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Foreword
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade contributes to New Zealanders’ well-being through
the action we take in the world to advance New Zealand’s interests and promote our values.
The purpose of this Strategic Assessment,
Building Our Future in a Disordered World, is to
ensure we are as clear-sighted as possible about what kind of world we will be operating in
over the next decade and the kind of action that will be required on the international stage
to promote New Zealanders’ well-being. In this world, our purpose of making
New Zealanders safer and more prosperous will remain a vital one, and the Assessment
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indicates that contributing to global sustainability will become more central to our work.
The practice of undertaking a Strategic Assessment every three years is intended to help
staff, Ministers and the agencies with whom we work to understand significant global shifts
and what they mean for New Zealand’s interests in the world. By providing a common
reference point, the Assessment will support policy development and decision-making, as
well as stimulating debate.
This Assessment has been delivered at a time when New Zealand faces a challenging global
outlook. This outlook is clouded by new levels of disruption and disorder. We will need
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more urgency, agency and entrepreneurship in our diplomacy to build New Zealand’s
resilience and so capitalise on the opportunities and manage the risks that a disordered
world will present.
We have proved our adaptability and resilience during earlier periods of uncertainty and
significant shifts in our strategic environment. The analysis and direction set out in the
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Assessment are designed to position New Zealand so that we can do so again in the future.
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Chris Seed
Chief Executive
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Executive Summary
Investing in global rules and
institutions
that
deliver
for
This Assessment provides direction for
New Zealand; and
New Zealand’s foreign policy to 2030 by
Tackling
increasing
risks
to
identifying important shifts in global
New Zealand’s security.
affairs and assessing their impacts on
our enduring interests in:
In pursuing these priorities, we will need
to invest more in, and demand more
A rules-based international order
from, our bilateral relationships – and be
that supports New Zealand priorities;
prepared to manage increased tensions
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A security environment that keeps
in them.
s6(a)
New Zealand people and activities
safe;
International
conditions
and
connections
that
enable
New Zealanders to prosper; and
Global action on sustainability issues
that matter to New Zealand.
It will be harder to protect these
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interests and defend our values over the
next decade. Many of the assumptions
about global and regional affairs on
which our foreign policy has rested will
no longer be valid: assumptions about
the virtue of ever deepening globalisation,
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about the effectiveness of multilateralism
and its institutions, about the appeal of
liberal democracy and economics, about
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the
We will need to invest in a wider range of
global leadership role of major powers
and
partners
about a benign Pacific neighbourhood.
s6(a)
At the same time,
environmental
imperatives will demand extraordinary
adaptation, and advances in technology
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will disrupt states and societies.
In this more complex world, six foreign
policy priorities will assume particular
as potential contributors to the kind of
significance for New Zealand’s interests
global order that reflects our interests.
and well-being over the coming decade:
We will also need a wider portfolio of
smaller, innovative like-minded partners
Strengthening
s6(a)
with whom we can readily work to
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the Pacific;
advance shared interests.
Shaping an Indo-Pacific regional
order that reflects New Zealand
Overall, the context for our diplomacy
interests;
will be more complex. We will need a
Maximising New Zealand’s export
more sophisticated understanding of our
value and resilience;
shifting external environment, more
Playing a credible role in global
collective effort among external- and
climate change action;
internal-facing government agencies and
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more entrepreneurship in our diplomacy.
We will need to focus our effort on areas
where we can, working with others, have
impact on issues of importance to
New Zealand,
and
work
to
build
New Zealand’s resilience to capitalise on
the opportunities and manage the risks
that a disordered world will present.
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
The next decade will be a challenging one
5
The lodestars that have helped
for New Zealand as we defend our values
guide New Zealand’s foreign policy – order
and pursue our interests against a disrup-
through rules; influence through relation-
ted and disorderly global landscape that
ships; the amplification of our voice
will present particular challenges to the
through architecture; and management
interests of small countries such as ours.
of economic risk through diversification –
will remain important as we navigate this
2
The trends impacting the global
emerging landscape. Our national assets
landscape (see pp. 14-20) suggest, in
that underpin New Zealand’s credibility
sum, a future that will be characterised
in the international arena will stand us in
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by increased complexity, heightened
good stead, but in a world that presents
strategic tension and new levels of
more risk than opportunity, we will need:
disruption and risk. We can expect a
A more sophisticated awareness and
world that is more transactional, more
understanding
of
our
external
volatile and disorderly and more
environment as it experiences
challenging for small states as global
marked and unexpected shifts;
authority and governance become more
contested s6(a)
Rigorous
prioritisation
of
our
external effort to harness limited
as the rules governing international
resources behind the most critical
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relations become more
issues within an expanding set of
strained; as
countries
opportunities and risks;
retreat behind borders; and as
human security threats from climate
A more collective effort which
change and resource scarcity increase.
mobilises the capabilities of a wider
range of government agencies, as
New Zealand’s foreign policy
the boundaries between “foreign”
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approach to 2030
and “domestic” continue to blur; and
Most of all, more urgency, agency and
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3
Basic assumptions on which our
entrepreneurship in our diplomacy,
foreign policy has rested over the years
now that we can make fewer
– a s6(a)
assumptions about the willingness of
others to safeguard the order which
has managed world affairs for the
liberal
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past 75 years, let alone to safeguard
order
s6(a)
New Zealand’s own interests.
6
We will find it more difficult to
and a globalised world where the benefits
maintain profile, achieve cut-through
of ever deeper market opening and
and exert influence on the issues that
behind the border integration would be
matter to us in this crowded, contested
self-evident – are less and less reliable.
and fragmented operating environment;
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4
This disrupted and disordered world
prioritising effectively and calibrating our
is also likely to s6(a)
ambition and effort will be important.
become
The greatest risk to the execution of
more transactional, as long-held norms
New Zealand’s foreign policy during this
and rules attenuates6(a)
difficult period will be trying to tackle too
muchs6(a)
to spread our
It will be harder and harder to navigate
trade policy effort too thin, or to fail to
between our interests and our values.
realise fully the benefits of coalitions.
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
New Zealand’s foreign policy
s6(a)
priorities to 2030
7
Six foreign policy priorities will be
especially significant for us because of
We will need deeper relationships
their deep interplay with our security,
with a broader portfolio of like-
prosperity and sustainability interests;
minded partners, often smaller
the effort required; and the complexity
countries, with whom we can readily
and weight of the choices that will arise:
work to advance shared interests.
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Strengthening
s6(a)
10 We will need to tend more
the Pacific;
assiduously to how we contribute value
Shaping an Indo-Pacific regional
to these partnerships and be especially
order s6(a)
judicious in where we expend diplomatic
capital, which will be in shorter supply.
Maximising New Zealand’s trade
Strengthening s6(a)
value and resilience;
the Pacific
Playing a credible role in global
climate change action;
11 There is no more urgent task for
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Investing in global rules and
New Zealand than to bolster our s6(a)
institutions
that
deliver
for
Pacific region s6(a)
New Zealand; and
Tackling
increasing
risks
to
This is no longer solely about the vital
New Zealand’s security.
task of ensuring that our Pacific neigh-
bours are individually safe, resilient and
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8
This section sets out directions and
prosperous; it is increasingly about the
choices for New Zealand under each of
strategic environment s6(a)
these priorities.
s6(a)
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in the Pacific s6(a)
9
In pursuing these priorities, we will
need to invest more in, and demand
more of, our bilateral relationships:
Australia will remain s6(a)
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important s6(a)
and
its
centrality to our interests will be
brought into sharper relief by the
environment we will be in. s6(a)
12 s6(a)
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We will need s6(a)
friends that have the motivation and
the means to help protect common
New Zealand’s
interests and values.
membership of the Pacific architecture
s6(a)
will
provide
another
avenue
to
understanding and shaping the region’s
priorities and approaches.
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
13 We will also need to ensure the
s6(a)
deepest possible working relationship
with Australia, whose reach, resources
and commonality of view make it an
indispensable partner in what must be a
common efforts6(a)
We will need to
engage
other
like-minded
powerss6
s6(a)
This will call
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for astute diplomacy as we seek the
benefits of having alternative models and
assistance available to our Pacific
partners while mitigating the risks of a
more crowded space s6(a)
16 s6(a)
14 But ultimately, if our preferred
model for a peaceful and prosperous
Pacific is to be realised, we will have to
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look to ourselves. We must engage as a
partner and not a transactional provider,
and we must ensure that the mix of
assets we bring to the region (diplomacy;
development, humanitarian and security
assistance;
political
engagement;
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community links) is sufficient for the task.
We will need to make substantial financial
investment, but our contributions will
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need to be about more than quantum
and will need to include deeper policy
responses. With Australia, we will need
to reflect on whether and how we can
incorporate Pacific Island Countries
Shaping an Indo-Pacific regional
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(PICs) into our domestic markets
order that reflects New Zealand
s6(a)
and our domestic
interests
regulatory space; increase alignment of
education and health systems; and use
17 New Zealand’s well-being is inter-
PACER Plus and other trade policy levers
twined with the Indo-Pacific’s. We have
to integrate PICs more fully into regional
a deep stake in the regions9(2)(g)(i)
and
global
economies.
Credible
domestic and inte
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In
climate change will also be critical to our
this we need to be active bilaterally and
role s6(a)
in the Pacific.
through regional architecture.
15 s6(a)
18 s9(2)(g)(i)
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
s9(2)(g)(i)
s6(a)
22 s6(a)
19 s6(a)
Our efforts to build more influential
relationships with s6(a)
regional powers
who broadly share our interests in a free,
open and inclusive Indo-Pacific s6(a)
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must be sustained.
23 Investment in regional institutions
will provide us with a further source of
resilience. Deepening our relationship
with ASEAN will be essential for the eco-
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nomic gains that such a connection will
enable and because deeper investment
in ASEAN will help sustain it as a strategic
centre of gravity; it is the best means of
integrating the region’s stakeholders into
20 Establishing and maintaining this
regional architectures that support our
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s6(a)
will be one of the presenting
preferred rules and norms (notably the
challenges of the 10-year horizon. It will
East Asia Summit (EAS) s6(a)
). That
not be easy but it will be easier if we are
said, we cannot ignore the emergence of
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judicious in our choices, consistent and
other possible regional architectures. We
predictable in our words and deeds and
will have to s6(a)
always take the sum of New Zealand’s
interests and values into account when
find our place among the
making decisions. s6(a)
s6(a)
Indo-Pacific s6(a)
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s6(a)
in line with our interests, our
values and regional priorities.
24 Finally, if we anticipate a less settled
region, we should also anticipate a region
21 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
where norms and rules are challenged,
and even where conflict is possible – all
against the backdrop of a region where
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there is no security architecture commen-
surate with its economic and political
infrastructure. s6(a)
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DIRECTIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
s6(a)
technical expertise and trade policy
entrepreneurship will be important and
determine our influence.
28 One mechanism for exercising
agency in a constrained environment will
be “concerted open plurilateralism” and
identifying “pathfinder” opportunities to
shore up existing rules and promote new
ones in areas that are important to
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New Zealand. We can work with key
Maximising New Zealand’s export
partners – smaller countries s6(a)
value and resilience
25 New Zealand’s prosperity is under-
pinned by a strong export sector that
– to contribute “building blocks”
delivers sustainable returns to the
to re-invigorate the multilateral system.
country. A number of disruptive forces
are bearing down on our trade interests:
29 Other fora, particularly APEC and
increased protectionism; s6(a)
the OECD will probably be relatively
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retreat from liberal economic
more influential on trade policy while the
norms; consumer shifts away from
WTO is constrained s6(a)
carbon
intensive
commodities
and
New Zealand’s
services;
new
international
trade
chairing of APEC in 2021 is a once in a
platforms without comprehensive rules
generation opportunity to promote a
(digital trade/e-commerce); and trade
sustainable and inclusive liberal economic
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tensions s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
agenda, which will create stronger
markets and more favourable market
conditions for our exports. The OECD
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likewise provides a forum to protect and
advance liberal economic norms.
Finally, climate change imperatives will
30 The Comprehensive and Progressive
require exporters to adapt, sooner or
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
later, to a low-carbon global economy.
(CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive
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26 This disrupted environment will test
Economic Partnership (RCEP) are two
the
key
resilience of our export sector. Our
pillars, along with the Pacific Alliance,
trade policy will
through
need to shift to bolster
which greater regional integration
that resilience: expanding market access
could be pursued. s6(a)
is
likely to be overtaken by other priorities
to secure long-term prosperity, not least
a shift in focus from volume to value.
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27 A weakened WTO will offer little
opportunity for expanding market access
and enhancing trade rules. s6(a)
31 s9(2)(b)(i)
Sustaining our reputation for
Bilaterally, New Zealand’s trade policy
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
effort will s6(a)
shift from achieving
s6(a)
new market access to leveraging better
the access we already have through
increased effort in FTA implementation,
tackling non-tariff barriers and upgrading
existing FTAs. A useful adjunct to this
Playing a credible role in global
work will be supporting developing
climate change action
economies with which we have FTAs to
undertake domestic reform to boost their
35 Climate change will present deep
economic development, with positive
challenges over the next decade in terms
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flow-on effects for trade and investment.
of both impacts and responses. We have
a compelling national interest in global
32 Given our export profile, one of the
action to reduce emissions because our
most critical areas to economic resilience
well-being effectively depends on others’
will be smoothing the domestic transition
action. s6(a)
to accommodate a low carbon global
economy
and
shifting
consumer
expectations. We will need good access
to international carbon markets and to be
positioned as a trusted, environmentally
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sustainable supplier of healthy food in
36 We have limited ability to shape
the future food system (which, absent
global responses fundamentally, but
scientific breakthrough, may entail some
what credibility and influence we do have
changes to our export profile). Further
in the international arena will depend on
increases in the services base of our
demonstrating mitigation action at home,
exports, particularly
in low-carbon
however small a contribution this makes
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sectors, will become more important.
to global emission reductions. At the
same time, we will need to continue to
33 Further consideration will need to
ensure international mechanisms treat
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be given to how trade policy, alongside
emissions from agriculture appropriately.
domestic policy, can support exporters to
We will thus need an international
transform and thrive in a low carbon
approach to climate change that delivers
global economy. The greater the
effective global action, satisfies domestic
momentum on global action on climate
policy and economic imperatives and
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change, the more pressing this will be.
supports our Pacific interests.
34 New Zealand’s trade policy and
37 The quantum of our foreign policy
economic diplomacy can further support
effort directed to climate change will need
resilience in the export sector by enabling
to increase markedly over the decade.
market diversification (e.g., increasing
Our effort will be directed to two broad
awareness of alternative trade oppor-
priorities: 1) driving and shaping global
tunities; and greater promotional effort
mitigation action; and 2) managing the
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in promising but less well-established
impacts of climate change. We have
markets) and supporting uptake of digital
some choice over the level of effort that
trade platforms (e.g., pursuing better
we put into the first. Given the interests
rules). Strategic engagement with the
at stake, we should, however, prioritise
export sector will be required to flesh out
building on our existing leadership role in
further how New Zealand trade policy
international climate action. Domestic
can best support the extraction of higher
action to underpin our credibility will
value from markets and diversification to
become increasingly critical as the Paris
provide long-term resilience. s6(a)
Agreement is operationalised from 2020.
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
38 Areas for New Zealand action will
42 This next decade will be a time when
include leadership diplomacy to drive
we will need to be selective in choosing
ambition and support mitigation efforts
those parts of the system we focus on
(e.g., the High Ambition Coalition, the
and rigorously prioritise allocation of
Global Research Alliance); initiatives to
effort. Choices will be influenced by our
use trade rules to support climate change
primary interests as a small exporting
action (e.g. fossil fuel subsidy reform, the
country with a large maritime zone and
Agreement on Climate Change, Trade
an Antarctic claim, with deep interests in
and
Sustainability
(ACCTS));
and
environmental
protections,
s9(2)(g)(i)
development of effective carbon markets
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that have environmental integrity.
and with a national identity that
values fairness, equality and freedom at
39 Effort on managing the impacts of
home and abroad.
climate change in the Pacific will be un-
avoidable, but the scale will depend on
43 With these interests and values to
the extent of climate change action at
the forefront, the areas of the system
the global level. With the Paris
that New Zealand will need to be most
Agreement likely to fail to limit global
committed to defending and developing
warming to 1.5 – 2 degrees, we should
will be: international trade rules; rules
be prepared for an increasing focus on
that govern Antarctica and the oceans,
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managing impacts of climate change.
including the Southern Ocean; inter-
national commitments on climate change;
40 Significant further scaling up of
and rules that govern conflict, reduce
support for PIC adaptation and disaster
threats from weapons of mass destruction,
relief through the aid programme will be
promote collective security, address
needed. Our efforts to address the legal
emerging security issues and uphold
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impacts of climate change (e.g.,protection
personal freedoms. Thus, the parts of the
of maritime zones and climate-induced
system likely to matter most to us are:
forced migration) will gain prominence.
The WTO, which protects market
THE
s6(a)
access commitments and enforces
global trade
rules;
The UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), which provides the
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legal framework for ocean activities.
It underpins our EEZ; codifies
freedom of navigation and overflight
Investing in global rules and
that are important for trade; and
institutions that deliver for
provides mechanisms to promote
New Zealand
ocean health, protect marine bio-
diversity and manage high seas
41 New Zealand’s well-being over the
fisheries and deep sea mineral
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last 75 years has been supported by a
resources;
system of institutions, rules, norms and
The Antarctic Treaty System, which
frameworks
that
has
provided
preserves our Antarctic claim and
predictability,
disciplined
power,
provides for peaceful environmental
reflected our values and s9(2)(g)(i)
and natural resource protection in
our interests. s9(2)(g)(i)
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean;
The
Paris
Agreement,
which
underpins global climate action;
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
Emerging frameworks to address
46 Our diplomacy will also need to
security issues such as cyber, new
extend more proactively to include non-
weapons and aspects of space
state actors as significant international
governance;
actors with global influence in their own
International
right, similar to our engagement with
Humanitarian Law/Laws
of Armed Conflict and various
social media companies through the
disarmament, non-proliferation and
Christchurch Call. More and more, the
arms control treaties, which together
capacity to tackle global challenges will
promote security, constrain use of
require contributions from non-state
force and protect civilians; and
actors. We should consider a wider, more
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International
deliberate and proactive engagement
human rights frame-
works, which address fundamental
strategy with a wider range of actors,
issues of equality, fairness and
particularly political actors below the
human freedoms.
level of state and large multinationals
that de facto shape international norms.
44 We will need to support these parts
of the system in particular to remain
Tackling increasing risks to
effective, through reform if necessary.
New Zealand’s security
s9(2)(g)(i)
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47 A disrupted and disorderly world
inevitably means an intensification of
risks to our security. s9(2)(g)(i)
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Violent
extremism will remain a pernicious and
persistent threat both off-shore and (as
THE
45 We will need to look harder at the
we have seen) at home. The availability
benefits of leading and joining coalitions
of cyber technology – in the context of
of interest with smaller countries with
sharpened super-power competition and
which we share (to varying degrees) a set
disruptive states and hostile non-state
of common interests and values, including
actors pursuing their agendas – will
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a commitment to multilateralism, free
continue to test the systems that protect
trade, the rule of law and liberal demo-
the information and infrastructure of the
cratic values. s6(a)
government, businesses and citizens
alike. Similarly, hostile states will exploit
technology and the open nature of our
democracy to seek undue influence in
our society, our economy and our
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politics.
48 These challenges highlight the fact
that our geographic isolation no longer
provides the protection it once did. These
are global challenges with increasingly
The exact make-up of any coalition
domestic manifestations;addressing
them
would of course depend on the issue as
will require increasingly deep cooperation
interest and “like-mindedness” will vary.
between domestic and external agencies.
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DIRECTION FOR NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN
49 We should anticipate further and
s6(a)
more sophisticated attempts to steal and
exploit data and intellectual property that
belong to our citizens, our businesses and
the state. Accordingly, we should expect
to confront further difficult choices about
the circumstances in which we attribute
such attacks publicly, and about what
response measures we deploy should
public attribution not result in a cessation
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of intrusions. We will need to invest in
further development of international rules
and norms in this area, but should not
assume that these will change behaviour
of states that do not share our interests,
53 Increased global turbulence also
want our data and can operate covertly.
implies increased demand for New Zealand
deployments to combat or peace support
50 A combination of a more disordered
operations s6(a)
. We will need
worlds6(a)
to continue to ensure we contribute to
and the availability of
global security efforts, also taking into
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vessels capable of reaching New Zealand
account the ancillary benefits of doing so
means investment in tackling people-
with our close security partners. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
smuggling will be an increasing priority.
s6(a)
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Conclusion
THE 54 This is unlikely to be a period
where great gains are easy for
New Zealand; what comes next is
unlikely to reflect our values as fully or
align as closely with our interests. We
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should anticipate a world in which
sustaining an independent foreign policy
51 s6(a)
will require us to be more active both in
making choices and in shaping affairs in
ways favourable to our interests; a world
where the trade-offs are ever more finely
Sustained commitment and
balanced but where potential costs and
investment will be required by NZ Inc
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benefits are more difficult to assess. We
across capacity-building, information
will need to be pragmatic and adroit to
sharing,
intelligence
gathering,
shape what we can and defend what we
development assistance and possibly
must,
all
the
while
building
defence s6(a)
domains.
New Zealand’s resilience so that we can
52 s6(a)
capitalise on the opportunities and
manage the risks that a disordered world
will present.
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THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE
Section I:
s6(a)
The Global Landscape to 2030
55
This section identifies the most
important global shifts in areas of
importance to New Zealand and our
foreign policy and provides the backdrop
for analysis of New Zealand’s foreign
58
Trade
policy priorities in the previous section.
and
advanced
ACT
technology are the current frontlines
56
The global landscape in which we
of s6(a)
strategic competition.
pursue our interests is shifting at pace
The potential for skirmishes through
and in complexity. The existing global
misstep in East Asia hotspots is risings6
order is receding and no new order is
s6(a)
emerging to replace it. The future will
not look like the recent past. Six
The greater risk is the emergence of a
megatrends1 will shape the global
zero-sum Cold War-like contest for
landscape over the next decade:
technological dominance, with serious
implications for global trading, the
INFORMATION
Global power shifts and heightened
integrity of the internet and the broader
competition;
contest between liberal democratic and
Fracturing
of
the
rules-based
s6(a)
ideological models.
international system;
Economic development pushing up
59
s6(a)
against critical planetary thresholds;
OFFICIAL
Disruptive effects of technology on
states and societies;
More people, fewer working people
THE
and greater people flows; and
Retreat of openness and liberal
democracy.
60
ASEAN centrality in East Asian
Global power shifts and
regional frameworks will come under
UNDER
heightened competition
more strain as pressure rises for greater
shared leadership amongst the full range
57
s6(a)
of countries involveds6(a)
RELEASED
61
Geostrategic competition has
returned s6(a)
1 A megatrend is a long-term change that affects
governments, societies and economies and significantly
disrupts systems and understandings. Each megatrend
will interact with and amplify other megatrends.
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62
More widely, hopes of a coopera-
A rules-based system under
tive multipolar world order have not
pressure
eventuated and look increasingly unlikely,
at least in the short term.
The trend is
65
s6(a)
in the rules-based
toward a persistent G-0 world order
international system,
the principles on
with powers unable or unwilling to provide
which it was built and the institutions
global leadership. s6(a)
that support and sustain it,
will become
even deeper as states retreat to
protect their own direct and short-
term national interest. s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
The
legitimacy of the system will be further
63
Non-state actors will become
challenged if it fails to address global
OFFICIAL
increasingly powerful players in the
problems, notably climate change, or
international system. Sitting outside
develop rules and norms in response to
the ambit of governments and the inter-
emerging technologies.
THE
national order, these actors (international
NGOs, multinational companies, powerful
66
These conditions will further
individuals, city authorities, social move-
enable
s6(a)
ments, etc.) have both influence and
greater room to manoeuvre. Their actions
UNDER
can be constructive and complementary,
states that
but power without a state’s mandates,
want
to
continue
misusing
and
responsibilities
and
accountabilities
undermining the system to prevent
established in international law, holds risk.
effective action or create mischief.
64
Military power is diffusing
67 s6(a)
among state and non-state actors
alike. Significant increases in military
RELEASED
capability in Asia and the Middle East,
the proliferation and use of weapons of
mass destruction, the return of nuclear
competition and greater access to
military-grade weapons for violent non-
state actors will all exacerbate security
challenges. Advances in gene-editing
technology will soon put a new generation
of bio-weapons within wide reach.
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Economic development pushing
72
Sea-level rise, drought, water
up against planetary thresholds
scarcity and more extreme weather will
trigger significant population movements
68
The growing network of global
within and across borders. The worst
environmental issues, including climate
effects in impacted countries will take
change, plastic pollution, declining ocean
place on a longer timescale, but
health, eco-system decline, deforestation
pressure
for
the
international
and species loss are showing how much
community to address a plethora of
development is pushing up against
associated social, legal, economic
environmental thresholds. The next 10
and security issues will become
ACT
years will see the negative effects of
more acute over the next 10 years.
climate change more acutely felt.
Inter-
national and social tensions related
73
s6(a)
to climate change will intensify.
69
s6(a)
Sub-national entities
and citizens are increasingly initiating
their own changes. Lack of state action
INFORMATION
is leading to growing mass protest move-
ments, which will spread further as the
timeline for action narrows. Sub-national
initiatives,changing businesspractices and
evolving consumer preferences could be
important drivers of the necessary but
OFFICIAL
disruptive transition to a low carbon
global economy.
Disruptive effects of technology
on states and societies
THE
70
Climate change will exacerbate
inequality and magnify existing
74
The exponential pace and scale of
risks, including political instability and
technological change will be peculiarly
traditional security challenges. Some
disruptive over the next decade.
Some
regions will be more affected than others
new technologies will erode the
UNDER
due to natural geographic advantage.
relative power of states to control the
Wealthier states and individuals will be
use of force, protect civilians, control
able to build resilience, adapt more
critical
infrastructure
and
manage
readily
and
recover
faster
than
economies;
others will have marked
vulnerable individuals and regions.
impacts on the fabric of societies.
71
Impacts of climate change will
75
Technological advances have
create human security challenges as
commoditised
and
democratised
RELEASED
health threats increase and access to
destructive means, with the capability
critical resources (fresh water, food, land,
to perpetrate large-scale violence no
clean air and energy) is reduced.
Fresh
longer the monopoly of states. Progress
water, in particular,
could become a
towards lethal autonomous weapons
powerful strategic weapon and re-
systems (LAWS) brings new legal and
emerge as a source of conflict. The
ethical challenges. An artificial
intelligence
geostrategic implications of water scarcity
(AI) breakthrough with LAWS applications
are already being felt as countries
by any one actor would significantly
manipulate water flow to neighbours.
disrupt the strategic power balance.
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76
Increased connectivity creates
emboldened by anonymity, common
new vulnerabilities for data, privacy,
biases and shared conspiracy theories.
intellectual property and critical infra-
Grievances, including those manufactured
structure.
Cyber platforms increase the
through false or misleading reports (“fake
number of potential hostile actors. Attacks
news”) and promoted by bots, are more
are difficult to attribute and the legal
easily translated into political power.
principle of proportionality makes any
These
features
of
contemporary
retaliation complex. Addressing terrorist
communication
are
exacerbating
use of the internet, cybercrime and foreign
polarisation in democratic societies.
interference also increases the appeal of
ACT
censorship and surveillance in cyberspace.
More people, fewer working
people and greater people flows
77
Economic
and
security
activities, increasingly reliant on
81
Population growth and increased
space-based systems, will be more
consumption by a larger global middle
vulnerable to disruption from space
class will place further pressure on
debris and hostile state and non-state
resources.
The global population is
activity. Defending space assets will be
projected to increase by nearly a
made more challenging by a lack of
billion people by 2030. Economic
formal regulation and control in space.
trends suggest
the middle class will
INFORMATION
continue to grow, particularly in
78
With
data having emerged as a
Asia, where two-thirds of the global
new strategic resource, the digital
middle class are expected to live by
power of companies (and the information
2030 (up from just over quarter in 2009).
they hold on individuals and populations)
will increasingly compete with the
82
Rapid population growth will
OFFICIAL
economic and military power of states as
continue
to
spur
large-scale
a source of strategic influence.
migration to urban centres. It is
forecast that by 2025 there will be 48
THE
79
The growth in the digital
megacities (cities with more than 10m
economy will create opportunities
inhabitants), up from 33 in 2018. Most
for companies,
regardless of size,
of this growth will be in Asia. Large
sector or location, to access the global
cities present many opportunities in
trading system
through the use of online
terms of economic development, but if
UNDER
plat-forms. Small and medium-sized
not planned and developed appropriately,
enterprises in particular stand to gain as
they can also have negative health,
digital technologies provide opportunities
security and psychosocial consequences.
to increase productivity, boost sales and
enhance international competitiveness.
83
The
uneven
distribution
of
Cryptocurrencies, still in their infancy,
population growth will have a number of
may erode the state monopoly on money.
second order effects.
Many developed
countries will see increasing old-age
RELEASED
80
Social
media
have
dependency as mortality and fertility
fundamentally changed the nature of
rates continue to fall.
public discourse by enabling groups to
coordinate more effectively and circulate
84
Conversely,
least developed
information freely and rapidly. Self-
countries (LDCs) will continue to
selected
experience a youth bulge, providing
news feeds and connections
between geographically remote groups
an opportunity for accelerated economic
make
growth. Should local conditions present
it easier for communities to emerge
spontaneously in virtual environments,
inadequate education and productive
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employment opportunities for these high
88
Globalisation has lifted many
numbers of young people, however,
millions out of crippling poverty, created
there is likely to be increased periodic
burgeoning middle classes across the
social upheaval, criminality and
world and achieved dramatic efficiencies
radicalisation. The shift to automated
in trade, finance and technology. But
production will disrupt the development
policies in developed democracies have
model of cheap labour and may
failed to address
increasing wealth
exacerbate social challenges for LDCs.
disparities within countries. Rewards
More broadly, technological displacement
are flowing disproportionately to the
will see
human labour diminish as a
wealthy while the working and middle
ACT
driver of economic growth.
classes, although not “poor,” are seeing
their living standards stagnate and face
85 Very visible social, economic and
persistent economic insecurity.
security issues associated with
large-
scale refugee flows will continue to
89
These conditions have resulted in
be a source of political tension for
a widespread populist backlash
receiving countries. The number of
among people who feel they have not
humanitarian refugees is unprecedented.
benefited from globalisation,
and a
In 2018 alone, 16.2m people were newly
subsequent retreat from liberal
displaced as they fled war, violence,
economic norms. Populism comes in
INFORMATION
persecution and economic collapse. The
nationalist, ethnic, nativist, far left, far
total number of forcibly displaced
right, religious and other forms. But all
persons stands at more than 68.5m.
variants have perceived inequality and
disenfranchisement at their root and all
Retreat from openness and
have disruptive effects on domestic and
liberal democracy
global stability. Most parts of the world
OFFICIAL
are affected by rising populist sentiment
86
The number of democratic states
of one sort or another.
remains high by historical standards, but
THE
a steady decline in the quality of
90
Political participation remains
democracies looks set to continue,
strong. Social movements around the
including in well-established democracies.
world
are
championing
equality,
sustainability and climate action at levels
87
The underlying tenets of
not seen in a generation.
liberal representative democracy are
UNDER
being challenged from within. Anti-
91
Authoritarianism continues to
establishment leaders in liberal states
be an appealing system in some
are varyingly seeking to centralise power
fragile states as an antidote to
in the executive, circumvent democratic
instability. s6(a)
process, politicise the judiciary, use the
state security apparatus in questionable
ways and undermine freedom of
RELEASED
expression. These changes are supported
by publics that have grown sceptical of
The combination
elites, institutions and globalisation. So
of big data, comprehensive surveillance,
far, formal democratic institutions are
computing power and AI may s6(a)
providing the checks and balances
necessary to resist the more egregious
deliver the better
challenges by leaders.
quality of life demanded by their citizens
while simultaneously suppressing dissent.
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
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INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
UNDER
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S REGION
s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
UNDER
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S REGION
s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
UNDER
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
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THE
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
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s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)
ACT
INFORMATION
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THE
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Section III:
154
The fracture lines in the existing
Implications for New Zealand's
global frameworks are deep and the
interests in the world
transition under way will continue over
the
next
10
years.
The
global
frameworks will need to evolve to
150
This section describes how the
present
greater
opportunities
for
megatrends identified in Section I will
compromise or they will be increasingly
impact on New Zealand’s interests in the
side-lined, with alternative mechanisms
world and explores the implications for
only coming into view more slowly.
our foreign policy.
ACT
155
A rules-based international order
151
New Zealanders’ well-being is
is a constant – there will always be an
impacted by how New Zealand’s foreign
order based on a spectrum of power and
policy safeguards and advances:
rules and it will always only be
An rules-based international order
selectively complied with. An important
that supports New Zealand priorities;
aspect for New Zealand of the
current order is its underlying liberal value
A security environment that keeps
system based on democracy, free and
New Zealand people and activities
open markets, human rights and
safe;
associated areas such as media freedom
INFORMATION
International
conditions
and
and freedom of speech, as well as the
connections
that
enable
normative
commitment
to
multi-
New Zealanders to prosper; and
lateralism as the best means for solving
Global action on sustainability issues
global problems. The values dimension
that matter to New Zealand.
is s9(2)(g)(i) contested s9(2)(g)(i)
That
A rules-based international order OFFICIAL
situation will worsen in an environment
that supports New Zealand
where other countries have more space
priorities
to pursue different agendas, structures
THE and outcomes. s9(2)(g)()
152
Countries rely on forms of inter-
national cooperation, including rules, to
solve problems that cannot be solved by
one country alone. The range and urgency
of such issues is increasing – from the
UNDER
156 s9(2)(g)(i)
overarching challenge of climate change,
to unprecedented humanitarian crises
through to a range of issues with frontier
technologies. But the outlook suggests
cooperation will be less and less the norm.
153
Small states lack the military or
RELEASED
economic strength to dictate outcomes.
Like other small states, New Zealand
therefore derives much of its security
and prosperity from the certainty,
stability, predictability, universality and
safeguards extended by the current
New Zealand response
order anchored in the UN and other
multilateral institutions.
157
There are limits to our ability to
influence the global system decisively.
Our best course of action will continue to
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be to seek collective solutions to shared
however, need to include a broader mix
problems, though the road will be harder
of countries if it is to achieve the critical
and additional avenues may need to be
mass to stem the retreat from the
explored. Demonstrating that the
international system. s9(2)(g)(i)
system can deliver positive outcomes will
be one way to help sustain it.
We
might usefully explore opportunities
158
We will need to be selective in our
within groups such as these to share the
approach, identifying systemically critical
load of representation in various fora.
areas, areas pegged to national interests
ACT
and those where the system can deliver
161 Non-state actors with increasing
results for New Zealand. We will need to
international influence create opportunity
strike a balance between defending
and risk. The Christchurch Call demon-
existing rules and norms (e.g., UNCLOS,
strated the role countries can play in the
International Humanitarian Law/Laws of
difficult task of bringing non-state actors,
Armed Conflict, international human
in this case tech companies, to engage
rights) and supporting development and
directly in development of action plans
implementation of new rules (e.g., space
and norms. Such engagement is likely to
governance), where the existing suite of
become more necessary across a greater
international
legal
and
normative
range of issues such as cyber, space and
INFORMATION
instruments is inadequate. There will be
the provision of development assistance.
choices to be made between universality,
which will require compromise on the
162 Within international development,
quality of the rules, and smaller group
humanitarian and collective security
outcomes (“mini-laterals”) with a better
frameworks to which we subscribe,
set of rules but narrower application.
New Zealand will be expected to provide
OFFICIAL
development,
humanitarian,
peace-
159 With such s9(2)(g)(i) shifts underway,
building and peace-support assistance.
new structures and approaches will
In a more disordered world, the demand
THE
emerge. The transition period will be
for contributions will increase. We will
difficult,
characterised
by
deep
need to be selective in where and how
uncertainty. We will need to be poised
we deploy our resources.
to help build new systems in areas where
it has key interests; it will need to be in
A security environment that
UNDER
the room and be recognised as having
keeps New Zealand people and
valuable skills and perspectives to offer.
activities safe
Innovation, agility, boldness and careful
163
diplomacy
will
be
required.
New Zealand’s security interests
include the security of the country and
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that what
people within national borders (land and
comes next will reflect our values as fully
maritime), the security of domains that
or align as closely with our interests.
New Zealanders use, such as oceans, air
RELEASED
160 We will need on many issues to
navigation, cyber and space, and the
partner with groups of countries s6(a)
state of international and regional
security environments that affect our
offshore activities (e.g., trade, travel).
which benefit in the same way
164
that New Zealand does from speaking
Our security environment is
deteriorating. Many of the challenges
together about the principles of open
arise from long-standing security threats
markets and collective security. Such a
that are overcoming traditional barriers
grouping of like-minded partners will,
of oceans and distance, and from new
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
actors engaging on old issues (e.g.,
destructive practices including drug
nuclear proliferation). New platforms,
smuggling.
such as cyber, are also exacerbating old
risks, while new domains, such as space,
169 Our distance from the source of
are creating new vulnerabilities.
recent
refugee crises has meant we
have not faced the pressures of a primary
Transboundary security threats
entry point country and for the most part
refugees taken by New Zealand are
165 Significant transboundary security
controlled under the UN refugee resettle-
threats to New Zealand over the next
ment programme. s9(2)(g)(i)
decade will come from terrorism,
ACT
transnational crime, people-smuggling,
The most immediate threat
human-trafficking and drug smuggling.
to New Zealand from irregular migration
166
Terrorism remains a pernicious
is, however, from
people-smuggling as
threat. Even as an international coalition
international syndicates continue to
has
explore New Zealand as an alternative
largely been successful in rolling back
the territorial gains of Da’esh, terrorism
destination to Australia.
within and originating from the Middle
New Zealand response
East (including under the Da’esh banner)
INFORMATION
will persist, fuelled by sectarian conflict,
170 New Zealand will need an ongoing
weak governance, economic displacement
focus on mitigating transboundary
and opposition
security threats. In terms of tackling the
to perceived Western
intrusion. Terrorism in North Africa
persistent threats of drug smuggling and
remains a significant (regional) threat
people smuggling, our efforts will be
while radicalisation and violent extremism
largely the same in type (i.e., capacity-
in the Indo-Pacific, susceptible to
building, information sharing, agency
OFFICIAL
influence from terrorist groups outside
cooperation, maritime surveillance and
the region, presents a terror threat
engagement in regional processes, such
closer to home.
as the Bali Process on people smuggling),
THE but we will need to dedicate increasing
167 The Christchurch terror attacks
NZ Inc effort as the scale of the problem
were a reminder of terrorist threats
inevitably
increases.
s6(a)
arising from other forces, such as far-
right, white supremacist and ethno-
close cooperation
UNDER
nationalist extremism. They also high-
on people-smuggling will remain critical.
lighted the harm terrorist and violent
extremist content online can cause. The
171 To reduce the incidence of trans-
advent of nationalist and isolationist
boundary threats and to respond more
narratives in many countries will likely
effectively to such events when they do
serve to normalise right wing extremism.
occur, states need enforceable borders
underpinned
by
strong
national
168 Threats
from
transnational
institutions
and
good
governance
RELEASED
organised crime are increasing as trans-
practices. Our foreign and development
national criminal syndicates are operating
policies in the Pacific and South East Asia
with extended reach. These groups are
promote such systems and will continue
increasingly involved in cyber-crime,
to be important in mitigating a range of
expanding their threat across societies,
security threats that affect New Zealand.
from banking systems to infrastructure,
and more broadly perpetuating insecurity
172 New Zealand will need to sustain
through terrorist financing and socially
investment
in
countering
violent
extremism (CVE) and building governance
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
capability to reduce the space for
New platforms and domains
terrorist (and other criminal groups) to
operate.
175
Cyber risks will continue to grow
s6(a)
as more people use and do business on
the internet, the pay-offs from cyber and
cyber-enabled crime increase, threat
New
actors become more sophisticated and
Zealand’s holistic domestic approach
to CVE through social inclusion, the
emerging technology, such as AI, 5G
building of robust communities and
wireless
networks
and
quantum
community
policing
initiatives
will
computing, bring new risks.
ACT
continue to shape our international
176 States are less likely to engage in
approach. Christchurch has given us an
open warfare and any hostile action will
opportunity
to
provide
ongoing
tend to be veiled, disruptive and
leadership in this area if we choose.
exploitative – all characteristics that are
Disarmament and arms control
common in the cyber domain. s6(a)
173 The rules governing disarmament
and arms control are among the most
important
to
New Zealand
and
INFORMATION
New Zealanders. We should expect the
177 The inter-state implications of
AI
increasingly
polarised
relationships
technologies, including the potential for
between s6(a)
the nuclear weapons
weaponisation of AI in LAWS, will be on
states s6(a)
to place
the foreign policy agenda. It is likely
increasing strain on the corner-stone
that a state will develop a LAWS capability
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and on
at some point. Non-state actors are also
OFFICIAL
ancillary models (such as New START)
active in developing relevant technology
for disarmament. Indeed, we should
in response to an expanding commercial
expect these countries to seek to increase
market. Authoritarian regimes may be
THE
and modernise their stocks, which will in
more able to co-opt new technologies.
turn undermine collective efforts to
178
Space is re-emerging as a venue
persuade other statess6(a)
for geostrategic competition, with states
to participate in non-
competing to develop technologies to
proliferation endeavours.
control space activity. Space is also
UNDER
New Zealand response
increasingly accessible to (and profitable)
for companies and individuals. Current
174 There will in one sense be much for
space governance frameworks (a series
a country like New Zealand, given its
of treaties negotiated in the 1960-70s in
staunch anti-nuclear credentials, to do.
a very different technological and
At the same time, the circumstances in
strategic environment) do not adequately
which we will be doing it are likely to
address the significant growing problems
become even less propitious, and we
RELEASED
of space debris and congestion, the
should expect to have to manage points
potential commercial exploitation of space
of friction and possibly trade-offs
resources and the potential militarisation
between our anti-nuclear policy and our
of space. The current framework leaves
security relationships. These have been
open therefore the potential for quantum
able to co-exist more or less harmoniously
leaps in how warfare is conducted and
because
s6(a)
the question of what constitutes a
wider strategic circumstances have been
“strategic deterrence” capability.
sufficiently settled to create a permissive
environment for our advocacy.
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New Zealand response
s6(a)
179 Malicious cyber activity is a
significant threat to New Zealand. The
transboundary nature of cyberspace
New Zealand will need to press the
means
applicability of existing international
international cooperation is critical
to managing the security threats and
legal obligations under International
maximising the benefits of cyberspace.
Humanitarian Law/Laws of Armed Conflict.
180 New Zealand will need to continue
184 New Zealand’s commitment to dis-
to advocate for norms that find a careful
armament and peaceful cooperation, as
ACT
balance between regulating the internet
well as our involvement in space-related
to maintain privacy and safety, while
activities s9(2)(b)(ii)
means we
maintaining one
have an interest in shaping an
free, open and secure
global
international legal and normative space
network. The challenge is great.
Already the internet is splintering due to
governance framework.
a range of competing interests.
International conditions and
181 New Zealand recognises the need
connections that enable
to remove unlawful content from the
New Zealanders to prosper
internet, and the Christchurch Call
INFORMATION
185 Trade is critical to New Zealanders’
specifically target aspects of terrorist use
well-being, with over a quarter of the
of the internet. But a focus on content
national income and some 620,000 jobs
removal can play into the hands of those
dependent on exports. Imports also help
states that remove or block content in
to maintain our standard of living and
the name of “national security” in a way
drive our productivity. The country’s
that is not consistent with international
small size mean
OFFICIAL s we rely on connections
human rights. We will need to continue
with other countries not just for trade in
to
promote
the
applicability
of
goods and services, but also for two-way
international law to cyberspace and a
THE flows of investment, people and ideas.
multi-stakeholder approach to internet
Global economic and financial stability,
governance that recognises the breadth
an
enabling
international
policy
of users and stakeholders.
environment and adoption of liberal
182 Public attribution of malicious cyber
economic policies by trading partners are
UNDER
behaviour is an important tool to develop
important if New Zealand is to maximise
and strengthen cyber norms and deter
benefits from its economic connections.
such behaviour in the future. We are
186 A slowing global economy, rising
increasingly prepared to highlight such
tension between Beijing and Washington,
behaviour publicly – which we will need
lack of traction in the WTO, public
to continue to do, alongside a broader
scepticism about trade agreements and
suite of deterrence and response options.
their impact on sovereignty, employment
RELEASED
s6(a)
and incomes (particularly in OECD
countries) and a steady stream of
inward-looking and protectionist policies
all create challenging headwinds for our
trade interests, the effects of which will
183 s6(b)(i)
be felt more acutely over the next 10
years. This period will also see the
necessary transition to a low carbon
global economy, which will place more
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
pressure on our top export earners
s9(2)(g)(i)
(primary products and tourism), which
are carbon-intensive, while also creating
The WTO faces a fresh s9(2)(g)(i)
opportunities in environmental and
challenge to its dispute settlement arm,
related goods as well as a broad range of
with the Appellate Body likely to cease to
services and investment opportunities.
function by the end of the year.
On balance, New Zealand trade policy
may need to focus over this period less
New Zealand response
on the issues that will make our
190 New Zealand’s interest is in securing
exporters more profitable in the short
the future of the WTO, including its
ACT
term and more on issues that will make
dispute settlement system. We will need
them more resilient over the longer term.
to continue to support reform efforts to
modernise the WTO and its rules to reflect
Challenges to trade governance and
the dramatic changes in the way trade
rules
occurs and the evolved interests of the
187 Our lack of economic power and
WTO membership. Continuing to fill gaps
dependence on primary exports that face
in trade rules by working with smaller
higher
than
average
levels
of
groups of partners (e.g., on environ-
protectionism have driven a successful
mental goods and services, e-commerce)
INFORMATION
focus on improving access to overseas
to develop high quality rules that can
markets through multilateral trade
later be plurilateralised will be one way.
negotiations and through bilateral and
191 Economic gains for New Zealand
regional FTAs. New Zealand has also
from trade policy efforts will come less
invested in other bodies that foster free
from new market access under new FTAs
and fair trade (such as the OECD and
and more from ensuring effective FTA
OFFICIAL
APEC). The recent s9(2)(g)(i)
retreat
implementation
and
utilisation.
from liberal economic norms holds
Addressing non-tariff trade barriers in
serious risks for our prosperity.
markets in which we already operate at
THE
188 Multilateral
trade
liberalisation
high levels with minimal tariffs will
through the WTO remains New Zealand’s
demand increased focus. In many
top trade policy priority: the WTO has
cases, removing these barriers requires
delivered
more than mercantilist trade-offs: it
comprehensive tariff reductions;
it is the only forum to address wider
requires confidence in the systems of
UNDER
disciplines on
others. In a protectionist environment,
agricultural subsidies; it has
one set of global trade rules; and it has a
the headwinds here will also be greater.
dispute settlement mechanism to enforce
192 New Zealand will also need to
the rules. But the WTO and the system
continue participating actively in the
it presides over are under threat.
wider ecosystem of “global public goods”
189 s9(2)(g)(i)
(e.g., APEC, the OECD and international
RELEASED
standards setting bodies) that, while
typically non-binding, nevertheless build
we have participated
up a useful common understanding on
in a number of plurilateral negotiations
issues that affect trade. s9(2)(g)(i)
involving
a (more ambitious) subset of
the WTO membership on particular policy
New Zealand will need to
areas to support progress, but most of
use these and other mechanisms to
these negotiations remain uncompleted.
influence key global standards, promote
s9(2)(g)(i)
liberal economic norms and pursue trade
reforms and other areas of international
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
trade policy to help shape whatever
has not, however, been accompanied by
comes next. APEC 2021 will be a key
a commensurate development of rules,
opportunity to make progress on trade
particularly multilaterally, which means
issues of importance to New Zealand.
the full benefits cannot yet be realised.
A changing global market place
197 On the downside, the inevitable
transition to a low carbon global
193 A changing trade environment –
economy will be disruptive to the
what is sold and how it is sold – presents
New Zealand economy, given the carbon
a range of disruptions, some positive and
emissions profile of our most important
some
ACT
less so, but all requiring adaptation.
export sectors: agriculture and tourism.
New Zealand trade policy and trade
promotional effort will need to support
198 There are three substantial and
exporters to respond to these changes.
inter-related challenges to maintaining
demand for our meat and dairy products:
194 On the positive side,
increasing
global income and consumerism will
Food
technology
is
enabling
see our mix of export
production of more plant-based
markets evolve as
emerging economies grow riche. Higher
proteins and synthetic meat and
incomes increase protein consumption,
dairy alternatives;
INFORMATION
which sits well with our export profile as
Contestable environmental sustain-
a supplier of high quality meat and dairy
ability arguments are seized upon to
products. Greater disposable income
support protectionist measures on
from an expanding global middle class
agricultural products; and
will also create opportunities for our
A consumer-led push for action on
services
exports,
particularly
in
climate
change
is
shifting
education and tourism.
consumption away from animal
OFFICIAL
protein even though this may not
195 Continuing increases in purchasing
reduce the carbon footprint.
power in a number of our key markets
THE
(e.g., China, Indonesia, and Viet Nam)
199 There will be opportunities in the
should, all other things being equal,
transition for New Zealand, for example,
continue to add value to our exports.
the heavy investment in research to
Rapid economic growth in emerging
reduce the environmental impacts of
countries (e.g., Nigeria and Bangladesh),
agricultural production has international
UNDER
suggest markets where, subject to local
application, our energy profile makes us
conditions, New Zealand might expect to
an attractive investment option, and the
build increasingly profitable markets.
ACCTS is an innovative approach to
using legally enforceable trade measures
196
Digital trade (traditional goods
to support the transformation to low
trade transacted via digital means and
emissions, climate-resilient economies.
trade in services via the internet) also
creates opportunities for New Zealand
200
RELEASED
With more than half of our
and it is increasing exponentially. Digital
emissions profile made up of methane
trade helps New Zealand exporters by
from agricultural production, and the
removing challenges of distance from
costs involved in transition to a low
market and small scale through the use
carbon economy, achieving our emission
of online platforms, as well as enabling
reduction targets under the Paris Agree-
small and medium-sized enterprises to
ment is likely to require some reductions
increase productivity, boost sales, access
to be bought through international carbon
new markets and enhance international
markets. Carbon trading in this way will
competitiveness. The rise in digital trade
entail reaching agreements with national
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
and subnational governments, demanding
while the world implements the Paris
significant policy and negotiating heft
Agreement will be a critical challenge.
and potentially development of relation-
Addressing this challenge will likely
ship capital with a new range of partners.
overtake traditional market access in
importance for New Zealand trade policy,
201 s6(a)
and will involve ensuring New Zealand’s
messages reach consumers and non-
Current
state actors who may be more influential
levels of international trade tension have
than governments. Adequate access to
not been seen for decades. Moves to
global carbon markets on good terms will
ACT
block the largest US tech firms from doing
be critical for New Zealand to smooth its
business with the largest Chinese ones
transition to a low carbon economy.
are a direct rejection of globalisation and
foreshadow gradual movement towards
206 New Zealand’s trade policy and
bifurcation of the global economy in
promotional effort will be affected by the
terms of telecommunications and data
extent to which export sectors pursue
systems. Any significant decoupling of
strategies based on growing volume or
such systems would have major global
growing value. Environmental constraints
economic and geopolitical implications.
on dairy and meat in particular will mean
that achieving greater value from existing
INFORMATION
202 At a minimum, such conditions
volumes should be a priority, reducing
would increase costs to exporters should
impetus for further market diversification.
they be required to operate dual supply
s6(a)
chain systems and comply with conflicting
standards and regulatory systems; prices
of imports would also increase. More
OFFICIAL
worryingly, potential for development of
economic spheres of influence beyond
the current sectors at issue is growing.
THE 207 Digital technologies will be a key
203 Even absent a more fundamental
enabler of the New Zealand economy and
breakdown, the tit-for-tat escalation in
will support the shift from volume to
tariffs between the US and China will
value in our export profile. Our trade
have an ongoing chilling effect on markets
policy will need to focus on development
more broadly, disrupting global value
UNDER
and implementation of frameworks to
chains and changing expectations around
enable exporters to take full advantage
how trade policy tools can be used.
of digital trade opportunities.
New Zealand response
Global action on sustainability
204 s6(a)
issues that matter to
New Zealand
RELEASED
208 In adopting Agenda 2030 for
Trade
Sustainable
Development
and
the
policy and trade promotional effort to
associated
Sustainable
Development
support exporters’ agility and resilience,
Goals (SDGs), the world has recognised
including through market diversification,
the need for urgent, integrated action to
will remain important.
ensure
a sustainable future for the planet
and its people by addressing challenges
205 Sustaining a global environment
related to poverty, inequality, climate
that is “fair” for New Zealand exporters
change,
environmental
degradation,
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
prosperity, peace and justice. We have
what is done – or not done – will have
a stake in that agenda successfully
profound implications for humanity’s
addressing the challenges it encompasses,
longer term future. In this context,
which variously affect us directly, our
international and social tensions related
Pacific neighbourhood and our wider
to climate change will intensify and
security and economic interests in other
developed countries will come under more
parts of the world.
pressure to take mitigation action and
fund adaptation in developing countries.
209 All countries have responsibilities
to take action to promote sustainable
213 Nation-first
impulses,
climate
ACT
development. The biggest challenges
scepticism and bureaucratic inertia will
though will only be addressed through
probably continue to stymie meaningful
collective action either because they
progress on climate change, at least in
transcend borders (e.g., climate change,
the near term. Popular and coordinated
health of the world’s oceans) or because
action will grow globally, but it is likely
of their scale (e.g., global poverty and
that a crisis will need to occur to shift
hunger elimination). It is in these
the dial. There may be conflict induced
elements of the sustainable development
by resource competition, such as access
agenda that our strategic interests lie.
to fresh waters6(a)
The Pacific could also be the
INFORMATION
Climate change
setting for such a crisis should a severe
210 Climate change is a challenge of
weather event make a country tempo-
acute global significance, requiring
rarily or permanently uninhabitable.
urgent action to avert collapse of eco-
New Zealand response
systems, with serious flow on impacts for
human
development,
security
and
214 To meet the global challenge in the
OFFICIAL
prosperity. Global population growth
narrowing window, rapid, ambitious and
and
the
associated
increase
in
effective actions are required both by
consumption will push against planetary
developed countries and by large high
THE
thresholds as well as driving significant
emitting developing countries. Like all
food and water security challenges.
countries, we will need to work with
others to achieve the Paris Agreement’s
211 Despite the known consequences of
goals through greater collective ambition
climate change and the achievement of
and accelerated action. s6(a)
UNDER
the milestone Paris Agreement, green-
house gas emissions are still increasing.
The solutions are difficult. Climate
change is one of the most difficult trends
to reverse as the contributors to it are
215 New Zealand has the opportunity
hard-wired into the global economy and
to pursue a global leadership role on
the
necessary
economic
transition
climate change. Such a role would
RELEASED
ultimately on the scale of the industrial
demonstrate our commitment to address
revolution. But lack of timely and
environmental challenges, which would
effective action on climate change will
support our Pacific strategy, shore up
exacerbate the challenge as feedback
our “green” credentials and lead by
loops increase the rate of environmental
example – if our domestic action can live
decline.
up to the international rhetoric. At a
minimum, New Zealand should continue
212 The negative effects of climate
to share its own policies (e.g., the
change will be felt more acutely over the
Carbon Zero Bill and the decision to price
next 10 years and the consequences of
emissions at the farm gate), promote its
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND’S INTERESTS
own assets (renewable energy sector),
219 Access to strategic resources (food,
share models to support the transition to
water, energy, land, minerals) will be a
a low carbon economy (e.g., trade policy
defining feature of the future global
levers such as the ACCTS) and cultivate
landscape that will start to come into
research partnerships to accelerate
sharper focus over the next 10 years.
technological progress.
Mechanisms to prevent over-exploitation
and illegal exploitation and to promote
216 The
need
for
New Zealand
cooperation between neighbours will be
assistance with climate change mitigation
needed to remove drivers of inter- and
and adaptation efforts in the Pacific will
intra-state conflict. It is likely, however,
ACT
only increase (the more so if global action
that there will be instances of conflict,
is insufficient to curb temperature rises).
particularly regarding access to fresh
We will also need to support PIC access
water. The potential scale of economic
to carbon markets. Our efforts here, our
disruption and humanitarian impact of
domestic action and our approach to
severe water shortages will probably in
international climate negotiations will
time require a multilateral solution and
have a significant bearing on the success
an investment in carefully managing
of our broader Pacific strategy.
(where feasible) international tensions
International
cooperation
for
caused by dwindling resources.
INFORMATION
sustainable development
New Zealand response
217 The SDGs are applicable and
220 New Zealand will contribute to
relevant to all countries. The challenge is
Agenda 2030 through a combination of
not only to sustain and accelerate
domestic action, international leadership
economic and social progress but also to
and support for developing countries.
share it more equitably. Poverty
OFFICIAL
and
New Zealand’s funding and policy efforts
economic insecurity continue to hinder
will
need
to
be
well
targeted.
prospects for a majority of people in low
Geographically, the Pacific is where our
and middle income countries, and the
development cooperation will continue to
THE
outlook for sustaining past patterns of
be most important. Here, our ODA will
development is clouded by climate
need to be sustained at a credible and
change, inward-looking attitudes in
effective level and address Pacific needs.
developed
countries,
protectionism,
governance issues and challenges
221 New Zealand also provides bilateral
UNDER in the
multilateral system.
and regional ODA outside of our region.
To support its successful delivery, we will
218 Middle income countries face
need to sustain investment in (effective
particular challenges as they strive to
elements of) the multilateral system that
sustain progress while dramatically
have reach and scale in parts of the
reducing carbon emissions and environ-
world where we have limited presence
mental impact. SIDS also face acute
but an interest in stability and prosperity.
RELEASED
challenges because climate change and
We will also need to support a strong and
enduring issues of scale and vulnerability
effective multilateral contribution to
constrain options and increase risk.
achievement of the SDGs in the Pacific
Even many developed countries will
and in SIDS more generally. Alongside
struggle to sustain progress while
our ODA, we should look to mobilise and
transitioning to lower-carbon economies
influence much-needed private sector
and building resilience to climate change
sources of support and investment.
effects.
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INFORMATION
OFFICIAL
THE
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RELEASED
