Non-Disclosure Agreement sent to former Director-General and other documents

Scott made this Official Information request to Government Communications Security Bureau

The request was successful.

From: Scott

Dear Government Communications Security Bureau,

I would like to make a request for the following documents related to the IGIS report "Inquiry into GCSB’s hosting of a foreign capability."

ONE: I would like to request copies of all communications, dated since 2020, between GCSB and the former GCSB Directors-General Bruce Ferguson, Simon Murdoch and Ian Fletcher relating to the matters covered in this IGIS report.

TWO: Former Director-General Ferguson told media that GCSB have recently been in contact with him regarding a "non-disclosure order:"

"He... said the GCSB asked him two weeks ago to sign a non-disclosure order, saying he wouldn't talk about the report. He says he refused to sign."

Source: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/512...

I would like to request copies of the records of all communications with Bruce Ferguson relating to this.

THREE: In paragraph 16 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2020, the Bureau alerted me to the existence of the capability and highlighted potential concerns about whether it had been operating unauthorised.”

I would like to a request a copy of the message sent to IGIS by GCSB alerting him to this capability's existence.

FOUR: In paragraph 29 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“A Powerpoint presentation prepared for the meeting detailed what the GCSB understood about the capability at the time, including its potential military applications. The presentation raised questions for the meeting about the legal and moral issues that might arise from hosting the system. It identified a need for a procedure for the GCSB to vet the tasking of the capability.”

I would like to a request a copy of this presentation.

FIVE: In paragraph 31 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2010 a senior GCSB officer signed an agreement in principle to host the capability. The letter noted the purposes of the capability, which included the potential use for military action. It recognised the value of the GCSB being involved. It highlighted that some operational scenarios would need careful handling to ensure compliance with New Zealand law, but the issues were not unmanageable.”

I would like to a request a copy of this "agreement in principle."

SIX: In paragraph 33 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“Late in 2011, the then Director-General, Simon Murdoch, noted in an email that GCSB legal would need to be closely involved in the matter and that it would potentially require the awareness or consent of the Minister, as well as consultation with the IGIS.”

I would like to a request a copy of this email.

SEVEN: In paragraph 78 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“The Bureau reported internally in February 2020 that the capability had been “rarely tasked - eight times in the past two years”.”

I would like to a request a copy of this internal report.

EIGHT: In paragraph 88 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“When asked about this in the course of the Inquiry, the GCSB noted: “GCSB is usually aware that [an overseas partner] is using data shared with it by way of [requests for changes to the capability’s settings]. In the unlikely but possible situation no […] change was required, GCSB would only be aware that the data could be used by [an overseas partner], not that it had been.””

I would like to a request a copy of the message from GCSB to the IGIS containing this statement.

NINE: In paragraph 95 of the IGIS report it is stated:

"Comments in emails suggest GCSB staff were under the impression they were meant to comply with requests from the overseas partner and not ask any questions. For example: "[…] we have no input whatsoever into the process as its all controlled from [overseas] […] [A staff member] has set up a separate data flow for the capability traffic so the process should be totally invisible to us.”

I would like to request a copy of the email containing this comment.

TEN: In paragraph 122 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“This inquiry found no record of any consideration, before or during the GCSB’s hosting of the capability, of how the supply of GCSB data to the system would relate to subsequent GCSB authorisations for relevant signals collection. The first substantive consideration of this was the GCSB’s Chief Legal Adviser’s briefing to the Director-General about the capability on 23 February 2021, after the system had ceased operating.”

I would like to request a copy of this briefing to the Director-General.

ELEVEN: I would like to request a copy of the first briefing to the responsible minister since the capability was “rediscovered” in 2020, that alerts the minister to this and advises the minister of the steps GCSB would be taking.

TWELVE: I would like to request copies of all talking points prepared for GCSB staff for dealing with inquiries related to this matter.

Yours faithfully,

Scott

Link to this

From: Information (GCSB)
Government Communications Security Bureau

Tçnâ koe,

Thank you for your Official Information Act request.

We will endeavour to respond to your request as soon as possible and, in any event, no later than 20 working days after the day that your request was received. If we are unable to respond to your request by then, we will notify you of an extension of that timeframe.

If you have any queries, please feel free to contact [GCSB request email].

Ngâ mihi,
GCSB

-----Original Message-----
From: Scott <[FOI #26200 email]>
Sent: Friday, 22 March 2024 12:48 PM
To: Information (GCSB) <[GCSB request email]>
Subject: Official Information request - Non-Disclosure Agreement sent to former Director-General and other documents

[You don't often get email from [FOI #26200 email]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentific... ]

Dear Government Communications Security Bureau,

I would like to make a request for the following documents related to the IGIS report "Inquiry into GCSB’s hosting of a foreign capability."

ONE: I would like to request copies of all communications, dated since 2020, between GCSB and the former GCSB Directors-General Bruce Ferguson, Simon Murdoch and Ian Fletcher relating to the matters covered in this IGIS report.

TWO: Former Director-General Ferguson told media that GCSB have recently been in contact with him regarding a "non-disclosure order:"

"He... said the GCSB asked him two weeks ago to sign a non-disclosure order, saying he wouldn't talk about the report. He says he refused to sign."

Source: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/512...

I would like to request copies of the records of all communications with Bruce Ferguson relating to this.

THREE: In paragraph 16 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2020, the Bureau alerted me to the existence of the capability and highlighted potential concerns about whether it had been operating unauthorised.”

I would like to a request a copy of the message sent to IGIS by GCSB alerting him to this capability's existence.

FOUR: In paragraph 29 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“A Powerpoint presentation prepared for the meeting detailed what the GCSB understood about the capability at the time, including its potential military applications. The presentation raised questions for the meeting about the legal and moral issues that might arise from hosting the system. It identified a need for a procedure for the GCSB to vet the tasking of the capability.”

I would like to a request a copy of this presentation.

FIVE: In paragraph 31 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2010 a senior GCSB officer signed an agreement in principle to host the capability. The letter noted the purposes of the capability, which included the potential use for military action. It recognised the value of the GCSB being involved. It highlighted that some operational scenarios would need careful handling to ensure compliance with New Zealand law, but the issues were not unmanageable.”

I would like to a request a copy of this "agreement in principle."

SIX: In paragraph 33 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“Late in 2011, the then Director-General, Simon Murdoch, noted in an email that GCSB legal would need to be closely involved in the matter and that it would potentially require the awareness or consent of the Minister, as well as consultation with the IGIS.”

I would like to a request a copy of this email.

SEVEN: In paragraph 78 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“The Bureau reported internally in February 2020 that the capability had been “rarely tasked - eight times in the past two years”.”

I would like to a request a copy of this internal report.

EIGHT: In paragraph 88 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“When asked about this in the course of the Inquiry, the GCSB noted: “GCSB is usually aware that [an overseas partner] is using data shared with it by way of [requests for changes to the capability’s settings]. In the unlikely but possible situation no […] change was required, GCSB would only be aware that the data could be used by [an overseas partner], not that it had been.””

I would like to a request a copy of the message from GCSB to the IGIS containing this statement.

NINE: In paragraph 95 of the IGIS report it is stated:

"Comments in emails suggest GCSB staff were under the impression they were meant to comply with requests from the overseas partner and not ask any questions. For example: "[…] we have no input whatsoever into the process as its all controlled from [overseas] […] [A staff member] has set up a separate data flow for the capability traffic so the process should be totally invisible to us.”

I would like to request a copy of the email containing this comment.

TEN: In paragraph 122 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“This inquiry found no record of any consideration, before or during the GCSB’s hosting of the capability, of how the supply of GCSB data to the system would relate to subsequent GCSB authorisations for relevant signals collection. The first substantive consideration of this was the GCSB’s Chief Legal Adviser’s briefing to the Director-General about the capability on 23 February 2021, after the system had ceased operating.”

I would like to request a copy of this briefing to the Director-General.

ELEVEN: I would like to request a copy of the first briefing to the responsible minister since the capability was “rediscovered” in 2020, that alerts the minister to this and advises the minister of the steps GCSB would be taking.

TWELVE: I would like to request copies of all talking points prepared for GCSB staff for dealing with inquiries related to this matter.

Yours faithfully,

Scott

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This is an Official Information request made via the FYI website.

Please use this email address for all replies to this request:
[FOI #26200 email]

Is [GCSB request email] the wrong address for Official Information requests to Government Communications Security Bureau? If so, please contact us using this form:
https://fyi.org.nz/change_request/new?bo...

Disclaimer: This message and any reply that you make will be published on the internet. Our privacy and copyright policies:
https://fyi.org.nz/help/officers

If you find this service useful as an Official Information officer, please ask your web manager to link to us from your organisation's OIA or LGOIMA page.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This electronic message, together with any attachments, contains information that is provided in confidence and may be subject to legal privilege.
Any classification markings must be adhered to. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not peruse, disclose, disseminate, copy or use the message in
any way. If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by return email and then destroy the original message.
The New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) and the departments comprising the NZIC accepts no responsibility for changes to this e-mail, or to any attachments, after its transmission
from NZIC. This communication may be accessed or retained for information assurance purposes. Thank you.

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Link to this

From: Scott

Dear GCSB,

Thank you for your acknowledgement of receipt.

I would like to further add, that for this request in terms of Section 16(2) of the OIA my preference is to receive copies of the documents I have requested, rather than excerpts or summaries.

Yours sincerely,

Scott

Link to this

Scott left an annotation ()

As I noted on my request yesterday:

A close reading of the IGIS report and leaked Snowden documents makes it clear that the foreign partner agency signals intelligence capability in question is an NSA capability called APPARITION and that its hardware was installed at GCSB's Waihopai Station.

APPARITION is a capability to "Find [the] position of isolated “VSAT” satellite users." APPARITION systems overseas have been used to locate high-value counter-terrorism targets in the Middle East for capture-kill missions. This would be what the IGIS meant when he said that the GCSB deployment of the capability had the potential to be used to support military operations.

The "capability’s predecessor" referenced in IGIS paragraph 37 is GHOSTHUNTER.

Sources:

http://static.stuff.co.nz/files/GCSBMarc... (this is apparently the very document referred to in paragraph 67 of the IGIS report: "...a GCSB presentation in March 2012 advised that installation was planned for June.")
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentclou...
https://theintercept.com/document/appari...
https://theintercept.com/document/appari...

Link to this

Scott left an annotation ()

This morning Nicky Hager and David Fisher published articles which in which they also deduce that the capability in question is APPARITION:

https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside...
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/e...

Link to this

From: Information (GCSB)
Government Communications Security Bureau

Tçnâ koe Scott,

We refer to your request of 22 March 2024 under the Official Information Act 1982, copied below.

The Official Information Act 1982 requires that we advise you of our decision on your request no later than 20 working days after the day that we received your request.

Unfortunately, it will not be possible to meet that time limit, as the consultations necessary for us to complete making a decision on your request are such that a proper response cannot reasonably be made within the original time limit.

We are therefore writing to notify you of an extension of the timeframe under section 15A(1)(b) of the OIA 1982, to 15 May 2024 at the latest.

Despite this extension, we will provide you with a response as soon as practicable.

You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman regarding our decision to extend the timeframe. Information about how to make a complaint is available at http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/ or by phoning 0800 802 602.

If you have any queries, or wish to discuss any aspect of your request with us (including this extension), please feel free to contact [GCSB request email].

Ngâ mihi,
GCSB

-----Original Message-----
From: Scott <[FOI #26200 email]>
Sent: Friday, 22 March 2024 12:48 PM
To: Information (GCSB) <[GCSB request email]>
Subject: Official Information request - Non-Disclosure Agreement sent to former Director-General and other documents

[You don't often get email from [FOI #26200 email]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentific... ]

Dear Government Communications Security Bureau,

I would like to make a request for the following documents related to the IGIS report "Inquiry into GCSB’s hosting of a foreign capability."

ONE: I would like to request copies of all communications, dated since 2020, between GCSB and the former GCSB Directors-General Bruce Ferguson, Simon Murdoch and Ian Fletcher relating to the matters covered in this IGIS report.

TWO: Former Director-General Ferguson told media that GCSB have recently been in contact with him regarding a "non-disclosure order:"

"He... said the GCSB asked him two weeks ago to sign a non-disclosure order, saying he wouldn't talk about the report. He says he refused to sign."

Source: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/512...

I would like to request copies of the records of all communications with Bruce Ferguson relating to this.

THREE: In paragraph 16 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2020, the Bureau alerted me to the existence of the capability and highlighted potential concerns about whether it had been operating unauthorised.”

I would like to a request a copy of the message sent to IGIS by GCSB alerting him to this capability's existence.

FOUR: In paragraph 29 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“A Powerpoint presentation prepared for the meeting detailed what the GCSB understood about the capability at the time, including its potential military applications. The presentation raised questions for the meeting about the legal and moral issues that might arise from hosting the system. It identified a need for a procedure for the GCSB to vet the tasking of the capability.”

I would like to a request a copy of this presentation.

FIVE: In paragraph 31 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2010 a senior GCSB officer signed an agreement in principle to host the capability. The letter noted the purposes of the capability, which included the potential use for military action. It recognised the value of the GCSB being involved. It highlighted that some operational scenarios would need careful handling to ensure compliance with New Zealand law, but the issues were not unmanageable.”

I would like to a request a copy of this "agreement in principle."

SIX: In paragraph 33 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“Late in 2011, the then Director-General, Simon Murdoch, noted in an email that GCSB legal would need to be closely involved in the matter and that it would potentially require the awareness or consent of the Minister, as well as consultation with the IGIS.”

I would like to a request a copy of this email.

SEVEN: In paragraph 78 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“The Bureau reported internally in February 2020 that the capability had been “rarely tasked - eight times in the past two years”.”

I would like to a request a copy of this internal report.

EIGHT: In paragraph 88 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“When asked about this in the course of the Inquiry, the GCSB noted: “GCSB is usually aware that [an overseas partner] is using data shared with it by way of [requests for changes to the capability’s settings]. In the unlikely but possible situation no […] change was required, GCSB would only be aware that the data could be used by [an overseas partner], not that it had been.””

I would like to a request a copy of the message from GCSB to the IGIS containing this statement.

NINE: In paragraph 95 of the IGIS report it is stated:

"Comments in emails suggest GCSB staff were under the impression they were meant to comply with requests from the overseas partner and not ask any questions. For example: "[…] we have no input whatsoever into the process as its all controlled from [overseas] […] [A staff member] has set up a separate data flow for the capability traffic so the process should be totally invisible to us.”

I would like to request a copy of the email containing this comment.

TEN: In paragraph 122 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“This inquiry found no record of any consideration, before or during the GCSB’s hosting of the capability, of how the supply of GCSB data to the system would relate to subsequent GCSB authorisations for relevant signals collection. The first substantive consideration of this was the GCSB’s Chief Legal Adviser’s briefing to the Director-General about the capability on 23 February 2021, after the system had ceased operating.”

I would like to request a copy of this briefing to the Director-General.

ELEVEN: I would like to request a copy of the first briefing to the responsible minister since the capability was “rediscovered” in 2020, that alerts the minister to this and advises the minister of the steps GCSB would be taking.

TWELVE: I would like to request copies of all talking points prepared for GCSB staff for dealing with inquiries related to this matter.

Yours faithfully,

Scott

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This is an Official Information request made via the FYI website.

Please use this email address for all replies to this request:
[FOI #26200 email]

Is [GCSB request email] the wrong address for Official Information requests to Government Communications Security Bureau? If so, please contact us using this form:
https://fyi.org.nz/change_request/new?bo...

Disclaimer: This message and any reply that you make will be published on the internet. Our privacy and copyright policies:
https://fyi.org.nz/help/officers

If you find this service useful as an Official Information officer, please ask your web manager to link to us from your organisation's OIA or LGOIMA page.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This electronic message, together with any attachments, contains information that is provided in confidence and may be subject to legal privilege.
Any classification markings must be adhered to. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not peruse, disclose, disseminate, copy or use the message in
any way. If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by return email and then destroy the original message.
The New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) and the departments comprising the NZIC accepts no responsibility for changes to this e-mail, or to any attachments, after its transmission
from NZIC. This communication may be accessed or retained for information assurance purposes. Thank you.

hide quoted sections

Link to this

From: Information (GCSB)
Government Communications Security Bureau


Attachment Scott response letter.pdf
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Attachment Scott release document.pdf
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Tçnâ koe Scott,

Please find attached the response to your request.

Ngâ mihi,
GCSB

-----Original Message-----
From: Information (GCSB) <[GCSB request email]>
Sent: Tuesday, 23 April 2024 12:42 PM
To: Scott <[FOI #26200 email]>
Subject: RE: Official Information request - Non-Disclosure Agreement sent to former Director-General and other documents

Tçnâ koe Scott,

We refer to your request of 22 March 2024 under the Official Information Act 1982, copied below.

The Official Information Act 1982 requires that we advise you of our decision on your request no later than 20 working days after the day that we received your request.

Unfortunately, it will not be possible to meet that time limit, as the consultations necessary for us to complete making a decision on your request are such that a proper response cannot reasonably be made within the original time limit.

We are therefore writing to notify you of an extension of the timeframe under section 15A(1)(b) of the OIA 1982, to 15 May 2024 at the latest.

Despite this extension, we will provide you with a response as soon as practicable.

You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman regarding our decision to extend the timeframe. Information about how to make a complaint is available at http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/ or by phoning 0800 802 602.

If you have any queries, or wish to discuss any aspect of your request with us (including this extension), please feel free to contact [GCSB request email].

Ngâ mihi,
GCSB

-----Original Message-----
From: Scott <[FOI #26200 email]>
Sent: Friday, 22 March 2024 12:48 PM
To: Information (GCSB) <[GCSB request email]>
Subject: Official Information request - Non-Disclosure Agreement sent to former Director-General and other documents

[You don't often get email from [FOI #26200 email]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentific... ]

Dear Government Communications Security Bureau,

I would like to make a request for the following documents related to the IGIS report "Inquiry into GCSB’s hosting of a foreign capability."

ONE: I would like to request copies of all communications, dated since 2020, between GCSB and the former GCSB Directors-General Bruce Ferguson, Simon Murdoch and Ian Fletcher relating to the matters covered in this IGIS report.

TWO: Former Director-General Ferguson told media that GCSB have recently been in contact with him regarding a "non-disclosure order:"

"He... said the GCSB asked him two weeks ago to sign a non-disclosure order, saying he wouldn't talk about the report. He says he refused to sign."

Source: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/512...

I would like to request copies of the records of all communications with Bruce Ferguson relating to this.

THREE: In paragraph 16 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2020, the Bureau alerted me to the existence of the capability and highlighted potential concerns about whether it had been operating unauthorised.”

I would like to a request a copy of the message sent to IGIS by GCSB alerting him to this capability's existence.

FOUR: In paragraph 29 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“A Powerpoint presentation prepared for the meeting detailed what the GCSB understood about the capability at the time, including its potential military applications. The presentation raised questions for the meeting about the legal and moral issues that might arise from hosting the system. It identified a need for a procedure for the GCSB to vet the tasking of the capability.”

I would like to a request a copy of this presentation.

FIVE: In paragraph 31 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“In late 2010 a senior GCSB officer signed an agreement in principle to host the capability. The letter noted the purposes of the capability, which included the potential use for military action. It recognised the value of the GCSB being involved. It highlighted that some operational scenarios would need careful handling to ensure compliance with New Zealand law, but the issues were not unmanageable.”

I would like to a request a copy of this "agreement in principle."

SIX: In paragraph 33 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“Late in 2011, the then Director-General, Simon Murdoch, noted in an email that GCSB legal would need to be closely involved in the matter and that it would potentially require the awareness or consent of the Minister, as well as consultation with the IGIS.”

I would like to a request a copy of this email.

SEVEN: In paragraph 78 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“The Bureau reported internally in February 2020 that the capability had been “rarely tasked - eight times in the past two years”.”

I would like to a request a copy of this internal report.

EIGHT: In paragraph 88 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“When asked about this in the course of the Inquiry, the GCSB noted: “GCSB is usually aware that [an overseas partner] is using data shared with it by way of [requests for changes to the capability’s settings]. In the unlikely but possible situation no […] change was required, GCSB would only be aware that the data could be used by [an overseas partner], not that it had been.””

I would like to a request a copy of the message from GCSB to the IGIS containing this statement.

NINE: In paragraph 95 of the IGIS report it is stated:

"Comments in emails suggest GCSB staff were under the impression they were meant to comply with requests from the overseas partner and not ask any questions. For example: "[…] we have no input whatsoever into the process as its all controlled from [overseas] […] [A staff member] has set up a separate data flow for the capability traffic so the process should be totally invisible to us.”

I would like to request a copy of the email containing this comment.

TEN: In paragraph 122 of the IGIS report it is stated:

“This inquiry found no record of any consideration, before or during the GCSB’s hosting of the capability, of how the supply of GCSB data to the system would relate to subsequent GCSB authorisations for relevant signals collection. The first substantive consideration of this was the GCSB’s Chief Legal Adviser’s briefing to the Director-General about the capability on 23 February 2021, after the system had ceased operating.”

I would like to request a copy of this briefing to the Director-General.

ELEVEN: I would like to request a copy of the first briefing to the responsible minister since the capability was “rediscovered” in 2020, that alerts the minister to this and advises the minister of the steps GCSB would be taking.

TWELVE: I would like to request copies of all talking points prepared for GCSB staff for dealing with inquiries related to this matter.

Yours faithfully,

Scott

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This is an Official Information request made via the FYI website.

Please use this email address for all replies to this request:
[FOI #26200 email]

Is [GCSB request email] the wrong address for Official Information requests to Government Communications Security Bureau? If so, please contact us using this form:
https://fyi.org.nz/change_request/new?bo...

Disclaimer: This message and any reply that you make will be published on the internet. Our privacy and copyright policies:
https://fyi.org.nz/help/officers

If you find this service useful as an Official Information officer, please ask your web manager to link to us from your organisation's OIA or LGOIMA page.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This electronic message, together with any attachments, contains information that is provided in confidence and may be subject to legal privilege.
Any classification markings must be adhered to. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not peruse, disclose, disseminate, copy or use the message in
any way. If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by return email and then destroy the original message.
The New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) and the departments comprising the NZIC accepts no responsibility for changes to this e-mail, or to any attachments, after its transmission
from NZIC. This communication may be accessed or retained for information assurance purposes. Thank you.

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