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AUS/NZ National Security Dialogue 
ACT 
Visit to Sydney 
ANDREW KIBBLEWHITE 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DPMC 
BROOK BARRINGTON 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MFAT 
INFORMATION 
HELENE QUILTER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENCE 
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, TIM KEATING 
OFFICIAL 
CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE 
THE 
REBECCA KITTERIDGE 
DIRECTOR, NZSIS 
ANDREW HAMPTON 
UNDER  DIRECTOR, GCSB 
HOWARD BROAD 
DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DPMC 
CATRIONA ROBINSON 
RELEASED  DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY, DPMC 
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Wednesday, 19 October – Wellington/Sydney 
4.00pm NZST 
Howard Broad 
Catriona Robinson 
Depart Wellington on Flight NZ849 
Travel time: 3hrs 45mins 
5.45pm AEST 
Howard Broad 
Catriona Robinson 
1982
Arrive in Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport on Flight NZ849 
Transfer from Airport to Hotel 
ACT 
Transport: Taxi 
Accommodation s6(a)
 
 
 
Own 
arrangements
 Thursday, 20 October – Wellington/Sydney 
INFORMATION 
1.15pm AEST 
Andrew Hampton 
Departs Canberra on Flight NZ7609 
2.05pm AEST 
Andrew Hampton 
Arrives Sydney Domestic Terminal 
4.00pm NZST 
Andrew Kibblewhite 
Brook Barrington 
OFFICIAL 
Helene Quilter 
Rebecca Kitteridge 
Depart Wellington on Flight NZ849 
THE 
Travel time: 3hrs 45mins 
5.45pm AEST 
Andrew Kibblewhite 
Brook Barrington 
Helene Quilter 
Rebecca Kitteridge 
Arrive in Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport on Flight NZ849 
UNDER 
Transfer from Airport to Hotel 
Transport: Taxi 
Accommodation s6(a)
 
 
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Own arrangements 
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7.15pm
Transfer 
from 
Hotel to s6(a)
  
Transport: Walk (10 mins) 
High Commissioner Chris Seed to meet attendees in the lobby at 7.15pm.  In the 
event of bad weather taxis to be used. 
s6(a) - map
1982
ACT 
INFORMATION 
7.30pm - 
Welcome Dinner 
10.00pm 
Theme: Informal discussion on the ‘state of the world’ including national security 
trends and key international developments.  Discussion to include US politics. 
OFFICIAL 
Format: Andrew Kibblewhite and s6(a)
 to offer short (2-3 mins) 
introductory comments.  s6(a)
 Office of National 
Assessments, to provide a 10 minute presentation framing key international 
THE 
strategic risks. 
Location: 
s6(a)
 
 
UNDER 
Transfer from s6(a)
 to Hotel 
(10 minute walk or 5 minute taxi ride) 
Own 
arrangements
Friday, 21 October – Sydney/Wellington OR Sydney/Auckland 
Breakfast – own arrangements 
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departing for the meeting.  
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7.40am – 
Transfer from Hotel to s6(a)
 
7:45am 
Transport: Walk (5 mins) 
High Commissioner Chris Seed to meet attendees in the lobby at 7.40am.  In the 
event of bad weather taxis to be used 
s6(a) - map
1982
ACT 
Note - Security considerations: 
As the meeting will be held in a high-security venue, access to mobile phones, 
laptops or tablets during the day will be limited. The following mobile will be 
INFORMATION 
monitored at all time for any urgent messages s6(a)
. 
Please ensure you bring photo identification.  This will be required to access the 
meeting venue. 
8.00am - 
Welcome and Introductory Remarks 
8.30am 
OFFICIAL 
Co-chairs: s6(a)
 (PM&C), Andrew Kibblewhite (DPMC) 
THE 
To include a discussion about the aim of the Dialogue and what each side hopes 
to achieve from it – both this meeting and in the future 
8.30am - 
Session 1:  Sharing perspectives 
9.30am 
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Ensuring collective understanding of each country’s national security narrative, 
context and respective capability endeavours, including: 
‐ 
Organisation/legislative reform 
‐ 
Building public trust in, and encouraging engagement with, security  
 agencies 
9.30am - 
Coffee Break 
9.50am 
RELEASED 
9.50am - 
Session 2: Responding to common challenges 
12.00pm 
Building on the broad overview provided in the previous session, an opportunity 
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to engage in more detailed discussions on three prioritised areas of interest 
where we have common objectives and that engage all agencies around the 
table.  
s6(a)
‐ 
‐ 
Challenges in the Pacific 
12.00pm - 
Lunch 
12.45pm 
1982
12.45pm - 
Session 2 (cont.) 
2.00pm 
‐ 
The Pacific (cont.) 
ACT 
‐ 
Collective strategies to manage risk of violent extremism, especially at 
home and in our near abroad. 
2.00pm - 
Coffee Break 
2.15pm 
2.15pm - 
Session 3: Priorities for working together 
3.00pm 
Identifying where the gaps are, or duplications, and opportunities where we can 
do more together, for example:  
INFORMATION 
‐ 
Develop and sustain joint capabilities 
‐ 
Opportunities for joint regional endeavours 
‐ 
Identifying for progression a specific opportunity for shared endeavour 
3.00pm - 
Concluding Session:  Wrap up and next steps 
3.30pm 
OFFICIAL 
3.30pm – 
Transfer from s6(a)
 to Hotel 
3:35pm 
Transport: Walk (5 mins) 
THE 
3.45pm 
Transfer from Hotel to Airport 
Transport: Taxi 
4.55pm 
Arrive at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport 
UNDER 
Check in for Flight 
Proceed through security 
Proceed to Lounge (if needed) 
6.45pm AEST 
Andrew Kibblewhite 
Helene Quilter 
Rebecca Kitteridge  
Andrew Hampton 
RELEASED  Depart Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport on Flight NZ842 
Travel time:3hrs 14mins 
6.55pm AEST 
Brook Barrington 
Depart Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport on Flight NZ108 
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11.59pm NZST 
Andrew Kibblewhite 
Helene Quilter 
Rebecca Kitteridge  
Andrew Hampton 
Flight NZ842 arrives in Wellington 
11.59pm NZST 
Brook Barrington 
Flight NZ108 arrives in Auckland 
1982
Saturday, 22 October – Sydney/Wellington  
Own 
arrangements
ACT 
6:30am -
Transfer from Hotel to Airport 
7:45am 
Transport: Taxi 
7.45am 
Arrive at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport 
Check in for Flight 
Proceed through security 
Proceed to Lounge (if needed) 
9.45am 
Howard Broad 
INFORMATION 
Catriona Robinson 
Depart Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) International Airport on Flight NZ846 
Travel time:3hrs 14mins 
3.00pm NZST 
Howard Broad 
Catriona Robinson 
Flight NZ846 arrives in Wellington 
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CANBERRA CONTACTS 
New Zealand High Commission 
Main: +61 2 6270 4211 
65 Canberra Avenue 
Fax: +61 2 6273 3194 
Griffith 
Chris Seed 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
High Commissioner 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
Residence: s9(2)(a)
 
Llewellyn Roberts 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
1982
Deputy High Commissioner 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
Mike Ketchen 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
Counsellor 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
ACT 
SYDNEY CONTACTS 
New Zealand Consulate-General 
Main: +61 2 8256 2000 
Level 10, 55 Hunter Street, Sydney 
Fax: +61 2 9221 7836 
Billie Moore 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
Consul-General 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
s9(2)(a)
 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
Administration Manager 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
s9(2)(a)
 
Office: s9(2)(a)
 
Team Administrator Consular 
Mobile: s9(2)(a)
 
INFORMATION 
OFFICIAL 
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Australia‐New Zealand National Security Dialogue – Annotated Agenda  
Thursday 20 October 
7:30 – 
Welcome Dinner 
10:0pm 
 You and Andrew Kibblewhite will both give a brief welcome (2‐3 minutes each)
1982
 Ask s6(a)
 to give a 5‐ 10 minute talk on the global and regional outlook,
including major strategic pressure points and tests.

ACT 
Open the discussion for contributions from other participants.
Friday 21 October 
8.00am 
Welcome and introductory remarks 
 Open with welcome and remarks about the purpose of the day (5 minutes).
 Andrew Kibblewhite introductory remarks (5 minutes).
 Open the conversation to contributions from the participants.
INFORMATION 
8:30am 
Session 1 –  
 Australia to introduce the session
Organisation and legislative reform (30 minutes) 
 Australia to lead discussion
OFFICIAL 
 Ask s6(a)
 to open discussion on organisational reform.
 (Andrew Kibblewhite to ask NZ representative for first response)
THE 
 Ask s6(a)
 about counter‐terrorism reforms.
 Ask s6(a)
 to discuss the cyber strategy.
Building public trust in, and encouraging engagement with, security agencies (30 
UNDER 
minutes)  
 New Zealand to lead discussion
 Ask s6(a)
 to open discussion on building public trust in, and encouraging
engagement with, security agencies.
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9:30am 
Session 2 – 
 New Zealand to introduce the session
s6(a)
 Australia to lead discussion

1982
Ask s6(a)
 to open discussion.
 (Andrew Kibblewhite to ask NZ representative for first response)
ACT 
 You may wish to ask CDF to follow.
Pacific  
 New Zealand to lead discussion
 Ask s6(a)
 to comment.
 You may wish to ask s6(a)
 to follow.
12:00 
Lunch 
INFORMATION 
12:45pm 
Session 2 continued – 
Strategies for managing risk of violent extremism 
 Australia to lead discussion
 Asks6(a)
 to open discussion.
OFFICIAL 
 (Andrew Kibblewhite to ask NZ representative for first response)
THE 
2:00 
Coffee  
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2:15 
Session 3 – Priorities for working together  
 New Zealand to introduce the session
 Australia to lead discussion on defence force capabilities
 Ask s6(a)
 to open discussion of defence force capabilities (development and
sustainment) and opportunities for joint endeavours.
1982
 (Andrew Kibblewhite to ask NZ representative for first response)
 Australia to lead discussion on intelligence capabilities
ACT 
 Ask s6(a)
 to open discussion of intelligence capabilities (development and
sustainment) and opportunities for joint endeavours.
 (Andrew Kibblewhite to ask NZ representative for first response)
3:00pm 
Wrap‐up  
 Australia to introduce the session
3:30pm  
Depart to Airport  
INFORMATION 
OFFICIAL 
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DEPARTMENT 
of the PRIME MINISTER 
and CABINET 
Australia-New Zealand National Security Dialogue, Sydney, 20-21 October 2016 
1982
Andrew Kibblewhite, Chief Executive, DPMC  
ACT 
Dinner, Thursday Evening 
Aim: members of both delegations will have the opportunity to speak for a few 
minutes each on any “top of mind” issues.  
What you might like to focus on: you have indicated your interest in raising the 
question of a post-Obama era particularly with respect to our neighbourhood?  What 
might a post-Obama presidency mean for the US ‘rebalance’ towards Asia?  What 
are the chances for the TPP under either Trump or Clinton?  What does a ‘worst 
INFORMATION 
possible scenario’ post-8 November look like? 
Joint PMs Statement – Australia and New Zealand  
Prime Minister the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP and Prime Minister the Rt Hon John 
OFFICIAL 
Key met in Sydney on 19 February 2016 for the annual Australia-New Zealand 
Leaders’ Meeting. 
THE 
The Prime Ministers emphasised that the enduring strength of the Australia-New 
Zealand relationship lay in the close bonds between our people, the extraordinary 
depth of our economic linkages, our shared values and outlook and strong sense of 
community. The visit yielded agreement to further deepen cooperation and 
collaboration between the two countries to enhance the prosperity and security of 
UNDER 
Australians and New Zealanders. 
To further enhance strategic cooperation and strengthen responses to 
domestic security challenges, the Prime Ministers agreed their 
departmental secretaries would lead an annual dialogue on national 
security between the heads of Australian and New Zealand policy, 
intelligence and security agencies. 
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What will a post-Obama presidency look like? 
s6(a)
1982
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INFORMATION 
OFFICIAL 
THE 
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Most likely scenario 
s6(a)
1982
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INFORMATION 
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Implications for the Trans-Pacific partnership (TPP) 
s6(a)
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INFORMATION 
OFFICIAL 
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1982
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INFORMATION 
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Introductory Comments, Friday Morning 
Your aim: to provide some introductory remarks to open the Dialogue along the lines 
of: Why are we here? What does success look like? How do we collectively engage? 
What might the future hold? 
1982
Key Points 
 s6(a)
ACT 
 The Trans-Tasman relationship makes both countries stronger.
 The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship is broad dialogue. The hope is
that, from a security perspective, the proposed annual Australia New Zealand
National Security Dialogue will go on to play an important role in keeping that
dialogue moving forward.
 This inaugural Dialogue, then, is an opportunity to take stock of the Trans-
Tasman security relationship at a moment of increasing global insecurity.

INFORMATION 
It should provide a constructive forum in which to talk about any points of
difference that may lead to friction in the relationship, while reaffirming that:
  Our shared understandings and common interests are too important to 
let small differences get in the way. 
 Longer-term, 
the 
Dialogue is about:
  establishing a platform intended to create the conditions for more 
OFFICIAL 
aligned and collaborative endeavour on national security issues; and 
  support a “no surprises” approach to Trans-Tasman national security 
policy development by facilitating the free flow of information both 
THE 
ways, and through an open and trusting relationship. 
Comparing National Security Systems 
 It is not expected that any specific measures will be agreed at this first up
meeting – it is not intended to be a pledging session.
UNDER 
 It is, however, an opportunity to:
  strengthen the community of A-NZ national security chief executives 
  build greater awareness of each country’s national security context 
  and hear where each other’s national security systems are at. 
 From New Zealand’s perspective, it is an opportunity to market ourselves as
having built a professional, capable and nimble national security system, by
outlining:
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modes 
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  the SIB’s progress toward genuinely collaborative sector leadership as 
(as enshrined in the BPS objectives) 
  new resources; investments and reforms 
  intelligence priorities/risk register 
 Also an opportunity for us to hear how the Australian system is tackling some
specific sector wide capabilities that we have struggled to progress i.e.
national security workforces and classified networks.
1982
The Australia-New Zealand relationship 
New Zealand and Australia will continue to cooperate closely in meeting the 
ACT 
increasingly wide ranging and complex international security challenges we face. 
“Mateship.” To use a popular (albeit highly gendered) Australian cultural idiom, our 
vision is for the Australia-New Zealand relationship to continue to be one built on the 
idea of “mateship” -  that it is a relationship that embodies equality, loyalty and 
friendship. 
In one sense, this history of cooperation between Australia and New Zealand goes 
back to the ANZAC spirit forged in the trenches of World War I.  
INFORMATION 
  And our two nations have continued to strengthen military cooperation 
through combined military deployments to places such as Timor Leste, 
Solomon Islands and, much more recently, in Iraq.  
But of course the relationship, even in a purely security sense, is broader than just 
the military dimension. We have been cooperating on a wide range of economic, 
OFFICIAL 
diplomatic and security initiatives stretching back from right now to a time well before 
our young men fought and died together on the beaches of Gallipoli. 
We share one of the deepest trading relationships in the world. We share wider 
THE 
economic interests, regional interests, and common positions on many of the issues 
facing the global community.  
[Refer back to last night’s “state of the world” discussion.] 
UNDER 
In response to this changing landscape, we need to both help shape our region 
through constructive engagement as well as be prepared for any unforeseen 
deterioration in the strategic environment. 
Why an A-NZ National Security Dialogue? 
s6(a)
 
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s6(a)
That said, it remains the case that each country does have different national 
interests, which do not always align. It is perfectly legitimate for the two countries to 
1982
come to different judgements about the various national security risks each faces.  
To be a success, this and future Dialogues should be seen as a safe space 
where the nature of these differences can be acknowledged openly so that ACT 
they can be managed effectively. 
And the key is that both countries take a “no surprises” approach to policy 
development where national security issues are concerned. 
The ‘value-add’ is in the bringing of a Whole-of-Government perspective 
Part of the Dialogue, then, is about understanding one another better (on a system 
basis); and part of it is about being joined up better where we can and identifying 
opportunities for how we can work even closer together on issues of common 
INFORMATION 
concern.  
For the Dialogue to prove its worth, however, it will need to establish its value add in 
the whole-of-government space and not duplicate conversations happening in other 
parts of the A-NZ architecture (e.g. ADF-NZDF, MFAT-DFAT, NZIC-AIC 
conversations). 
OFFICIAL 
Ultimately the Dialogue presents an opportunity for the two countries to discuss how 
well connected we are in responding to the issues under discussion; whether there is 
any daylight between our responses; if there is daylight, are we comfortable that this 
THE 
is the case; or, is there more we could do jointly. The value of having MoD, NZDF, 
MFAT, NZIC around the table is that all the relevant insights and different 
approaches are available to the meeting as it occurs. 
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Australia – New Zealand National Security Dialogue 
s6(a)
 
Friday 21 October 2016 
Session 1: Sharing perspectives 
0830 - 0930 
1982
[Australia to lead; New Zealand (Broad) to respond] 
Your aim here is to provide New Zealand’s national security perspective - our context, 
ACT 
priorities, objectives, and major capability endeavours.   
In the session immediately preceding this one, Andrew Kibblewhite will have provided 
some introductory remarks to open the Dialogue. His initial musings will be along the 
line of: Why are we here? What does success look like? How do we collectively 
engage? What might the future hold? 
At the welcome diner the night before, members of both delegations will have had the 
opportunity to speak for a few minutes each on any “top of mind” issues. Andrew’s 
comments are likely to cover the question of a post-Obama era particularly with 
respect to our neighbourhood.  s6(a)
 
INFORMATION    
 
* 
[Introductory remarks – link back to the conversation at diner the night before.] 
OFFICIAL 
My job this morning is to give you an overarching view of national security from the 
New Zealand perspective. I plan to briefly cover New Zealand’s overall approach to 
THE 
national security before turning to a consideration of what we see are our national 
security challenges and how we are responding to them. 
The principles of New Zealand’s national security 
As a nation, New Zealand’s national security interests are unusually extensive for our 
UNDER 
size, population and geographic location. They extend far beyond the obvious priorities 
of protecting the physical security of citizens, sovereign territory and resources. They 
also include maintaining national freedom of action and independence, societal 
cohesion and a democratic political system. We likewise seek to maintain the 
conditions for prosperity, including secure access to energy supplies and international 
markets.  
Sitting as Andrew and I do at the centre of government in New Zealand, our mandate 
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extends to both ends of the national security spectrum. Food security, earthquakes 
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s6(a)
 
Friday 21 October 2016 

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Australia – New Zealand National Security Dialogue 
s6(a)
 
Friday 21 October 2016 
and other civil emergencies feature on the national security landscape just as regional 
instability, espionage, cybersecurity and protection of our troops abroad do. National 
security, then, is a broad church of risk.   
And so we define the national security outcome as: “… the condition which permits 
1982
the citizens of a state to go about their daily business free from fear and able to 
make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life.” 
ACT 
In New Zealand we have been going about our daily business lately largely free from 
fear.  And we have been steadily making the most of our opportunities.  Continued 
advancement of our national security interests, then, is based on a number of enduring 
principles. 
We will protect ourselves from the risks we face by “being resilient.” This means that 
our systems, people, institutions, physical infrastructure, and communities are able to 
anticipate risk, limit impacts, cope with the effects, and adapt or even thrive in the face 
of change.   
Regional engagement is crucial. This means doing all we can to strengthen the trans-
INFORMATION 
Tasman alliance, which is fundamental, and other alliance-based security structures, 
as well as positively influencing the shape of the future regional architecture.  
s6(a)
 
 
 
 
OFFICIAL 
   
We support, and are supported by, an international rules based order that 
THE 
disciplines power through law, custom and convention, and according the same rights 
to all countries. At the global level, we have long been active in the highest councils of 
world affairs, whether at the United Nations, the World trade Organisation or similar 
multi-lateral institutions.  
Given how much of our prosperity depends on the international rules based system, 
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the case for taking our share of the burden in a collective process is as relevant now 
as it ever was. Crucial to our national security policy, therefor, is the role played by a 
cadre of professional diplomats led emphatically by Ministers in the Government of the 
day.   
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Friday 21 October 2016 

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Australia – New Zealand National Security Dialogue 
s6(a)
 
Friday 21 October 2016 
National security challenges 
 [As we touched upon last night] the striking feature of the current international security 
environment is its complexity – particularly the sheer range of challenges. 
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“Non-traditional” security risks characteristic of the post-Cold War period persist, 
joined by a resurgence of risks deriving from geopolitical competition among nations. 
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 It is by no means clear, anymore, 
that economic independence, trade and globalisation will prevent a return to a more 
contested regional environment. Major powers are manoeuvring for position, and 
some states are prepared to use coercion and the threat of force to gain advantage in 
territorial disputes. Some rules, norms and institutions that New Zealand has relied 
upon (along with Australia and others in the region) to foster peace and prosperity are 
under pressure. 
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Some conflicts in the world appear distant.  Tensions remain in the Ukraine, the “zone 
of conflict” that has captured attention running through North Africa, the Middle East 
and into South Asia, now spawns terrorism elsewhere and has propelled a major 
refugee crisis in Europe.   
In our own South Pacific region, we observe risk factors including the impact of 
climate change, resource depletion, political instability and population movement. 
The Pacific is family – we can’t shirk our responsibilities here.  Further south the 
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  We watch closely the marketing of New 
Zealand as a substitute illegal migration destination now that Australia is closed.   
Then there is ISIL/Dae’sh – a terrorist venture sourced in a mix of intra/inter-national 
and sectarian disputes.   On the one hand ISIL/Dae’sh seeks a fight to gain and hold 
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ground.  On the other it seeks a fight with non-Islam values and people wherever. 
Thus it inspires extremists to “come join them”.  Or sends extremists back home to 
carry the fight there.  Now also we see the self-inspired vulnerable mind just looking 
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for a cause to attach their death wish.  Finally, as ISIL/Dae’sh “state” comes under 
increasing military pressure we see and worry about its ideologically linked seeds 
growing around the world.  
Terrorism is something that worries us. While not wanting to overstate the situation, 
we do see that New Zealanders are being inspired by Da’esh or ISIL propaganda and 
messages and that some of them are talking about, or advocating, or planning to 
commit violent acts in New Zealand as a result. That’s a big change for New Zealand; 
and Martin Place was, I think, a big wake-up call for the people of New Zealand. 
Paris and Ottawa are a long way away. Sydney brought home to New Zealanders the 
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fact that if it could happen there, it could happen here too.  So, regardless of what 
happens in the Middle East, the issue for New Zealand of those inspired by ISIL and 
its propaganda is not going to be resolved any time soon.   
Our EEZ is the fourth largest in the world; the maritime search and rescue zone for 
which we’re responsible stretches from Antarctica almost to the Equator. There are all 
sorts of resources in and under that water, which we either exploit for ourselves or 
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permit others to do so under licence.  It’s also a handy transit area for people wanting 
to move, say, irregular migrants or illicit goods around our region.  The size of our 
maritime domain, then, is both an enormous asset and an enormous security issue. 
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Finally, New Zealand companies with valuable intellectual property are vulnerable to 
theft, vandalism, and commercial espionage.  There are many interested in our assets 
in order to obtain trade and other advantage.  Organised crime, with its off-shore links, 
threatens in several ways. 
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Risk Analysis 
So what do we make of our risk environment?  The first point is that “states still 
matter”.  The rise of religiously based extremism may tempt us to look away from the 
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  What is true is that an ability to interpret the motivations behind the conduct of 
international relations is as important as ever. 
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Secondly,  “geography still matters”.  Building on the first theme, the excitement 
around hyper-connection and globalisation tend to crowd the fact that the issues of 
most concern are influenced by geography.  Conflict in the Middle East, s6(a)
 
 political instability and climate change influence security in our 
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near region.  The point is that New Zealand has interests in all these global risk centres 
of gravity and the accumulation of risk to us is of concern. 
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Thirdly – “security threats to New Zealand are, in the main, externally driven”. They 
may manifest as an internal problem but the ones of most concern are driven by 
external factors, namely – risks ranging from corporate espionage, cyber-attack, or 
regional instabilities, have their gestation off-shore.  
Fourthly - Complexity rules; where the connected world does impact seriously, is in 
the system wide linkages that have developed.  We try, therefore, to lift the risk 
management sights of enterprises from agency specific issues (which are important 
no less) to system wide effect.  Crucially, the maintenance of system sight on common 
capabilities is a significant success factor.   
The Fundamental Pillars of Capability 
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New Zealand’s national security policy builds on a number of enduring capabilities.  
First, we put a premium on an activist but nimble diplomatic strategy squarely 
aimed at keeping our region, and beyond, peaceful and prosperous. In navigating 
today’s turbulent waters, New Zealand recognises that our best course is to build upon 
the qualities of adaptability and appropriate modesty that have characterised our 
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external dealings up to the present.   
Second is our New Zealand Defence Force.  Responding to New Zealand’s changing 
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strategic environment, the 2016 Defence White Paper makes sure we have the right 
defence capabilities to bring to bear when necessary, in a range of situations from 
combat operations to disaster relief, both at home (Christchurch Earthquake) and 
abroad. 
Thirdly, is the ability of our national security agencies and capabilities to work 
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effectively together in the national interest using a common national security system. 
Like Australia, New Zealand has continued to refine existing arrangements that 
enhance national security policy coordination and action rather than establishing 
something new like a department of homeland security. Building on what was already 
a cohesive national security community, adjustments to the national security system 
implemented since 2014 have improved strategic direction and leadership, particularly 
in relation to the identification, prioritisation and management of key risks. 
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More so than before, New Zealand’s national security system is better able to 
coordinate national capabilities around robust risk management processes. That is, 
as a result of the refinements made since 2014, we are today far better positioned to 
identify and describe our risks, reduce the likelihood of a security event, build 
preparedness for national resilience, respond expertly to events when required and 
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recover rapidly and expertly from adversity.   
Reforms already well underway in respect of the intelligence agencies remain 
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ongoing. The NZSIS and GCSB are both responding to changes in New Zealand’s 
threat environment. In New Zealand, perhaps more so than many other like countries, 
and much more so than in Australia, any change to the agencies – legislative, policy 
or practice, edges into a very contested political environment.  
But the repair of the fracture in public confidence in the agencies, and of the political 
consensus around such key components of national security capability, are key 
objectives of the current government.  This is being pursued down four lines of effort: 
Firstly, in the area of mandate – new legislation is directed at governance, structure, 
powers, and process. Secondly, lies in the area of purpose – through the setting of 
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intelligence priorities and then checks performance back against those priorities. And 
thirdly, in the area of capability – after a lengthy process, Ministers agreed progressive 
development of capabilities was necessary if the agencies were to fulfil their role.  
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As I’ve referred to, the area of the difference in appreciation of risk between national 
security professionals and the general public is perhaps a problem that is particularly 
acute in New Zealand. 
We are often accused of drinking the national security kool-aid and thus become too 
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amenable to over-reaction to an issue – that is to “over frame it”..  On the other hand, 
the public has been entitled to think we are inured against risk by what someone 
described to me as the “moat and barrier” strategy.  The moat refers to the oceans 
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around us and that it takes a determined and skilled traveller to mount an expedition 
to invade us.  And to do so they have to overcome the “barrier” – Australia……  
The public never sees the “what might have been but for….”  How well then are we, 
the New Zealand public, prepared for the fallout from a security, rather than a natural 
hazard event?   What would the post event fallout look like?  Perhaps “we spent all 
this money and still something happens?”  Or, “what do you mean you were not sifting 
everything on line”.  So, here in New Zealand, we worry about advising on the right 
policy balance to strike on risk based capabilities. 
We worry about relevance and competence.  If we cannot strike the right policy for 
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prudent risk management, we will err too much on the side of caution.  Attention and 
investment will wane, capabilities will erode, performance will decline, the existential 
questions will dominate and the risks, well they will increase.  So, then, we worry that 
we will miss something that will end with catastrophic effect.  Here, our national 
security depends on remaining vigilant: vigilant about our environment, and vigilant 
about our capability - without losing touch with those things that make us distinctively 
New Zealanders and basically good people… Forewarned, is forearmed. 
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Additional Classified Papers 
National Assessments Bureau papers 
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Session 2.3: Responding to common challenges – countering/preventing 
violent extremism, at home and our near abroad. 
New Zealand’s domestic threat environment does not warrant development of 
anything like the large scale, national approach to address violent extremism such as 
that implemented in Australia over the past six years. s6(a)
 
 
 
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‘Violent extremism’ describes the beliefs and actions of people who support or
use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. This includes
terrorism, other forms of politically motivated violence and some forms of
communal violence.
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Countering violent extremism (CVE) is an approach which ranges from
preventing people from embracing extreme beliefs (radicalisation) that might lead
to these forms of violence, to reducing active support for terrorist groups.
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
It is part of a broader set of initiatives that include social cohesion and community
building objectives, more effective border controls, anti-money laundering, and
clear understanding of the scale and scope of the issue.

Despite recent changes in the domestic threat environment, there are no major
drivers in New Zealand to warrant development of anything like the kind of large-
scale, highly publicised national approach to addressing violent extremism as
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implemented in Australia.
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In September 2014, Australia raised its terror threat level from ‘medium’ to ‘high’
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- the first change since the system was introduced in 2002. The National
Terrorism Threat Level remains at ‘probable’, meaning there is credible
intelligence indicating individuals or groups have both the intent and capability to
conduct an attack.
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In light of the increased threats and activity, the Australian Government allocated
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AUS$77.4 million for CVE measures as part of a broader AUS$630 million
counter-terrorism package in 2014 (supplemented by an additional AUS$326.4
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million in the 2015-16 Budget. The 2016-17 Budget included an additional 
AUS$5.0 million targeted at CVE. 
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New Zealand’s approach to enhancing social cohesion and community
engagement led by the Department of Internal Affairs and New Zealand Police
respectively, has received a lot of positive attention internationally and is
considered progressive.
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That said, two years ago the current domestic terrorist threat level in New
Zealand went up from ‘very low’ to ‘low’ – which means that a terrorist attack is
not expected, but is possible. There are some in New Zealand who advocate for
attacks, but their capability is pretty unsophisticated.

In-country networks of people are an important factor in an individual taking the
step from accepting a radical ideology to planning real-world action. Such
networks are largely absent in New Zealand or, if present, are very very small.
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This may well be part of the reason why, although some people in New Zealand
are showing susceptibility to online radicalisation messages, this hasn’t as yet
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followed through to the same sort of attack planning or attempts that Australia 
sees.   
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But this does not mean we can be complacent. In terms of preventing violent
extremism at home, then, our major focus is on preventing the development or
spread of radical messages online.

Social sector agencies are also collaborating with Police and Corrections to ‘wrap
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around’ at-risk individuals, especially young people. Noting that the numbers are
very small – these programmes are really only at pilot scale and build on
programmes already in place to help at-risk youth.
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While our respective threat environments currently differ – that is not to say that
it will stay that way.  Our two countries are very close to each other – in every
respect. Travel is easy and frequent between our two countries and many
communities share close trans-Tasman links.  Anything that impacts Australia
impacts us.
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It is clear from the evolving nature of the threat overseas that violent extremists
are exploiting countries like ours’ open nature and the mobility of the modern
age.  For this reason, border management and transportation security remain
critical aspects of our two countries counter-terrorism efforts.
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More importantly, we need to ensure our approach to intelligence and other
information sharing, both between our two countries and within, is as
comprehensive as it can be.
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Regionally, New Zealand is also committed to regional cooperation on CVE, and
has contributed funding and expertise to a number of regional counter-terrorism
capacity building initiatives, particularly in Indonesia and nearby. We have
supported a series of courses through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement
Cooperation in CVE for law enforcement professionals from around Indonesia
and supported research into CVE through an Indonesian NGO named IPAC.
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Internationally, New Zealand is committed to enhancing our partner’s capacity
(civil society and government) to address the drivers of radicalisation, including
through the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, contributions to the Global
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Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (and recent constituency board 
membership with Australia).  
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In the context of international counter-terrorism fora, we conform to the standard
language and use CVE/counter-radicalisation, but always stress the importance
of community engagement and measures to build social cohesion.
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Countering Violent Extremism Domestically 

Terrorism continues to evolve and several factors have resulted in increased
threats internationally and domestically in recent years. This is a persistent
threat that will require ongoing attention and resources.

Many countries, including Australia and New Zealand, have become
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increasingly concerned about, and took additional steps to counter domestic
and international threats. These include nationals fighting with overseas
terrorist and insurgent groups (‘foreign fighters’) and different forms of
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‘homegrown’ terrorism—whether it be individuals associated with particular
groups, or so-called ‘lone wolf’ or ‘lone actor’ threats.

The conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the rise of the ‘Islamic State’ group (IS) and its
declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 are key factors in the heightened terror
threat the world currently faces. While a small number of countries in the
Middle East, South Asia and Africa continue to account for a high proportion
of attacks and resulting deaths, terrorist attacks around the world (including in
Western nations) have increased in both their frequency and, somewhat less
consistently, their severity.
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Recent Trends in Australia 
1 
In September 2014, Australia raised its terror threat level for the first time since 
the system was introduced in 2002. The decision was made in light of the number of 
Australians who were joining conflicts in Iraq and Syria (and potentially returning); 
supporting overseas extremist groups from Australia; and potentially planning 
domestic attacks (including those ‘prevented from travel’). The National Terrorism 
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Threat Level remains at ‘probable’, meaning there is credible intelligence indicating 
individuals or groups have both the intent and capability to conduct an attack. 
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Since the threat level was raised, there have been several successful and foiled 
attacks in Australia. These have included the stabbing of two police officers in 
Melbourne in 2014, the murder of a police accountant in Parramatta in 2015 and the 
disruption of attacks allegedly planned for Anzac Day and Mother’s Day in 2015. 
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The New Zealand Counter Terrorism Environment 
Refer separate classified note from NZSIS. 
New Zealand’s Priorities 
7 
New Zealand’s domestic terrorist threat level remains lower than that of some of 
our partners, but that does not mean we are complacent.  We see a real risk that New 
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Zealanders could be impacted either at home or overseas by terrorist attacks, and 
while it is not the only source of terror, we would assess ISIL to be the greatest single 
source of risk at present. 
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New Zealand’s major strategic priority is that we should be neither a victim nor 
a source of terrorism. 
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9 
In terms of protecting ourselves from becoming a victim of terrorism at home, 
then, a major focus is on preventing the development or spread of radical messages. 
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Coordination right across government is critical.  What we are finding – probably 
at least in part because we don’t have a direct ‘existential’ terrorist threat to confront – 
is that while the police and intelligence and security agencies all have a part to play, 
so too do the social agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the justice sector, and 
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the local faith communities.  Social sector agencies are collaborating with Police and 
Corrections, for example, to “wrap around” at-risk individuals, especially young people. 
Note that the numbers are really small – these programmes are really only at pilot 
scale and build on programmes already in place to help at-risk youth. 
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We are fortunate in that we don’t believe that there is a problem with extremist 
Islamist teaching by individuals actually operating within New Zealand, nor do we see 
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widespread alienation among the Muslim population in New Zealand.  That’s a view 
shared by the leaders of the faith communities.  But we are all equally keen not to let 
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such a problem develop.  Officials and community leaders are working side-by-side 
on programmes to strengthen communities and enhance social cohesion.    
12 
So where people in New Zealand are being influenced by radical Islamist 
ideology, it’s happening online – making what’s happening much less visible to the 
community at large or indeed to officials.  We are most concerned about the impact 
on vulnerable youth.  This underlines our reliance on effective intelligence, and great 
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intelligence cooperation domestically and internationally, to know what is going on. 
13 
Intelligence about what is happening within New Zealand is helpful, but so too is 
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taking action to counter the messages which ISIL promulgates so effectively.  s6(a)
 
 
       
14 
And we still need to be vigilant, and to play our part in countering terrorism 
abroad. It is not in New Zealand’s national character to stand by and assume that an 
international threat such as that posed by Islamist extremism has nothing to do with 
us.  Additionally, international engagement with the counter-terrorism effort has direct 
relevance on our ability to protect our own interests.  This gives us better access to 
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information to position our own assessment of the risk, and contributes to keeping 
stable parts of the world which are important to us.   
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Our ability to provide value is dependent on partnerships with s6(a)
 
countries.   New Zealand has troops in Iraq, working with Australia to train the Iraqi 
forces to counter ISIL.  Our Counter-Terrorism Ambassador is building relationships 
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with other countries in the region, specifically with Malaysia and Indonesia.  And 
collaborative efforts are already underway between various regional partners and New 
Zealand’s intelligence, police and defence agencies. 
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New Zealand’s Approach to Mitigating the Risk of Violent Extremism 
16 
A key tenet of New Zealand’s approach is an honest, dedicated and long-term 
commitment to enhancing community engagement through policies and programmes 
based on inclusivity, respect and tolerance.  
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17 
While these policies form a significant contribution to New Zealand’s domestic 
counter-terrorism efforts, they were not in fact developed with counter-terrorism in 
mind – and we are mindful that to label them ‘CVE or Counter-terrorism initiatives’ 
risks undermining the very inclusivity we are trying to promote. 
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New Zealand’s approach to CVE domestically reflects the low threat of violent 
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extremism here.  Large scale programmes targeting wider communities are not always 
appropriate in the New Zealand environment, where Police have positive relationships 
with many communities and can address issues on a case-by-case basis. Ours is a 
coordinated, whole of government effort where we identify and reduce local pressures 
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that might turn vulnerable individuals toward a path of radicalisation and violent 
extremism. Bring together resources from MSD, MoH, Education, Corrections and 
Police, the interagency Young Person Intervention Programme (YPIP) is currently a 
‘pilot’ operating as a ‘wraparound’ for four individuals. 
Additional Counter-Terrorism Priorities 
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Overview of threat landscape and attack plotting: the threat paradigm is 
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shifting. s6(a)
 
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adjusting our arrangements to include a short- or no-notice event by an individual or 
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small group, to which front-line responders (Police, NZDF) must react and which is 
over before national agencies have had time to properly engage.  This requires new 
planning / exercising regimes. 
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21 
Increased intelligence sharing and integration:  We are trying to ensure our 
approach to information sharing improves domestic and international security 
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outcomes, and that our settings match the global community’s expectations. 
22 
Enhanced Border Protection and Information Sharing: 

Immigration New Zealand will strengthen protection against identity fraud
in visa applications and when arriving at the border through the IDMe
initiative.  This automatically matches biographic and biometric information
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against existing Immigration New Zealand records.  Advance Passenger
Processing and Passenger Name Record data will be used in outbound
passenger processing – this will incorporate a cleared passenger list (a
“white list”) to reduce the impact of al
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erts on genuine travellers, a VIP list (a
“green list”), and a persons of interest list (a “grey list”) which will be used
to notify agencies of the person’s imminent arrival.

New Zealand takes a case-by-case approach to sharing watchlist
information.
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Targeting information is shared on an ad-hoc basis. A subset of entry
refusals, interdictions and offloads is routinely shared with Australia
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New Zealand is introducing systematic checks against the Interpol
passport database as part of its Advanced Passenger Processing

Immigration New Zealand has an initiative underway to establish
permanent Airline Liaison Officers at key airports around the world. They
will be involved in security and facilitation for travellers to New Zealand, and
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also a new engagement initiative with new airlines and routes bound for
New Zealand.
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23 
New Zealand Customs Counter-Terrorism border protection and 
information sharing measures: 
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Customs CT Intelligence team provides 24/7/365 on-call CT support for
Customs frontline work areas.
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Australia – New Zealand National Security Dialogue 
Friday 21 October 2016, Sydney

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Dual Citizenship Renunciation  
Key Points  
 The New Zealand Government continues to seek assurances from the
Australian Government of prior and genuine consultation on the handling of any
A/NZ dual national who faces the risk of losing their Australian citizenship for
engaging in terrorism-related conduct.
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 We also want to ensure open lines of communication in the case of any
New Zealand-only citizens living in Australia with known or suspected
ACT 
connections to terrorist activities and who may face visa cancellation and
deportation under the Migration Act.
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INFORMATION 
Background: 
New provisions in Australia’s Citizenship Act for cancelling the Australian citizenship of dual-
nationals who engage in terrorism-related conduct entered into force in late 2015.  Under the 
provisions a dual-citizen automatically renounces Australian citizenship if they have been in 
the service of a declared terrorist organisation, engaged in specified terrorism-related conduct, 
or convicted of a specified terrorist-related offence.   
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New Zealand interests 
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6              While  the  Australian  system  has  registered  New  Zealand’s  interests  and 
expectations, it remains to be seen how consultation might play out in practice.  s6(a)
 
 
ACT 
 
 
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INFORMATION 
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Countering terrorism and violent extremism
Cat Barker, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security
the world (including in Western nations) 
have increased in both their frequency and, 
Key Issue
somewhat less consistently, their severity.
Terrorism continues to evolve and 
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several factors have resulted in 
Domestic situation and outlook
increased threats internationally and 
In September 2014, Australia raised its 
domestically in recent years. This is 
terror threat level for the first time since 
ACT 
a persistent threat that will require 
the system was introduced in 2002. The 
ongoing attention and resources.
decision was made in light of the number 
of Australians who were joining conflicts in 
Domestic coordination and 
Iraq and Syria (and potentially returning); 
international cooperation, particularly 
supporting overseas extremist groups from 
within the region, are important 
Australia; and potentially planning domestic 
components of an effective response. 
attacks (including those ‘prevented from 
Australia will need to remain 
travel’). The National Terrorism Threat 
responsive in a rapidly changing 
Level remains at ‘probable’, meaning 
environment. However, consideration 
there is credible intelligence indicating 
could be given to a strategic plan that 
individuals or groups have both the intent 
INFORMATION 
would provide direction for, and foster 
and capability to conduct an attack.
coordination of, countermeasures 
over the longer term.
Since the threat level was raised, there 
have been several successful and foiled 
attacks in Australia. These have included 
the stabbing of two police officers in 
During the 44th Parliament, many countries, 
Melbour
OFFICIAL ne in 2014, the murder of a police 
including Australia, became increasingly 
accountant in Parramatta in 2015 and the 
concerned about, and took additional steps 
disruption of attacks allegedly planned for 
to counter, domestic and international 
Anzac Day and Mother’s Day in 2015.
THE 
threats. These include nationals fighting 
with overseas terrorist and insurgent groups 
(‘foreign fighters’) and different forms of 
The number of Australian civilians involved in 
‘homegrown’ terrorism—whether it be 
the Syrian and Iraq conflicts has plateaued, 
individuals associated with particular groups, 
remaining at around 110 for around 
or so‑called ‘lone wolf’ or ‘lone actor’ threats. 
18 months. This is due to a range of factors, 
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including battlefield deaths and people being 
prevented from travel by the interventions 
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the rise 
of families, communities and authorities.
of the ‘Islamic State’ group (IS) and its 
declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 
are key factors in the heightened terror 
Police and security agencies are particularly 
threat the world currently faces. While a 
concerned about a trend towards individuals 
small number of countries in the Middle 
becoming involved with extremist groups and 
East, South Asia and Africa continue to 
ideologies at younger ages. This presents 
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account for a high proportion of attacks and 
particular challenges, and even the Australian 
resulting deaths, terrorist attacks around 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) has 
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Some key figures
 16 counter‑terrorism operations in Australia since 
September 2014, resulting in more than 40 people
being charged with terrorism and other offences 
and disruption of nine attacks.
 ASIO managing around 400 high‑priority 
counterterrorism investigations.
 Around 110 Australians fighting or engaged with 
terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, and 190 people 
providing support (such as recruiting, funding) from 
Australia.
 About 40 Australians have been involved in those 
conflicts and since returned, while at least 50
emphasised the need for an approach that is 
Challenges for the coming years include 
Australian foreign fighters have been killed.
‘far broader and more sustained than simply 
managing the threats associated with 
a security and law enforcement response’.
returning foreign fighters and individuals 
 177 Australian passports have been cancelled and 
prevented from travel, potential radicalisation 
33 suspended.
ASIO has assessed that while the more 
in prisons, and managing the release of 
likely form of terrorist attack in Australia 
terrorism offenders back into the community.
remains a ‘low capability attack against a 
“soft” target [such as a shopping centre 
Regional situation and outlook
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or sporting event], perpetrated by a lone 
actor or small group’, the threat of a 
Many existing terrorist and extremist 
more complex attack remains. The recent 
groups throughout Southeast Asia have 
completed and foiled attacks have been 
pledged their allegiance to or support ACT 
of the smaller scale, lower capability type. 
for IS, and some have indicated a wish 
Lone actors and smaller informal networks 
to establish an official IS province in 
are more difficult for police and security 
the region. IS has recently increased its 
agencies to detect in advance, and low‑
propaganda efforts in the region, including 
capability attacks can move quickly from 
through videos featuring Indonesians and 
idea to action as they require less planning.
Malaysians—at least one of which urged 
militants in the region to unite behind the 
leader of the Philippines‑based Abu Sayyaf 
Group—and the release in June 2016 
Some key figures
of its first Malay language newspaper. In 
INFORMATION 
2016, both Indonesia and Malaysia have 
  16 counter‑terrorism operations in 
experienced successful IS‑related attacks.
Australia since September 2014, 
resulting in more than 40 people 
In Indonesia, after largely successful 
being charged with terrorism and 
counterterrorism efforts over several years, 
other offences and disruption of 
the al‑Qaeda aligned group, Jemaah 
nine attacks.
Islamiyah, is reportedly rebuilding and 
  ASIO managing around 400 
OFFICIAL 
preparing for attacks. It has been recruiting 
high‑priority counterterrorism 
again—with membership estimated to 
investigations.
be back to around 2,000 (matching pre‑
  Around 110 Australians fighting 
Bali bombing levels)—raising funds, 
THE 
or engaged with terrorist groups 
and sending fighters to train in Syria.
in Iraq and Syria, and 190 people 
providing support (such as 
The number of foreign fighters in Iraq and 
recruiting, funding) from Australia.
Syria originating from Southeast Asian 
  About 40 Australians have been 
nations is estimated to be in the range 
UNDER 
involved in those conflicts and 
700–1,000. While this is small proportionally, 
since returned, while at least 50 
authorities are nonetheless concerned about 
Australian foreign fighters have 
the threats posed by returning fighters.
been killed.
  177 Australian passports 
There have also been concerns raised about 
have been cancelled and 33 
how effective Indonesia’s deradicalisation 
suspended.
efforts are, with the head of an organisation 
that assists parolees estimating that around 
RELEASED 
40 per cent of 400 militants released as 
at December 2015 have returned to a 
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radical network. One of the attackers in a 
CVE programme, which comprises four 
January 2016 incident in Jakarta had been 
main streams of work—social inclusion; 
released from prison several months earlier.
targeted work with vulnerable communities 
and institutions; addressing online 
Domestic countermeasures
terrorist propaganda; and diversion and 
deradicalisation. This has generally been 
In light of increased threats and activity, the 
welcomed by experts in the field, though 
Australian Government provided additional 
there have also been calls for Australia not 
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funding of $630.0 million for counterterrorism 
to repeat the mistakes of the UK’s Prevent 
and countering violent extremism (CVE) in 
strategy. Prevent, the CVE component of the 
August 2014, supplemented by an additional 
UK’s counterterrorism strategy, has been 
$326.4 million (excluding defence spending) 
criticised by the Independent Reviewer of 
ACT 
in the 2015–16 Budget. The bulk of that 
Terrorism Legislation, amongst others, as 
funding went to the intelligence and law 
having become ‘a more significant source 
enforcement agencies for counterterrorism 
of grievance in affected communities 
purposes. Less has been allocated to CVE 
than the police and ministerial powers’.
measures, though the spending and focus 
on this area has also increased compared 
CVE initiatives are relatively new in Australia, 
to previous years. The 2016–17 Budget 
with Australian Government efforts dating 
included an additional $5.0 million for 
back only to 2010. It will be important during 
CVE, including $4.0 million to ‘establish 
the process of expanding Australian CVE 
and trial community support and advice 
and deradicalisation initiatives to deal with 
INFORMATION 
services’ with the states and territories.
the current and future threat environment to 
continue learning from overseas experience. 
Specific funded initiatives included:
Interventions need to be adapted to the 
Australian context and tailored to each 
  interventions to prevent Australians 
individual’s particular circumstances. 
becoming foreign fighters, including a 
However, lessons can be drawn from 
Community Diversion and Monitoring 
the UK’s experience as well as European 
OFFICIAL 
Team in the Australian Federal Police, 
countries, such as Germany and Denmark, 
a multi‑agency disruption group and 
which have had some success addressing 
additional investigators and analysts for 
far‑right, far‑left and religious extremism.
THE 
the Australian Crime and Intelligence 
Commission
Some work remains in responding to the 
  the Australian Border Force establishing 
recommendations of the Review of Australia’s 
counterterrorism units at Australia’s eight 
Counter-Terrorism Machinery and the report 
international airports
on the joint Commonwealth‑NSW review 
of the Martin Place siege (both released 
UNDER 
  a revised and expanded CVE programme 
February 2015). The ongoing coronial 
and
inquest into the deaths that occurred during 
  funding for the establishment and initial 
the Martin Place siege may identify further 
operations of the Australian Intervention 
issues requiring a response. In addition, 
Support Hub (AISH).
in July 2016, the Prime Minister asked the 
National Counter‑Terrorism Coordinator for 
There has been increasing recognition 
advice on several matters to guide efforts 
of the need to work effectively across 
to prevent lone actor attacks. Among the 
RELEASED 
the spectrum, from prevention and early 
matters the Coordinator will report on are 
intervention, through to responding to actual 
the vulnerability of soft targets and the 
attacks. This is reflected in the revised 
means to protect them; measures to ensure 
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vulnerable individuals who come into contact 
terrorism financing. Australia hosted a 
with the justice and health systems are 
regional summit on CVE in June 2015 and 
identified by security authorities; and how 
co‑hosted a counterterrorism financing 
agencies are responding to the challenges 
summit in November 2015 with Indonesia. 
presented by rapidly radicalised lone actors.
The latter will become an annual summit, 
with the next one to be held in Indonesia 
While many of the fundamentals remain the 
in August 2016. Australia and Indonesia 
same, Australia’s counterterrorism framework 
also co‑chair the GCTF Detention and 
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underwent significant changes during the 
Reintegration Working Group and Australia 
last parliament, and many of those changes 
has been keen to learn from Malaysia 
took place quickly in a reactive environment. 
and Singapore about their approaches 
While it will remain important for Australia 
and programs for deradicalisation. ACT 
to be responsive in this policy area, the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute has 
The current security environment 
suggested it is time for Australia to take a 
highlights the importance of 
step back and spend some time formulating 
Australia’s continued engagement and 
a strategic plan for counterterrorism. Such a 
cooperation with regional partners.
plan would go beyond the Counter‑Terrorism 
Strategy agreed to by governments in 2015, 
See also the separate articles in this 
by providing a framework to guide future 
Briefing Book on national security and 
work across different levels of government 
counterterrorism laws, and Iraq and Syria 
and ensuring it remains coordinated 
(for information on military involvement).
INFORMATION 
and directed towards shared goals.
Regional cooperation
Further reading
Australia has been working for some time 
with countries in the region both bilaterally 
C Barker, Australian Government 
and multilaterally through forums including 
measures to counter violent 
OFFICIAL 
the Association of Southeast Asian 
extremism: a quick guide, Research 
Nations (ASEAN), the Jakarta Centre for 
paper series, 2014–15, Parliamentary 
Law Enforcement Cooperation and more 
Library, Canberra, 2015.
recently, the Global Counterterrorism Forum 
THE 
(GCTF). Australia and Indonesia’s joint 
Council of Australian Governments 
investigation of the 2002 Bali bombings 
(COAG), Australia’s counter-
built a strong foundation for cooperation, 
terrorism strategy, COAG, 2015.
and Indonesia has been a key focus 
of Australia’s bilateral capacity‑building 
S Zeiger and A Aly, eds, Countering 
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and cooperation on counterterrorism. 
violent extremism: developing an 
Australia has also worked closely with 
evidence-base for policy and practice, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Curtin University, Perth, 2015.
Mirroring international developments and 
JC Liow, ‘ISIS in the Pacific: 
attention, there was somewhat of a shift 
assessing terrorism in Southeast 
in Australia’s regional engagement during 
Asia and the threat to the homeland’, 
the last parliament, with a greater focus 
Brookings Institution, 27 April 2016.
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on: CVE, including online; deradicalisation; 
foreign fighter issues; and countering 
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UNCLASSIFIED 
Funding and National Security 
Background notes for Australia-New Zealand National Security Dialogue 
Security Intelligence Agencies 
The Government has made a number of investments in the core intelligence and security 
agencies in the past two years.  In the New Zealand context, the Government has expected 
all departments to operate within their fixed nominal baselines over this period.  So the 
increases are significant in this context. 
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 s6(a)
ACT 

INFORMATION 
Defence 
In 2013, Cabinet agreed to an indicative plan of capability and associated funding so that the 
Defence Force could deliver on the Government’s stated Defence Policy – the Defence Mid-
Point Rebalancing Review.  Significant investment has occurred in the New Zealand 
Defence Force since: 
 2014: $535 million between 2014/15 and 2017/18 ($170 million ongoing);
OFFICIAL 
 2015: $239 million between 2015/16 and 2018/19 ($84 million ongoing); and
 2016: $301 million between 2016/17 and 2019/20 ($90 million ongoing).
THE 
In 2016, Cabinet agreed to an indicative plan of capability and associated funding so that the 
Defence Force could deliver on the Government’s stated Defence Policy as per the Defence 
White Paper 2016. The indicative levels of new investment in future years are similar to 
those provided in Budgets 2014 to 2016. 
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In Budget 2015 there was also a material increase of $27 million between 2015/16 and 
2018/19 for the Ministry of Defence to improve New Zealand’s military equipment 
procurement ($8.6m ongoing).   
Note all of the above numbers for Defence are operating expenditure. 
At the Defence White Paper 2016 the Government also signalled a commitment to a portfolio 
of planned Defence capability investments valued at close to $20 billion capital expenditure 
to 2030. 
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New Zealand 
Security Intelligence 
Service 
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Te Pa Whakarnarumaru 
ACT 
Australia-New Zealand National 
Security Dialogue 
Session 1:  Sharing Perspectives 
INFORMATION 
Strategic Goals 
In the next four years, in order to ensure that: 
(1) New  Zealanders  are safer:  New  Zealanders  - whether at home or  abroad  -
OFFICIAL 
are  kept  safe  from  physical  (national  security)  threats.  In  particular,  this
outcome refers to  NZSIS's contribution towards countering terrorism
(2) New  Zealand  Institutions 
THE  are protected:  New Zealand's most significant
institutions  - government  and  non-government  - are  protected  from  internal
and external threats
(3) New  Zealand's  National  Advantage  is  promoted:  New  Zealand  is  able  to
fulfil  its  role  in  the  international  environment  in  terms  of  understanding  its
UNDER 
region,  contributing  to  international  security  and  advancing  its  political  and
economic interests
NZSIS will have: 
• Significantly  increased  coverage  of  domestic  security  threats,  including
counter-terrorism,  counter-espionage and counter-intelligence
• Delivered  a step-change in  whole-of-government  protective security  practices
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• Delivered highly valued foreign intelligence
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Enabled the continued monitoring of domestic threats 
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Enhanced  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  our  security  intelligence 
functions through the introduction of a new operating model 
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• Delivered  a  step-change  in  the  quality,  speed  and  customer  experience  of
vetting through a continuous improvement approach and introduction of a new
security clearance management system
ACT 
111 
Enhanced the ability of staff to meet legal obligations with the support of a new 
compliance team 
Enhanced  the  capability  of  our  staff  through  a  new  Intelligence  Training 
@ 
Programme 
Organisational  Reform 
1.
The  NZSIS  has  continued  its  ambitious  organisational  change  programme  to
INFORMATION 
modernise our systems and culture.  These changes will ensures that the  NZSIS has
the  capability,  systems,  and  people  to  meet  the  challenges  of  a  complex  and
changing threat environment now, and into the future.
2.
The  NZSIS's  change  programme  was  launched  to  address  a  number  of
challenges  identified  by  the  2014  Performance  Improvement  Framework  (PIF)
review.  The  NZSIS  is  halfway  through  its  change  programme  and  has  made
OFFICIAL 
significant progress to date. The change programme has five different components:
111 
Match-fit leadership:  strong  organisations  start  with high-performing  leaders 
who  set  clear  priorities  and 
THE strategies. The NZSIS has focussed on improving 
management and leadership across all levels of the organisation;  from the Senior 
Leadership Team through to Branch, Section and Team leaders. 
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Outstanding  people:  As an  organisation  focused on  human intelligence,  we 
recognise that people are our greatest asset.  Investment in our people and  their 
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skills  ensures  that  we are  ready  and  able  to  protect  New  Zealand and  the  New 
Zealand  public.  The  NZSIS  continues  to  train,  develop,  and  put  systems  and 
processes  in  place  to  support  employees  and  enable  them  to  succeed  in  their 
careers. 
• Systems  that  enable:  Effective  leadership  and  outstanding  people  will  only
be as strong as the systems that enable them.  Strong systems  are enablers for
the  NZSIS's  work.  They  ensure  that  we  are  effective,  efficient,  considered,
proportionate,  and compliant in all aspects of our work.
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Delivery  excellence:  The  NZSIS  aims  to  be  an  effective  and  efficient 
organisation,  delivering  excellence  and  impact  to  the  New  Zealand  public  and 
government decision makers. 
Iii 
Powerful  profile:  To  be  successful,  the  NZSIS  requires  the  support  of  the 
New  Zealand  public,  and  our  domestic  and  international  partners  need  to 
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understand and value  the work  NZSIS  does.  The  NZSIS  cannot  be successful in 
our mission if we operate in isolation. 
ACT 
Legislative  Reform 
1.
The  first  independent  review  of  intelligence  and  security  in  New  Zealand  by
the  Honourable  Michael  Cullen  and  Dame  Patsy  Reddy  recommended  significant
changes to the way the Agencies currently operate. The government has considered
their  report  since  late  February  2016,  and  its  response  is  the  New  Zealand
Intelligence and Security Bill introduced on 15 August.
2.
The  NZIC  is  anticipating  that  the  bill  will  be  passed  in  February/March  2017,
with all aspects of the Act coming into force in September 2017.
INFORMATION 
3.
This  bill  will  be  the  most  significant  change  to  NZSIS's  legislation  since  the
original passage of the NZSIS Act (1969);  of specific note the legislation will:
8 
apply to both NZSIS and GCSB; and alter how we work together 
• create  a  new  warrants  and  approval  regime  (i.e.  purpose-based  vs  class-
based warrants)
• specify FTF powers (e.g. visual surveillance and urgent authorisations)
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8 
give explicit access to specific datasets
8 
Result in  NZSIS  becoming  a  Government  department,  and  be  subject  to  the
State Sector Act THE 
4.
In  order  to  ensure  the  legislation  is  implemented  effectively,  the  Agencies
have established  a  Legislative Implementation  Programme  Team  which is  overseen
by  the  Programme  Steering  Group.  Governance  is  provided  by  the  Programme
Governance  Board.  Subject  matter  experts  will  be  engaged  to  support  the  relevant
work stream activities.
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Building  Public trust and engagement in the security agencies 
1.
The  new  bill  will  contribute  to  the  building  of  public  trust  and ·confidence,  by
providing  clarity  in  the  law,  and  additional reassurance  that  we  are  acting  lawfully,
through increased ministerial,  parliamentary and Inspector-General's oversight.
2.
NZSIS has also increased public trust and confidence through the following:
RELEASED 
• In 2015, the NZSIS commissioned a review of compliance. The review made a
number  of  recommendations  to  increase  compliance  in  the  NZSIS,  and  a
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INFORMATION 
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THE 
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Session  2.3:  Responding  to  Common  Challenges  (Countering  Violent 
Extremism) 
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1.
The  terrorism  threat  level  in  New  Zealand  is  LOW  (terrorist  attack  is  assessed  as
possible,  but is not expected),  and terrorist threats against New Zealand are very rare.  NZSIS
nonetheless  remains  guarded  to  the  threat  of  terrorism,  especially  that  from  extreme
ACT 
lslamist groups whose calls for attacks in the West have inspired both complex terror plots
and unsophisticated, lone-actor attacks.
2.
NZSIS assesses a small number of New Zealanders ascribe to radical interpretations
of  Islam,  and  that  some  of  these  individuals  are  supportive  of  terrorism  and  may  pose  a
threat to New Zealand.
Current Domestic CT Environment 
.. 
As of 30 June 2016,  there were,  at any one time, between 30  and 40 people listed on 
the NZSIS counter-terrorism risk register. These individuals were determined to represent an 
INFORMATION 
actual or potential terrorism threat to New Zealand and include individuals in New Zealand 
and offshore.  s6(a) New Zealanders under investigation by NZSIS are assessed to be located 
in Syria,  s6(a)
s6(a)
.. 
s6(a)
s6(a)
the  return  of  such  individuals  is  a  realistic 
OFFICIAL 
possibility  for  the  future.  These  individuals  could  return  with  the  requisite  skills  and 
experience  to  use  weapons  and  explosives,  or  have  the  ability to contact  and/or facilitate 
others to fight with extremist militant groups. 
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Offshore threats 
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Trends 
INFORMATION 
•
The  small  number  of  extremists  in  New  Zealand  and  the  absence  to  date  of  any
domestic terrorist attacks make it difficult to assess the  New Zealand terrorism and violent
extremism environment for trends .
s6(a)
OFFICIAL 
THE 
New Zealand as a target of offshore-direct terrorism 
•
We  have  not  seen  credible  intelligence  to indicate  any  group  is  advancing  plans  to
conduct an attack in New Zealand.
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•
New  Zealand's  deployment  to  Iraq,  to  date,  has  not  had  any  direct  effect  on  the
domestic  terrorism  threat  level.  While  the  New  Zealand  flag  has  appeared  in  ISIL  media,
alongside  flags  of  other  nations  that  contribute  to  the  counter-lSIL  coalition,  ISIL  has  not
officially commented on the deployment.
•
However, officials continue to judge that it is likely to make an attack in New Zealand
or  against  New  Zealanders  more permissible to  a  wider  range  of  extremists. s6(a)
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Information-sharing (general) 
.. 
NZSIS  shares  information  with  international  liaison  partners,  other  New  Zealand 
government departments, and the New Zealand Police as is necessary and lawful in order to 
advance  its  investigations  into  persons  of  national  security  concern.  NZSIS  also  routinely 
shares  published  intelligence  reporting  with  FVEY  partners.  NZSIS  has  established  liaison 
officers
1982
s6(a)
to assist the sharing of information with both 
traditional and non-traditional partners. 
" 
NZSIS notes that liaison,  police and government partners are typically responsive on 
ACT 
matters  related  to  terrorism,  and  these  relationships  generally  function  well  within  the 
constraints  that  accompany  the  sharing  of  classified  intelligence  and  national  security 
information. 
NZSIS relationship with New Zealand Law Enforcement 
.. 
NZSIS  works  closely  with  New  Zealand  Police  (NZP)  to  provide  national  security 
assessments  and  intelligence  about  counter  terrorism  issues;  formally  reported  through 
security intelligence reports and regular briefings. This may result in a joint investigation into 
an  individual,  with  NZP  focussing  on  pursuing  criminal  charges  and  NZSIS  focussing  on 
reporting an individuals activity of national security concern. 
INFORMATION 
s6(a)
OFFICIAL 
NZSIS ,-elationship with Australian Law Enforcement 
" 
As an intelligence agency with a reporting mandate only,  NZSIS' primary relationship 
THE 
with  Australian  law  enforcement  agencies  is  transacted  through s6(a)
s6(a)
his  provides a 
clear  channel  for  communication  and  information  sharing,  with ASIO  and  NZP owning  the 
relationship with the AFP. 
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INFORMATION 
OFFICIAL 
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