SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 1982
Background briefing Document
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Friday 10 June – Sunday 12 June 2022, Singapore
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CONTENTS
TAB ONE: MEETING OVERVIEW __________________________________________ 5
Visit Overview: 19th Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 (SLD22) ________________________ 7
Agenda (as at 17 May) _________________________________________________ 11 1982
TAB TWO: BACKGROUND BRIEFS _______________________________________ 13
Hot topics ___________________________________________________________ 15
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Indo-Pacific concept ___________________________________________________ 19
Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific ___________________________________ 23
Southeast Asia regional architecture ______________________________________ 27
Russia/Ukraine _______________________________________________________ 31
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) _________________________________ 33
China in the Pacific (including New Zealand in the Pacific) _____________________ 37
South China Sea _____________________________________________________ 41
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Myanmar ___________________________________________________________ 45
Security situation on the Korean Peninsula _________________________________ 47
New Zealand Defence and Climate Change ________________________________ 51
Cyber Security _______________________________________________________ 55
Space ______________________________________________________________ 57
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in South East Asia _______________________ 59
NZDF Domestic COVID-19 Response _____________________________________ 61
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[IF RAISED] Budget 2022: Implications for Defence __________________________ 63
Defence Assessment 2021______________________________________________ 65
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TAB ONE: MEETING OVERVIEW
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Visit Overview: 19th Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 (SLD22)
The annual Shangri-La Dialogue, convened by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) in Singapore, is the premier forum for Defence Ministers in the Indo-Pacific.
The high levels of attendance from Ministers, defence force leaders, and senior security
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agency officials make it an important focal point for major power relationships and for
discussion on contemporary strategic issues.
Objectives
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The Dialogue provides a key opportunity to underscore New Zealand’s strategic interests
in the Indo-Pacific region, your Defence priorities and our enduring commitment to
supporting global peace and security. Our credentials in supporting security issues of
significance complement the pursuit of our trade and economic objectives in the region.
The Dialogue offers an unparalleled opportunity for you to conduct bilateral meetings with
a range of counterparts and to participate in high-level discussions on regional security
issues. In addition to the Forum itself, key side meetings include a
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, Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
breakfast hosted by Singapore, and the Cohen’s Breakfast hosted by Secretary William
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Cohen, Former United States Secretary of Defense.
Officials are seeking bilateral meetings with a range of counterparts including Industry,
Solomon Islands, Japan, Republic of Korea,
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, Singapore, s6(b)(i)
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and Canada. You will likely also meet the new Australian Minister of Defence (Minister to
be confirmed).
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New Zealand’s objectives for the Dialogue are to:
Strengthen and establish personal relationships with Defence Ministers from partner
countries after a two year hiatus from in-person meetings.
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Convey New Zealand’s position on regional security matters to a high-level audience.
Hear first-hand the strategic priorities and concerns of key security partners in order
to inform New Zealand’s defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, but also
more broadly.
Promote New Zealand’s attendance and engagement at the SLD22.
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Key messages to convey include:
The importance we place on the international rules-based order.
The importance of regional security dialogues and their role in the wider regional
security architecture.
The promotion of New Zealand Defence’s longstanding presence and continued stake
in the region.
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Strategic Issues
Discussions will likely centre on managing geopolitical competition and degradation
of the International Rules Based System and international law (including the
relationship between China and the US). Russia – Ukraine will naturally feature in
many discussions, especially with your counterparts from Europe and Canada,
specifically any implications for the Indo-Pacific region.
Developments on the Korean Peninsula are also likely to feature in many of your
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engagements.
Maritime security is an enduring concern for the Indo-Pacific region, and the disputes
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in the South China Sea are likely to be a key point of discussion in engagements with
regional partners. You can expect likeminded nations to continue to call for the
maintenance of international law, including rights of freedom of navigation and
overflight, and the avoidance of miscalculations. They are also expected to emphasise
the importance of presence operations in support of these freedoms.
Partners’ will likely be interested in our perspectives on the South Pacific, especially
in light of the China – Solomon Islands security arrangement.
Minister of Defence Programme
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You will receive an updated programme on arrival in Singapore, as some bilateral
meetings are unlikely to be confirmed until that time. Your programme combines
bilateral meetings, attendance at plenary sessions, as well as a number of Ministerial
lunches and dinners convened by the
IISS. These bilateral meetings and events will
take place in an unclassified environment.
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This year, you have been invited to deliver a speech and participate in a panel
discussion on the topic of ‘
Climate Security and Green Defence’ during the first
simultaneous special session on Saturday 11 June. This is a high profile opportunity
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for you to convey New Zealand’s views on climate security, its implications to New
Zealand and the Pacific, and our response to this challenge. Your fellow panellists are
yet to be confirmed by the
IISS, but are expected to include your counterparts from
Canada, a small island nation and a European nation.
Your speech – as well as all plenary sessions – will be ‘on-the-record’ and open to the
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Delegation
You will be accompanied at the Dialogue by the Secretary of Defence, Andrew Bridgman
and the Chief of Defence AVM Kevin Short. The High Commissioner, HE Jo Tyndall, will
also be in attendance at the Shangri-La and accompany you for the plenary and special
sessions.
Other members of the delegation include:
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Name
Title
Kathleen Pearce
Head of International Branch
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Mike Thompson
Director Asia
Col Grant Motley
New Zealand Defence Advisor to Singapore
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Intermediate Analyst – Asia Regional
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Intermediate Analyst
Col Mel Childs
Personal Staff Officer to Chief Defence Force
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Two policy analysts (
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support to both the Minister and Secretary.
Briefing
This briefing pack includes background briefs to support you in possible pull-asides with
counterparts. Key messages are included for a range of issues and topics that are
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expected to be raised in bilateral meetings, including briefing on ‘if raised’ issues s6(a)
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Meeting briefs for bilateral and multilateral meetings will be provided to you separately in
early June, closer to date of the Shangri-La Dialogue.
International Branch, Ministry of Defence
May 2022
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Agenda (as at 17 May)
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TAB TWO: BACKGROUND BRIEFS
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Hot topics
Strategic competition
The competitive dynamic between the United States and China remains the defining
characteristic of the region’s strategic environment.
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We see an increasing potential in the Indo-Pacific for confrontation that could escalate
to military conflict. Among the most significant conflict risks are:
o Increasing Taiwan cross-Strait tensions;
o Maritime incidents and tensions in the South and East China Seas;
o North Korea’s nuclear and missile development; and
o Conflicts in and through space and cyber-space.
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See Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific brief, for further background
Russia/Ukraine
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Whilst outside of the Indo-Pacific region, the Ukraine/Russia situation has far-reaching
implications for the international rules based order.
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See Russia/Ukraine brief, for further background
US Partnerships and alliances
The Biden Administration has given signals of a renewed US commitment to regional
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engagement, so that the US looks set to be more present in regional fora than it has
been in recent years.
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US Secretary of Defense Austin’s speech at the 40th International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) Fullerton Lecture in Singapore last year focussed strongly on
the US’s commitments to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and on the need
for a resilient regional order based on international law, human rights, transparency
and inclusion.
The US heavily emphasised their desire to strengthen long-established alliances, to
build new partnerships and enhance their presence in the Indo-Pacific, including with
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close partners and allies.
South China Sea
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, starting with the
submission of the Third Person Note (TPN) to the UN Secretary General on 3 August
2021. The TPN states on the record New Zealand’s legal position on how the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies to the South China Sea.
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Since then, the New Zealand Defence Force has participated in the FPDA 50th
Anniversary Exercise (Ex Bersama Gold), the UK Carrier Strike Group and s6(a)
See South China Sea brief, for further background
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Indo-Pacific tilt
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In the face of heightened strategic competition, numerous partners have felt
compelled to roll out their own framework for engagement in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN
has sought to retain its strategic centre of gravity in the region through the ASEAN
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which has been designed to enable others to
participate in the region through cooperative activities. The AOIP repeats ASEANs
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long held core principles of the 10 nation group, and upholding ASEAN centrality
Other countries have also articulated their own Indo-Pacific branded policies, such as
Australia, Japan, South Korea (“New Southern Policy”), the UK, France, Germany,
and most recently the EU. Individual concepts of the Indo-Pacific vary between
countries with respect to geographical definition, policy priorities and emphasis on
multi, mini or bilateral approaches.
The Biden administration released their long-awaited US Indo-Pacific Strategy in
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February 2022.
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Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)
In recent years, Japan, India and Australia have sought to step up on a range of
regional issues, through their own Indo-Pacific branded strategies or initiatives. This
includes their investment in the QUAD, a strategic security dialogue, of which the
United States is a core member. These four countries have also markedly increased
their regional military presence and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
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Last year, US Secretary of Defence Austin shared the United States’ desire to look at
complementary mechanisms to ASEAN in the region. The QUAD was cited as a
structure that could make the region’s security architecture more durable. However,
some media reports have described the QUAD as an informal alliance, set up to
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respond to China’s economic and military might.
The most recent meeting of QUAD leaders took place in Tokyo on 24 May 2022, where
the four QUAD Leaders released a joint statement, renewing their commitment to a
free and open Indo-Pacific. Leaders were reported to have discussed a number of
issues, including their responses to the War in Ukraine, North Korea’s surge in missile
testing, challenges to the maritime rules order (East and South China Sea) and the
military coup in Myanmar.
Myanmar
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New Zealand remains deeply concerned about the situation in Myanmar. This is also
an issue with serious implications for the stability of the region and for the ASEAN –
particularly at a time when the region already faces many complex challenges to its
peace and prosperity.
The New Zealand Chief of Defence Force joined the US-led statement condemning
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the use of lethal force by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) against unarmed civilians
on 28 March 2021, alongside 11 counterparts (Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, ROK, the UK and the US).
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New Zealand engagement with Myanmar has been limited to multilateral forums such
as the ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum. New Zealand has used our
attendance at these forums to raise our concerns about Myanmar. The most recent of
these was the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), in
Cambodia on 18 May 2022, where New Zealand reiterated our concerns about
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Myanmar.
See Myanmar brief, for further background
International Branch, Ministry of Defence
May 2022
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Indo-Pacific concept
Handling note:
This brief sets out the regional context for your bilateral and multilateral meetings at
the Shangri-La Dialogue.
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Key messages
New Zealand is a country in and of the Pacific. We see the Indo-Pacific as our wider
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home region, in which the Pacific continues to be our primary focus. In our
engagement in the Indo-Pacific forums, we seek to ensure that Pacific issues and
perspectives are appropriately reflected.
Our policy aims to build regional resilience and recognises the growing role of India
and the importance of the maritime domain.
In this increasingly contested region, New Zealand’s policy is underpinned by a set
of principles fundamental to the conduct of our foreign policy and that we see as
critical to ensuring peace, prosperity and stability in the region. These are open
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markets, inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and
overflight, international rules, and ASEAN centrality.
These principles are reflected in the approach we take to regional issues and in our
support for regional architecture and new regional initiatives.
Openness and inclusivity are especially important for New Zealand. As a small
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country, our success depends on working with the widest possible set of partners.
We see a strong correlation between our approach and the ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific (AOIP) released by ASEAN in 2019. As a long-standing ASEAN
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dialogue partner, we are committed to supporting the ASEAN-led architecture to
respond to contemporary challenges.
In practical terms, our principles-based approach underpins New Zealand’s
responses to key issues such as the military coup in Myanmar, and nuclear
proliferation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Our principles
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are also reflected in our decision to join with others in setting out our legal position
on the South China Sea, and the importance we have attached to building regional
trade integration and to supporting countries in the Indo-Pacific to respond to climate
change.
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Background
New Zealand is first and foremost of ‘the Pacific’. But ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become an
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accepted descriptor for our wider region – which in strategic and economic terms now
demonstrably extends from the western shores of the Americas into the Indian Ocean. In
2022 the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ no longer captures adequately the full span of New Zealand’s
interests, our economic and strategic partnerships. It has become increasingly seen as
an economic construct, promoting regional trade and economic integration.
2.
By contrast, the Indo-Pacific is used to focus on regional order, rules and norms
across the spectrum of the region’s political, economic and security engagement. New
Zealand uses the nomenclature Indo-Pacific in all ASEAN-centred forums, whose
membership is drawn from both oceans. It is the best geographical description there is
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for the group of countries involved in the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) because it
recognises the importance of the Indian subcontinent and of maritime issues in the region.
We also use the term in day to day diplomatic interactions as a descriptor of our wider
home region.
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3.
The Indo-Pacific is the fastest-growing region in the world, home to half of the
world’s population. The region contributes 60 percent of global GDP, led by the United
States, China and Japan. It includes some of the fastest-growing economies and
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technology superpowers, including India, China and Japan, and emerging markets such
as the ASEAN-Five countries. The economic significance of the region is reflected by its
range of plurilateral free trade agreements including the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP).
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4.
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New Zealand’s Indo-Pacific policy approach
5.
New Zealand does not have an Indo-Pacific “strategy” like some of our partners,
but rather a “policy approach”. New Zealand’s policy approach continues to be based on
the seven principles that we see as critical to ensuring regional peace, prosperity and
stability in times of growing insecurity and strategic competition: open markets,
inclusiveness, transparency, sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight,
international rules, and ASEAN centrality. These principles have underpinned our
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responses to key regional issues, including the military coup in Myanmar, nuclear
proliferation by the DPRK and the South China Sea disputes, as well as our focus on
advancing the regional trade agenda and addressing climate change.
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Asia Regional Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
May 2022
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Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific
Handling note:
All regional partners have an interest in this topic
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Key messages
New Zealand’s Defence Assessment, published last year, finds New Zealand faces
a substantially more challenging and complex strategic environment than it has for
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decades, and that the principal challenges to New Zealand’s security interests will
arise from strategic competition and climate change.
There has never been a more important time for likeminded partners to work
together in support of rules-based system and international law.
In the Indo-Pacific, we are living through a point of intense strategic clarification in
international relations.
Working collectively to uphold multilateralism and established rules and norms
remains fundamental – particularly for small states like New Zealand who depend
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on the international rules based system for our security and prosperity.
The complex challenges that feature in the wider region need active engagement
from a range of partners to support our shared goals of stability and economic
integration across the Indo-Pacific.
We are seeing strategic competition play out in our own region of the Pacific. As
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Prime Minister Ardern has stated, there are many players who have an interest in
our region. While New Zealand is committed to working together where we can, we
must also be clear when we have areas of concern.
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We have been clear with all partners that it is important to support long-term
resilience outcomes in line with Pacific priorities, and to ensure a peaceful,
prosperous, stable, and resilient Pacific. Military competition in our region would
undercut that, and is therefore a very clear concern for us.
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Background
The Indo-Pacific is the central global theatre for strategic competition, and this
competition is layering on top of existing regional tensions and fault lines. It is in the Indo-
Pacific that the rules based international order, respect for international law and norms
and challenges to freedom of navigation and commerce are coming under the most
persistent pressure.
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2.
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The Biden
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Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (released early 2022) firmly anchors the US in the
Indo-Pacific and seeks to strengthen it in the process. The US has a network of formal
alliances across the region and its increasing Indo-Pacific investment has also elevated
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the QUAD, with Australia, India and Japan), and
helped prompt the AUKUS initiative (with Australia and the UK).
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3.
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Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific
4.
Partners are increasingly focused on the implications of what is happening in
Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific region, in the context of heightened geostrategic competition.
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5.
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6.
While ASEAN is at the centre of the region’s formal architecture (i.e. the East Asia
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Summit), there is a complex array of other, often overlapping, Indo-Pacific relationships,
frameworks and strategies.
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ASEAN leaders
released the principles-based “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) in 2019 in an
attempt to advance their own vision of the Indo-Pacific.
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Asia Regional Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
May 2022
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Southeast Asia regional architecture
Handling note:
This brief sets out the regional context for your bilateral and multilateral meetings in
the wider multilateral architecture of the region.
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Key messages
New Zealand places priority on strengthening and contributing to regional security
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architecture. This includes ASEAN-centric security fora, including the foreign affairs-
led ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Defence-led ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting (ADMM)-Plus.
These forums fulfil an important role promoting understanding, entrenching habits
of dialogue, and facilitating practical mil-mil cooperation between participants.
The ADMM-Plus framework is New Zealand’s principal forum for multilateral
defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region central to our interests.
With the current state of regional tensions, ASEAN-centric regional security
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architecture has an increasingly important role in bringing countries together and
providing a forum for discussions.
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[If raised: Expanded membership of the ADMM-Plus]
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New Zealand respects ASEAN’s right to consider expanding the membership
should they see the benefits. This remains a matter for ASEAN Defence Ministers
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to decide.
On a case-by-case basis, New Zealand supports observers to ADMM-Plus
exercises or seminars. However, it must be clear that observer status is not a
pathway to membership.
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New Zealand supports countries with direct/demonstrated commitment to the
Asia-Pacific being more involved in regional architecture.
[If raised: Myanmar – an ASEAN member]
New Zealand is strongly supportive of ASEAN’s five-point consensus. However,
greatly disappointed by the lack of adherence to this from the Tatmadaw.
New Zealand sees action and pressure from international partners such as Australia
as a way to urge the Tatmadaw to uphold its undertakings to ASEAN under the Five-
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Point Consensus.
While participation at ASEAN meetings is for ASEAN to determine, New Zealand is
supportive of ASEAN’s decision to have non-political representation from Myanmar
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at high level meetings, which we see as an important way to discuss with
representatives directly and thereby put pressure on the Tatmadaw.
[If raised: Engagement with Russia in multilateral forums] Note: New Zealand Defence’s
engagement with Russia is solely through multilateral forums, such as the ADMM-Plus.]
New Zealand stands with the international community in condemning Putin’s
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unjustified and unprovoked attack on Ukraine.
For working-level engagement in forums with active Russian participation, we
continue to discuss approaches with likemindeds for each meeting. Regionally, this
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includes the ADMM-Plus (which you are scheduled to attend in November) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (officials level).
Despite Russia’s actions violating the ASEAN charter and Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, ASEAN consensus on engagement with Russia is unlikely to be easily
reached, if at all.
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Background
New Zealand places priority on strengthening and contributing to regional security
architecture. In the Asia region, this includes ASEAN-centric security fora, including the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
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Plus). The ADMM-Plus is New Zealand’s principal forum for multilateral defence
engagement in the Indo-Pacific.1
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2.
These forums fulfil an important role of promoting understanding and managing
tensions, entrenching habits of dialogue, and facilitating practical mil-mil cooperation.
Defence Engagement with ASEAN
3.
Defence’s primary engagement with ASEAN is through the ADMM-Plus
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governance group meetings. The annual Governance meeting structure includes: a
Ministerial Meeting; a Senior Officials’ Meeting; and one or more Working Group meetings
at the Director level. These meetings are hosted on a rotating basis by the current ASEAN
Chair.
4.
Each year the ASEAN Chair is afforded the opportunity to shape the focus of
ADMM-Plus to a degree, and gets the opportunity to issue a unilateral statement.
Cambodia is the 2022 ASEAN Chair. Cambodia’s stated objectives as Chair are to
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1 The ADMM-Plus, comprised of 18 nations (the ten ASEAN nations and eight Plus nations: Australia
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the United States), enables Defence Ministers
representing approximately 90% of the world’s militaries, to meet annually to discuss defence issues.
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“maintain ASEAN centrality and unity, collectively address common challenges, ensure
continuity of our works and uphold a human-centred approach.” Accordingly, Cambodia’s
theme for its hosting year is “ASEAN A.C.T. - Addressing Challenges Together” – which
reflects “the importance of ASEAN’s spirit as a united family of ten in jointly acting for
results to achieve common goals.
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ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) co-chairs
7.
There are seven EWGs in the ADMM-Plus. Each of the seven EWGs bring
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together working level representatives from the eighteen ADMM-Plus militaries several
times a year to undertake practical training, conduct exercises, exchange lessons learned
and share best practice. Each EWG co-chairing cycle is three years. These chairs will
the
next rotate in 2024.
Experts’ Working Group
2021-2024 Co-Chairs
Maritime Security
Thailand/US
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Counter-Terrorism
Myanmar/Russia
Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief
Indonesia/India
Peacekeeping Operations
Viet Nam/Japan
Military Medicine
Brunei/Australia
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Humanitarian Mine Action
Cambodia/China
Cyber Security
Malaysia/ROK
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8.
New Zealand is not co-chairing an EWG in the 2021-2024 term. In the absence of
chairing an EWG, New Zealand plans to host a Defence Policymakers’ Course and a
Future Leaders Seminar for ASEAN partners later this year (COVID-19 border policy
dependent). The Future Leaders Seminar will be focussed on Climate Change.
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ASEAN Regional Forum
10.
This Foreign Ministers-led forum fosters
political and security engagement amongst 27
member countries. The ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) has four work streams: maritime security;
counter-terrorism and transnational crime; disaster
management
and
non-proliferation
and
disarmament.
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11.
The only Defence-led component of the ARF
is the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue, which was
held on 29 April 2022, and co-chaired by Cambodia
and China.
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International Branch, Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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Russia/Ukraine
Handling note:
All regional partners have an interest in this topic
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Note that further options for New Zealand assistance will be considered at ERS on
7 June, to be confirmed at Cabinet on 13 June.
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Key messages
Aotearoa New Zealand condemns, unequivocally, the unprovoked and unjustified
attack by the Putin regime in Russia on Ukraine, which represents a clear violation
of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We stand with the international community in condemning Putin’s unjustified and
illegal attack on Ukraine.
Russia’s actions egregiously undermine international rules, not only in Europe but
also in our shared region – the Indo Pacific. Russia’s actions are inconsistent with
the fundamental ASEAN principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the UN
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Charter, and our shared objectives of promoting regional peace and security in the
region.
The international community is paying close attention to the Indo-Pacific and the
ASEAN-led regional architecture within, and our ability to uphold and defend the
international rules-based order. We must act strongly and decisively in addressing
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actions such as those perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine, in order to advance
our collective objectives in a credible manner.
New Zealand has provided support to Ukraine via economic, humanitarian,
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diplomatic and military channels. We continue to assess if there are further areas
where New Zealand can provide useful support.
Background
New Zealand’s contributions
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New Zealand has contributed over $8 million in humanitarian assistance to support
the Ukrainian response to Russia’s illegal invasion. To support human rights and
provide legal assistance New Zealand has contributed NZ$1m to the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights and NZ$0.8m for the international legal
responses to the situation in Ukraine, including further funding towards the
International Criminal Court's investigation against Russian actions in Ukraine.
In terms of military contributions, New Zealand has deployed a NZDF C-130H
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Hercules aircraft and 66 personnel to Europe to provide intelligence, liaison and
logistics contributions to partner efforts to support the self-defence of Ukraine. We
have also deployed 30 personnel and ammunition to the United Kingdom to train
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the Ukrainian Army in the use of the L119 light field gun, as well as donating surplus
aiming systems.
The NZDF has activated its New Zealand-based open-source intelligence capability
and contributed surplus equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
New Zealand has donated approximately NZD $15.7 million for the provision of
critical military equipment to Ukraine through the NATO Trust Find and UK Ministry
of Defence, and commercial satellite access
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Russian participation
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Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, likemindeds including New Zealand, have been
considering how best to manage Moscow’s participation in ASEAN-led architecture,
particularly forums with security and defence-related cooperation.
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Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force
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Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
Handling note:
There will be a FPDA breakfast with your counterparts from Singapore. Malaysia,
Australia and the United Kingdom on 11 June.
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Key messages
Pleased to participate in the 50th FPDA Anniversary last October, and to celebrate
the longevity and relevance of these defence arrangements.
Our regular engagements and exercises have strengthened cooperation and
interoperability amongst our nations’ forces. The regular tempo of Exercise Suman
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Protector, supported by the bi-annual exercises Exercise Bersama Shield and
Bersama Lima are key to this.
Note the FPDA’s efforts to build capacity in non-conventional areas are also
commendable and puts us in good stead to respond to newly emerging threats, as
outlined in the FPDA stocktake paper.
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Background
Five Power Defence Arrangements
The Five Power Defence Arrangements (comprising Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore, and the United Kingdom) is one of New Zealand’s oldest collective defence
arrangements and a cornerstone of our defence engagement in South East Asia. Signed
in 1971, it is described as the second oldest multilateral defence arrangement of its kind
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in the world. It anchors New Zealand’s bilateral defence relationships with Malaysia and
Singapore and provides an enduring avenue for defence engagement by the United
Kingdom in the Indo-Pacific.
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2.
Last year was the 50th anniversary of the FPDA, and a range of activities took place
to mark this event. Exercise Bersama Gold took place 8-18 October 2021. The exercise
marked the first field exercise for the FPDA since 2019, with the COVID-19 pandemic
reducing drills to virtual command post exercises. Exercise Bersama Gold involved sea
and air exercises, mostly in the South China Sea international waters between the coasts
of Malaysia and Singapore. New Zealand contributed the replenishment ship HMNZS
Aotearoa, the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha, and a Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion.
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Current and future contributions to FPDA exercises
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6.
New Zealand Defence Force ships, aircraft and personnel regularly participate in
FPDA exercises. Participation in these exercises provides New Zealand with a regular
presence in the region.
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China in the Pacific (including New Zealand in the Pacific)
Handling note:
Includes tailored talking points on the Solomon Islands – China security agreement
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Key messages
The stability of our Pacific region matters deeply to New Zealand – our identity,
prosperity and security are intertwined. Our security is directly tied to the security,
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stability and strategic balance of the South Pacific region.
We work hard to promote strong, independent Pacific governance, human rights
and rule of law. We expect other partners working in the Pacific to respect these
principles.
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Solomon Islands – China Security agreement (Unclassified talking points)
The Solomon Islands–China Security Arrangement is both unwelcome and
unnecessary. While we recognise this is a sovereign decision for Solomon Islands,
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it is also a matter of regional security and will have implications for all Pacific Islands
Forum members.
Pacific Islands Forum members have a strong commitment to support each other to
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meet our broader ambitions for our region’s security, as set out in the Biketawa
Declaration. As Pacific neighbours, we have worked very hard together to make
sure we are meeting one another’s needs. Collectively, we are ready, willing, and
able to meet the security needs of Solomon Islands.
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It is critical that we come together, as a region, at the Pacific Islands Forum to hold
a dialogue on this agreement and discuss its regional security implications. There is
widespread support amongst Pacific Islands Forum members for this dialogue to
take place at the upcoming Forum Leaders’ Meeting, possibly scheduled for June.
We are disappointed and concerned by the lack of transparency regarding the
agreement, particularly given its regional implications. It is important that the text of
the agreement is released so that we, as Pacific neighbours, can fully understand
its implications for our regional security.
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New Zealand has a long-standing and close partnership with Solomon Islands,
including on security matters. We are deeply disappointed that Solomon Islands has
chosen to pursue this security agreement outside the region.
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We refute any allegation that security assistance offered by Pacific partners is
insufficient. Our view remains that the Pacific Islands Forum members have the
capacity and commitment to meet our region’s security needs.
Background
Chinese Foreign Minister visit to the Pacific
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China has also announced publicly that it intends to hold a second China-Pacific Foreign
Ministers’ meeting in Fiji in hybrid format (excluding Australia and New Zealand). China
has proposed that the meeting also adopt a
Common Development Vision (and
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associated action plan).
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7.
The NZDF deployment to Solomon Islands has recently been extended from 31
May 2022 to 31 May 2023.
8.
There are no present plans to increase the NZDF’s current footprint in Solomon
Islands. We anticipate that there will be a steady state of between two to five NZDF
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personnel throughout the deployment timeframe.
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9.
Ministers with Powers to Act will provided with further recommendations on the
future of the New Zealand deployment prior to 31 May 2023.
[Refer to “New Zealand Defence in the Pacific for further background]
International Branch
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South China Sea
Handling note:
Brunei Darussalam, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnam have competing territorial claims in the South China Sea (see map).
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Non-claimant countries who have submitted their legal position to the UN include US;
Australia; France, Germany and the UK (jointly); Japan; New Zealand.
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Key messages
New Zealand places high value on the peaceful management of maritime disputes
in accordance with international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
We are increasingly concerned about actions and behaviours in the South China
Sea, including militarisation and destabilising activities at sea. We have enduring
interests in a peaceful and stable region.
New Zealand continues to call on all claimants to refrain from actions which risk
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escalating tensions or which undermine the trust and confidence that is needed to
achieve an enduring solution. Our decision to submit a diplomatic note to the UN
Secretary General outlining our legal position on the South China Sea reflects our
concerns about actions in the region which challenge international rules and norms.
The New Zealand Defence Force has operated in the region including in the South
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China Sea for decades, in support of regional peace and stability and freedom of
navigation and overflight.
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Background
The South China Sea remains a major security concern for New Zealand. In recent years
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there has been a notable pattern of China exerting pressure on other South China Sea
claimant states by disrupting resource activities inside their Exclusive Economic Zones,
in order to assert China’s claims within its 9-dash line. This has resulted in a number of
concerning maritime incidents.
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3.
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, a Third Person Note was
submitted to the UN Secretary General on 3 August 2021. This provided the opportunity
to state on the record New Zealand’s legal position on how UNCLOS applies in the
South China Sea. It makes clear that New Zealand neither recognises China’s historical
rights, nor that its artificial islands are capable of generating an EEZ. The TPN forms part
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of the exchange of notes on the South China Sea prompted by Malaysia, to which
partners including the US, Australia, Japan, China, Viet Nam, Indonesia and the
Philippines have responded.
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Map of the South China Sea (with various competing claims)
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New Zealand defence developments
4.
For nearly five decades New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) ships and aircraft
have operated in the South China Sea, both contributing to the Five Power Defence
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Arrangements (FPDA) exercise programme outside China’s self-claimed nine dash line
and operating within the nine dash line. The prioritisation of deployments to the Middle
East, frigate upgrades, and decommissioning of the HMNZS Endeavour reduced New
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Zealand’s defence presence in the region over the last decade. Despite this, the NZDF
continued to undertake P-3K2 maritime air patrol operations in the South China Sea, in
support of regional security and exercising freedom of overflight. From late 2021, the
completion of the frigate upgrades for HMNZ ships TE KAHA and TE MANA, and the
introduction into service of the new fleet tanker, HMNZS AOTEAROA, enables the NZDF
to resume a regular naval presence in South East Asia and the South China Sea.
5.
Over the past few years, the NZDF operated alone rather than with partners inside
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China’s self-declared nine dash line,
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6.
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Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force
May 2022
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Myanmar
Handling note:
All regional partners have an interest in this topic
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Key messages/ Talking points
More than one year on from the coup, New Zealand remains concerned about the
situation in Myanmar, and the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian
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conditions in Myanmar.
New Zealand is supportive of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. We are greatly
disappointed by the lack of adherence to this from Myanmar’s military government
and urge the prompt implementation of the Consensus.
Background
Situation in Myanmar
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Fourteen months since the 1 February 2021 military coup, the situation in Myanmar
continues to deteriorate. In its attempts to bring the country under its control, the military
have killed more than 1,700 civilians and detained a further 10,000 including three
quarters of the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD)
Government. The economy has shrunk by 18%, over 1.6 million people in the formal
sector have lost their jobs and the military continues to target civilians including burning
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down over 6,000 homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship in the past year. Fifty
percent of the population have plunged into poverty and over 500,000 have become
internally displaced.
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Ending the conflict – potential for political dialogue
2.
The Tatmadaw continues its repression of all civic activity; The People’s Defence
Force (PDFs) and some ethnic groups continue to put pressure on the Tatmadaw.
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3.
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. The State Administrative
Council (SAC) has blocked requests from the ASEAN Special Envoy to meet with
opposition figures.
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4.
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In April
2021, ASEAN Member States agreed on a Five-Point Consensus, a commitment to
peace signed by all ASEAN members which sets out: the need for a cessation of violence;
dialogue with all parties for a peaceful solution; appointment of an ASEAN Special Envoy;
provision of humanitarian assistance; and a visit by the Special Envoy.
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on 15 October 2021 in an ASEAN consensus decision to downgrade Myanmar’s
attendance at the upcoming ASEAN-summitry to ‘non-political representation’. Act
5.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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May 2022
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Security situation on the Korean Peninsula
Handling note:
The security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains a key risk to regional and
global security, and a high priority for our defence partners,
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Key messages
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New Zealand is committed to supporting the diplomatic effort to persuade North
Korea to take concrete steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearisation, and abandon its ballistic missile and other weapons programmes.
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is an active contributor to peace and
security on the Korean Peninsula through deployments to United Nations Command
in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and maritime surveillance operations in support in
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against North Korea.
Background
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North Korea remains one of the most pressing security issues facing the Indo-Pacific. Its
nuclear programme and ballistic missiles capability (some of which are assessed as
capable of reaching New Zealand) impact key New Zealand political, security, and
economic interests, and presents proliferation risks for nuclear weaponry and technology.
It also poses a risk to North Korea’s immediate neighbours, the ROK and Japan.
Official
2.
As of 25 May 2022, North Korea has launched ballistic missiles on 15 occasions
including at least two inter-continental ballistic missiles (the first since 2017), and a
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile on 7 May 2022. All of its ballistic missile tests are
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in violation of UNSC resolutions. Kim Jong-un has indicated twice, in 2019 and in January
2022 that he no longer feels bound by North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear
tests and long-range missile tests. Further tests are expected as North Korea aims to
deliver on its five year capability development plan, including improvements to inter-
continental ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities.
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3.
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Such
a test would be the first since 2017 and a grave provocation, which would threaten
regional and international stability and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. The
Kim Jong Un regime seems to be strengthening its rhetoric around its nuclear
programme. In a speech on 25 April, Kim called for the development of nuclear forces “at
the highest rapidity” and for improving the quality of nuclear weapons, including tailoring
them to different operation purposes and missions. The DPRK has been working on
reconstituting its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri and should be in a position to test a
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weapon “within weeks.”
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4.
UN sanctions are the international community’s key tool to restrict North Korea’s
access to inputs for its illicit nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes and to encourage
it to pursue denuclearisation and a return to diplomacy. From 2006 to 2017 the UNSC
passed ten resolutions imposing sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions ban North
Korea’s export of resources such as coal and sand (revenues that have historically
contributed to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes) and limit the import of refined
petroleum to 500,000 barrels per year (a key strategic resource for North Korea’s
weapons programmes). Humanitarian aid is exempt from sanctions.
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5.
North Korea continues to violate sanctions by illicitly importing refined petroleum
and exporting commodities such as coal and sand.
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Inter-Korean relations
6.
The ROK’s security outlook is dominated by its relations with North Korea which
invaded in 1950, leading to the creation of the US-led United Nations Command (UNC)
to assist ROK forces,
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An Armistice was signed on
27 July 1953, splitting the Korean Peninsula along a Demilitarised Zone. A Military
Armistice Commission was set up by both sides to monitor adherence to the Armistice
agreement (although North Korea has since withdrawn).
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So what for New Zealand? the
8.
New Zealand’s national security and economic prosperity rely on protecting peace
and stability in the Indo-Pacific region: our economy and prosperity are reliant on our
ability to trade in a peaceful Indo-Pacific, particularly with the large powerhouse
economies of Northeast Asia. A renewal of conflict on the Korean Peninsula (even if
currently a remote possibility) would have global ramifications, likely involving major
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powers, and carries risk for New Zealanders on the Korean Peninsula and in North Asia.
NZDF deployments
Operation Monitor
9.
In 2021, Cabinet extended the mandate for the NZDF deployment to UNC and its
Military Armistice Commission from 31 August 2021 until 31 August 2023. Cabinet also
approved increasing the NZDF contribution by three personnel, from nine to 12.
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Operation Whio
10.
Since 2018, New Zealand has deployed NZDF P-3K2 maritime patrol aircraft on
five occasions to undertake maritime surveillance and monitoring in support of UNSC
sanctions against the DPRK. This activity is a coordinated effort
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May 2022
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New Zealand Defence and Climate Change
Key messages
In support of the wider New Zealand Government work programme on climate change,
New Zealand Defence has taken a proactive approach in promoting global recognition
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of climate change as a security risk, and to integrate climate change impacts into
Defence activities and decision-making processes.
Climate change remains the central security concern for our Pacific partners. In the
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2018 Boe Declaration, Pacific Island leaders affirmed that climate change represents
the single greatest threat to the livelihood, security and wellbeing of Pacific peoples.
Since 2018 New Zealand’s Defence Policy has formally recognised the importance of
Climate Change. Most recently, the Defence Assessment 2021 recognises Climate
Change as one of the two most significant long term trends affecting New Zealand’s
security, together with Strategic Competition.
Defence continues to make progress on actions that sit under the four pillar framework
—Respond, Adapt, Mitigate and Engage—outlined in the 2019 Defence climate
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change implementation plan, Responding to the Climate Crisis.
We are exploring options to hold a Future Leaders’ Seminar for ASEAN partners. This
seminar would focus on a thematic issue each year, looking firstly at Climate Change,
with a focus on the potential impacts on defence readiness and responsibilities and
capabilities.
Key updates under the Engage pillar Official
The Ministry of Defence continues to support policy partners internationally by sharing
policy development best practice—this currently includes Australia, Canada, and
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Papua New Guinea.
Defence will be co-chairing the Policy Working Group at the upcoming Pacific
Environmental Security Forum, which will be held over 1 – 4 August in the Maldives.
NZDF also is engaged with a wide range of military partners actively sharing insights
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and best practice on climate security. This includes adapting exercise scenarios and
future operating concepts to include climate security impacts.
Key updates under the Mitigate pillar
Defence is a participant in the New Zealand Carbon Neutral Government Programme
(CNGP), which challenges the public sector to lead by example in emissions reduction
and has a goal of Carbon Neutrality from 2025. Toitū Envirocare has verified an initial
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NZDF-wide emissions database and work is underway to verify all years to the
baseline of Financial Year 2016/17.
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This will allow for a greater understanding of the variabilities in Defence operations,
regional climate impacts, and financial drivers to support emissions reduction planning
(gross and net). The NZDF intends to use FY2016/17 as its base year for CNGP
reporting with a gross emission reduction target of 42% by 2030. This base year and
target information will be publicly released in the NZDF’s Annual Report for
FY2021/22. The Ministry is also working to track its emissions as per the
implementation plan.
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NZDF is working with the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) to
progress decarbonisation opportunities – including progressive introduction of electric
vehicles and charging stations at camps and bases from Financial Year 2021/22,
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decommissioning the coal boilers at Burnham in Financial Year 2022/23 (other site
studies are underway), and introducing electric passenger stairs and electric buggy’s
at Air Force bases. The NZDF Sustainable Infrastructure Standards became
mandatory on 1 March 2021 for all new and retrofit buildings and infrastructure on the
Defence estate. These standards incorporate the guidance from the Government and
are intended to reduce the embodied and operational carbon of new building projects.
Key updates under the Adapt pillar
The NZDF is currently finalising an assessment of their climate change risks for all
camps, bases and training areas and their impacts on wider NZDF activities. NIWA
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were engaged to undertake modelling and a high level hazard assessment. The next
step is to undertake specific adaptation planning.
Capability adaptation is already happening through the introduction of more fuel-
efficient ships and aircraft, and increased regional response capability.
Key updates under the Respond pillar
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The NZDF is expecting to need to respond more frequently to natural disasters,
especially in the Pacific as a result of climate change. Future capability decisions will
need to take this into consideration.
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Throughout the pandemic, the NZDF maintained essential rapid response capability
in the Pacific and developed ‘contactless’ border procedures to protect vulnerable
islands. Activities include air and martime surveillance to assist Pacific partners
protect their maritime EEZs, Search and Rescue, and survey flights following Tropical
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Cyclones.
As New Zealand increases its range of engagement following the pandemic, NZDF
will be prioritising regenerating readiness to respond to more frequent, severe, or
concurrent crises arising from climate change impacts in the Pacific.
Background
Climate Change Implementation Plan
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2.
This Defence Climate Change Implementation Work Plan, titled Responding to the
Climate Crisis: An Implementation Plan, puts actions to the recommendations from the
52
2018 Climate Crisis Defence Assessment. The plan has been co-produced by the Ministry
of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force.
3.
The plan highlights Defence’s early efforts and commitments relating to climate
change and how we will grow best practice and raise our ambition over time. It identifies
next steps Defence will take to ensure we are even more prepared for the challenges
climate change will bring over the next decade.
4.
The NZDF has recently activated a Climate Change Response Programme to
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coordinate and drive further action to plan for and implement change across the four
pillars framework of Respond, Mitigate, Adapt, and Engage.
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Cyber Security
Handling note:
For information. All regional countries have an interest in cyber security.
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Key messages/ Talking points
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New Zealand is a member of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security.
New Zealand regularly collaborates with partners on cyber security issues.
Cooperation and collaboration with our close security partners is essential to our
ability to deal effectively with cyber threats.
Defence is developing a Cyber Security and Support capability to enhance
protection of Defence networks.
Background
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Cyber-enabled threats to New Zealand’s security continue to grow in number, scope, and
scale. NZDF day-to-day operational and non-operational activities also face increasing
cyber threats. New technologies are accelerating this trend.
2.
At a national level, New Zealand is experiencing a significant increase in cyber
incidents, and has joined a number of other countries to call for an end to this type of
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malicious cyber activity, which undermines global stability and security.
3.
At a whole of government level, New Zealand released an update of its National
Cyber Security Strategy in 2019. The Strategy has five priority areas: cyber security
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aware and active citizens, a strong and capable cyber security workforce and ecosystem,
internationally active, a resilient and responsive New Zealand, and proactively tackle
cybercrime.
4.
New Zealand views cyber as a business-as-usual activity for military operations
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and a key aspect of interoperability with close partners.
5.
To maintain relevant combat capabilities, including interoperability with close
partners, Defence is seeking to develop its cyber capabilities to ensure that military
commanders have the tools they need to achieve objectives.
6.
Defence cyber activities and interests are interdependent with the wider
Government’s cyber security efforts. Collaboration on cyber across Government and our
diplomatic efforts is increasing.
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May 2022
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Space
Handling note:
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United
States are fellow members of the Combined Space Operations initiative and may 1982
address this topic in meetings with you.
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Key messages
Work continues across government to develop policy settings relevant to the space
domain.
Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand is participating in
work at the United Nations (UN) to reduce space threats through the development
of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour.
Defence participates in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative.
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On 23 February 2022, New Zealand Defence, alongside our other CSpO partners,
published the CSpO Vision 2031 statement. This is a major milestone for CSpO and
represents a clear public statement of our shared values, guiding principles and
objectives with respect to space.
Background
Official
Space policy development in New Zealand is carried on an all of government basis, and
encompasses diplomatic, national security and economic development interests. The
Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment is New Zealand’s lead agency for space
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policy and sector development, and stewards of New Zealand’s regulatory regime for
commercial space activities.
2.
New Zealand made a national submission on Norms, Rules and Principles of
Responsible Behaviours in Space to the UN Secretary-General in May 2021.
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3.
New Zealand’s work promoting responsible behaviours in space in the UN context
is primarily carried out through the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing
Space Threats in Geneva, established by the First Committee of the General Assembly.
Additionally, aspects of the issues covered by the OEWG in Geneva would have overlap
with some of the work carried out in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
in Vienna, where New Zealand also has an active presence.
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4.
New Zealand Defence’s main contribution is CSpO. It consists of Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It
is a non-binding international initiative dedicated to coordinating effort and sharing
information about activities in space. Discussion of the development of defence space
policy and how to communicate these developments to the wider world, forms an integral
part of CSpO’s work
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in South East Asia
Handling note:
Countering violent extremism in all its forms, and may be raised by some partners,
particularly Southeast Asian partners who are grappling with countering domestic 1982
terrorism and violent extremism,
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Note that the CTIF mandate is being considered at ERS on 7 June 2022, to be
confirmed at Cabinet on 13 June.
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Key messages
New Zealand has experienced first-hand the impact of violent extremism, in
Christchurch in March 2019 and again in Auckland in September last year.
New Zealand is committed to supporting regional efforts to preserve stability and
prevent the Indo-Pacific region becoming a source, or destination for terrorists.
New Zealand has a whole-of-government engagement strategy on CVE in South
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East Asia, which identifies opportunities and ways to increase our CVE efforts and
to better support the region.
Background
Major trends in countering violent extremism
Incidents of terrorism in South East Asia have declined in the past seven years, in line
Official
with global trends. However, the threat of extremist groups aligned with the Islamic State
persists in South East Asia, and remains a concern in strategic security discussions with
partners. The Philippines remains in the top ten countries afflicted by terrorism worldwide,
the
with several suicide bombings occurring in the southern Philippines in recent years.
Domestic and international movement restrictions as a result of COVID-19 may have
reduced in-person radicalisation opportunities, however, extremists have continued to
recruit and carry out attacks during the pandemic.
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3
It is estimated that over 1,000 fighters from South East Asia travelled to the Middle
East to join the Islamic State, with at least 700 remaining held in prisons and camps in
Syria, including women and children. Though returning foreign fighters may be few in
number, they present a threat due to their experience, prestige, international linkages,
and indoctrination, all of which may assist in radicalisation. This was highlighted in the
Philippines where foreign terrorist fighters played a significant role in the 2017 siege of
Marawi.
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4
Outside of those aligned to the Islamic State, there are other violent extremist
factions and groups in the region which appear latent but may resurface, including the
Jemaah Islamiyah network, a Southeast Asian militant extremist terrorist group.
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Singapore’s Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF)
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The CTIF was established
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to respond to an enduring and
increasingly multifaceted threat of terrorism in South East Asia. It is the first open source
counter-terrorism information and sharing collaboration facility in Southeast Asia. It aims
to enable regional militaries and law enforcement agencies to work together to achieve
better early warning of terrorist threats in the region.
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The CTIF consists of representatives from 10 nations,
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New Zealand currently has one NZDF analyst
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attached to the CTIF for a period of 15 months (from April 2021 to June 2022).
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While the CTIF is a Singaporean initiative, our participation also provides
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opportunities for New Zealand to strengthen bilateral security relationships with other
regional security partners contributing to the CTIF..
‘Our Eyes’ Initiative
the
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‘Our Eyes’ was established by Indonesia to strengthen surveillance and early
detection of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) development and activity in the Asia-
Pacific. It is primarily an intelligence-sharing strategy. It was launched on 25 January 2018
in Bali, Indonesia. Current members include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei,
Singapore, and Thailand. New Zealand will follow this closely and will support the initiative
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where we can.
International Branch/ Defence Intelligence,
Ministry of Defence/ NZDF
May 2022
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NZDF Domestic COVID-19 Response
Handling note:
COVID-19 remains a key topic for all countries in the region
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Key messages
From 25 March 2020, the NZDF supported the All-of-Government COVID-19
response effort. NZDF personnel have been committed to the management,
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coordination and security of Managed Isolation and Quarantine operations
throughout New Zealand, including personnel assigned and seconded to key
strategic positions at the national level.
NZDF’s involvement in the Managed Isolation and Quarantine system through
Operation PROTECT, has made a significant contribution as a core and critical
intervention for keeping New Zealand safe. It has managed the risk of COVID-19
posed by nearly 230,000 people entering at the border and over 3,600 cases from
the community.
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The NZDF has deployed more than 6,200 personnel to the Managed Isolation and
Quarantine system over the past two years (900 to 1200 personnel committed at
any given time), with the majority from the New Zealand Army with 3278. This
includes more than 500 Reserve Force personnel.
The implementation of the New Zealand Governments Reconnecting New
Zealanders to the World plan has reduced the demand for Managed Isolation and
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Quarantine at the border. Consequently the NZDF has ended its commitment and
withdrawn all associated resourcing requirements, as the majority of MIQ facilities
have decommissioned and future staffing requirements have transitioned to the
the
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.
With the closure of this substantial part of Operation PROTECT, the NZDF can look
forward to regrouping, refreshing training, and regenerating those capabilities that
have been impacted by this significant commitment.
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Strategic Commitments and Engagements Branch
New Zealand Defence Force,
April 2022
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[IF RAISED] Budget 2022: Implications for Defence
s9(2)(g)(i)
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Key messages/ Talking points
The New Zealand Government announced its Budget on 20 May 2022.
The Minster of Defence has announced that Defence will receive an additional
NZ$662.5 million over four years. This will maintain existing defence capabilities, and
support the regeneration and strengthening of the Defence Force following its
intensive commitment to Operation Protect, a key component of the Government’s
COVID-19 response.
New Zealand’s total Defence budget is approximately $4.9 Billion for 2022/23. The
Information
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates New Zealand’s
defence budget to be approximately 1.4% of GDP, according its latest internationally
comparative database. This is a significant increase from 1.15% five years ago.
(Handling Note: there is not an official Treasury figure for NZ defence expenditure as
a percentage of GDP. SIPRI is the major globally recognised comparative data set.)
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The Minister of Defence has noted that this Budget supports the Governments key
current defence priorities of People, Infrastructure and the Pacific. The immediate
focus is on force regeneration and the timely introduction of new capabilities into
the
service including the new P-8A and C-130J aircraft, upgraded frigates and littoral
capabilities for the Navy, and new Army capabilities including protected vehicles and
modern networked C4ISR capabilities.
Since 2018, the Government has committed NZ$ 4.5 billion to 12 major defence
capability projects – the largest capability investment Defence has ever received.
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These investments will support the NZDF to continue to deliver for New Zealanders
across the full range of their requirements, including maritime patrol, tactical transport,
search and rescue, and disaster response.
o The first of four P8-A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will be delivered later
this year.
o The first C-130J aircraft will be delivered in 2023.
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International Branch/ Policy Branch/ Strategic Commitments and Engagements
Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force
May 2022
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Defence Assessment 2021
Key messages
Background
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On 8 December 2021, the Secretary of Defence released
Defence Assessment
2021: He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka: a rough sea can still be navigated.
(U)
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Defence assessments are not themselves Government policy, but do inform policy
decisions. (U)
Key findings
Defence Assessment 2021 finds that New Zealand faces a substantially more
challenging and complex strategic environment than it has for decades, and that the
principal challenges to New Zealand’s security interests will arise from:
o strategic competition; and
o climate change. (U)
Information
s6(a)
Growing strategic competition will increase the potential for confrontation and
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conflict. Even without open conflict, strategic competition will play out across a range
of geographic areas in ways that threaten New Zealand’s security. (U)
At the same time, the impacts of climate change are accelerating, and are being felt
the
early and deeply in the Pacific. Climate change is causing more extreme weather
patterns and increasing numbers of climate-related natural disasters. Climate
change is most acutely affecting states that are less equipped to respond. For some
countries, including in the Pacific, the threat from climate change is existential. (U)
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Defence Assessment 2021 recommends New Zealand’s defence policy should shift
to be more deliberate, proactive and strategy led, with more explicitly prioritised
defence policy objectives. A more strategy-led approach would still, however,
require the New Zealand Defence Force to respond to specific events where it is
needed, whether in New Zealand or offshore. (U)
The Assessment further recommends New Zealand’s defence policy and strategy
should focus on New Zealand’s immediate region, and with a particular emphasis
on working with partners in the South Pacific. (U)
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An increased priority on the Pacific doesn’t mean Defence won’t be operating further
afield. Defence will always need to be able and prepared to make valuable and
credible contributions to addressing security challenges elsewhere, especially in the
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wider Indo-Pacific, in line with New Zealand’s interests and values, and when
directed by Government. (U)
Further work is now underway to develop the high-level approach set out by the
Assessment into a meaningful and actionable strategy, as well as to understand the
longer term capability implications. (U)
Impact of subsequent events on the Assessment’s findings
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Much has happened in the international security environment since the Assessment
was published. This includes a range of discrete events in the Pacific, as well as
the signing of a security agreement between Solomon Islands and China. But the
greatest test of the Assessment’s findings so far has been Russia’s invasion of
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Ukraine. (U)
These events, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, are consistent with the
findings of the Assessment, but suggest the strategic environment is changing even
more rapidly than the Assessment anticipated. (U)
The fundamental direction of the policy recommendations set out in the Assessment
therefore remains sound, but delivering on that direction will now be even more
challenging. (U)
Background
Information
The above talking points are consistent with the public version of
Defence Assessment
2021, which was publicly launched on 8 December 2021. This version preserves the
essence of the findings of the
s6(a)
Assessment that has been provided to
Ministers and considered by Cabinet. (R)
s6(a)
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More detailed analysis on the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the
findings of the Assessment is included in the Ministry of Defence paper
Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine: implications for New Zealand’s strategic defence policy settings, provided to
the Minister of Defence on 12 April 2022.
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Policy Branch
Ministry of Defence
May 2022
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