
Link in with other central functions and leadership meetings and disseminate knowledge about
Ministry-wide strategic considerations and risks across the group.
•
Further systematise how the Government Services Peer Group that is working with the Public
Service Commission analyses and responds to risks. That could include:
-
Making risk identification and assessment a standard agenda item.
-
Working with the wider system to identify mitigations.
Expand the role of the Government Services Group.
There is an opportunity to expand the role of the group to coordinate the proactive release of Cabinet
Papers. Currently each Directorate coordinates the proactive release of its Cabinet papers. There is
an opportunity to centralise the oversight of that group and manage a central knowledge and content
management, increasing consistency and efficiency of current practices.
38
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWEES
Internal interviewees
•
Jan Torres, Acting Manager Official Information Services
•
Nick Allen, Manager Official Information Services (substantive)
•
Andrew Dames, Manager Government Services and Coordination
•
Vera Hennessy, Acting Manager Ministerial Correspondence
•
Emily Richards, Manager Office of the Deputy Director-General
•
Ricarda Vandervorst, Manager Office of the Deputy Director-General
•
Elisabeth Brunt, Group Manager Government Services
•
Sarah Turner, Deputy Director-General, Office of the Director-General.
External interviewees
•
Magnus O’Neil , General Manager Ministerial and Executive Services, MSD
•
Nicky Dirks, Manager Ministerial and Executive Services, Public Service Commission
•
Jenna Bottcher, Manager Ministerial Relations and Services, Ministry of Justice.
39
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
APPENDIX 2: DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED
Numbers and data
•
GSaC data 2020-2021
•
OIA statistics as published by the Public Service Commission:
https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/resources/latest-oia-statistics-released-jul-dec-2021/
•
Calculations and workload estimations shared in emails and memos by the Ministry of Social
Development and the Ministry of Justice.
Processes
•
Process Flow diagrams on Briefings, Ministerial Correspondence, WPQs and OIAs and excel
logs detailing the changes made in the new system.
•
Proposed future state value stream of the workflow management system.
Resourcing
•
Current organisational charts detailing the structure of the group
•
Information provided by the manager of each group
•
OLT memorandum from 12 November 2021 on “Proposed temporary changes to Government
Services Group management arrangements and work distribution.”
40
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
APPENDIX 3: GSAC STAFFING
ASSUMPTIONS
The table below lists the detailed assumptions and data we have used to demonstrate the caseload
per FTE from 2019-2023.
Table 6: Assumptions for WPQ staff resourcing analysis
Assumptions
2020/21
2021/22
2022/23
2023
Staffing
Jun 2020- Oct 2020
Jan 2021- Jun
Dec 2021 – June 2022
Similar temporary
resources
staff resource
2021 figures staff
staff resource numbers
arrangements as the Dec
numbers for MoH4
resource numbers
in recent OLT
2021- June 2022 staff
• Manager (1) at
for MOH
memorandum with two
resource numbers in recent
0 FTE
• Manager (1) at 0
additional resources (1
OLT memorandum with two
Principal Advisor and 1
additional resources (1
• Senior Advisor
FTE
Advisor)
Principal Advisor and 1
(1) at 0.25
• Senior Advisor
•
Advisor)
FTE
(2) at 0.25 FTE
Manager (1) at 0
FTE
• Manager (1) at 0 FTE
• Advisors (2) at
• Advisors (2) at
•
•
0.5 FTE
0.5 FTE each
Principal Advisor
Principal advisor (1) at
(1) at 0.5 FTE
0.5 FTE
Oct 2020 – Jun
•
•
2021 figures staff
Senior Advisor (2)
Senior Advisor (1) at
Jun 2021- June 2022
resource
at 0.25 FTE
0.25 FTE
staff resource
numbers for MoH
•
•
numbers for MoH
Advisors (4) at 0.5
Advisors (2) at 0.5
• Manager (1) at
•
FTE
FTE
Manager (1) at 0
0 FTE
•
•
FTE
Advisor (1) at 1
Advisor (1) at 1 FTE.
• Senior Advisor
•
FTE
Senior Advisor
(2) at 0.25
(2) at 0.25 FTE
FTE
• Advisors (2) at
• Advisors (2) at
0.5 FTE
0.5 FTE each
• Advisors (2) at 2
FTE5
Volume of
Dataset provided
Dataset provided
Using base volumes of
Using base volumes of
WPQs
WPQs from 2021 as we
WPQs from 2021 and
are still observing a
calculating a 25% reduction
peak in the volume of
of two COVID-19 related
WPQs in the third month
directorates (
Health System
of 2022.
Response and
Vaccine &
Immunisation Programme)
MSD
Estimation of a manageable workload of
150 WPQs per FTE provided by MSD6 for comparison
Baseline
MoH
Estimation of a manageable workload of
176 WPQs per FTE fully dedicated to WPQs in 2020.
Baseline
4
Ministry of Health’s staff resource figures for the Government, Services and Coordination team were sent to us by Elizabeth Brunt,
assuming advisors spend 50% of time on WPQs and senior advisors spend 25% of their time on WPQs.
5
Note that Advisors added as a resource from 2021 are assumed to solely help with WPQ workloads, (1 FTE), and newly resourced Senior
and Principal Advisors are estimated to spend half their time on WPQs (0.5)
6
Ministry of Social Development’s caseload by FTE figures for the Ministerial and Executive team were sent to us by Magnus O’Neill.
41
Commercial In Confidence
Document 1
APPENDIX 4: GSAC TEAM
RESOURCING ANALYSIS
Table 7: GSaC team resourcing analysis
Assumptions
2020
2021
2022 [Forecast]
2023 [Forecast]
Manageable workload per FTE
MOH baseline (monthly)
176 cases per FTE
176 cases per
176 cases per FTE
176 cases per FTE
FTE
MSD baseline (monthly)
150 cases per FTE
150 cases per
150 cases per FTE
150 cases per FTE
FTE
Volumes of WPQ
WPQ volume
2699
8144
8144
5723
Highest monthly volume of WPQ
May: 586 requests
September:
September: 1030
September: 741
in a year
1030 requests
requests
requests
5th highest monthly volume of
March: 336 requests
March: 747
March: 747
March: 521 requests
WPQ in a year
requests
requests
Peak volumes of WPQ
March-July
July-November
July-November
July-November
Staff resources fulfilment numbers
Maximum option: Total FTE
3 FTE
6 FTE
6 FTE
4 FTE
required to fulfil WPQ with ease
at any given point of time
Medium option: Total FTE
2 FTE
4 FTE
4 FTE
3 FTE
required to fulfil WPQ
comfortably for 8 months out of
12
Comparison: FTE that were
1.25 FTE (Jan-Oct)
1.5 (Jan-June)
4.5 FTE
1.5 FTE
dedicated to WPQs (assuming
and 1.5 FTE (Oct-
3.5 FTE (from
(From Jan-June
temporary arrangements will not
Dec)
June 2021- June
2022, assuming
be extended)
2022)
the additional
advisor roles set
out in The OLT
paper
1.5 FTE
(from July
onwards, when
temporary
arrangements
conclude)
1 Figures are rounded.
2 The manageable workload figures are calculated based on information gathered through the interviews, and estimates
provided by MoH and MSD
3 Staff resources fulfillment numbers are calculated by dividing the volume of WPQ by the MoH baseline caseloads per FTE
to calculate FTEs needed.
4 Current FTE numbers are staffing numbers and proposed plans (2022-onwards) from the OLT memorandum provided by
MoH.
5 Full time advisors are calculated to use 0.5 FTE resources for WPQs, full time Senior Advisors are calculated to manage
0.25 FTE caseload for WPQs, and Managers and Coordinators are assumed to spend no time on WPQs.
6 2022 estimated to have the same volume of WPQs as 2021
7 2023 estimated to have a 25% reduction of COVID-19 related requests in COVID-19 related Directorates
42
Commercial In Confidence
Document Outline
