Integrated Targeting and Operations
Centre (ITOC)
2016 Review
under the Official Information Act 1982
Simon Murdoch
Released
May 2016

Foreword

This Review was commissioned by the governance group for ITOC which set its Terms of
Reference (see Annex B). The Reviewer proposed a methodology which was accepted. It
involved the circulation to interested agencies and within Customs of a questionnaire based
around the TOR; this was followed by in- person interviews, covering senior and mid-level
managers, past and present, as well as two CEOs. Those agencies and entities which were
thus consulted are listed under Annex B but the views of individuals have been generalised
in this report. The Reviewer received full cooperation and views were expressed thoughtfully
and frankly by all interviewees.
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The Review was supported logistically by Customs. The Reviewer expresses appreciation to
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Customs for this support and warmly thanks Matt Haddon for his expertise and his many
other helpful contributions.
What follows in the report is largely self-explanatory. It was clear enough from the Terms of
Reference and became even more apparent as the Review progressed, that the story of
ITOC cannot be divorced from the evolution of border sector institutional architecture in
machinery-of-government terms. Shifts in strategic priorities for border protection between
human and economic security have also had a bearing on the perceived value of ITOC as a
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small but capable asset for the collective border community. Customs has persisted in
articulating this element of value in the face of developments which went in other directions.
The big question, which the Review was asked to explore, is whether ITOC has a future as a
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sector-serving entity. Answering it took the Review to a wider underlying question – whether
capability developments within the sector member agencies over the seven years since
ITOC`s establishment had, in aggregate, carried the sector significantly closer to the point of
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“a single border system” which had been the declared goal of the 2008-13 Border Sector
Strategy. The extent to which this Strategy, which set the developmental direction for the
border sector, remains relevant is unclear.
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The conclusions and recommendations of the Review turn both of these questions back to
the Border Sector Governance Group with some suggestions about where future value may
lie. Whereas some officials hold a view that “things have moved on” and the moment for a
collective version of ITOC has passed, it may be more fruitful to think about ITOC in terms
less of organisational form than of risk management functions, of how they need to evolve or
improve in future to meet dynamic border sector risks, and then of what institutional
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architecture best suits these needs.  Some of these functions are currently being performed
quite efficiently by agencies, and collaboratively up to a point. But they may need to advance
to higher levels of collaboration in terms of system harmonisation and practice
interoperability if the sector is to continue to serve national and international security well.
The Reviewer also took into account that in the period since ITOC was established and the
sector Strategy was first developed, there have been important changes in New Zealand’s
national security policy settings, management doctrine, and the governance arrangements
under the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC). A
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refresh of the 2008-13 Strategy by the Border Sector Governance group (BSGG), as is
recommended, would also be worthwhile on these grounds.
The Review contains, in Part One, an evolutionary history of ITOC and commentary on the
2008-13 Strategy, as well as on the emergence of advanced targeting as the critical new
technology for border risk management. Part Two is about ITOC`s value as seen by
interviewees in terms of its present utility as a sector and a Customs asset and of what
future value an entity with ITOC`s functions and capabilities could provide within the border
sector and beyond. Part Three contains conclusions and recommendations, some of which
are necessarily speculative and are therefore cast as ideas for further follow up.

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link to page 5 Part One:  ITOC – Evolutionary Development

Timeline/Milestones
1.
Although ITOC was not formally established until 2011, Customs had been reshaping,
and modernising its approach to border protection and control for some years. It was
well aware of the synergies to be unlocked by de-siloisation done in tandem with the
other border agencies. The option of a structural unification of the sector had been on
the table in New Zealand, as well as internationally, for even longer. Annex A outlines
this evolutionary story, including the various developmental milestones and factors
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influencing the eventual shape and character of ITOC. The following sections cover
the most recent developments in greater detail.1
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The National Targeting Centre (NTC) – Forerunner of ITOC
2.
With the advent of tighter requirements for advance information about passenger and
goods movements (especially post 9/11), and leaps in technology (for data
management and bio-identification) new border control tools became available for
developed countries. These tools enable the targeting function. Targeting, in the
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border context, applies to the functions and practices which aim to prevent border
security breaches by the early application of screening and profiling techniques to
identify probable risk actors and threat behaviour patterns. By the use of analysis the
profiles can be applied to mass data to narrow the risk-scape progressively, and to
prioritise decisions about threat reduction, interdiction and investigation operations.
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Customs in particular recognised this as a step-change in border security tradecraft –
a generic capability.
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3.
Customs also believed that a wider public management doctrine shift (“managing for
outcomes”) which demanded cross-sectoral responses to cross-cutting problems, and
emphasised sector clusters, could bring border sector architecture issues back into
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focus. It might even reopen the option of a full merger of all border management
functions under a single agency, but at least it could mandate non-structural
integration and accelerate a process across agencies of harmonised risk management
involving certain common border security functions, and shared services affecting the
operational/enforcement frontline, or the enabling infrastructure behind it.
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4.
The common function Customs foresaw as being particularly suitable for integration
was targeting. A multi-agency “integrated border targeting team” could deepen the
range and quality of information and intelligence about border sector risks and threats
upon which the targeting function depends.

1  The documentation upon which this summary is based comes from Customs files. There appears to have
been no recorded interagency reporting (e.g. Joint Ministerial submissions, budget papers or ODESC
briefings) and it is assumed that such interagency consultation as occurred took place informally or on the
fringes of sector governance (BSGG) meetings. As part of its NTC and ITOC project management, which
reported upwards to Customs Executive Leadership Team, Customs kept border partner agencies informed,
but not consulted. Until recently, no standing body for ITOC governance existed.
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5.
This expectation was clearly reflected in the NTC project documentation. Customs
planned not just the Customs-specific “NTC Implementation Project”, but also a
multiagency “NZ Inc Implementation Programme”.
6.
At the core of the NTC Project was Custom`s ambition to address “border and security
risks” from people, craft and goods holistically. This would enable Customs to act more
coherently across its various enforcement activities and efficiently in terms of not
having its regimes set at an overall level of security precaution that would impose
heavy compliance costs on legitimate traders or travellers. Customs aimed for better
integrated information, improved knowledge management (especially intelligence
analysis) and to achieve a new standardised targeting process, with common rules for
profiling within Customs. This would require both a structural realignment and
reallocations of command, control and communications. The NTC was to be a
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centralised entity, part of the new Intelligence, Planning and Coordination (IP&C)
group providing services to operational staff and decision-makers based in the field.
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7.
The question of how Customs should manage information and share knowledge
(especially knowledge derived from sensitive intelligence) was part of an IP&C
realignment programme. But in fact, although it utilised intelligence analysts in the
targeting teams and was part of the IP&C group which included Intelligence, NTC itself
was established as a separate unit to the existing intelligence component. Some of
Customs’ key overseas partners, by contrast, post 9/11, had undertaken broader re-
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structuring and institutional realignments aimed directly at the fusion of all forms of
border security knowledge, including what had previously been very
compartmentalised intelligence. This was not solely in order to strengthen homeland
security against foreign passenger threats. Facilitation of trade became more
dependent on the perceived quality of border security management (particularly for
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exports to the United States of America).
the
8.
In June 2006, the NTC commenced operations at a Customs’ premises in Mangere
with a staff of 55 Customs’ employees. Partner agencies with a presence at Mangere
were initially the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry/Biosecurity New Zealand; later
Immigration New Zealand and Maritime New Zealand. Police were not a partner at this
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time. The costs of establishing the NTC were borne entirely by Customs from within
baseline.
The 2008-13 Border Strategy and Priority Work Programmes
9.
This public document emerged from an extensive Cabinet process. The first of its kind,
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it was issued in October 2007 by the chief executive level Border Sector Governance
Group (BSGG) created a year earlier after a State Services Commission (SSC) review.
It defined the border sector as a group of six agencies – Customs, Labour (Immigration
NZ), the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Transport (and its three
Crown Entities – Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation Security and Maritime New Zealand),
the New Zealand Food Safety Authority and the Department of Internal Affairs. BSGG
core membership was the first four.
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10.  The structural options for a merger/amalgamation to create a single border operations
force, or a unified border service, or the further step to a single “homeland security”
agency – in vogue overseas – had all been rejected by Cabinet. Instead it opted for “a
more functional approach” to deliver “joint sector outcomes” emphasising systems
integration. It would not entail legal or administrative change to the current
responsibilities of any agency. Although the Ministerial level is not mentioned in the
strategy, the Cabinet portfolio arrangements were not changed.
11.  The New Zealand border sector would therefore remain vertical in its architecture of
six agencies (and other public entity stakeholders, all with border-related missions or
interests) but, by intent, increasingly horizontal in output production and delivery,
progressively building one border management system. This was a federated model
resting on collaboration principles, firm but not binding; agencies would apply them
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“according to their own planning and service delivery needs”. The strategic objective –
system integration – would be brought about progressively through dedicated
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programmes of work to realign agency machinery and processes to make them more
accessible and interoperable, particularly at the physical border. A sector budget line
would be created. An active governance posture by BSGG (not just passive monitoring
but “directive/overseeing”) was seen as essential. Four work programmes were to be
given priority. Each would have projects managed by its own multidisciplinary, cross-
agency team.
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12.  Of the four priority work programmes thus established, one in particular was relevant
to ITOC and this Review – the risk-profiling of people, goods and craft before they
arrive at the physical border. The goal was to develop “a shared border sector
intelligence/risk framework and related border alert system to service whole sector”.
This was further defined under the protection header in the Border sector operational
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context and work programme priorities outlined in Figure 1 below.

the

Facilitation
Protection
Partnership

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Operational environmental drivers

-  Speed/cost/effectiveness trade offs
-  International competitiveness
-  Complexity and change
-  International developments

Intelligence/Risk/Profiling environment

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-  Constraints and opportunities
-  Complex problems and need for ready
response to threats
-  Technology is a key enabler
-  Tools to target risk without increasing staff
numbers
-  Border agencies at different stages of
intelligence, risk management and profiling
development
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Facilitation
Protection
Partnership

Aims for intelligence, risk and profiling

environment
1.  Make available the best possible information to
front line decision-makers
2.  Increase protection through coordination and
collaboration

Enabling priorities

Intelligence/risk/profiling

Develop a shared border sector intelligence/risk
framework and related border alert system to
service whole sector
Identity
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Develop identity processes at the border for
facilitation, protection and partnership

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Sector-wide operational design principles
1.  Some areas of operation will need national consistency.
2.  Technology is a significant enabler but needs to be future-proofed, and accompanied by behaviour
changes to make it work.
3.  Existing investments will be optimised as far as possible; more than one agency will use border
assets
4.  Border agencies and stakeholders will leverage off one another’s’ knowledge and standards and
border infrastructure needs. Costs will be met appropriately across the system.
Information

Intelligence/Risk/Profiling

General

Need holistic picture of the border and resulting
risks. Effective risk management is needed to
enable facilitation.
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Security of Information

Need to balance security of and access to
information
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Need workable privacy and information security
frameworks
Tools & methodologies

Standards are required, with ANZS 4360:2004
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Technology is a key integration tool

Use technology for staff to do more value-d
adding tasks.
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Whole-of-border intelligence-enforcement
flows.
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information

Need for interoperability with other jurisdictions.

Figure 1: Border sector operational context and work programme priorities – Protection

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From NTC to ITOC (Expectations – Mission and Functions)
13.  Customs’ IP&C Review (commenced in mid-2009 after the change of government)
described NTC as “the first step” towards a more strongly coordinated approach to
border risk management and the targeting of high risk persons and goods. The next
step, as seen by Customs, was to enhance support for more rapid and efficient
responses to identified border threats. This would be achieved by moving the targeting
function and elements of Customs’ then operational planning and coordination
arrangements closer together.
14.  In developing the ITOC project charter (March 2010) Customs continued, as it had with
NTC, to think in wider sectoral terms, aiming at consistency with the Strategy. The
Charter said ITOC was to be “a multiagency-focussed facility, and with growth in
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membership in the future, may be a catalyst to the merging of border management
functions”. Elsewhere in project documentation the need to develop multiagency
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accords and to establish multiagency national standards and shared governance
arrangements (a Joint Interagency Coordinating Group) are outlined.
15.  The particular Customs’ elements to be centralised in ITOC were:
i.
The watch function – previously a function performed regionally in ports-based
operational teams on a limited hours schedule. Now ITOC would provide a
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continuous nationwide over-watch.
ii.
The planning function – if a response operation required extra Customs’
resources (e.g. from another workgroup), ITOC`s planners would plan for and
coordinate the deployment of the increment/reinforcement elements and redirect
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or prioritise human or other resources for the operation in question. The
provision of analytical and logistic support for an operation commander would
the
continue to come from the relevant operational work area to be augmented by
ITOC as required.
iii.
Knowledge management and decision support by maintaining higher-level
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domain and situational awareness, including the contact with other agencies
contributing to a particular operation. It was clearly stated that the command of
operations in the field was not ITOC`s role except in certain specific
circumstances. The default position remained that the relevant local/regional
operations group would command.
iv.
Targeting – the risk profiling and target development process which, at this time,
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was seen as both a growing necessity for Customs’ own business needs and
potentially a multiagency function, an integral part of the ‘single border
management system’ under the 2008-13 Strategy.
16.  With a common location and an integrated staff the new ITOC would offer 24/7/365
day services. It would identify risks, assess threats, provide targeting directions, help
plan responses to threats, and help direct or coordinate the conduct of operational
responses as required.
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17.  ITOC would also better serve as the clearing-house and contact point for a range of
Customs overseas liaison interests and border sector/homeland security entities with
who very close partnerships had been established.
18.  Both this new operational coordination (support) function and the targeting function
would consume and generate information. ITOC would also need to become the
institutional home for a multiagency approach to ‘border sector awareness’ through the
fusion of information and intelligence-derived knowledge between Customs and a
group of existing and potentially new agency partners. The main objective regarding
fusion was not necessarily a single intelligence repository but to better share law
enforcement and regulatory information across the border sector.
19.  This change also brought Customs’ targeting function a step closer to its Intelligence
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group. The new premises at the Auckland Customhouse offered improved security
features making it easier, in principle, for other agencies to bring various kinds of
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information into a common space where it might become fused, or at least more
readily available. Unlike the Mangere facility, ITOC would also have the ability to
handle highly classified intelligence.
20.  Besides the opportunity for better sharing of strategic knowledge (the border risk-
scape), Customs foresaw that the real-time situational awareness required for
operational or tactical decision-making could also be generated on a fused or
integrated basis between agencies (the ITOC Charter had expressed the aim as “to
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ensure integration of collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence with respect to
targets that are a threat to border security”). Customs incorporated a state-of-the-art
visual display system – a video wall – in the design for the new ITOC premises in the
Auckland CBD. Planning provision was also made to develop the means to deliver an
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even fuller situational awareness capability – a ‘Common Operating Picture’ – in the
form of an electronic capture and display of multiple activities in real time,
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simultaneously available to both frontline and rear. This multi-layered geospatial
capability had initially been a military tool but law enforcement and homeland security
entities overseas had been adopting it more widely.
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21.  Customs’ project documentation for ITOC acknowledged some risks, including failure
to secure interagency uptake and participation. Behind this (although not as explicitly
stated) were some deeper constraints. Fusion as a concept had known limitations.
Some would be imposed between domestic agencies by standard operational (‘need-
to-know’) security. Furthermore, certain types of information from overseas partners
whether strategic or tactical, could not be shared freely; it was generally vouchsafed by
one counterpart to another (e.g. Customs to Customs) under specified conditions of
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use. It had to be handled according to the rules and restrictions of the originators.
Absent a new joint information management platform, or at the least, a clear set of
information management protocols, these were enduring constraints for sector wide
knowledge management.
22.  Similarly, the aim of a higher level of national cross-agency interoperability in other
functional areas (e.g. interventions and investigations) also had ongoing restrictions
because the agencies had no common legal basis for exercising the various powers
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required to enforce border controls, and this in turn created different doctrine and
operational practices.
23.  Customs had a clear idea of what sorts of operations might be supported by ITOC.
Their operational environment is made up of pre-border, at-border and post-border
activities. At each of these, there are three kinds of operations:
i.
‘routine’ enforcement – normal operational activity in ports and airports.
ii.
‘deliberate’ – pre-planned operations to mitigate or neutralise identified risks and
latent or materialising threats (including those exposed by targeting) of a certain
magnitude or complexity.
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iii.
‘contingency’ – time critical interventions against actual events where border
security had been or was about to be breached, and response operations
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mounted.
24.  Customs’ experience was that it could have all three types of operations in progress at
any one time, and it could also be a party to operations which border partner agencies
had initiated for their own or wider national security reasons.
25.  It was also Customs’ belief that beyond its value to Customs, ITOC, with its Auckland
CBD location and then technical advancement opportunities, offered a new capability –
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a multipurpose infrastructure and scaleable platform – for multiagency command,
control and coherence in either deliberate or response operations of a certain scope
and complexity.
26.  In mid-2011, ITOC commenced operations in the Auckland CBD with a staff of 65
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Customs employees. Partner agencies with a presence were MPI, NZSIS, Immigration
NZ and Maritime NZ; Police and AvSec joined later. The costs of establishing ITOC –
the
both capital and operating – were borne exclusively by Customs from within baseline
although the video wall received extra appropriation via a business case. The average
annual Customs’ budget allocation for ITOC over the past three years is $4.4 million.
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The Targeting Function
27.  Customs’ institutional grasp of the power of targeting matured between NTC and ITOC
and has continued to do so with uptake of new technology supported by other
investments in, and practice with, profiling tools. The ability to access mass data about
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goods and people flows prior to the physical movement, to screen it electronically and
to integrate layers of information and interrogation into it so as establish risk profiles
and selectively target them is now central to its risk management.
28.  Recent performance data suggests that productivity, in terms of alert hit rates, is
increasing  exponentially and can be directly associated to the capacity of the
technology to cope with increases in the number of profiling rules with which the data
can be interrogated. There appears to be a virtuous circle as inputs from profiling,
intelligence and frontline feedback are sequenced into the process by experienced
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operatives. As a business practice which enables border risk management, targeting is
now in common use amongst overseas partners with whom important profiling inputs
are exchanged.
29.  The underlying technology and the applications are the same or similar. However,
there are some fundamental differences in how the three New Zealand border
agencies need to set their risk parameters and how much reliance they put on the
frontline intervention. Customs can rely on its targeting processes to treat a bigger
proportion of travellers and traders as trustworthy (not requiring primary line scrutiny)
based on their profiling than can MPI. MPI’s risk parameters have to cover
unintentional or adventitious contamination or infection. Immigration NZ, for reasons
related to the role played by agents in its pipeline, and because it is still building its
profiling infrastructure and expertise, regards primary line scrutiny, as a more 1982
significant input to its risk management. Immigration NZ therefore needs a high level of
interaction and feedback between its frontline and its targeting staff. There are also
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differences in the quality of advance information between the maritime border and the
air border. In short, at present, there are parts of the targeting function where agencies
interests, capabilities and practice are not uniform or convergent.
30.  Nonetheless targeting can still be considered a common business practice and border
sector craft and the agencies can still benefit from harmonising practice – to some
considerable extent. The potential for joint or teamed approaches lies most clearly in
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the application of data analytics to information and core data sets which are
increasingly being interfaced, and then in the application of profiling tools enriched by
intelligence inputs to the mass information. It is a progressive knowledge refinement
process which can utilise common infrastructure, methodology and practices.
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31.  Given that the process must accommodate differences in type and nature of the risks,
these inherent commonalities in respect of core information and data sets, targeting
the
tools, and techniques and methodologies across the sector, will need to be leveraged
in practice and could be expected to emerge organically as practice matures.
32.  The following diagram (Figure 2) considers a commonality and divergence continuum
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with regard to the border risk targeting functions. This primarily looks at traditional law
enforcement security risks versus biosecurity risks although can be applied to the
majority of agencies risks to a greater or lesser extent. It leads to the suggestion that
the most fruitful area for multiagency collaboration lies at the top of the process where
the commonalities are greatest.
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Information

Figure 2: Targeting commonality and divergence continuum

33.  MPI and Customs have further significant developments at hand in respect of goods
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and trade (beyond the Joint Border Management System (JBMS) Trade Single
Window). The broader aim of the JBMS project is to provide a greater level of
the
information access, risk assessment and work flow management for both agencies.
This, when fully rolled out, will shift data sharing and integration to a new level not so
far seen elsewhere in the New Zealand border sector. In this sense the ‘facilitation’
objective prioritised in the 2008-13 Strategy, at least as it affects trade and commerce,
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has been achieved by Customs and MPI.
34.  Whilst the JBMS project has no direct impact on the configuration of ITOC, MPI also
has a major internal project to further develop its capability to analyse data to inform
several of its risk management processes and this may yet impact.
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Part One: Summary Observations/Conclusions
35.  Customs developed the NTC and later ITOC over a decade, principally for their own
business improvement (effectiveness and efficiency) reasons. The costs were borne
by Customs.
36.  Customs also saw NTC/ITOC in a wider border sector context where outcomes (public
safety and trade facilitation) and outputs (security risk management and related
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protection or control operations) were increasingly interdependent between agencies
and therefore required enhanced interoperability.
37.  Customs always saw itself as the hub agency for the border sector. This arises not
only from the fact that it is the only agency with border management as its sole and
central statutory mission but also from the reality that the Customs systems have
provided core elements of the systems architecture for border management. Other
partners and stakeholders “orbited” around Customs. It therefore expected to lead the
way, in the sense of having to prepare Customs’ infrastructure and systems for other
agencies to connect with in order to enable deeper interoperability. In this context, the
expression “build it and they will come” was used by some Customs staff recalling the
NTC/ITOC planning phases.
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38.  Customs had also expected that the fact of co-location would, over time, stimulate
recognition that integrated targeting was both necessary and technically feasible.
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Common doctrine and practice standards would evolve. At the time it was not as clear
as it is now that this does not apply end-to-end but to some parts of the targeting
continuum than in others.
39.  In Customs’ planning for both NTC and ITOC, the gaps and obstacles to systems
integration, full knowledge fusion, centralised risk management and the various
constraints to functional interoperability were directly acknowledged. The need for
intelligence sharing for risk recognition (not threat response activation) – that is,
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strategic (not tactical) intelligence reporting collated and disseminated within the sector
and beyond to key partners (such as the Police) – was one such gap identified.
40.  The need for an authorising and mandating process to further align systems,
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intervention doctrines and enforcement practices – through a “border accord” by
border sector governance leadership – was foreshadowed.
the
41.  The establishment of BSGG and the subsequent promulgation of the 2008-13 Strategy
and work programmes appeared to meet this purpose. The strategy sets a goal of a
“more integrated and responsive border management system”. The targeting function,
primarily under the ‘protection’ work stream (refer Figure 1) was to be a specific point
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of focus. Customs NTC/ITOC plans were congruent with this.
42.  It had, however, always been in Customs mind that the general tide of public
management doctrine in New Zealand, towards ‘joined-up’ government, with an
emphasis on sectoral and cross-sectoral outcomes, might, one day, carry the border
sector into a more defined hub and spokes architecture, or even to a unitary structure.
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This was a rational enough expectation, based on international comparisons. But the
2008-13 Strategy expressly ruled it out.
43.  Other later machinery-of-government changes under the 2012 Better Public Services
reforms have somewhat taken border partners into other structural alignments – into
different sector configurations with different mission priorities.
44.  The Reviewer does not intend this comment to be read as criticism of the decisions
that took Immigration NZ into an economic growth mega-agency (MBIE) and which
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tied Biosecurity NZ into an expanded primary industries mega-agency (MPI). They
were made by a different government from the one which owned the 2008-13 Strategy
and the economic (productivity) rationale especially in the immediate post-GFC context
(2008-11) was compelling. However, in the sense that all such acts have
consequences, one perhaps underappreciated consequence was that other pressures
and priorities besides border sector security interoperability came to the fore. At a time
of severe budget constraints, integrating border facilitation, and reducing compliance
for traders/tourists became the higher priority (e.g. JBMS Trade Single Window).
45.  Furthermore the Strategy, spread across the three fields – Facilitation, Protection and
Partnerships – was intentionally incremental. In particular, it is not surprising that
progress towards knowledge fusion and integrated targeting has been incremental.
The obstacles to it foreseen by Customs – some extrinsic in nature – have persisted,
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and have constrained progress.
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46.  The means by which the goals of the 2008-13 Strategy were to be achieved were
clearly not hard wiring but soft wiring – an “accord” based on collaboration, not
compulsion. Agencies retained their autonomous status; the border sector was a
confederation. Members would form “coalitions of the willing” and they were expected
to opt into resourcing the projects mandated by the BSGG as the programmes rolled
from design to implementation.
47.  It is not clear whether the BSGG has formally reviewed progress and constraints
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across the Protection agenda as a whole, or in the subsidiary work programmes in
which enhanced targeting interoperability is a specified sectoral objective. Some
interviewees felt that ITOC had progressively become disconnected – “left to its own
devices” – from any wider sense of sector strategy and mission.
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48.  The 2008-13 Strategy may have been overtaken or subsumed in other sector policy
documents or understandings, of which the Reviewer is unaware.
the
49.  In any event, in a way the Strategy has lived on. There have been and are still efforts
towards its objectives at a sub-sectoral level, notably between Customs and MPI, in
the various components of the JBMS initiative.
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50.  Also, operational cohesion for border protection has been sustained, if not improved,
because of longstanding relationships and well-established practices for on-the-ground
collaboration, including between investigation and enforcement arms.
51.  From a wider national security perspective, over the decade 2005-15, there do not
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appear to have been any major operational failures that could be traced back to
dysfunctionality of border sector response attributable to risk management or
knowledge management deficiencies. In fact, during this period there have been
several border security risk mitigation and threat management successes where cross-
sector collaboration was essential (for example, the Rugby World Cup). Sector
sensitivity to emergent risk and readiness also appear to have been well maintained
through exercising (for example, people-smuggling / mass arrivals).
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link to page 16 52.  In addition, for some border agencies/partners, 2008-15 has been a time of heightened
alert or high operational tempo (for example, biosecurity issues) necessitating focus on
their core business, their business models and their support systems.
53.  And it appears that all the core border agencies – and other collaborating agency
partners – have still managed to find resources to make certain capability investments.
So in terms of aggregate border readiness, and protection and facilitation capabilities,
it could also be said that national security may well have been improved.
54.  Whether the various bespoke and agency-dedicated systems and tools fully
complement and reinforce each other or simply duplicate and whether a more
coordinated sectoral approach to capability might have further enhanced the sector’s
systemic capability are questions beyond the scope of this review.
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55.  It is pretty clear, however, that the need for ITOC to provide capabilities which others
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did not possess a decade ago, particularly for operational coordination and crisis
management, has been much reduced.
56.  This leads the Reviewer to conclude that overall sector governance (and indeed other
governance, for example, ODESC) have perhaps “left well alone” the border sector. It
has generally been seen as functional. It had its strategy and knew the Government’s
priorities, its evolutionary systems developments were a work-in-progress and its
operational performance overall was satisfactory.  The saying “if it ain’t broke, it
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doesn`t require fixing” is true – up to a point.
57.  It may, nonetheless, be time for BSGG undertake a strategy refresh and reaffirm the
importance of agencies leaning towards not away from the 2008-13 Strategy agenda
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of systems harmonisation and alignment. It can be argued, consistent with the
direction of the all hazards national security framework, that because the risk-scape
will continue to change and perhaps grow more complex, a wider range of border
the
effects will be required to meet a widening span of sectoral and cross-sectoral needs.
Therefore, agency systems will need to work ever more inter-operatively and across
the sector not just for tactical reasons but also if they are to emerge eventually as the
“one border management system” ordained by the 2008-13 Strategy.
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58.  The sector architecture itself also deserves some consideration. As it stands it is a
federated / loosely affiliated structure comprised of largely separate services which
interoperate to achieve border security/facilitation effects, in the same way that the
service arms of the New Zealand Defence Force interoperate (but there is no
comparable central command and no joint headquarters).2
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59.  A refresh led by BSGG could therefore ask if the sector`s evolutionary progress is
visibly towards highest interoperability at the points of highest interdependency where
risk management might otherwise fail.

2  Australia`s institutional architecture for border management reflects a different approach to border sector
integration from New Zealand’s. It has taken the structural path, amalgamating Customs and Immigration into
a single department (Department of Immigration and Border Protection) and also bringing previously separate
operations into one force (Australian Border Force) under one command. This resulted in integration of
targeting and operations in respect of all the non-biosecurity components of border protection. A further
summary is at Annex C.
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60.  As for the 2008-13 Strategy systems integration agenda, the path itself may not have
changed; shared knowledge, aligned doctrine and harmonised practices (“no silos
within sectors”). A refresh might establish what has happened through or without the
work programmes and it could seek a consolidated picture of present and future
capability investment intentions.
61.  A refresh should also look closely at the ‘protection’ work stream (refer Figure 1) of the
2008-13 Strategy. It should ask what was intended in the “intelligence/risk profiling”
programme particularly in light of what is now known of the potential of automated data
analysis.
62.  Specifically for Customs, a refresh needs to deliver some clarity about the future
sectoral value proposition of ITOC.
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Part Two: Value Proposition

Post-Interview Key Points and Findings about Current Value
63.  This section explores the question of present value on the basis of interviews and
responses to a questionnaire sent to the ITOC Governance Group agencies and some
of the partner/stakeholder entities identified in the 2008 BSGG terms-of-reference.
64.  Customs itself is confident it is now getting most of what it wanted from ITOC. In
particular, it is getting results in terms of successful interdictions/seizures at the border
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from its investments in the targeting function, especially as its technical capabilities
have expanded around data analysis and smarter profiling tools. This is against a
backdrop of rising passenger volumes, rising cargo and mail volumes, and behavioural
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dynamics at vector or entity level. Customs shares with most New Zealand partner
agencies a particular sense of exposure to maritime border risks from craft and
passengers.
65.  It has also become possible for Customs to achieve a higher degree of functional
alignment between intelligence and targeting – a situation it had been seeking since
the review of its IP&C Group – and ITOC is integral to this.
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66.  Some progress has been made towards the wider sectoral goal – border protection
intelligence de-compartmentalisation – but the same systemic inhibitions about
privacy, information sharing and operational security that have affected other sectors
dog the border sector. ITOC has not become the centre of an interagency fusion
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function. In some respects, in fact, intra-sectoral accesses may have become more
constrained.
the
67.  ITOC has become a recognisable “front-of-shop” for Customs externally. Overseas
partners can approach or be approached through ITOC. Whereas Customs values
ITOC as a reliable clearing house for its various offshore partnerships and regional
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connections, other agencies do not see it as a collective facility representing the
international face of the New Zealand border sector. Agencies largely conduct their
own business bilaterally with counterparts.
68.  An interesting observation was made, separately by two senior officials, about the
extent to which border management doctrine itself is shifting internationally towards
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balancing the traditional vector-specific risk management model (that is, single
movements of sea cargo/vessels, air cargo or passengers) with an entities-based
approach which spans all vectors and focuses on persons and cohorts with the
capability and intent to exploit border controls. This reflects strategic determination to
manage risk earlier – pre-border, not at border – and it may not apply equally to all
national circumstances. But it is a matter for consideration whether more pre-border
offshore collaborations of a multiagency nature are likely and should be explicitly
recognised as a future management challenge in the New Zealand context.
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69.  If so, it may impact on ITOC`s future usefulness. It appears that there is presently no
institutional coordination point for the offshore engagements for the border sector as a
sector. That degree of agency autonomy in border sector diplomacy may well have
been, and may still be, quite appropriate for policy, information exchanges and even
political consent and assurance matters. But interviewees asked whether is it so for
the more complex operational matters that will inevitably arise with agencies
expanding both the range of overseas partnerships (for example, to cope with a
deeper internationalisation of organised crime) and the depth of offshore pre-border
operational engagement required to be effective in deterring or disrupting threats.
ITOC itself, in terms of its present form, may not be the answer to this question, but it
could be part of a functional solution if this were seen as a new strategic area for
systems integration.
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70.  The present group of border sector partners – those with a presence at ITOC – held
views on a spectrum of mildly positive to rather negative about ITOC`s value to their
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agencies. The MPI group is the largest; it is made up of tactical intelligence analysts,
data analysts and target evaluators. Other agencies have, or have had, a one or two
person liaison presence. Some saw their interests better served by repatriating their
co-located staff, who appear to feel that the tasks being carried out were for their
parent agency, not the border sector. The greater benefit has been perceived in
stronger internal alignment and such external interfaces as were necessary with
Customs, or other partners, could be managed virtually. For some, the CBD location of
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ITOC was problematic because their efficiency gains came from frequent and easy
interaction between frontline staff and “their own” targeting specialists. The idea of
improving this situation by having an ITOC satellite facility at Auckland and
Christchurch airports received some support.
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71.  Those partners closest to ITOC`s day to day business expressed misgivings about
culture and working environment.  Some issues (incidents) have arisen involving
the
partner staff where accommodations amongst partner agencies have not been able to
be found and matters have escalated. There are feelings of marginalisation. Customs
acknowledges that there is some foundation for these attitudes and wants the new
cross-agency “governance” group to support its management, and guide it to effective
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solutions to future matters of this kind. This is a sensible and overdue development.
72.  The Reviewer wonders, however, because these are in many respects matters of
“feel” and “touch” regarding the working environment, it would be better to mandate the
group in a “management advisory” rather than classic governance role – expected and
entitled to be called upon, and consulted by management, contribute in a hands-on
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way to issue-management with practical solutions and carry their parent agencies
along with such solutions.
73.  The senior interviewees from partner agencies were also aware of these matters, but
were less inclined to see them as devaluing ITOC itself. They generally felt ITOC had
bought efficiencies to Customs from which sector agencies benefited indirectly but as
a sector fusion centre and a sector communications and operations hub, it was an idea
whose time had not come or had passed (“things have moved on”).
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74.  But they still saw some potential in reaffirming or renewing a sense of common
direction about border security risk management, better sectoral information sharing
and in continuing to treat targeting as a function with elements which are amenable to
very close, if not fully integrated practices, by border agencies.
75.  The vast majority of Customs’ border protection activities are ‘routine’ and are carried
out by the relevant teams. They often require some bilateral collaboration between
agencies’ frontline team leaders, but do not require significant ITOC involvement.  By
the same token, Customs’ own experience is that, in these cases, if called upon (for
example, at times of very high tempo) ITOC can supply planning and logistics inputs of
a high professional standard.
76.  When Customs has the lead agency role in ‘deliberate’ operations of significant scale
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and complexity, involving other agencies, it relies on ITOC support. Other agencies,
notably Police and MPI, tend to use their own centres for tactical command and handle
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strategic oversight from their Wellington facilities close to the national security
apparatus run by DPMC. There are successful examples of the use of ITOC by lead
agencies other than Customs for joint operations where the delivery of effects at the
frontline/border are a big part of the tactical plan.
77.  ITOC is capable of providing facilities for cross-agency crisis management in a
national civil emergency response, as it did for Customs in the Christchurch
earthquake, or in a wider event with international or regional actors. Many interviewees
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acknowledged that ITOC has such a contingency value, especially in Auckland.
78.  A question asked by interviewees concerned the relationship between the National
Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC) and ITOC particularly in regard to the fusion of
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sector information to create a common operating picture. NMCC is differently
governed. It is under its own CEO sector configuration (the Maritime Security
Oversight Committee not BSGG), is hosted by Customs but co-located with NZDF,
the
and has a formalised multiagency character, charter and mission.
79.  That mission, leaving aside the rationing of maritime patrol assets for civil stewardship,
sovereignty and regulatory enforcement operations, is to support New Zealand
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maritime domain awareness of physical activities and vessel/craft presences inside the
county’s Exclusive Economic Zone and beyond in the high seas approaches to it.
ITOC is a user of the NMCC`s current geospatial picture, which is multiagency-
sourced and fused up to a point defined by information security boundaries.
80.  ITOC likewise produces for Customs a multi-layered picture of its operations onshore
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and offshore, maritime and aviation, more akin to that developed by NZDF. Other
border sector agencies and border entities have been developing similar capabilities,
as has Police.
81.  But interviewees noted the absence of anything approaching a comprehensive holistic
multiagency security risk/threat awareness product for the maritime border
(passengers, crew and craft) – in contrast to the aviation border. There appears to be
room for some forward thinking in the border sector community about whether this is a
significant knowledge and systems gap. Some particular concerns exist about visits by
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cruise ships. Regulatory agencies such as Maritime NZ have risk management (vessel
safety and environment) alerting information and mitigation duties to discharge in the
same locations as Customs and other maritime border protection agencies. Risk
assessment, threat recognition and operational de-confliction are interests in common
which can be serviced by shared knowledge.
Value Proposition
82.  With regard to ITOC`s future value, the following propositions, which arise from the
conversations with agencies and their feedback to the questionnaire, could guide
BSGG and other sector discussion and analysis.  There are six broad areas where
future border sector interests potentially align. Within each area there are specific
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tasks and functions which appear multiagency in nature and which could involve ITOC
itself or the capabilities it houses. The future institutional shape of ITOC and its
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organisational configuration should be determined by decisions about future tasks and
functions. An evaluation of these propositions should involve testing for overall impact
in the wider context of border sector strategies and future developmental priorities.
Offshore arrangements and event-specific domestic operational coordination:
•  Overseas partner arrangements and messaging – for pre-border operations
offshore involving more than one agency at either end and for Pacific regional
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support.
•  Established, known, 24/7 accredited contact point and clearing house for
counterpart National Targeting Centres.
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•  Large scale operational coordination and headquarters element capability for
certain domestic cross-agency operations (deliberate and responsive), and for
the
exercising.
•  Profiling/Targeting capability for wider national security risk evaluation (including in
response to the risk shift to departures).
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•  Secure functionality for Customs or multi-agency use if business continuity fails at
other locations (for example, Auckland airport) or as ops/crisis centre for civil
defence and emergency management purposes.
Maritime border knowledge management – awareness and coordination:
•
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  There is an opportunity, leveraging the NMCC and multiple agencies, to develop a
joint technology platform (geographic information system based common operating
picture) in support of the border sector responsibility to manage maritime border
security holistically and direct border risk responses. This would ensure the NMCC
knowledge product for maintaining maritime awareness and asset tasking and
coordination compliments ITOC’s product which is aimed at border response
planning and coordination functions.
•  A stronger planning, coordination and de-confliction capability – covering small craft
arrival and departure season, cruise industry, maritime operations, risk vessels and
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maritime events – appears needed, and would be best enabled by a holistic
knowledge product.
•  It would first require obstacles to secure information management and
communications functionality for multi-agency use to be addressed.
•  Interested ITOC parties include: Customs, MPI, Immigration (and MBIE – offshore
oil industry), Maritime NZ and Police. Additional interested parties could include the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Health, NMCC and NZDF.
Maritime targeting:
•  A broader and better consolidated maritime border risk targeting process covering
commercial vessels (cargo, fishing, cruise) the small craft arrival and departure
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season, the cruise industry (passengers and crew), and safety and environmental
risk vessels.
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•  Interested ITOC parties include: Customs, MPI, Immigration (and MBIE – offshore
oil industry), Maritime NZ and Police. Additional interested parties could include the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Health, NMCC and NZDF.
Joint target analysis and development:
•  It is considered that both data analytics capabilities and certain target development
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capabilities are inherently quite interoperable across the sector.
•  There is commonality between the tools and techniques used to analyse and exploit
data and information.
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•  The convergence of data and information streams, including that already underway
through JBMS, can be taken further to a wider group of border security risk
the
managers.
•  It is increasingly well understood that the greatest convergences lie at the front end
of the target develop processes – i.e. data analysis (refer Figure 2).
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•  The efficiency and effectiveness benefits of closer targeting alignment, which
accrue with practice, are available to a wider group of border security risk managing
partners without compromise to operational specialisations.
•  The means of achieving closer alignment and higher interoperability in these
particular functions maybe by co-location but certainly involve close engagement
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regarding doctrine and principles of collaboration best captured in an integrated
team approach.
•  Different risk profiles and different vectors necessitate divergent threat management
and response practice. Tactical level target evaluation and selection is not a
function that lends itself to integration (as much as the data analytics and target
development functions and methodologies above do). But it still requires
accessibility, communication and other coordination arrangements amongst
agencies to support border security outcomes.
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link to page 23 •  Intelligence enriches the process at two levels – strategic and tactical. There is a
need for a ‘border sector emerging risk’ identification capability and a strategic
knowledge product, generated by sector members and other contributors, and
commonly available.3 It would be a holistic product joining vector and entity-based
approaches and analytics. BSGG and DPMC (SIB) would need to engage to
establish viability and mandate the arrangements.
ITOC configuration:
•  ITOC performs for Customs a range of functions consistent with its title. But it is not
a facility which conducts sector-wide targeting or integrated operational
coordination. Based on the primary function of ITOC being the support of Customs
activities, Customs should therefore control ITOC.
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•  Depending on the response of the BSGG to this review, the facility itself might in
future become the hub for a multi-agency targeting function focused on the
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elements of this process which have the greatest commonality in their practice (in
particular data analytics and target development – as outlined above).
•  The targeting function could be configured as follows:
−  Rotating manager responsible for process alignment and approach, tools and
capability development, relationship management and conduct.
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−  Embedded agency representatives in a taskforce type approach.
−  Team members report to their substantive agency for ‘pay and rations’ and retain
agency risk focus and profile development but utilising joint doctrine and
methodologies.
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−  If so, it could be described as a team (or taskforce) housed within ITOC and be
separately named (for example, a Border Targeting Team).
the
•  If other aspects of the future value propositions put forward above are adopted, the
sector functions to be performed should be carefully scoped and determined by
interagency agreement and those to be undertaken within a border targeting team
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be the subject of a new charter.
•  One consideration is the development of an airport based hub for border agency
targeting and evaluation staff to base themselves in either a permanent presence in
support of frontline staff or as an extension of the CBD based ITOC environment.
Overall impact – border sector mission and indicative development goals:
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•  Apart from the joint targeting function proposed above, the remainder of the future
value propositions, whilst largely pointing at an interagency entity, only make sense
in the wider context of border sector mission and underlying developmental
direction. It is for BSGG to reaffirm the 2008-13 Strategy in that respect, or adapt it
by re-specifying as border sector collaboration goals, functional developments
which recognise interdependencies and support interoperability enhancements for

3 A sector product (the “Strategic Border Risk Assessment”) was developed. It is not currently being produced.
This may be related to wider intelligence community concerns and issues.
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agencies and partners with shared risk management responsibilities. However, in
order to make this document coherent to itself, the Reviewer has taken the liberty of
providing below an indication of what these refreshed or adjusted sector goals
might be. Adapted in part from recent Australian policy documents (see Annex C),
they are presented as outcomes and border security benefits:
−  Improved ability to identify latent and hidden risks (strategic knowledge).
−  Increased confidence about discerning levels of risk and prioritisation of
treatment.
−  Earlier analysis of risk reduction and threat mitigation options (enables pre-
border responses).
−  Earlier and richer quality threat-alert / watch list information to core sector
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agencies and partner/stakeholders.
−
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  Analysis based on ‘one border’ (not single stream) and ‘entity plus vector’ to
enable more effective treatment of cross-cutting risks (e.g. maritime).
−  Deeper international collaboration.

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Part Three: Conclusions, Recommendations and Suggestions

Conclusions
83.  Over the decade of NTC / ITOC evolution (2005-15) the border sector has largely
coped with rising pressures to enable commerce and enhance security without
imposing excessive compliance costs. Trade facilitation performance has been
improved. At the same time no significant border protection failures attributable to
institutional incoherence or interagency dysfunctionality appear to have occurred.
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84.  A strategic agenda of systems integration between sector agencies and entities has
delivered some planned results but decision making about capabilities appears to have
become driven more by rising agency portfolio pressures rather than by a sense of
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sector mission.
85.  ITOC has progressively become more integral to Customs’ core business. Its
performance meets expectations.
86.  ITOC has not met Customs’ expectation that it could evolve into a multiagency facility
and hub for integrated border security risk management and protection operations.
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87.  Other agencies and entities which value highly their relationship with Customs,
question the value they derive from ITOC even though their costs are more opportunity
costs than fiscal.
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88.  Those with past or present experience of staff located in ITOC, have reservations
about maintaining these deployments.
the
89.  Some of the reservations derive from intrinsic factors, including quality of
management, the work environment and conduct of business at ITOC. Others are
extrinsic and systemic. Recent steps towards more participatory ITOC governance
should help resolve the former, but may not be sufficient for the latter.
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90.  Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between improving matters within ITOC,
which is a task for management, and recreating a sense of direction for border security
/ border protection, which is a sector governance matter and the role of the BSGG.
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Recommendations and Suggestions
91.  The 2008-13 Border Sector Strategy, which emphasises convergence upon a “single
border management system” appears to be the only sectoral “roadmap” but its current
status is unclear and its work streams (especially in regard to protection), whilst still
apparently relevant, needs refreshment.
92.  A BSGG strategy stocktake should explore those aspects of border security where
risks are becoming more complex and crosscutting; identify where risk management
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interdependencies are rising; and determine where correspondingly higher levels of
inter-sectoral or cross-sectoral interoperability are needed.
93.  The stocktake should also focus on defining outcomes which can be enhanced by
deeper collaborations and function or process convergences delivering recognisable
benefits.
94.  The stocktake should inform and guide discussion and decisions about ITOC’s future
value proposition.
95.  In particular, BSGG should form a view on data analysis and target development as a
common sector function, on the merits of a co-located sector-serving data analysis
capability and on its institutional shape and relationship to ITOC.
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96.  Pending that, Customs should not take decisions about ITOC`s future management,
location, configuration or capabilities which assume continuity of interagency
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participation along present lines.

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Annex A: ITOC Prehistory and Timeline

1989
A review by Gerald Hensley (‘A Structure for Border Control in NZ”) advocates
a structural merger to create a single border agency.
1990s
Customs builds a single integrated data base (‘CUSMOD”) with automated
capability to collect and analyse in real-time information from across its
various specialised outputs; underpins new operating model based on
applying risk management principles.
1999
The Border Services Review (“The Efficient and Effective Management of
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Border Services”) explores non-structural options for common or joint service
delivery.
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2000
Asylum-seeking phenomenon (unauthorised refugee movements by air and
sea) trending upwards internationally and affecting Australia (unauthorised
boat arrivals spike from 200 in 1998 to 3721 a year later). “Tampa” incident
occurred in August 2001.
2000
NZ immigration, education and tourism policy settings change – rising
onwards
numbers of authorised people movements across the border. New trade
agreements require Customs to offer faster assurance services (rules-of-origin
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validations) to goods traders. Wider range of source countries.
2001
Following the 9/11 attack in New York and related terrorist events in Europe
and East Asia, border security and security risk management became far
more intense. The US in particular raised new assurance requirements for air
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and sea movements of goods and people. Globalised financial flows and
internet-based communications were creating new pressures on border
security in regard to it targets, both traditional (e.g. drugs) and expanding (e.g.
the
people trafficking) for organised crime.
2002
The National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC) was established by
Cabinet (part of civ/mil review – Maritime Patrol capability and later “Project
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Protector”). The NMCC to be standalone (operationally independent), club
funded, collocated with NZDF (JFHQ-Trentham) but hosted by Customs.
2005
Customs commences a major structural review – “Project Guardian”. Decision
to realign work streams to form a central Intelligence, Planning and
Coordination Group (IP&C).
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2006
A new National Targeting Centre (NTC) based at Mangere was established.
(June)
2006-07
SSC Review sector governance (not structural). Recommends new CEO level
sector governance group (BSGG).
2007
Cabinet considers the review; rejects single border agency, endorses a
(April)
collaborative approach by autonomous agencies aimed at a single border
management system.
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2007
Cabinet approves new governance and strategic work programme; TOR for
(October)
BSGG promulgated 17 Oct 2007.
2007
ODESC review; NMCC funding and administrative accountabilities shift to
Customs.
2008
BSGG issues a five year Border Sector Strategy.
(July)
2008
Election and change of government.
2009
Smartgate (facial recognition for air passenger processing).
2009-10
IP&C review by Customs CEO/SLT. ITOC proposal scoped and project
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development approved (March). Relocation to Auckland CBD from Mangere
set for December 2010.
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2011
Ministry for Primary Industries established by departmental amalgamation.
(July)
2011
ITOC operations commence at CBD location. Officially opened by the PM in
September.
2011-12
ATS-G, an advanced passenger screening/profiling tool (originally provided to
Customs by US for RWC) fully deployed.
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2012
MBIE (includes Immigration NZ) established by departmental amalgamation.
(July)
2013
Joint Border Management System and Trade Single Window Project.
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MPI/Customs common IT platform/shared services for import/export of goods.
Also changes in internal workflow management and investment planned for
new risk assessment and intelligence tools –“R&I” programme (funded under
the
BPS).
2014
IP&C group restructured to incorporate investigations and response functions
becoming Intelligence, Investigations and Enforcement (II&E). ITOC presently
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belongs to this group.

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Annex B: Terms of Reference and List of Agencies Consulted

ITOC Review: Terms of Reference
Purpose
1.
The Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre (ITOC) was designed to bring
together multiple agencies in one location to better facilitate the targeting and
treatment of risks presented to New Zealand’s border.
2.
The purpose of this review is to identify and report on the operational effectiveness of
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the ITOC and, capitalising on the work done to date, determine what next steps are
needed to ensure ITOC remains fit for purpose and of value to the partner agencies.
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Background
3.
The ITOC was officially opened by the Prime Minister on 02 September 2011 and has
continued to evolve and develop since this time.
4.
The ITOC was designed to bring together multiple agencies in one location to better
facilitate the targeting and treatment of risks presented to New Zealand’s borders. Co-
locating the targeting and operational planning and coordination functions should
Information
improve the capability to assess threats and to target risks to the border, and respond
to these more effectively and efficiently. The ITOC is also responsible for maintaining
an awareness of daily activity at the border, providing a 24x7 communications hub and
providing support to operational activity as required.
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Situation
5.
The ITOC has been operational in its current state for over four years and over this
the
time the number of partner agencies has increased. It is appropriate that the use and
operational effectiveness of the centre is reviewed. A review should provide the
opportunity for the ITOC partner agencies to increase the level collaboration and
coordination to maximise the benefits for all partners. This review also provides an
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opportunity to identify potential overlaps or duplication in similar government agencies.
Objectives
6.
The review should address the following points and make recommendations:
a.  Consider the original purpose and objectives of the ITOC and determine whether
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these are being met;
b.  Assess how the ITOC reflects or integrates with the current and emerging
strategic priorities of partner agencies;
c.  Determine if there are impediments to the efficient and effective operation of the
ITOC;
d.  Determine the level of effectiveness of the ITOC’s resources and capabilities,
including potential performance measures, to inform partner agency investment in
the future;
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e.  Consider the future purpose and role of the ITOC – ‘where to next’;
f.  Consider how the governance, organisational arrangements, policies and
procedures of the ITOC could be improved to better serve the border sector and
related regulatory, law enforcement and security needs and requirements;
g.  Consider the alignment of the ITOC with the National Security System and with
other joint intelligence, targeting and coordination centres, including the National
Intelligence Centre, the Gang Intelligence Centre, the Australian National Border
Targeting Centre and the National Maritime Coordination Centre.
Proposed Scope
7.
The review will be informed by the experience of ITOC partner agencies and 1982
customers and by operational level staff and senior representatives of the ITOC
member agencies.
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8.
The review will not cover the individual partner agency products, deliverables or
workflows except where they are directly linked to the broader ITOC purpose and
objectives.
Governance and Resources
9.
The work is jointly commissioned by the ITOC partner agencies through the ITOC
Governance Board. Recommendations from the review will be discussed and agreed
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with senior leadership teams (and other work groups) within the partner agencies as
appropriate.
10.  An external consultant will be commissioned to undertake the review.
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Assumptions
11.  The following assumptions are made:
the
a.  Document and information will be made available to the reviewer as appropriate.
b.  Key people within the partner agencies will be made available for interviews
and/or workshops as appropriate.
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c.  The review will take into account change projects underway in each agency.

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List of Representatives Consulted

Name
Agency
Position
Bill Perry
Customs
Deputy Comptroller, Operations
Robert Lake
Customs
Customs Councillor, Brussels
Jamie Bamford
Customs
Group Manager Intelligence Investigations
and Enforcement
Anthony Davis
Customs
Manager Risk and Intelligence
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Lloyd Smith
Customs
Manager ITOC (Acting)
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Peter Lewis
Customs
Manager Auckland Airport
John Duxfield

(Former Customs) Group Manager
Intelligence Planning and Coordination
Martyn Dunne
MPI
Chief Executive
Stephanie Rowe
MPI
Head of Intelligence and Operations
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David Hutchison
MPI
Head of Intelligence and Operations (Acting)
Catherine MacGowan
MPI
Manager Intelligence
Carl McLennan
Police
National Manager of Intelligence
Official
Stephen Vaughan
MBIE
Assistant General Manager, Intelligence and
the  Risk
Karen Urwin
AvSec
Group Manager, Operations
Keith Manch
Maritime NZ
Chief Executive
under
NZSIS
NZSIS
Northern Region Manager

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Annex C:  Australian System

In May 2014, a new unitary agency of state, the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection (DIPB), was formed by amalgamating the Customs and Immigration departments
and services. The Australian Border Force was also subsequently established as the
frontline operational entity of the Department and also reflects a greater focus on the border
as a strategic national asset.
In July 2014, a new National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC) within the then Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) and co-located with the Strategic Border
1982
Command was established. The NBTC would operate under a charter (joint agency
agreement) involving eight other federal partner agencies. In 2016, following a capability
review of the integrated intelligence function (a key goal of the charter), it was determined
Act
that the NBTC should be retitled the Border Intelligence Fusion Centre and be
organisationally re-positioned as a unit of the Intelligence Division of the DIPB to bring about
closer alignment of the NBTC capabilities with the department’s intelligence apparatus. The
BIFC would be headed by a departmental Assistant Secretary.
The 2014 NBTC charter and joint agency accord are not new to New Zealand. Both in terms
of concepts and principles, Australian system designers drew on the foundational (2009)
Information
documents for ITOC. Of course there are other differences, including between the Australian
and New Zealand risk scape. But Australia has tackled the same underlying issues that
drove the New Zealand strategy development in 2008/09 and more recently. The Reviewer
therefore considered that Australian thinking about future border sector integration,
particularly in the way questions of value and benefits are framed, can be helpful to NZ.
Official
Because of this cross-fertilisation, the  Australian NBTC Operating Model Overview
the
(November 2015) follows a logic that may be more transferable than expected to a BSGG-
led refresh of the New Zealand Strategy, as this Review recommends. Part nine of that
document explores the way that benefits of integration or partial integration of border
management functions and systems fall between the core Australian agency (DIPB/ACBPS)
under
and partners, although not identically or contemporaneously.
Drawing upon Australian sources, the Reviewer developed (see Part 2) a set of indicative
outcomes (benefits) for New Zealand border security to be delivered through a (refreshed)
strategy and sector work programme built around the future value propositions developed
during this Review.
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Document Outline