

29 May 2026

Agnes Fecher
fyi-request-33336-2446b1e7@requests.fyi.org.nz

Tēnā koe Agnes

Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) request dated 19 December 2025, in which you requested:

Following public reporting on the Bondi Junction attack in Sydney, and broader concerns about ideologically motivated violence, I am seeking information held by your agency relating to assessments of extremist ideologies that may pose a public safety risk in New Zealand.

This request is made in the public interest, to assist affected communities, including NZ's Jewish community, to better understand the nature and scale of risks identified by government agencies, and to support informed community safety planning and engagement with public institutions

Specifically, I request:

- Any reports, assessments, briefings, or analytical material held by Police that discuss the presence, prevalence, or risk of extremist ideologies in New Zealand comparable to those publicly attributed to the Bondi Junction attacker, insofar as those views are characterised in official reporting as violent, extremist, or posing a threat to public safety.

- Any high-level estimates, trend analyses, or qualitative assessments (whether quantitative or descriptive) held by Police regarding the number or proportion of individuals in New Zealand assessed as holding such views, where such information already exists.

Any definitions, frameworks, or criteria used by Police to categorise or assess such ideologies for policy, regulatory, or public-safety purposes.

Any inter-agency communications, briefings, or advice to Ministers prepared by Police following the Bondi Junction incident that reference implications, parallels, or relevance to New Zealand.

I am not seeking the identification of any individuals, nor am I requesting that Police create new data, estimates, or analysis. This request is limited strictly to information already held by the Agency.

If any part of this request is refused, I ask that all reasonably separable and releasable information be provided, and that any withheld material clearly identify the relevant withholding grounds under the Act.

You clarified, in an email dated 13 January 2026, that your request was “regarding the recent Bondi Beach attack.”

Thank you for your patience while the material was being prepared for you.

The following documents were found to be in scope of your request (see attached document bundle).

Table 1: Document titles and withholding grounds under the OIA

Document Title	OIA withholding section
NSG Quarterly Report 2025 Q3	6(c)
NIC-IR-20240124-Intelligence Report - Extremism and VE – Organisation Groups and Networks in New Zealand	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)
Memo – Guidelines for assessment of extremism	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-IN-251009-Current Threat Environment Specific to the Jewish Community	6(c), 9(2)(ba), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-IN-250228-Risk and Threat Commentary Jewish Interests in New Zealand	6(c), 9(2)(ba), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-IN-241213-Domestic implications of antisemitic attacks in Australia	6(c), 9(2)(ba), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-in-240806 The Changing Global Threatscape: Implications for New Zealand Police	6(c) and 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-20251215-INTSUM-Op BONDI 1500	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-251219-INTSUM-0800HRS Op BONDI	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(g)(ii), 9(2)(a)
NIC-251218-INTSUM-Op BONDI 0800hrs	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(g)(ii), 9(2)(a)
NIC-251217-INTSUM-Op BONDI 0800hrs	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-251217-INTSUM-Op BONDI 1500HRS	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(g)(ii) 9(2)(a)
NIC-251216-INTSUM-Op BONDI 1500hrs	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NSG Quarterly Report 2025 Q4	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)
NIC-251216-INTSUM-Op BONDI 0800hrs	6(c), 6(b), 9(2)(g)(ii)
Intelligence Report Violent Extremist Ideologies and Causes in New Zealand 14 September 2023	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)
2311 Case Categories November 2023	6(c), 9(2)(g)(ii)

The OIA withholding reasons (sections referred in table 1) are as follows:

- 6(b) to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand by the Government of any other country or any agency of such a government or any international organisations;
- 6(c) as making this information available would be likely to prejudice the maintenance of the law;
- 9(2)(a) to protect the privacy of natural persons;
- 9(2)(ba) to protect information which is subject to an obligation of confidence or where the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the

- supply of similar information, or information from the same source and it is in the public interest that such information should continue to be supplied,
9(2)(g)(ii) to protect employees from improper pressure or harassment

Police considers the interests requiring protection by withholding the information are not outweighed by any public interest in release of the information.


Consistent with Police vision (to be the safest country), purpose (to ensure everyone is safe and feels safe) and mission (to prevent crime and harm), we take every opportunity to prevent harm. The national security space is one of the eight functions where threats to harm others, create fear and intimidation, or undermine the legitimacy of our democracy can have devastating consequences and erode the fabric of our society. As part of the New Zealand Counter Terrorism Strategy, Police are a vital part of the All-of-Government effort to detect and prevent terrorism, in all its forms.

Police aim is to detect, understand, and prevent extremist activity that may ultimately contribute to, or result in, a terrorist act within New Zealand. The underpinning justification for Police to conduct this activity is the prevention of a terrorist act under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (TSA). A terrorist act is one that is intended to cause serious harm or damage in order to advance a political, ideological or religious cause with the intention of inducing terror in the populations or compelling a government or international organisation.

This means some reports relating to how Police identify and manage national security issues are withheld in full as they relate to specific individuals, data reporting, and reporting requirements. The reports would also disclose details of Police's intelligence gathering techniques and thematic analysis of cases and how Police address national security concerns. These reports are intended to inform leaders on the current state of case management and to identify opportunities to improve practice. They were not intended for wider publication.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to review my decision if you are not satisfied with the response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz.

Nāku noa, nā




John O'Reilly
Director (Acting): National Intelligence Centre
Police National Headquarters

Discussion



NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa



New Zealand Police

National Security Group Quarterly Report

Quarter Three 2025 (01 Jul – 30 Sep)



HOW TO USE THIS REPORT

The information in this report reflects our best current understanding of cases and issues, which may change based on new information and reassessment as appropriate.

This report is classified ~~RESTRICTED~~. It **must not** be shared outside of New Zealand Police without the written approval of the Director: National Security Group. It can be shared amongst Police staff at the discretion of the principal recipients.

Classification Key: (U) = Unclassified, (IC) = ~~Internal Confidentiality~~, (R) = ~~Restricted~~.

Commentary


(U) This report summarises key developments in terrorism, violent extremism, and foreign interference relevant to Police.

(U) Multiple developments in the third quarter raised public awareness and concerns about the threat environment, building on issues such as international conflicts and tensions, reported threats, and coronial and other processes.

(U) The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) released its third annual report on the Security Threat Environment in August. Director-General of Security Andrew Hampton commented that the security environment was “one of the most challenging I’ve seen in my nine-and-a-half years in the intelligence community. Our threat environment is deteriorating and that has a direct impact on our safety and security”. The report set out six key assessments:

- The most plausible violent extremist attack scenario is a lone actor, radicalised online, and prepares without intelligence forewarning, most likely using easily accessible weapons.
- Greivance and polarising issues online are almost certainly driving support for a range of violent extremist ideologies. No one ideology stands out as presenting a greater threat.
- Young and vulnerable people are particularly at risk of radicalisation, especially while online.
- Foreign interference by several states continues, including transnational repression.
- Undetected espionage is almost certainly occurring and harming national interests.
- Foreign states have attempted to exploit staff in public and private organisations.

s 6(b) OIA



(U) In September Police and partner agencies

launched an awareness campaign for crowded places. The Crowded Places Strategy was established in 2020, and supports owners and operators of crowded places to improve safety and security. The awareness campaign also promoted messaging around what to do in an attack.



Source: NZ Police Crowded Places Strategy

(U) High profile incidents raise awareness, prompt community concerns, and can inspire further attacks. A key incident in this period was the assassination of US political activist Charlie Kirk on 10 September. The shooting reflected increasing political violence and polarisation in the United States. It attracted significant international attention and was immediately incorporated into violent extremist discourse and propaganda.

(U) On 26 August Desmond Freeman shot and killed two Victorian Police officers. A third officer was shot and injured. Freeman remains at large. New Zealand Police has assisted in the operation to locate him. Together with the death of two Police officers at Wiembilla in 2022, the incident has raised concerns about staff safety in rural areas and the risk posed by the sovereign citizen movement in Australia and New Zealand.

(U) Developments in long running cases, including the conviction of a serving soldier for attempted espionage and the arrest of individuals in Australia linked to the case of New Zealand hostage Philip Mehrstens featured in media reporting.

Threatscape

(R) The Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) assess that a terrorist attack is a realistic possibility (25-50% chance of occurring).

(R) The most likely attack scenario involves a lone actor or small group not known to agencies, with basic but effective capability. s 6(c) OIA

[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]

(R) Conflict in the Middle East continues to influence the security, protest, and activism environments. While Police have not sighted credible domestic threats to Jewish communities, antisemitic online commentary, pro-Palestine mail sent to Jewish individuals, graffiti and other incidents have occurred. s 9 (2)(ba) OIA

[Redacted]

(R) Domestic white identity extremist (WIE) networks have grown online and are influenced by the Australian National Socialist Network (NSN). The NSN is a neo-Nazi movement led by Thomas

Sewell, an Australian-New Zealand dual citizen.

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA

Significant Incidents

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA


s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

(R) A New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) soldier was convicted of attempted espionage and other offences in August and was sentenced to two years in military detention. s 6(c) OIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. This is the first espionage conviction in New Zealand. It also highlights the issues posed by extremists in the military and other agencies.



Source: RNZ 20 August 2025

s 6(c) OIA

[REDACTED]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

Foreign Interference

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

(U) The Foreign Interference Bill has been delayed and continues to progress through the parliamentary process. It is now expected to pass into law in the next quarter.

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

(R) National Security Group (NSG) staff continue to engage with partner agencies on foreign interference issues. NSG staff also continue to work to raise internal awareness of foreign interference risks.

Quarterly Developments

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

(U) In July Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Kash Patel announced the establishment of a legal attaché position in New Zealand. This upgraded the previous assistant legal attaché post that was under the remit of the FBI's Canberra

office. This reflects the development of law enforcement relationships between the United States, New Zealand, and other Pacific partners, and the need to collaborate to disrupt current and emerging threats in the region.



Source: RNZ 31 July 2025

Stakeholder and Partner Engagement

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

(R) NSG represents Police in a range of national security system standing and ad hoc engagements on an ongoing basis.

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block] the Ministry of Justice consideration of targeted reform of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.

Training & Development

(U) NSG staff delivered a range of presentations and other training in this quarter to raise awareness and capability, including sessions with:

- Canterbury and Eastern district staff.
- Youth Aid Service Qualification course.
- NZDF Information Warfare Course.
- Recruit Wing 387.
- Central Special Tactics Group.
- Wellington Police Negotiation Team.
- Te Raranga Reference Group.
- Briefings for staff as part of pre-deployment training and preparation.

Person of Interest Operating Framework

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

S 6(c) OIA



NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
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Intelligence Report

Extremist and Violent Extremist
Organisations, Groups, and
Networks in New Zealand

24/01/2024

Key Findings

- ▶ There are currently no identified active groups or organisations carrying out or planning acts of violent extremism in New Zealand.
- ▶ Possible reasons for this include an absence of charismatic leaders, the influence of the online environment, and an increasing risk of being investigated by security agencies or targeted by others with different views.
- ▶ Acceptance of extreme beliefs among peers creates an enabling and supportive environment that can allow extremists to accept the use of violence in support of their ideology. Since the COVID-19 pandemic and associated government response, extreme views appear to have become more commonplace in the domestic environment.
- ▶ An apparent increase in individuals adhering to a violent extremist ideology and the ease of sharing ideas has created an environment that could enable the formation of violent extremist groups or organisations in the right circumstances.
- ▶ Current extremist organisations and groups in New Zealand with an extremist ideological foundation include **s 6(c) OIA**. There is a large degree of fluidity in the extremist environment where unorganised networks exist and could quickly and easily form an organisation or group.
- ▶ Much of the domestic extremist engagement is online, rather than in person. Network sizes tend to vary between a few hundred up to few thousand and typically host a range of extremist ideologies, most prominently anti-government, anti-authority, and white identity ideologies. These networks range from being loose and passive such as primarily consuming content posted online by a few individuals to more active such as those taking real-world action such as protest gatherings and posting hostile messages targeting individuals.
- ▶ New Zealand-based individuals are known to participate in online violent extremist networks; however, **s 6(c) OIA**.

Introduction

Background

1. The current VE environment appears to consist primarily of lone actors; however, it appears that there is the presence of a small number of extremist organisations and groups that are active in NZ, some of which have been active for several years. **s 6(c) OIA**

[REDACTED]

Methodology

2. **s 6(c) OIA**
3. **s 6(c) OIA**
4. Structure Analytical Techniques including Key Assumptions Check, Inference Development Model, and Structured Brainstorms were used to inform this product.
5. Several NZP intelligence workgroups were consulted during the development of elements of this product, including NSG, District Intelligence Units and National Intelligence Centre workgroups, as well as a range of external partners including the Combined Threats Assessment Group.

Definitions

The following terms^{1 2} are defined broadly as follows for the purpose of this product:

- **Extremism:** An intense version of a belief that typically supports or promotes hostile, but not violent, action against a particular group of people.
- **Violent extremism (VE):** An intense version of a belief that typically supports or promotes hostile, violent action against a particular group of people.
- **Organisations:** formal entities comprising of multiple individuals, with a recognisable hierarchy or structure, acting towards a collective goal.
- **Groups:** informal collections of individuals with little or no recognisable hierarchy or structure, acting broadly towards a collective goal or movement.
- **Online networks:** individuals connected solely through the online environment. These networks are wide ranging and have varying levels of activity from being largely to passive to having frequent activity. Passive channels tend to make up the majority of these online networks.

¹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (June 2021). *New Zealand's Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy*. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

² Combined Threat Assessment Centre. (November 2021). *CTAG Glossary – 2021 Update*. 21-151-TI.

Purpose

6. The purpose of this product is to provide an initial overview of the relationship between extremism and violent extremism (VE) and explore the presence of any active domestic VE or extremist organisations, groups, or networks. Due to their disparate nature, movements are not considered.
7. This product also provides insight on how identified organisations and groups may continue to develop over time.
8. This product forms part of a suite of strategic intelligence reporting to inform decision makers regarding the domestic national security threat landscape (threatscape).

Analysis

The relationship between extremism and violent extremism

9. **An increase in extremist rhetoric is likely to result in an increase in the likelihood of individuals adhering to VE.** Acceptance of extreme beliefs among peers creates an enabling and supportive environment that can allow extremists to accept the use of violence in support of their ideology. This was seen to a degree during the recent COVID-19 pandemic when extremist language and beliefs became more mainstream and accepted. This shift in the environment *almost certainly* created an enabling environment which influenced the observed increase of Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE) sighted during this period. The pandemic was a significant and deeply impactful event with long term implications and demonstrated the fluidity that exists between the extremist and VE threatscape.
10. Extremist and VE rhetoric continues to be present in the domestic environment which has created an environment that could see the formation of VE groups or organisations, given the right conditions. However, terrorism and VE acts remain rare, and a key aspect of modern lone actor extremism is that there are often many talking but very few acting.

Violent Extremism

Organisations and groups

11. There are currently no identified active groups or organisations carrying out or planning acts of violent extremism in New Zealand. However the possibility of unknown VE organisations and groups existing cannot be discounted. The VE environment is complex and highly dynamic meaning a group or organisation could be formed quickly, dependent on a range of domestic and offshore ideologies, grievances, and events that may be influencing the environment as well as the possibility of an offshore group embedding themselves in NZ.

The Absence of VE Organisations and Groups in NZ

12. **It is likely there is an absence of charismatic leaders that have the capability to form and maintain groups or organisations, that also have an intention to use violence.** An effective leader of a VE group or organisation must be able to maintain a collective belief system, establish and maintain organisational routines, control the flow of communication, manipulate incentives for followers and maintain morale. ³ s 6(c) OIA

[REDACTED]

13. **It is likely the online environment has decreased the need and want for in-person organisations and groups.** The online environment has significantly altered the way people communicate and access information, removing geographical barriers that existed prior. This has allowed for communities and networks to be established that exist solely online with memberships and engagement from individuals across the globe. The establishment of online VE and extremist networks that connect and unify likeminded individuals has *likely* decreased the appetite for in-person or more established organisations and groups. Furthermore, individuals who are seeking community and sense of belonging who may have previously wanted to seek out VE groups or organisations can now find this online. s 6(c) OIA

[REDACTED]

³ Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nexus to Violent Extremism

22. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Extremist Groups

24. There are currently s 6(c) OIA [Redacted] No other groups have been identified that adhere to extremist ideologies and that are collectively moving towards a common goal. However, there are a range of other groups that are of note, s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

25. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

⁶ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

¹⁰ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

¹¹ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

[REDACTED] s 6(c)

26. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

27. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
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s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Barton, C. (2005, February 12). *Destiny's Children on a Mission*. Retrieved 31 October 2023, from NZ Herald: nzherald.co.nz

s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁶ Ibid.

s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁵ Ibid.

s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

Other Groups of Interest

33. Several other groups of interest have been identified that do not currently meet the criteria for extremist organisations or groups. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

▶ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

▶ [Redacted]

▶ [Redacted]

▶ [Redacted]

Online Networks

34. There are a number of known individuals in New Zealand who are involved in a range of extremist online networks. Examples are detailed below:

▶ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

▶ [Redacted]

▶ [Redacted]

35. While they frequently use Telegram, these networks are spread across multiple platforms. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

²¹ s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

²² s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA

Outlook

Violent extremism

37. The VE environment is complex and dynamic. It could change and adapt very quickly dependent on a range of domestic and international factors. It is *possible* there could be the formation of a domestic VE group or organisation if one or more of the following factors were present in the domestic VE environment:
- a charismatic, organised, and influential VE individual that had genuine intentions to form a VE organisation or group or who has intentions of radicalising an already existing extremist group or organisation
 - an event or series of events that creates a focal point for a range of extremists and VE individuals
 - significant and rapid breakdown in social cohesion and increase in political polarisation
38. It is *likely* New Zealand-based individuals will continue to engage and participate in internationally based VE online networks in the near term. The online environment will *almost certainly* remain a key enabler of the spread of violent extremism in New Zealand. It is *likely* engagement will remain dynamic and dependent on a range of domestic and international events, ideologies, and grievances.

Extremism

39. The extremism environment varies dependent on a range of factors. It is *likely* there will continue to be changes in the status of current organisations, groups, and networks including splintering, dissolution, and evolution. It is *possible* there will be the establishment of new organisations and groups in NZ *likely* dependent on, but not limited to, the below factors:
- increase in political polarisation
 - the introduction of a controversial policy or legislation
 - decrease or fracturing in social cohesion
 - an unprecedented and/or mass impact event that creates a focal point for a range of extremist individuals.
40. There will *almost certainly* continue to be a range of extremist online networks that exist domestically, which will *almost certainly* fluctuate dependent on the domestic and international climate. It is *likely* extremist online networks will continue to be a key facilitator and enabler of extremist content being disseminated across the country.

Considerations

41. s 6(c) OIA

42. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]
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All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as **RESTRICTED** if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

METHOD	RULES
Electronic transmission	ALL ██████████ information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use ██████████
Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>██████████ mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>In an office environment, ██████████ material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet.</p> <p>In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e. Blue Bins)</p>
More information	https://tenone.police.govt.nz/pi/information-classification-and-protection

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	The event will occur in most circumstances	>95%
LIKELY	The event will probably occur in most circumstances	>65%
POSSIBLE	The event might occur some of the time	>35%
UNLIKELY	The event could occur in some circumstances	<35%
RARE	The event has remote chance of occurring	<5%

Acknowledgements

Several Police intelligence workgroups were consulted on various elements during the development of this product, including the National Security Group and the Open-Source Intelligence Group, as well as a range of external partners including the Combined Threats Assessment Group (CTAG).

Disclaimer

The interpretations and conclusions drawn in this report are made on the balance of probability on information available at the time of preparation. The information contained herein is not evidence and is intended to provide a basis for further investigation only.

Document Production


	Originator	Reviewed by	Released by
Name	██████████	s 6(2)(g)(ii) OIA ██████████	██████████
Role	Senior Intelligence Analyst	Intelligence Supervisor Principal Intelligence Analyst	Manager – Security Intelligence
Extension	41332		
Date	24/01/2024	21/09/2023	24/01/2024


Distribution List

For Action

National Security Group
Security Intelligence and Threats Group

For Information





Memo



Title	Guidelines for Assessing Extremism
From	s 6(2)(g)(ii) OIA
To	
Date	7/03/2025
Subject	Details of guidelines for assessment of extremism

Purpose

1. This document provides details for a draft set of guidelines for objectively assessing whether an activity, narrative, network, or individual is extreme.

Background

2. *Securing Safer Protests* is a 2024 tasking for Security Intelligence and Threats Group (SITG) to examine how the National Intelligence Centre (NIC) manages scanning and collection of protest activity generally, and the question of extremist participation in otherwise lawful protest. Interrogation of this question identified a number of issues, and has resulted in a broadening of the tasking to encapsulate the respective roles of Analytics and Intelligence Operations (AIO), SITG, and National Security Group (NSG).
3. In March and June 2024 memos to you outlined the extent of the issue and provided a series of recommendations for action. One such action was to draft an assessment framework by which SITG can contribute to the overall national security system, primarily by better defining and delineating types of extremism. In NIC-IN-240710 I outlined a set of draft guidelines that would allow such delineation.
4. Since 2019, SITG has performed a key role in defining current and growing types of extremism. This sometimes involves providing subject matter expertise (SME) support to NSG and other units, and often involved providing strategic notification and warnings.
5. This role is important, because there are a number of individuals, groups, and ideas that represent a type of 'lawful extremism' that necessitates observation, but does not necessitate immediate or direct Police intervention. Who has responsibility for this cluster of ideas, groups, and persons has to date been uncertain, which creates the risk of 'strategic surprise' should events conspire to accelerate any extremism towards mobilisation and/or violence. By having SITG keeping a watching brief on different extremisms as part of regular scanning processes, Police is positioning itself to uncover and avoid 'unknown unknowns', while allowing NSG to concentrate on management of known persons of interest (POI).
6. The question of what happens to ideas, groups, and individuals objectively assessed and labelled as 'extreme' s 6(c) OIA. This encapsulates groups or individuals appear extreme, but cannot be linked to any offending or violent intent, and are usually not be taken up as cases by NSG. s 6(c) OIA. This

activity by SITG would support the unit's responsibility to maintain a strategic oversight of the national security landscape.

Current Situation

7. In July 2024 a set of draft guidelines was provided to you. These guidelines were split into two types: the first determines that a person or group represents possible violent extremism and should be immediately referred to the Counter-Terrorism Leads team. The second was a set to be used by SITG to objectively assess whether it is appropriate to apply the label 'extremism' to a person, group/network, or narrative.
8. These guidelines were provided to you in summary, and are expanded below to allow discussion and consultation.

Guidelines for referral to CT Leads team

s 6(c) OIA

Guidelines for identification and labelling of extremism

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

Next Steps

s 6(c) OIA

Handling Instructions

This document is classified ~~IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~IN CONFIDENCE~~

All ~~IN CONFIDENCE~~ reporting and information (including data) should be dated and clearly identify the originating Government agency.

Method	Rules
Electronic transmission	IN CONFIDENCE information can be transmitted across external or public networks but the level of information contained should be assessed before using clear text. Username/Password access control and/or encryption may be advisable (with the aim of maintaining confidence in public agencies).
Manual transmission	May be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms as well as mail delivery staff in a single closed envelope. The envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases involving privacy concerns, identifying the originating department may be inappropriate and a return PO Box alone should be used.
Storage and disposal	IN CONFIDENCE information can be secured using the normal building security and door-swipe card systems that aim to keep the public out of administrative areas of government departments. Must be disposed of by departmental arrangements. Electronic files must be protected against illicit internal use or intrusion through two or more of the mechanisms recommended in the official guidelines.




NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Intelligence Notification

Current Threat Environment Specific to the
Jewish Community in NZ

9 October 2025



Key Findings

1. Police have not seen any specific or credible threats of violent extremism towards the Jewish community in New Zealand.
2. The threat environment specific to the domestic Jewish community has remained stable since October 2023. While Police observed an increase in reported threats following the October 7 Hamas attacks and subsequent Israeli military action, the total number of these reports made to Police each year is not reflective of an increasing threat environment.
3. The most common activities reported by the Jewish Community include negative online sentiment, antisemitic mail, protest activity, and wilful damage.
4. It is **highly likely** social media and mainstream reporting on conflicts involving Israel, and international antisemitic incidents, creates a heightened sense of fear within the NZ Jewish community. It is also **likely** actions or statements conducted by the state of Israel are misconstrued as being representative of the Jewish community as a whole.
5. It is **likely** anti-Israel or pro-Palestine actions and sentiment will be perceived as antisemitic by the Jewish Community.
6. Ongoing political decisions by the NZ Government in relation to Israel and Gaza are **likely** to temporarily influence the frequency of protest activity in NZ.

Purpose

7. This Intelligence Notification was prepared to inform Police about the current threat environment regarding the Jewish community in NZ.

Current Environment

Organisational Observations

8. Police have not seen any specific or credible threats of violent extremism towards the Jewish community in New Zealand but continue to monitor the situation closely and engage with representatives of the Jewish community.
9. OSIG have not observed any changes in the online environment regarding **credible threats** towards the Jewish community or locations of significance. They continue to observe antisemitic rhetoric and have noted the on-going presence of pro-Palestine actors.¹
10. DPS have not observed any changes in the environment regarding threats towards the Israeli Embassy. There continues to be protest activity observed at the locations, **s 6(c) OIA** [REDACTED]
11. **s 6(c) OIA** [REDACTED]
12. **s 6(c) OIA** have assessed Israel-Palestine protest activity in NZ is largely lawful and peaceful. However, recent incidents of spontaneous physical violence at Israel/Palestine events in multiple locations across NZ were reported.⁴ The majority of incidents of physical violence were recorded at events organised by Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA). Incidents broadly relate to minor

¹ **s 6(c) OIA** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁴ National Intelligence Centre. Israel-Palestine Protest Environment in New Zealand. 3 September 2025. [REDACTED]

altercations between Pro-Palestine and Pro-Israel individuals, consisting of verbal abuse and pushing which has required Police attendance.⁵ [redacted] assess the escalation to physical violence occurring across the Israel/Palestine protest environment is spontaneous in nature and is *likely* the result of ideological and/or individual differences.⁶

§ 6(c) OIA [redacted]

13. § 6(c) OIA [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

§ 6(c) OIA [redacted]

14. § 6(c) OIA [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

15. In 2023, the overwhelming majority of the incidents were reported between October and December. It is *almost certain* this is due to the October 7 Hamas attacks.⁷

16. § 6(c) OIA [redacted]
[redacted] Of the reported incidents, negative online sentiment, antisemitic mail and a variety of protest activity appears to be most commonly reported. Since 2021, vandalism or graffiti has increased at locations of significance to the Jewish community (see Appendix Two), as well as at private residences.

17. In 2024, § 6(c) OIA [redacted], one towards an individual holding an Israeli flag, and a Jewish person was assaulted after refusing to remove a religious hat (likely referring to a *Yamika*).

Influences on the Threat Environment

18. **At current, the threat environment specific towards the Jewish community is stable, with no observable change noted.** There are, however, factors that may affect the perception of unsafety within the community.

19. It is *highly likely* social media and mainstream reporting on conflicts involving Israel, and international antisemitic incidents, creates a heightened sense of fear within the NZ Jewish community.

20. The United Nations (UN) released an independent international Commission of Inquiry (COI) stating Israel is responsible for the commission of genocide in Gaza, and four out of five acts defined under international law as genocide have been carried out.⁸ It is *a realistic possibility* the continuation of Israel's ground incursion into Gaza, despite international and UN condemnation, will influence anti-Israel activity in New Zealand, which is *likely* to be perceived as antisemitic by the Jewish Community.

⁵ [redacted]
⁶ National Intelligence Centre. *Physical Violence in the Israel/Palestine Protest Environment*. 7 August 2025. [redacted]
⁷ National Intelligence Centre. *Domestic implications of antisemitic attacks in Australia*. 13 December 2024. [redacted]
⁸ Human Rights Council. *Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. 16 September 2025. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds>

21. It is **likely** actions conducted by the state of Israel will be misconstrued as a representation of the Jewish Community as a whole. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Police have received previous reporting of anti-Israel sentiment directed at members of the Jewish community, regardless of their stance on the Israeli Government's actions.
22. On 2 October 2025, the Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF)¹⁰ travelling to Gaza was intercepted by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) after being warned to avoid the active combat zone and turn around. Three NZ citizens travelling with the flotilla were detained by the IDF and are reportedly being held in Israel until the conclusion of 'Yom Kippur' – the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) have been in 'proactive contact' with the NZ Embassy in Turkey regarding the expectations for treatment of the 3 individuals, and the provision of consular services.¹¹ Social media posts on multiple domestic pro-Palestine pages are calling for the Government and MFAT to demand their release.¹²
23. Following antisemitic attacks on synagogues and Jewish businesses in Australia, NZ Police noted temporary increases in reports of concern from the Jewish community and the public.¹³ On 2 October 2025, a 35-year-old male individual conducted a knife attack outside a local synagogue in Manchester, England. The attacker drove into the crowd before attacking people with a knife, killing one person (another individual was accidentally shot and killed by responding officers), and seriously injuring three others. Video footage of the incident showed Police response, fatally shooting the attacker after fears the individual had been wearing a vest with an explosive device.¹⁴ The attack occurred on 'Yom Kippur', and has been declared a terrorist attack by the Metropolitan Police. NZ Police have not seen any specific or credible threats to the NZ Jewish Community following the attack, however, arranged reassurance patrols for sites relating to the Jewish and Muslim communities until 7 October 2025. CTAG have assessed the incident and stated they are not aware of any New Zealand-based violent extremist reactions in response to the stabbing.¹⁵ **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
24. Ongoing political decisions by international governments and the NZ Government are **likely** to temporarily influence the protest environment in NZ. In a recent statement at the United Nations (UN) conference, the NZ Government has decided not to recognise Palestinian statehood.¹⁶ Mainstream media reporting has indicated public disagreement with the NZ Government's decision. It is **likely** tensions within the protest and activism space will be observed following the decision, and protest activity will increase temporarily before returning to baseline levels.¹⁷
25. It is **likely** anti-Israel or pro-Palestine demonstrations, and sentiment will be perceived as antisemitic by the Jewish community. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

⁹ **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

¹⁰ A float of 50 boats with people from across the world, travelling to Gaza with the intent to deliver humanitarian aid.

¹¹ <https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/02-10-2025/new-zealander-kidnapped-everything-we-know-about-the-global-sumud-flotilla-attempting-to-reach-gaza>

¹² **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

¹³ National Intelligence Centre. *Domestic implications of antisemitic attacks in Australia*. 13 December 2024. [REDACTED]

¹⁴ <https://www.nbcnews.com/world/united-kingdom/manchester-synagogue-stabbing-car-ramming-synagogue-police-rcna235117>

¹⁵ Combined Threat Assessment Group. *Post incident: Manchester terrorist attack*. Threat Assessment. [REDACTED]

¹⁶ New Zealand National Statement to the UN General Assembly – 'Leadership, Global Affairs & the United Nations'. 27

September 2025. Retrieved from <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/new-zealand-national-statement-un-general-assembly-%E2%80%93-%E2%80%98Leadership-global-affairs-united>

¹⁷ **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

Previous SITG reporting indicates the Jewish Community have made similar reports of 'pro-Palestine' or 'anti-Israel' actions being perceived as threatening.¹⁹

26. Following Australia's recent announcement of Iranian Government involvement in at least two antisemitic arson attacks in 2024,²⁰ it is a **realistic possibility** the Jewish community may report heightened perceptions of persecution by state actors in NZ.

27. Locations of significance to the Jewish community continue to be targets for antisemitic activity. Between September 2024 – August 2025 various concerns in relation to wilful damage, antisemitic mail, suspicious activity and offensive phone calls were linked in NIA (see Appendix One).

Community Services Group

28. s 9 (2)(ba) OIA, s 6(c) OIA

29.

30.

¹⁸ s 6(c) OIA

¹⁹ National Intelligence Centre. *Domestic implications of antisemitic attacks in Australia*. 13 December 2024.

²⁰ <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/breakingdeply-disturbing-anthony-albanese-says-iran-directed-two-antisemitic-attacks-in-australia/wvp03w6ti>

²¹ National Intelligence Centre. *Domestic implications of antisemitic attacks in Australia*. 13 December 2024.

²² s 6(c) OIA

²⁴ The Community Service Group (CSG) is a group of volunteers who work to ensure the safety and security of friends, family, and congregants in the Aotearoa Jewish community.


²⁵ s 6(c) OIA

²⁶ s 6(c) OIA

²⁷ s 6(c) OIA

31. s 6(c) OIA

Appendix One: Reported incidents at locations of significance to the Jewish Community



s 6(c) OIA

Appendix Two: Locations of Jewish Significance in Aotearoa

s 6(c) OIA

S 6(c) OIA

Handling Instructions

This document is classified [REDACTED]

~~RESTRICTED~~

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as [REDACTED] if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

Method	Rules
Electronic transmission	ALL [REDACTED] information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use [REDACTED].
Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>[REDACTED] mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>In an office environment, [REDACTED] material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet.</p> <p>In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e., Blue Bins)</p>

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	A scenario or explanation that has only a remote chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	>90%
HIGHLY LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that has only a small chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	75-85%
LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is more likely than not to occur or to be currently accurate	55-70%
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY	A scenario or explanation that has a realistic chance of occurring or being currently accurate, but which does not outweigh all other alternative possibilities and explanations	25-50%
UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is plausible, but which has only a small chance of occurring or being currently accurate	15-20%
HIGHLY UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that only has a remote chance of occurring or being currently accurate	<10%

Probability Yardstick



Disclaimer

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Document Production

	Originator	Reviewed by	Released by
Name	s9(2)(g)(ii) OIA	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Role	Intelligence Analyst	Lead Intelligence Analyst	Manager: SI (acting)
Extension	s9(2)(g)(ii) OIA	-	s9(2)(g)(ii) OIA
Date	26/09/25	30/09/25	09/10/25

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Director: National Security Group
Director: National Intelligence
Director: Auckland Partnerships

For Information

s 6(c) OIA



NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Intelligence Notification

Risk and Threat Commentary:
Jewish Interests in New Zealand

28 February 2025

FOIA

Reference	NIC-IN-250228-Risk and Threat Commentary: Jewish Interests in New Zealand
Date	28 February 2025
To	District Intelligence Units
Prepared by	Security Intelligence and Threats Group
Approved by	AJPB49
Subject	Risk and Threat Commentary: Jewish Interests in New Zealand

Key Findings

1. There has been **no corresponding increase in threat reporting in relation to Jewish interests in New Zealand for acts of extremist violence following recent antisemitic attacks in Australia**. Jewish interests in New Zealand have been targeted as a part of activities relating to protest and activism in relation to the Israel/Gaza situation, and there have been isolated acts of personal confrontations, threatening rhetoric, and hate-based online posts of an ‘awful but lawful’ nature from individuals who hold antisemitic beliefs. Jewish interests therefore continue to be the focus of targeted and hate-based incidents in New Zealand.
2. **Police have not sighted any specific or credible threats of violent extremism towards the Jewish community in New Zealand** but continue to monitor the situation closely and engage with representatives of the Jewish community.

Supporting Information

The Risk Environment

1. Jewish communities in New Zealand continue to face an elevated risk of violent incidents, in addition to other harms, that can cause alarm, distress, and raise localised security concerns.
2. The rate of antisemitic incidents continues to increase in western nations. These issues are enduring and historic in nature but exacerbated by recent issues and events. The global rise of information disorders (e.g. un-moderated behaviours online, and the spread of mis/dis information and conspiratorial mindsets) and a general normalisation of hate-based, intolerant, and violent rhetoric, leading to an erosion of societal cohesion, has increased the exposure of individuals to more extremist narratives and content. Global events, such as the ongoing Israel/Hamas conflict, act as a significant catalyst to the frequency and intensity of public reactions.
3. Since October 2023, protest and activism directed against Israeli and Jewish interests in New Zealand has continued. While the scale of this activity has abated in recent months (coinciding with the ceasefire arrangements), tensions remain and are expected to increase again in response to announcements by the US Administration regarding the future of Gaza.
4. This elevated risk arises from a broad range of sources, including:
 - Identify Motivated Violent Extremists (IMVE) – for example, neo-Nazi, ethno-nationalist, and white supremacists.
 - Faith Motivated Violent Extremists (FMVE) – including ISIS/AQ inspired individuals/groups.
 - Politically Motivated Violent Extremists – including individuals/groups opposed to Israeli military action in Gaza and Lebanon; and
 - Acutely Disaffected Persons (ADPs) – including individuals with mental health issues, conspiratorial mindsets, or other forms of personal grievance.
5. Across this spectrum, attention is directed at both Israeli and Jewish Community interests in New Zealand - the latter often mistaken as a proxy for the Government of Israel. This manifests as

activity directed against the official Israeli presence, synagogues, schools, businesses (selling Israeli made products) and public figures with known Israeli or Jewish affiliations.

6. As more people are consuming and sharing more extremist content, Police therefore assess that there is more antisemitic activity (including the potential for more activity) than has previously been experienced in New Zealand. This typically presents as derogatory and threatening commentary online (i.e. inflammatory comments inciting intolerance and hatred), through to micro aggressions (personal confrontations) and acts of intentional damage and vandalism.
7. The overall risk temperature has therefore increased, and from that, more serious acts of spontaneous or targeted violence (including terrorism) in New Zealand are possible, but at this time, no specific threat issues have been identified.

The Threat Environment

8. While risk assessment looks at the criticality should an event occur, threat assessment focuses on the likelihood of an event occurring, and this is based on an examination of the specific intentions of an individual (assessing their confidence, desire, and commitment) and their capability (knowledge and resources). In doing so it accounts for the indicators of concerning behaviours (not just thoughts) that demonstrate an individual is moving beyond radicalisation, to mobilising to violence.
9. While Police acknowledge that Jewish interests in New Zealand continue to be the focus on targeted and hate-based incidents and issues, that are of an 'awful but lawful' nature, Police have not sighted any specific or credible threat information in respect of violent extremism/terrorism (such as have been witnessed in Australia) towards the Jewish community.
10. Police manage a number of Persons of Interest with IMVE ideological beliefs, that have been known to express antisemitic views. But there have been no indications that these individuals have demonstrated the intent and capability to carry out acts of extremist violence.
11. The threat of extremist violence from previously unknown individuals remains a possibility, and such an incident could occur without intelligence warning.
12. Police workgroups at the national and district level continue to be responsive to issues raised by the Jewish Community. Police hold good relationships with key Jewish stakeholders who typically report on any issues or significant events within their community. This enables Police to maintain awareness of issues which may be developing and to respond accordingly.

████████████████████

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as ██████████ if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

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Probability Yardstick



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Document Production

	Originator	Reviewed by	Released by
Name	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] 1
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Extension	-	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Date	28/02/25	28/02/25	28/02/25

Distribution List

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s 6(c) OIA



NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Intelligence Notification

Domestic implications of
antisemitic attacks in Australia

13 December 2024

Key Findings

1. Following events in Australia, Security Intelligence and Threats Group have not sighted any direct and credible threat to Jewish communities in Aotearoa. However, events such as the Melbourne Synagogue Terrorist Attack on 6 December and subsequent vandalism are **likely** to increase fears within the Jewish community in Aotearoa.
2. It is **highly likely** Police will experience a short-term increase in reporting from the Jewish Community.
3. It is **highly likely** New Zealand Police (NZP) will receive ad hoc calls or requests from the Jewish community or Israeli Embassy. It is important Police maintain awareness of local locations of significance.¹ s 6(c) OIA

Background

4. On **6 December 2024**, the Adass Israel Synagogue, in Melbourne, Australia, was the target of an arson attack. There were no fatalities or serious injury, however members of the congregation were inside at the time and there is extensive damage to the synagogue. This incident has been deemed a terrorist act and Australian Police are pursuing three individuals in relation to this attack.
5. On **11 December 2024**, an unknown number of individuals torched a car and graffitied anti-Israel slogans in Woollahra, Sydney. Although a place of worship was not the target in Sydney, it was still identified as an antisemitic attack. The suburb of Woollahra is a location of significance as the largest Jewish community in Australia resides there.
6. The majority of Aotearoa's Jewish community reside in Tāmaki Makaurau and Pōneke; however, Aotearoa does not have a particular suburb which is as heavily Jewish-centric.
7. This Intelligence Notification was prepared to create awareness around these events and the nexus they may have to Aotearoa. In lieu of official reporting from Australian partners, this report primarily uses Open-Source information.

Supporting Evidence

Recent Domestic Examples of Anti-Semitism

8. On 5 December 2024, s 6(c) OIA s 6(c) OIA
9. On 11 November 2024, a prominent member of the Jewish community in Tāmaki Makaurau s 6(c) OIA did not feel this was a personal threat, but as a threat to the Jewish community as a whole.
10. s 6(c) OIA
11. Whilst these items are unsettling to receive, s 6(c) OIA

¹ See Appendix One for list of locations.

² s 6(c) OIA

- American public figure Candace Owens, known for her right-wing views and antisemitism, had originally planned to speak in Tāmaki Makaurau on 14 November however had her visa entry into Australia and Aotearoa.⁵
- On 12 December, Associate Minister Chris Penk overturned the initial Immigration New Zealand visa denial, allowing Owens' entry to New Zealand. **s 6(c) OIA**. It is *likely* an announcement of a new event will further heighten feelings of unsafety in the domestic Jewish community.

s 6(c) OIA

- Police are *highly likely* to observe an increase in reporting from the Jewish community. It is *likely* this will create a temporary demand increase for Police staff in order to support this community.

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

Organisational Observations

- s 6(c) OIA** indicate hate speech is the most common antisemitic modus operandi that is reported to Police. This ranges from specific mention of hate towards the Jewish Community, to 'pro-Palestine' or 'anti-Israel' content, which can be perceived as threatening to the Jewish Community. **s 6(c) OIA** most of these reports receive follow up by local Police.
- s 6(c) OIA**
- NZP Open-Source Intelligence Group (OSIG) note the majority of antisemitism they identify is from overseas and have not come across much rhetoric in the domestic environment which would cross the threshold of violence extremism. **s 6(c) OIA**

- s 6(c) OIA**

Community Service Group

The Community Service Group (CSG) is a group of volunteers who work to ensure the safety and security of friends, family, and congregants in the Aotearoa Jewish community.

- s 9(2)(ba)(i) OIA**

⁵ For further reading/context, refer to 241112_IN_Candace Owens

s 8(c) OIA

22. s 9(2)(ba)(i) OIA [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- [Redacted]
 - [Redacted]
 - [Redacted]
 - [Redacted]

- e) s 9(2)(ba)(i) OIA [Redacted]
[Redacted]

New Zealand Jewish Council

s 9(2)(ba)(i) OIA

[Redacted]

Considerations

26. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
27. As a whole, NZP hold good relationships with the Jewish community. s 6(c) OIA [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

¹¹ s 8(e) OIA [Redacted]
¹² s 8(c) OIA [Redacted]



Appendix One:

Locations of Jewish Significance in Aotearoa

Location name	Address	Google maps link
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Auckland

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

Handling Instructions

This document is classified [REDACTED]

~~**RESTRICTED**~~


All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as [REDACTED] if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

Method	Rules
Electronic transmission	ALL [REDACTED] information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use [REDACTED].
Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>[REDACTED] mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
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Probabilistic Language

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Probability Yardstick



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Document Production

	Originator	Reviewed by	Released by
Name	§ 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA	██████████	██████████
Role	Intelligence Analyst	Intelligence Supervisor	Manager: HRTT
Extension	-	§ 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA	§ 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA
Date	13/12/2024	13/12/2024	13/12/2024

Distribution List

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Protection Services (DPS)
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NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Intelligence Notification

The Changing Global Threatscape:
Implications for New Zealand Police


6 August 2024



Reference	NIC-IN-240806
Date	6 August 2024
To	Assistant Commissioner Pannett
Prepared by	[REDACTED] – Manager High Risk Targeting Teams
Approved by	DWQQ51 – Director of National Intelligence
Subject	<i>The Changing Global Threatscape: Implications for New Zealand Police</i>

Context

- On 5 August, the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) raised the national threat level in Australia from **Possible** to **Probable** (credible intelligence, assessed to represent a plausible scenario, indicates an intention and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia). NTAC commentary advises that the increase in threat level is not related to a single issue, but rather a response to the changing nature of the global threatscape and exacerbated by issues such as the increase in tensions in the Middle East¹.
- The National Intelligence Centre (NIC) concurs with the assessment that the global threatscape has changed and that the contextual themes, particularly around the complexity and volatility of threat issues, is directly applicable to the New Zealand environment.
- These issues are being explored through a New Zealand lens in a strategic intelligence assessment that is still in draft, pending peer review. However, some of the key findings of that paper are reflected in graphic and summary below, along with additional commentary of their implications for New Zealand Police. The paper, including full referencing, will be published in late August.



¹ <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/current-national-terrorist-threat-level>

Key Findings

4. In the global context, there is a:

- **decentralisation of attack vectors** - with more lone-actor/self-initiated and leaderless attacks and fewer structured or directed attacks from organized groups.
- **democratisation of extremism** - with lower barriers to entry and fewer constraints on individuals to engage in, and act on their beliefs.
- **diversification of motivations** - with less clear-cut ideologies, more mixed, unclear, and unstable drivers are emerging. These include grievance-based or conspiracy-driven motivations, rather than deeply held beliefs; and
- **socialisation to violence** – where the normalisation of violent rhetoric and acceptance of violence as a legitimate means to affect change, are increasing.

5. Exacerbated by the:

- **proliferation of false information** - energising people to act on inaccurate or false beliefs.
- **growth in conspiracy mindsets** - fuelled by the proliferation of false information (including mis and disinformation) online, where these mindsets provide narratives that channel resentment and grievance directed at political, religious, or cultural targets, fuelling radical attitudes and reducing barriers to violence.
- **decline of group-directed extremism** – where traditional group-directed acts of violent extremism had declining, 'movement-based' (individuals loosely associated and inspired by an extremist narrative or cause) and non-ideological driven acts of targeted violence, are increasing.
- **rise of anti-authority motivations** - where individuals reject the legitimacy of the government and rule of law, presenting as a latent potential for extremist mindsets.
- **more shallow ideological commitment** - there is a growing pattern of individuals with an extremist mindset who are less intellectually committed to a particular belief system or worldview, making prevention a harder and more unpredictable task.
- **more threats from less clearly defined vectors** - with underlying factors of mental health and conspiratorial narratives, we can expect [lone actor] grievance fuelled violence to be increasingly prevalent, including random or indiscriminate "rampage" attacks on opportunistic or soft targets; and
- **the failure of digital citizenship** – the withering effectiveness of digital citizenship is declining in the face of anonymous and unmoderated spaces online, shifting the tone and toxicity of public discourse, manifesting in more anti-social, aggressive, and extremist behaviours.

6. Leading to....

- **further polarisation and splintered realities** - where common ground is harder to find and some find it challenging to discern fact from fiction.
- **the erosion of shared values** – where the foundations of democratic societies, such as civic norms, respect for others, the rule of law, and trust in institutions appear to be

eroding. As discontent and contempt grow, the sense of a shared identity - that is critical for stability and social cohesion - diminishes; and

- **an increase in cognitive radicalisation** - where more people are exposed to virulent extremist content online, is contributing to increases in both cognitive radicalisation, violent rhetoric is normalised, and behavioural radicalisation, where violence is considered a legitimate course of action.

7. Overall, this is likely a precursor to the increased manifestation of violence from both traditional and non-traditional sources in New Zealand.

Implications for Police

8. New Zealand agencies will face increasing pressure to prevent and respond to largely unpredictable acts of violence – whatever the source of motivation.
9. Threat mitigation will require whole-of-society changes to pro-social attitudes, particularly in online sub-cultures. As such change is unlikely, Police will likely have to adapt to a public safety environment that covers a wider range of public safety harms, including violent extremism and other forms of targeted violence, such as more grievance fuelled lone actor attacks.
10. Agencies will be faced with an increasing threat surface area, making it more difficult to cover by intelligence and investigations resources. Diversification of motivations has also increased the quantity of threat issues requiring study and subject matter expertise amongst our staff, to understand the threat.
11. False information and conspiracy directly contribute to the risk of violent extremism – and both are growing in New Zealand.
12. The shallowing of ideological commitment reduces the opportunity to identify prevention opportunities, as traditional protective factors, such as whānau or community leaders, may have less visibility of what is occurring.
13. In addition to increased tensions in the Middle East, which are already reflected in a hardening of the protest and activism space in New Zealand - that can act as trigger points for wider extremist activity - specific issues unique to New Zealand, such as Iwi/Crown relations and Treaty issues, are likely to exacerbate divisions and societal tensions in the medium term.
14. Overall, the issue of radicalisation to violence is getting bigger, broader and more complex and that means more risks for New Zealand Police to detect, understand and respond to.

~~In Confidence~~

This document is classified ~~IN CONFIDENCE~~. All ~~In Confidence~~ reporting and information (including data) should be dated and clearly identify the originating Government agency.

Handling Instructions

Method	Rules
Electronic transmission	IN CONFIDENCE information can be transmitted across external or public networks but the level of information contained should be assessed before using clear text. Username/Password access control and/or encryption may be advisable (with the aim of maintaining confidence in public agencies).
Manual transmission	May be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms as well as mail delivery staff in a single closed envelope. The envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases involving privacy concerns, identifying the originating department may be inappropriate and a return PO Box alone should be used.
Storage and disposal	IN CONFIDENCE information can be secured using the normal building security and door-swipe card systems that aim to keep the public out of administrative areas of government departments. Must be disposed of by departmental arrangements. Electronic files must be protected against illicit internal use or intrusion through two or more of the mechanisms recommended in the official guidelines.

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	The event will occur in most circumstances	>95%
LIKELY	The event will probably occur in most circumstances	>65%
POSSIBLE	The event might occur some of the time	>35%
UNLIKELY	The event could occur in some circumstances	<35%
RARE	The event has remote chance of occurring	<5%

Disclaimer

The interpretations and conclusions drawn in this report are made on the balance of probability on information available at the time of preparation. The information contained herein is not evidence and is intended to provide a basis for further investigation only.

Document Production

	Originator	Reviewed by	Released by
Name	[REDACTED] OIA	[REDACTED]	DWQQ51
Role	Manager HRTT	Manager: Security Intelligence	DNI
Date	5/8/24	6/8/24	6/8/24


Distribution List

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AC Deployment

S 6(c) OIA



Intelligence Summary

National Intelligence Centre



Title	Operation BONDI
Document reference	INTSUM-251215-1500 Op BONDI
Date and time	15 December 2025 – 1500hrs
Produced by/location	Analytic and Intelligence Operations, Security and Intelligence Threats Group

Key Assessments and Updates

All updates are in blue. The next INTSUM will be disseminated at 0800hrs on 16 December 2025.

Key Assessments

- On 14 December, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died. To date, no New Zealand nexus has been identified.
- It is *almost certain* the Bondi Beach terrorist attack will create a heightened sense of fear and increase the perception of a heightened threat environment within the New Zealand (NZ) Jewish community. Police staff will be armed at synagogues for the next 48hrs, and reassurance patrols will take place among both Jewish and Muslim communities for the remainder of the week.¹
- It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
- The attack will highly likely impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel and Palestine conflict. **s 6(c) OIA**

[Redacted]

5.

s 6(c) OIA

6.

15 December: **s 6(c) OIA**
[Redacted]

Current Situation

7. On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died, including one of the shooters. Another 40 people, including two police officers, are injured and have been taken to hospitals across Sydney. Police have also confirmed there were two improvised explosive devices found at the scene. The NSW Health Minister has stated the death toll may rise.^{vii}
8. The alleged gunmen have been identified as Sajid Akram (50), and Naveed Akram (24), they have been confirmed by the NSW Police Commissioner as a father son duo. Sajid Akram was shot dead by Police and Naveed Akram is in critical but stable condition. Police are not looking for any other offenders. Sajid Akram was a licensed firearms holder and had six firearms licensed to him.
9. Australia's domestic Intelligence Agency (ASIO) reportedly examined Naveed Akram six years ago for his ties to a Sydney-based Islamic State Group terrorism cell. Media reporting has stated investigators from the Joint Terrorism Team believed the gunman had pledged allegiance to the IS terrorist group.^{viii} This has not been confirmed by NSW Police.

10.

NOT IN SCOPE

11.

12. According to New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is no indication yet that any New Zealanders have been killed or injured in the attack.^{xix}

Current Threat Environment

13. It is *almost certain* NZP will note an increase in reports of concern from the Jewish community and the public following the attack. At the time of writing, no credible threats have been identified.^{xiii}

14.

S 6(c) OIA

15. The New Zealand national terrorism threat remains **LOW**; *terrorist attack is assessed as a realistic possibility*. CTAG is continuing to monitor events in Australia and New Zealand and will update the assessment as necessary.

16.

S 6(c) OIA

17.

Current Domestic Sentiment

18. It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
19. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel and Palestine conflict.
 - a) Brian TAMAKI published a Facebook post and a video following the attack. TAMAKI suggested the attack was a result of 'weak political leadership and forced multiculturalism' and encouraged New Zealanders to attend the 31 January March for New Zealand/New Zealand Day. [REDACTED]
20. Social media comments on posts by Prime Minister Luxon, Hon. Winston Peters, and Hon. Chris Bishop's condemning the attack show support for the Jewish community in Australia and New Zealand. Some comments reflect anti-immigration rhetoric and some commentators have blamed pro-Palestine protesters for contributing to increased antisemitic sentiment.^{xx}

Upcoming Events

21. **15 December:** s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
22. **16 December:** s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

Probabilistic Language

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Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA	[REDACTED]	TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analyst	Manager: AIOG (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	15/12/2025	15/12/2025	15/12/2025

Handling Instructions

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Title	Operation BONDI
Document reference	INTSUM-251219-0800hrs Op BONDI
Date and time	19 December 2025 – 0800hrs
Produced by/location	Analytics and Intelligence Operations, Security and Intelligence Threats Group

Key Assessments and Updates

All updates are in blue. The next INTSUM update will be assessed as required.

Key

1. 
2. At around 2000hrs (AEST) on 18 December, the NSW Tactical Operations Unit rammed two vehicles on route to Bondi after receiving information that a “violent act was possibly planned”. At the time of writing, Police have not identified any connection to this incident and the Bondi attack.¹ It is *almost certain* the operation will impact feelings of safety in Sydney in the wake of the Bondi attack and contribute to the proliferation of mis and dis information. Open-source imagery indicates at least five men were detained and investigations are ongoing.
3. Australian news outlets have been reporting fears of a repeat of the 2005 Cronulla Riots² after a social media post has been circulated calling for a “Wog/Middle Eastern Bashing Day” to occur on 27 December 2025 at Cronulla Beach in Sydney.³ The anti-Middle Eastern rhetoric and organisation of this event in close proximity to the Bondi attack is *highly likely* an indicator of growing resentment and decline in social cohesion in Australia.
4. The Bondi attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict. It is *likely* this will result in the use of hostile language between individuals with opposing views at some upcoming events.

Friday 19 December:

- The Anglican Parish of Hastings is holding a vigil at their Church at 1200hrs. The organisers have no indication of the number of attendees. The event has been advertised publicly and within the Churches normal networks.⁴ [The Mayor and Deputy Mayor have confirmed their attendance with the event organiser.](#)
- At 1815hrs, a short public walk and vigil ceremony is scheduled to occur at Coronation Park in Bay of Plenty District. Attendees will walk along Pilot Bay and the Mount Maunganui beach. Organisers are planning to be finished by 2000hrs and will be walking with various flags.⁵ It is unknown how many are expected to attend, and the organisers have requested NZP presence.

Current Situation

5. **Incident:** On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah¹ at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Sixteen people are confirmed to have died, including one of the gunmen. Police have also confirmed there were two improvised explosive devices found at the scene.⁶ As at 2140hrs local time (AEST) 18 December 2025, 15 people remain in Sydney hospitals – two are in critical condition, three are critical but stable.⁷

6. **NOT IN SCOPE**

7. **Philippines visit:** According to the Philippine Police and hotel staff, the gunmen rarely left their hotel and remained in Davao City throughout their visit.¹⁰ The Philippines Bureau of Immigration has stated there is “no valid report or confirmation” the two individuals received any form of military training while visiting.¹¹

8. **Hunting training:** Zastava Hunting Association President has revealed Naveed Akram received training at the Sydney shooting club about five years ago in “firearms safety” and “how to hunt.”

9. At around 2000hrs 18 December, the NSW Tactical Operations Unit rammed two vehicles on route to Bondi after receiving information that a “violent act was possibly planned”. At the time of writing, Police have not identified any connection to this incident and the Bondi attack.¹³ It is *almost certain* the operation will impact feelings of safety in Sydney in the wake of the Bondi attack and contribute to the proliferation of mis and dis information. Open-source imagery indicates at least five men were detained and investigations are ongoing.

Current Threat Environment

10. **s 6(c) OIA**

11. NZP staff are expected to be guarding key locations for the Jewish community until the end of the week, however, the necessity of these deployments is being assessed daily.¹⁵ Additionally, NZP are providing community reassurance at scheduled Hanukkah events and places of worship across New Zealand.¹⁶ Jewish community leaders nationwide have continued to engage with Police regarding upcoming events and have been asking for assistance with security.
12. It is *almost certain* NZP will continue to receive an increased number of reports of concern from the Jewish and Muslim communities and the wider public following the Bondi attack.

Current Domestic Sentiment

13. It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information. Some of the identified misinformation shared domestically includes:

¹ Hanukkah, also known as Chanukah, is one of the world’s most widely celebrated Jewish festivals. It is an eight-day celebration that began on Sunday 14 December 2025 and finishes on Monday 22 December 2025.

- The sharing of content identifying the Bondi attack as a false-flag operation by the Australian Government to restrict the freedom of citizens.
 - Some social media users have referenced the proposed introduction of the NZ digital ID as an example of government control permitted as a result of mass violence events.¹⁷
14. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict. *It is likely this will result in the use of hostile language between individuals with opposing views at some upcoming events.*
- s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
15. Brian TAMAKI²⁰ and Destiny Church continue to post on social media about the Bondi attack to generate support for their cause, highlighting perceived relaxed immigration requirements. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

International Sentiment

16.

NOT IN SCOPE

17.

18. In the United Kingdom, the Metropolitan and Greater Manchester Police have announced that protesters who chant “globalise the intifada” will now be arrested, citing the Bondi attack has changed the context of the slogan.² Two people have subsequently been arrested. It is a *realistic possibility* this could prompt increased reporting of pro-Palestine activity in New Zealand, particularly in relation to the use of “Intifada” in rhetoric.²⁶
19. Multiple instances of misinformation have been identified following the Bondi attack, including AI-generated misinformation being spread on social media. It is *almost certain* mis-and-disinformation regarding the attack will continue to proliferate across social media platforms.²⁷ Some of the identified misinformation includes:
 - An image of Naveed Akram in the Philippines sitting at a table with the Defence Attaché of India to the Philippines.²⁸

Upcoming Events

This is not an exhaustive list. For a full list of upcoming events please refer to this [link](#).

20. Friday 19 December:

- The Anglican Parish of Hastings is holding a vigil at their Church at 1200hrs. The organisers have no indication of the number of attendees. The event has been advertised publicly and within the Churches normal networks.²⁹ [The Mayor and Deputy Mayor have confirmed their attendance with the event organiser.](#)
- At 1815hrs, a short public walk and vigil ceremony is scheduled to occur at Coronation Park in Bay of Plenty District. Attendees will walk along Pilot Bay and the Mount Maunganui beach. Organisers are planning to be finished by 2000hrs and will be walking with various flags.³⁰ It is unknown how many are expected to attend, and the organisers have requested NZP presence.

21. Sunday 21 December:

- At 1500hrs, a march is scheduled to occur in Auckland in support of the Jewish Community following the attack.³¹ The event is planned to start at Aotea Square, with speeches and a vigil before a march down Queen Street.³² **s 9(2)(a) OIA**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³³ Expected attendance at this march is unknown, however, on the Facebook event page 41 people have indicated they intend to go and 154 are ‘interested’.³⁴
- In Auckland, a joint community event is being organised between Jewish group Deyenu and the local Muslim community including the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), to mourn the victims of the Bondi attack. The event is scheduled to begin at 1900hrs at the Auckland Unitarian Church.³⁵
- [In Whangarei, a candlelight vigil will be held in support of the Bondi attack victims between 1945-2100hrs. The event will observe Hanukkah and stand against antisemitism.](#)³⁶

² In the context of the Israel-Palestine context Intifada refers to an uprising by Palestinian people against Israeli occupation and Israel. <https://www.dw.com/en/intifadas-what-you-need-to-know/a-41695912>

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Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA		TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analysts	Manager: AIO (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	19/12/2025	19/12/2025	19/12/2025

Handling Instructions

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~~RESTRICTED~~

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¹ [Seven men assisting police after operation at Liverpool in Sydney's south-west - ABC News](#) Retrieved 19 December 2025 at 0610hrs

² s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

⁴ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

⁵ The Guardian. [Bondi beach shooting live updates: opposition leader Sussan Ley accuses government of failing to protect Jewish Australians and urges immediate action in wake of terror attack](#). Retrieved 15 December 2025, 1255hrs.

⁶ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-18/bondi-beach-shooting-terrorist-attack-live-blog-dec-18/106155938>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0737hrs.

⁷ Stuff. [Stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach](https://www.stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach)

⁸ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

⁹ [Bondi terror suspects spent whole Philippines visit in city and rarely left hotel, staff and police say | Bondi beach terror attack | The Guardian](#) Retrieved 18 December 2025 at 1053hrs

¹⁰ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹¹ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-18/bondi-naveed-akram-firearm-hunting-training/106159540>

¹² [Seven men assisting police after operation at Liverpool in Sydney's south-west - ABC News](#) Retrieved 19 December 2025 at 0610hrs

¹³ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁴ [NZ police to guard Jewish community locations following Bondi attack | RNZ News](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 0959hrs

¹⁵ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁶ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁷ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁸ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

¹⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1CaWEwwHEc/> Retrieved 18 December 2025 at 1316hrs

²⁰ (3) Facebook Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1123hrs

²¹ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

²² s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

²³ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-18/albanese-announces-tougher-hate-speech-laws-after-bondi-terror/106157020>. Retrieved 19 December 2025, 0100hrs.

²⁴ <https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/cronulla-race-riots> retrieved 19 December 2025 at 0639hrs

²⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14QDVe5k1Nu/> Retrieved 19 December 2025 at 0640hrs

²⁶ NOT IN SCOPE [REDACTED]

²⁷ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

²⁸ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

²⁹ Stuff. [Fake hero, wrong suspect: Misinformation floods social media after Bondi shooting | Stuff](#). Posted 17 December 2025, 0055hrs. Retrieved 17 December 0350hrs.

³⁰ [AI-generated images of alleged Bondi gunman used to spread false information - ABC News](#)

³¹ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³² s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³³ [Community Scoop » Never Again Is Now – Auckland March Against Jew Hatred](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0648hrs

³⁴ (2) Facebook Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1045hrs

³⁵ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³⁶ s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³⁷ (3) [Vigil for Bondi and March Against Antisemitism | Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1300hrs

s 6(c) OIA

Intelligence Summary

National Intelligence Centre

Title	Operation BONDI
Document reference	INTSUM-251218-0800hrs Op BONDI
Date and time	18 December 2025 – 0800hrs
Produced by/location	Analytics and Intelligence Operations, Security and Intelligence Threats Group

Key Assessments and Updates

All updates are in blue. The next INTSUM will be disseminated at 0800hrs on 19 December 2025.

Key Assessments

1.

s 6(c) OIA

2.

Naveed Akram has been charged with 59 offences, including 15 counts of murder, and charges of committing a terrorist act and wounding with intent to murder.¹

3.

NOT IN SCOPE

4.

5.

No information has been sighted on domestic events taking place on 18 December.

Current Situation

6. **Incident:** On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah¹ at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Sixteen people are confirmed to have died, including one of the gunmen. Police have also confirmed there were two improvised explosive devices found at the scene.⁴ As at 2100hrs local time (AEST) 17 December 2025, 17 people remain in Sydney hospitals – one is in critical condition, four are critical but stable.⁵

7. **NOT IN SCOPE**

8. **Charges laid:** Naveed Akram has been charged with 59 offences, including 15 counts of murder, and charges of committing a terrorist act and wounding with intent to murder.⁸

Current Threat Environment

9. **s 6(c) OIA**

10. NZP staff are expected to be guarding key locations for the Jewish community until the end of the week, however, the necessity of these deployments is being assessed daily.¹⁰ Additionally, NZP are providing community reassurance at scheduled Hanukkah events and places of worship across New Zealand.¹¹ Jewish community leaders nationwide have continued to engage with Police regarding upcoming events and have been asking for assistance with security.
11. It is *almost certain* NZP will continue to receive an increased number of reports of concern from the Jewish and Muslim communities and the wider public following the Bondi attack.

Current Domestic Sentiment

12. It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
13. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict.
14. Brian TAMAKI¹² and Destiny Church continue to post on social media about the Bondi attack to generate support for their cause, highlighting perceived relaxed immigration requirements. Destiny Church has planned several vigils and protest events in response to the Bondi attack over the upcoming weekend. **s 6(c) OIA**

¹ Hanukkah, also known as Chanukah, is one of the world's most widely celebrated Jewish festivals. It is an eight-day celebration that began on Sunday 14 December 2025 and finishes on Monday 22 December 2025.

International Sentiment

15. Multiple instances of misinformation have been identified following the Bondi attack, including AI-generated misinformation being spread on social media. It is *almost certain* mis-and-disinformation regarding the attack will continue to proliferate across social media platforms.¹⁴

16. **NOT IN SCOPE**

17.

18. International violent Salafi-jihadist violent extremist groups have praised the actions of the Bondi attackers and used the event to call for ongoing acts of violence towards the Jewish community in the West. Similarly, international violent extremist online forums, including white-identity motivated groups, have celebrated the attack, called for similar acts of mass murder, and named the shooters heroes for their actions. s 6(c) OIA

Upcoming Events

This is not an exhaustive list. For a full list of upcoming events please refer to this [link](#).

19. **18 December:**
- The Anglican Parish of Hastings is holding a vigil at their Church at 1200hrs. The organisers have no indication of the number of attendees. The event has been advertised publicly and within the Churches normal networks.²¹
20. **20 December:**
- At 1815hrs, a short public walk and vigil ceremony is scheduled to occur at Coronation Park in Bay of Plenty District. Attendees will walk along Pilot Bay and the Mount Maunganui beach. Organisers are planning to be finished by 2000hrs and will be walking with various flags.²² It is unknown how many are expected to attend, and the organisers have requested NZP presence.
21. **21 December:**
- At 1500hrs, a march is scheduled to occur in Auckland in support of the Jewish Community following the attack.²³ The event is planned to start at Aotea Square,

with speeches and a vigil before a march down Queen Street.²⁴ s 6(c) OIA

Expected attendance at this march is unknown, however, on the Facebook event page 41 people have indicated they intend to go and 154 are 'interested'.²⁶

- In Auckland, a joint community event is being organised between Jewish group Deyenu and the local Muslim community including the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), to mourn the victims of the Bondi attack. The event is scheduled to begin at 1900hrs at the Auckland Unitarian Church.²⁷

22. No known incidents of note have occurred at previously reported upcoming events.

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	A scenario or explanation that has only a remote chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	>90%
HIGHLY LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that has only a small chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	75-85%
LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is more likely than not to occur or to be currently accurate	55-70%
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY	A scenario or explanation that has a realistic chance of occurring or being currently accurate, but which does not outweigh all other alternative possibilities and explanations	25-50%
UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is plausible, but which has only a small chance of occurring or being currently accurate	15-20%
HIGHLY UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that only has a remote chance of occurring or being currently accurate	<10%

Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA		TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analysts	Manager: AIO (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	18/12/2025	18/12/2025	18/12/2025

Handling Instructions

This document is classified [REDACTED]

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as ~~RESTRICTED~~ if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

Method	Rules
Electronic transmission	ALL [REDACTED] information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use [REDACTED].
Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>[REDACTED] mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>In an office environment, [REDACTED] material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet.</p> <p>In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e., Blue Bins)</p>

¹ NZ Herald. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/naveed-akram-24-charged-over-mass-shooting-at-bondi-beach/Z2QSREL5YRDOPLO6ZJZV5QE3VQ/>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 1138hrs.

NOT IN SCOPE

⁵ https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-17/bondi-beach-shooting-terrorist-attack-islamic-state-live-blog/106151426?utm_campaign=abc_news_web&utm_content=link&utm_medium=content_shared&utm_source=abc_news_web#live-blog-post-247321. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0206hrs.

⁶ Stuff. [stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach](https://www.stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach)

⁷ s 6(c) OIA

⁸ NZ Herald. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/naveed-akram-24-charged-over-mass-shooting-at-bondi-beach/Z2QSREL5YRDOPLO6ZJZV5QE3VQ/>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 1138hrs.

⁹ s 6(c) OIA

¹⁰ [NZ police to guard Jewish community locations following Bondi attack | RNZ News](https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 0959hrs

¹¹ s 6(c) OIA

¹² (3) [Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1123hrs

¹³ s 6(c) OIA

¹⁴ Stuff. [Fake hero, wrong suspect: Misinformation floods social media after Bondi shooting | Stuff](https://www.stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach). Posted 17 December 2025, 0055hrs. Retrieved 17 December 0350hrs.

¹⁵ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-17/nsw-parliament-recalled-for-gun-reform-over-bondi-beach-shooting/106154014>. Retrieved 17 December 2025, 2310hrs.

¹⁶ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-17/frydenberg-s-fury-at-bondi-attack-royal-commission-calls/106154546>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0117hrs.

¹⁷ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-15/albanese-told-to-endorse-antisemitism-plan-after-bondi-shooting/106142578>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0156hrs.

¹⁸ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-17/frydenberg-s-fury-at-bondi-attack-royal-commission-calls/106154546>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0117hrs.

¹⁹ ABC news. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-16/coalition-launches-antisemitism-taskforce-after-bondi-terror-att/106151212>. Retrieved 18 December 2025, 0122hrs.

²⁰ s 6(c) OIA

²¹ s 6(c) OIA

²² s 6(c) OIA

²³ [Community Scoop » Never Again Is Now – Auckland March Against Jew Hatred](https://www.comunityscoop.co.nz/news/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0648hrs

²⁴ (2) [Facebook](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1045hrs

²⁵ s 6(c) OIA

²⁶ (3) [Vigil for Bondi and March Against Antisemitism | Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1300hrs

²⁷ s 6(c) OIA

Title	Operation BOND1
Document reference	INTSUM-251217-1500hrs Op BOND1
Date and time	17 December 2025 – 1500hrs
Produced by/location	Analytics and Intelligence Operations, Security and Intelligence Threats Group

Key Assessments and Updates

All updates are in blue.

Key Assessments

1. **s 6(c) OIA**
2. Brian TAMAKI¹ and Destiny Church continue to post on social media about the Bondi attack to generate support for their cause, highlighting perceived relaxed immigration requirements. Destiny Church has planned several vigils and protest events in response to the Bondi attack over the upcoming weekend. **s 6(c) OIA**
s 6(c) OIA
s 6(c) OIA
3. Media reporting has highlighted Sajid Akram migrated to Australia from India and used his Indian passport during recent travel to the Philippines.³ It is a *realistic possibility* this connection to India will be leveraged to fuel anti-immigration narratives and amplify mis and dis information.

17 December:

- Between 1900-2000hrs, a vigil is being held at Saint Patricks Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, Palmerston North for Bondi victims. The vigil has been arranged through the Interfaith organisation and approximately 50 people are expected to attend.⁴

Current Situation

- Incident:** On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah¹ at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died, including one of the gunmen. Police have also confirmed there were two improvised explosive devices found at the scene.⁵ As at 2000hrs local time (AEST) 16 December 2025, 22 people were in Sydney hospitals – three are in critical condition, six are critical but stable.⁶
- Act of terrorism:** The Australian Government has declared the shooting an act of terrorism which specifically targeted the Jewish community.⁷ **s 6(c) OIA, s 6(b) OIA**
[REDACTED]
- The gunmen:** Media reporting indicates Sajid Akram (50) was originally from the Indian city of Hyderabad. Police in the Indian state of Telangana stated Akram obtained a degree in Commerce and moved to Australia in 1998. During their recent travel to the Philippines, Sajid Akram travelled on an Indian passport, Naveed Akram (24) travelled on an Australian passport.⁹

Current Threat Environment

- s 6(c) OIA**
- NZP staff are expected to be guarding key locations for the Jewish community until the end of the week, however, the necessity of these deployments is being assessed daily.¹¹ Additionally, NZP are providing community reassurance at scheduled Hanukkah events and places of worship across New Zealand.¹² Jewish community leaders nationwide have continued to engage with Police regarding upcoming events and have been asking for assistance with security.
- It is *almost certain* NZP will continue to receive an increased number of reports of concern from the Jewish and Muslim communities and the wider public following the Bondi Beach attack.

Current Domestic Sentiment

- It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
- The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict.
- Brian TAMAKI¹³ and Destiny Church continue to post on social media about the Bondi attack to generate support for their cause, highlighting perceived relaxed immigration requirements. Destiny Church has planned several vigils and protest events in response to the Bondi attack over the upcoming weekend. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

¹ Hanukkah, also known as Chanukah, is one of the world's most widely celebrated Jewish festivals. It is an eight-day celebration that began on Sunday 14 December 2025 and finishes on Monday 22 December 2025.

International Sentiment

13. Multiple instances of misinformation have been identified following the Bondi attack, including AI-generated misinformation being spread on social media. It is *almost certain* mis-and-disinformation regarding the attack will continue to proliferate across social media platforms.¹⁵ Instances of misinformation reported so far include:¹⁶
- The widespread reposting of historical videos and content originally created in response to the October 7 2023 Hamas attack or at previous protest events, which are being misleadingly presented as current content in relation to the Bondi attack.
 - The false identification of the bystander who disarmed one of the gunmen.
 - An image of a man having make up and fake blood applied at the scene.
 - A cropped image of two female police officers claiming they “completely froze” while the “gunmen reportedly fired for up to 20 minutes without interruption”, when in fact the uncropped image shows the officers directing civilians away from the scene after the shooters had been neutralised.
 - An innocent Pakistani man living in NSW who had been falsely identified as one of the shooters, as he shared the same name.
 - False reports of coordinated attacks at Dover Heights and Double Bay in NSW.
 - The creation of a fake Google Maps listing labelling the home address of one of the gunmen as “Bondi beach shooters place” and categorising it as a “local mosque”.
14. The first funeral for one of the victims killed during the Bondi attack is currently occurring. The service is being held at the Chabad of Bondi before a burial at the Rookward Cemetery. Large crowds have gathered to pay their respects to the victim and the event is being livestreamed. Significant security has been deployed to the event and no issues have been reported.¹⁷ Further funerals will occur over the coming days.

Upcoming Events

This is not an exhaustive list. For a full list of upcoming events please refer to this [link](#).

15. **17 December:**
- Between 1900-2000hrs, a vigil is being held at Saint Patricks Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, Palmerston North for Bondi victims. The vigil has been arranged through the Interfaith organisation and approximately 50 people are expected to attend.¹⁸
16. **20 December:**
- At 1815hrs, a short public walk and vigil ceremony is scheduled to occur at Coronation Park in Bay of Plenty District. Attendees will walk along Pilot Bay and the Mount Maunganui beach. Organisers are planning to be finished by 2000hrs and will be walking with various flags.¹⁹ It is unknown how many are expected to attend, and the organisers have requested NZP presence.
17. **21 December:**
- At 1500hrs, a march is scheduled to occur in Auckland in support of the Jewish Community following the attack.²⁰ The event is planned to start at Aotea Square, with speeches and a vigil before a march down Queen Street.²¹ The events organiser has previously been arrested for breaching the peace at a pro-Palestine rally in 2023.²² Expected attendance at this march is unknown, however, on the

Facebook event page 41 people have indicated they intend to go and 154 are 'interested'.²³

- In Auckland, a joint community event is being organised between Jewish group Deyenu and the local Muslim community including the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), to mourn the victims of the Bondi attack. The event is scheduled to begin at 1900hrs at the Auckland Unitarian Church.²⁴

18. No known incidents of note have occurred at previously reported upcoming events.

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	A scenario or explanation that has only a remote chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	>90%
HIGHLY LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that has only a small chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	75-85%
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Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA		TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analysts	Manager: AIO (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	17/12/2025	17/12/2025	17/12/2025

Handling Instructions

This document is classified **[REDACTED]**

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Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>[REDACTED] mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>In an office environment, [REDACTED] material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet.</p> <p>In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e., Blue Bins)</p>

1 [\(3\) Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1123hrs

2 [REDACTED]

3 [Bondi beach mass shooting: what we know so far about the terrorist attack | Bondi beach terror attack | The Guardian](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1404hrs

4 s 6(c) OIA, s 9(2)(a) OIA [REDACTED]

5 The Guardian. [Bondi beach shooting live updates: opposition leader Sussan Ley accuses government of failing to protect Jewish Australians and urges immediate action in wake of terror attack](#). Retrieved 15 December 2025, 1255hrs.

6 BBC news. [Bondi live updates: Three more victims named as Australian police investigate suspects' Philippines trip - BBC News](#) Posted 16 December 2025, 2321hrs. Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 0243hrs

7 Stuff. [Stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach](#)

8 s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

9 [Indian family of alleged Bondi gunman didn't know of 'radical mindset', Indian police say | Reuters](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 0902hrs

10 s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

11 [NZ police to guard Jewish community locations following Bondi attack | RNZ News](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 0959hrs

12 s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

13 [\(3\) Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1123hrs

14 s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

15 Stuff. [Fake hero, wrong suspect: Misinformation floods social media after Bondi shooting | Stuff](#). Posted 17 December 2025, 0055hrs. Retrieved 17 December 0350hrs.

16 Stuff. [Fake hero, wrong suspect: Misinformation floods social media after Bondi shooting | Stuff](#). Posted 17 December 2025, 0055hrs. Retrieved 17 December 0350hrs.

17 [Bondi latest: First funeral held in Australia for victims of mass shooting - BBC News](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1330hrs

18 s 6(c) OIA, s 9(2)(a) OIA [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [Community Scoop » Never Again Is Now – Auckland March Against Jew Hatred](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0648hrs

21 [\(2\) Facebook](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1045hrs

22 s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

23 [\(3\) Vigil for Bondi and March Against Antisemitism | Facebook](#) Retrieved 17 December 2025 at 1300hrs

24 [REDACTED]

Current Situation

4. **Incident:** On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah¹ at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died, including one of the gunmen. Police have also confirmed there were two improvised explosive devices found at the scene.^{vi} As at 0815 local time (AEST) 16 December 2025, 25 people were in Sydney hospitals – six are in critical condition, four are critical but stable.^{vii}

5. **Act of terrorism:** The Australian Government has declared the shooting an act of terrorism which specifically targeted the Jewish community.^{viii} s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA, s 6(b) OIA

6. **NOT IN SCOPE**

Current Threat Environment

7. **s 6(c) OIA**

8. s 6(c) OIA
s 6(c) OIA
s 6(c) OIA

9. NZP are providing community reassurance at scheduled Hanukkah events and places of worship across New Zealand.^{xiii} Jewish community leaders nationwide have continued to engage with Police regarding upcoming events and have been asking for assistance with security.

10. It is *almost certain* NZP will continue to receive an increased number of reports of concern from the Jewish and Muslim communities and the wider public following the Bondi Beach attack.

- On 16 December 2025, a member of the Muslim community s 6(c) OIA
s 6(c) OIA

¹ Hanukkah, also known as Chanukah, is one of the world's most widely celebrated Jewish festivals. It is an eight-day celebration that began on Sunday 14 December 2025 and finishes on Monday 22 December 2025.

11.

s 6(c) OIA

Current Domestic Sentiment

12. It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
13. Police have been notified of several online posts containing anti-immigration, antisemitic, and Islamophobic rhetoric on Facebook, X, Reddit, and Telegram. s 6(c) OIA
14. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict. s 6(c) OIA

International Sentiment

15. Open-source scanning has identified some incidents targeting Jewish and Muslim communities internationally following the Bondi terror attack. s 6(c) OIA
- s 6(c) OIA

Upcoming Events

This is not an exhaustive list. For a full list of upcoming events please refer to this [link](#).

16. **16 December:**
- s 6(c) OIA
 - The Nelson Mayor has advised a public vigil is scheduled to occur at Tāhunanui Beach at 2000hrs.^{xxi} The event has been advertised publicly, expected attendance is unknown. The mayor's post currently has 322 reactions, 48 comments, and 42 shares.^{xxii} s 6(c) OIA
17. **21 December:**
- At 1500hrs, a march is scheduled to occur in Auckland in support of the Jewish Community following the attack.^{xxiv} The event is planned to start at Aotea Square, with speeches and a vigil before a march down Queen Street.^{xxv} s 6(c) OIA
- Expected attendance at this march is unknown and it is unknown whether counter-protest will occur.

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	A scenario or explanation that has only a remote chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	>90%
HIGHLY LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that has only a small chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	75-85%
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Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s9(2)(g)(ii) OIA		TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analysts	Manager: AIO (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	16/12/2025	16/12/2025	16/12/2025

Handling Instructions

This document is classified [REDACTED]


~~RESTRICTED~~

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as [REDACTED] if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

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Electronic transmission	ALL RESTRICTED information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use [REDACTED].
Manual transmission	<p>For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title.</p> <p>[REDACTED] mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT.</p> <p>The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.</p>
Storage and disposal	<p>In an office environment, RESTRICTED material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet.</p> <p>In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment.</p> <p>Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e., Blue Bins)</p>

s 6(c) OIA

- iv [\(8\) I invite Nelsonians who wish to affirm our... - Hon Dr Nick Smith | Facebook](#)
Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1120hrs
- v [\(2\) Destiny Church Nelson | Facebook](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1208hrs
- vi The Guardian. [Bondi beach shooting live updates: opposition leader Sussan Ley accuses government of failing to protect Jewish Australians and urges immediate action in wake of terror attack](#). Retrieved 15 December 2025, 1255hrs.
- vii [Bondi beach shooting live: 26 still in hospital, some with 'devastating injuries' from terror attack, health minister says](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1010hrs
- viii [Stuff. Stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach](#)
- ix [REDACTED]
- x [Bondi beach mass shooting: what we know so far about the terrorist attack | Bondi beach terror attack | The Guardian](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0834hrs
- xi s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
- xii [REDACTED]
- xiii s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
- xiv s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
- xv s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]
- xvi [REDACTED]
- xvii [Antisemitic Chants and Smoke Bombs Disrupt Hanukkah Concerts in Amsterdam | Combat Antisemitism Movement](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1200hrs
- xviii [Pig Heads Found on Muslim Graves After Bondi Terror Attack / X](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1406hrs
- xix [REDACTED]
- xx [REDACTED]
- xxi [REDACTED]
- xxii [\(8\) I invite Nelsonians who wish to affirm our... - Hon Dr Nick Smith | Facebook](#)
Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1120hrs
- xxiii [\(2\) Destiny Church Nelson | Facebook](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 1208hrs
- xxiv [Community Scoop » Never Again Is Now – Auckland March Against Jew Hatred](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0648hrs
- xxv [REDACTED]
- xxvi [REDACTED]



New Zealand Police

National Security Group Quarterly Report

Quarter Four 2025 (01 Oct – 31 Dec)



HOW TO USE THIS REPORT

The information in this report reflects our best current understanding of cases and issues. This may change based on new information and reassessment as appropriate.

This report is classified ~~RESTRICTED~~. It **must not** be shared outside of New Zealand Police without the written approval of the Director: National Security Group. It can be shared amongst Police staff at the discretion of the principal recipients.

Classification Key: (U) = Unclassified, (IC) = ~~In Confidence~~, (R) = ~~Restricted~~.

Commentary

(U) This report summarises key developments in terrorism, violent extremism, and foreign interference relevant to Police.

(R) In November the National Security Group (NSG) disseminated the report *Disruptions, Near Misses, and Attacks: Terrorism in New Zealand 2018-2024*. The report aimed to identify and assess relevant incidents since the establishment of NSG in 2018 to contribute to the understanding of the terrorism environment and complement Police and partner agency analyses of the threatscape.

killed by responding police. The other was wounded and faces 15 murder and one terrorism charge, with multiple charges for other offences.

(U) The attackers were a father, aged 50, and son, aged 24. The attack was almost certainly inspired by the terrorist group Islamic State (IS). The son was investigated in 2019 for links to IS supporters. An IS flag was displayed on their vehicle at the time of the attack, and the attackers had recorded video statements inspired by IS.



Source: Reuters

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

(U) Attacks and other high-profile incidents and developments offshore continue to have domestic impacts and implications. On 14 December 2025 two gunmen attacked a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach in Sydney. 15 people were killed and around 40 wounded. One attacker was shot and

(R) Bondi is the most significant terrorist attack on Australian soil. It follows escalation of anti-Semitic incidents and concerns since the 7 October 2023 attacks in Israel, s 6(c) OIA

Significant initiatives including tighter restrictions on firearms and laws prohibiting hate speech and hate groups have already been enacted. s 6(c) OIA

[Redacted text]

(R) The Bondi attack had immediate impacts on New Zealand, particularly in terms of community concerns about potential inspired or retaliatory incidents. Significant engagement with the Jewish and Muslim communities followed, with Police deploying to sensitive sites and times for reassurance and security. **s 6(c) OIA**

[Redacted]

Threatscape

s 6(c) OIA

(R) The most likely attack scenario continues to be an attack by a lone actor or small group whose identity or intentions are not known to agencies.

s 6(c) OIA

(R) The environment is increasingly complex, influenced by global events and narratives in a period of international instability and conflict. This is compounded by the online environment which provides access and exposure to misinformation, violent extremist influences, propaganda, and networks, and to material related to attack capability such as bombmaking instructions.

(R) Given these factors the motivations and drivers of potential threat actors are increasingly idiosyncratic. A range of personal grievances and ideological influences can be combined in complex, dynamic, and potentially confounding ways. **s 6(c) OIA**

[Redacted]

(R) International influences and events continue to be the primary driver of violent extremism in New Zealand. The Bondi attack is the most recent significant example. The attack impacted the sense of security of communities, **s 6(c) OIA**

[Redacted]

Police have not sighted a credible and specific domestic threat to communities in this quarter, although hostile online commentary, graffiti and other incidents continue to occur.

Significant Incidents

s 6(c) OIA

(R) In October a 41 year old man was arrested and charged with multiple offences related to series of cell phone tower arsons in the South Island. **s 6(c) OIA**

[Redacted]



Source: Chris Lynch Media

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA


(U) In October the New Zealand Defence Force appealed the sentence of a soldier convicted of attempted espionage and other offences. In August 2025 the soldier had been sentenced to two years' detention in military prison and dismissed from the army. s 6(c) OIA

Two years is also the maximum period that can be served in military prison, with longer terms served in civilian prison. The Director of Military Prosecutions described the original sentence as "manifestly inadequate", while the Crown Prosecutor stated "There's a need for the clang of the prison gates" to reflect the seriousness of the matter and for deterrence. The Court of Appeal reserved its decision.

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA

s 6(c) OIA




Stakeholder and Partner Engagement

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted] Ministry of Justice consideration of targeted reform of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Training & Development



Foreign Interference

(U) The Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Act 2025 (the Act) was passed in November 2025. The Act adds new offences to the Crimes Act 1961 and amended existing offences related to espionage and wrongful communication, retention, or copying of official information.

(IC) The Act came into force on 27 November 2025. Internal communications were distributed to advise staff of the changes and the provisions for the investigation and prosecution of the new offences. This includes a requirement to consult with the Director National Security or the Counter Foreign Interference (CFI) Investigations Manager NSG before undertaking any investigation into espionage or foreign interference.


(U) The prosecution of espionage or foreign interference offences requires the consent of the Attorney General.

(U) General instructions are in development.

Quarterly Developments

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



S 6(c) OIA

Title	Operation BONDI
Document reference	INTSUM-251216-0800 Op BONDI
Date and time	16 December 2025 – 0800hrs
Produced by/location	Analytic and Intelligence Operations, Security and Intelligence Threats Group

Key Assessments and Updates

All updates are in blue. The next INTSUM will be disseminated at 1500hrs on 16 December 2025.

Key Assessments

1. On 14 December 2025, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died including one of the gunmen. To date, no New Zealand nexus has been identified. s 6(c) OIA, s 6(b) OIA
[Redacted]
2. It is *almost certain* the Bondi Beach terrorist attack will create a heightened sense of fear and increase the perception of a heightened threat environment within the New Zealand Jewish community. New Zealand Police (NZP) will be armed at synagogues for the next 24hrs and will continue to provide reassurance patrols near places of worship, and at scheduled events among both Jewish and Muslim communities for the remainder of the week.ⁱⁱ
3. It is *almost certain* NZP will receive an increase in reports of concern from the Jewish community and the wider public following the Bondi Beach attack. Police have received reports from members of the public about incidents perceived to be antisemitic and anti-muslim. s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
4. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel and Palestine conflict.
5. s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
6. **16 December:**
 - s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted]
 - [Redacted]
 - The Nelson Mayor has advised a public vigil is scheduled to occur at Tāhunanui Beach at 2000hrs.^{vii} The event has been advertised publicly, expected attendance is unknown.

Current Situation

7. **Incident:** On 14 December at 1845hrs, two gunmen opened fire on hundreds of civilians attending a Jewish celebration for the first day of Hanukkah¹ at Bondi Beach in Sydney. At the time of writing, 16 people are confirmed to have died, including one of the gunmen. **s 6(c) OIA, s 6(b) OIA**
[REDACTED]
8. **Act of terrorism:** The Australian Government has declared the shooting an act of terrorism which specifically targeted the Jewish community. **x s 6(c) OIA, s 6(b) OIA**
[REDACTED]
9. **Persons of Interest:** NSW Police have confirmed the two alleged gunmen have been identified as Sajid Akram (50) and Naveed Akram (24), who are father and son. Sajid was shot dead by Police and Naveed is in critical but stable condition. Police are not looking for any other offenders. Sajid was a licensed firearms holder and had six firearms licensed to him which were recovered. Naveed reportedly came to the attention of the Australia Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in 2019, as an associate of a Sydney-based Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) group. Media have also reported that investigators from the Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) believed the gunmen had pledged allegiance to ISIS.^{xii} This has not been confirmed by officials.
10. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]

Current Threat Environment

11. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
12. **NZP are providing community reassurance at scheduled Hanukkah events and places of worship across New Zealand.**^{xiv}
13. The New Zealand national terrorism threat remains **LOW**; *terrorist attack is assessed as a realistic possibility*. New Zealand's Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) is continuing to monitor events in Australia and New Zealand and will update the assessment as necessary. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
 - CTAG assess that heightened online rhetoric regarding the attack will likely feed Islamophobic and anti-immigrant narratives, which may include coordinated disinformation. They assess the attack will fuel antisemitic narratives online, particularly by those who already hold such beliefs.^{xvi}
 - **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
14. It is *almost certain* NZP will receive an increase in reports of concern from the Jewish community and the wider public following the Bondi Beach attack.

¹ Hanukkah, also known as Chanukah, is one of the world's most widely celebrated Jewish festivals. It is an eight-day celebration that began on Sunday 14 December 2025 and finishes on Monday 22 December 2025.

- Police have received reports from members of the public about incidents perceived to be antisemitic and anti-muslim. This includes hateful music and speech being played loudly, an Israeli flag with anti-Israel slogans written on it being cut down, and threats of violence left as voice messages at a Mosque.^{xviii} District Police staff are following up these incidents.^{xix}

15.



Current Domestic Sentiment

16. It is *highly likely* this attack will contribute to antisemitic, anti-immigration, and Islamophobic narratives online and this is *highly likely* to include the spread of mis and dis information.
17. Since 14 December 2025, online sentiment scanning continues to identify antisemitic, anti-immigration and Islamophobic narratives, however no specific calls to violence in New Zealand have been observed.^{xxii} Key themes included commentary regarding:
- Accusations of Jewish/Israeli conspiracy,
 - Applying tighter restrictions on migrants,
 - Drawing attention to violence against Palestinians by Israel,
 - A general mistrust of the motives of New Zealand politicians who commented on the attack.
18. The attack will *highly likely* impact sentiment within the domestic protest and activism environment regarding the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict.

- **s 6(c) OIA**
[Redacted text block]
- It is a *realistic possibility* some pro-Palestine activists will protest at upcoming Jewish and Hanukkah events. **s 6(c) OIA**
[Redacted text block]

Upcoming Events

This is not an exhaustive list. For a full list of upcoming events please refer to this [link](#).

19. **16 December:**

- At 1030hrs, a pro-Palestine protest is scheduled to occur at Parliament. This is a reoccurring event; however, it is unknown whether this event will go ahead.^{xxvi}
- At 1730hrs, an event titled 'Lighting the Chanukah Forecourt' is scheduled to occur on the Parliament forecourt. The event has not been advertised outside of the

Jewish community.^{xxvii} It is expected between 120-150 will be in attendance. Some Ministers are also expected to attend.^{xxviii}

20. The Nelson Mayor has advised a public vigil is scheduled to occur at Tāhunanui Beach at 2000hrs.^{xxix} The event has been advertised publicly, expected attendance is unknown.

21. **21 December:**

- At 1500hrs, a march is scheduled to occur in Auckland in support of the Jewish Community following the attack.^{xxx} The event is planned to start at Aotea Square, with speeches and a vigil before a march down Queen Street. s 9(2)(a) OIA

Expected attendance at this march is unknown and it is unknown whether counter-protest will occur.

Previous Related Events

22. **15 December:**

- At 1700hrs, a candlelight vigil in response to the attack took place at the Auckland s 6(c) OIA. Several Ministers were in attendance as well as representatives from the Jewish Community and the public. Armed Police attended the event and provided reassurance patrols throughout. No issues were reported.
- Vigils also occurred in Bay of Plenty and Canterbury and no issues were reported.

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	A scenario or explanation that has only a remote chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	>90%
HIGHLY LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that has only a small chance of not occurring or not being currently accurate	75-85%
LIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is more likely than not to occur or to be currently accurate	55-70%
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY	A scenario or explanation that has a realistic chance of occurring or being currently accurate, but which does not outweigh all other alternative possibilities and explanations	25-50%
UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that is plausible, but which has only a small chance of occurring or being currently accurate	15-20%
HIGHLY UNLIKELY	A scenario or explanation that only has a remote chance of occurring or being currently accurate	<10%

Probability Yardstick



Document production

	ORIGINATOR	REVIEWED BY	RELEASED BY
Name	s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA		TORH01
Role	Intelligence Analysts	Manager: AIO (Acting)	Director National Intelligence (Acting)
Date	16/12/2025	16/12/2025	16/12/2025

Handling Instructions

This document is classified ~~RESTRICTED~~

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as ~~RESTRICTED~~ if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

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s 6(c) OIA

viii The Guardian. [Bondi beach shooting live updates: opposition leader Sussan Ley accuses government of failing to protect Jewish Australians and urges immediate action in wake of terror attack](#). Retrieved 15 December 2025, 1255hrs.

ix The Guardian. [Bondi beach mass shooting: what we know so far about the terrorist attack | Bondi beach terror attack | The Guardian](#). Retrieved 16 December 2025, 0336hrs.

x Stuff. [Stuff.co.nz/worldnews/360914214/reports-shooting-bondi-beach](#)

s 6(c) OIA
xii Stuff. [Live: Australian intelligence agency linked Bondi shooter to Isis six years ago | Stuff](#). Retrieved 15 December 2025, 1336hrs.

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

xviii s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]

xxx [Community Scoop » Never Again Is Now – Auckland March Against Jew Hatred](#) Retrieved 16 December 2025 at 0648hrs

s 6(c) OIA
[Redacted text block]




NEW ZEALAND
POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Intelligence Report

Violent Extremist Ideologies and
Causes in New Zealand

14 September 2023



Key Findings

- Known persons of interest (PoI) in New Zealand support a diverse range of violent extremist (VE) causes and ideologies. Of the **s 6(c) OIA** PoI recorded in the New Zealand Police National Security Portal:¹
 - 52% are assessed to adhere to a form of Identity Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)
 - 20% are assessed to adhere to a form of Faith Motivated Violent Extremism (FMVE)
 - 18% are assessed to adhere to a form of Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE)
 - 10% are assessed to have a Mixed, Unclear and Unstable (MUU) form of violent extremism
- While adherence to some causes and ideologies are indicators of VE, it is important that identification and management of VE is not narrowly focused on specific ideologies. Potential violent extremists increasingly have unclear, unstable, and mixed ideologies, and range from complex ideologies to a commitment to relatively simple political, ideological, or religious causes, with their threat based upon individual intent and capability. The VE environment in New Zealand has the ability to change rapidly, and narrow focus on specific ideologies is unlikely to be beneficial to detection and intervention efforts.
- The online environment continues to influence the presence and prevalence of different ideologies and causes in New Zealand. Increased VE rhetoric relating to political causes has been observed.
- Adherence to VE is becoming increasingly motivated by a combination of individualised and complex drivers. The COVID-19 pandemic, the online environment, and unstable social cohesion have likely contributed to this shift towards individualisation. The individualised nature of ideologies, often associated with a fixation on violence will likely exacerbate the threat of lone actors, and continue to present challenges for New Zealand Police (NZeP) regarding detection, prevention, and disengagement.
- The possibility of a galvanizing event or development, domestically or internationally, that specifically impacts a group within society has the potential to significantly influence New Zealand's VE landscape. As observed with the COVID-19 pandemic, galvanizing events have the potential to emerge very quickly, and significantly influence individual and group grievances, ideologies, causes, and the way members of New Zealand society perceive Government institutions, including NZeP.
- Consideration could be given to continuing to monitor New Zealand's VE ideologies and causes to inform both an awareness of whether problems are developing within New Zealand's VE landscape, **s 6(c) OIA**.

¹ Data included **s 6(c) OIA**

Introduction

Background

1. The crime of terrorism is defined in the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 as involving one of a range of serious violent acts that are intended to advance an ideological, political, or religious cause.² While many violent extremists in New Zealand adhere to extensive ideologies, engaging in a violent act to advance a simple cause, such as anti-vaccination, may also meet the definition of terrorism in New Zealand.
2. New Zealand's Violent Extremist (VE)³ environment is dynamic and influenced by a broad range of domestic and international events, causes, and ideologies. New Zealand has experienced a number of violent incidents carried out in support of a range of ideologies and causes. Some of the different examples include the 1982 Whanganui computer bombing, acts conducted by those influenced by the rise of ISIS, and modern forms of white supremacy, accelerationism, and conspiracies.
3. In addition to VE ideologies, Grievance Fuelled Violence (GFV), which is violence for revenge, retribution, or justice, also interacts with the VE landscape and often mirrors ideological motivations and manifests in similar ways. A separate Intelligence Report assessing New Zealand's GFV landscape is currently underway.

Purpose

4. This product provides insight into the current domestic VE landscape, with a particular focus on the presence and prevalence of VE ideologies and causes.
5. This product assesses the presence and relative prevalence of different kinds of VE ideologies and causes held by the individuals identified in the NZP National Security Portal (NSP), and the likely future forecasts for New Zealand's VE ideologies.

Analysis

New Zealand's Violent Extremist Landscape

6. A spectrum of ideologies continue to influence New Zealand's VE landscape, including Identity Motivated VE (IMVE), Faith Motivated VE (FMVE), Mixed, Unclear and Unstable (MUU), and Politically Motivated VE (PMVE).
 - IMVE is defined as promoting violence to advance one's own perception of identity and/or denigrate other's perceived identities.⁴ Examples of IMVE include White-Identity Motivated VE (W-IMVE),⁵ and Involuntary celibates (Incel),⁶ and Hindutva.⁷

² Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 <https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM152702.html>

³ Violent extremism can be described as the justification of violence with the aim of radically changing the nature of government, religion, or society. Sourced from: New Zealand's Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy, 2022.

⁴ CTAG 22-121-TI CTAG Glossary – 2022 Update, issued 19 October 2022.

⁵ W-IMVE is defined as promoting violence to further perceived white supremacist ideals.

⁶ Incel IMVE is defined as promoting violence against others for denying them sexual relationships to which they believe themselves entitled.

⁷ Hindutva IMVE is defined as promoting violence to further Hindu nationalist supremacy, based on the denigration of others for their identity as "non-Hindu".

- FMVE is defined as promoting the use of violence to advance one's own spiritual or religious objectives.⁸ Examples of FMVE include Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda-(AQ) Inspired VE,⁹ Christian-Inspired VE, and Anti-abortion VE.¹⁰ The majority of individuals who have been identified in the NSP as adhering to FMVE adhere to ISIL inspired VE, with some individuals adhering to Christian-Inspired VE.
 - PMVE is defined as promoting violence to achieve change to an existing political system.¹¹ Examples of PMVE ideologies include Anti-authority PMVE¹² and Sovereign Citizen-inspired PMVE.^{13,14}
 - MUU is defined as supporting the use of violence to advance ideological beliefs that do not fit clearly into a defined category of VE.¹⁵ Establishment of MUU ideologies can help explain the presence of individuals who appear to adhere to a combination of ideologies or have fluidity or instability in their adherence.
7. **IMVE makes up the largest cohort of known VE individuals in the NSP (52%).** This is *likely* due to a range of factors, including the influence of **s 6(c) OIA** and the increase in members of the public reporting and discovering such rhetoric.
8. **FMVE (20%) and PMVE (18%) are the next largest and have similar sized cohorts. MUU (10%) currently makes up the smallest cohort of known VE individuals in New** **s 6(c) OIA**
9. **Although IMVE makes up the largest cohort of individuals, this does not necessarily translate into the level of threat posed by this ideology.** New Zealand's current VE landscape is highly individualised and dominated by people who are likely to plan and act alone. However, given New Zealand's VE landscape has the potential to change rapidly, ongoing monitoring is necessary to support existing efforts and inform future approaches.

⁸ CTAG Glossary – 2022 Update. Issued 19 October 2022. Page 3.

⁹ ISIL and AQ-Inspired FMVE: Use of violence to create a state based on an extreme, conservative, version of Sunni Islam.

¹⁰ Anti-abortion FMVE is defined as the use of violence to further an anti-abortion belief based on faith.

¹¹ CTAG 22-121-TI CTAG Glossary – 2022 Update issued 19 October 2022.


¹² Anti-Authority PMVE promote violence to further perceived or experienced grievances against typically government authority figures and institutions.

¹³ Defined as promoting violence to further claims national governments are illegitimate and that individuals can legally withdraw their consent to be governed by national governments.

¹⁴ NIC-IN-230530 Update – Sovereign Citizens in New Zealand

¹⁵ CTAG DMS6-15-1399 - Mixed Unstable and Unclear Ideologies in the New Zealand National Security Environment issued 21 December 2022.

Figure 1: Violent Extremist Ideologies that Individuals Adhere to in the New Zealand Police National Security Portal



Identity Motivated Violent Extremism

10. The majority of individuals adhering to IMVE in the NSP adhere to W-IMVE, with a small number adhering to Incel IMVE. A small number of individuals adhere to both W-IMVE and Incel IMVE related ideologies.

A domestic example of W-IMVE includes the terrorist attack that occurred in Christchurch on 15 March 2019.

11. **Over the past 12 months, an increase in anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric espoused by the IMVE community, particularly W-IMVE, has been observed.** Anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric is often rooted in perceptions that the LGBTQ+ community is an ‘out-group’ that challenge a perceived dominance by IMVE ideologies and contradicts the W-IMVE desired state of community. It is *likely* IMVE individuals use the public espousal of anti-LGBTQ+ communities as an opportunity to persuade, recruit, and radicalise individuals who hold similar views. This has been sighted internationally, particularly in the United States.¹⁶

12. **Attention paid by activists, media, academics, and communities, to those they perceive as IMVE is increasing.** As with other VE ideologies and causes, public attention is inevitable and can have complex effects. It can increase awareness and reporting, helping to bring individuals to attention of agencies, as well as increase the social cost of certain behaviours, and act as a deterrent. However, it can also raise the profile and impact individuals disproportionately to their actions, complicate operational and preventative activities, and create expectations of law enforcement. This can in turn impact public trust and confidence, particularly with groups and individuals who are, or perceive that they are, targets of VE.

13. **Increased public awareness and attention on VE individuals pose a range of risks to Pol themselves.** The public naming and shaming can result in the breakdown of protective factors such as career prospects, familial relationships, and access to a bank account, all of which may influence individuals to become further entrenched and disenfranchised by their ideological beliefs. **This creates challenges for prevention activities, as it may result in individuals obscuring their beliefs following concerns they may be exposed and shunned by society.**

¹⁶ 19/06/2022 “Why are white nationalist groups targeting LGBTQ groups?”, National Public Radio, accessed via <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/19/1106125400/why-are-white-nationalist-groups-targeting-lgbtq-groups>.

Faith Motivated Violent Extremism

14. Many individuals identified as adhering to FMVE in the NSP spend a lot of time online, regularly posting their activities and providing their opinion on various political issues. The majority of FMVE individuals in New Zealand possess violent ISIL and AQ propaganda and literature, with many displaying flags and symbols in their homes.

A domestic example of ISIL inspired FMVE includes the Lynmall Supermarket attack on 3 September 2021.

15. **As with other forms of VE, those assessed as supporting FMVE can have differing levels of commitment to act.** Those supportive of an FMVE cause can have unclear and changeable levels of observable religious behaviour and alignment with faith communities, which may or may not play a role in their radicalisation. For example, there are individuals who voice support for ISIS but have little interaction with the Islamic faith, the Muslim community, or observable religious behaviour.

16. **The complexity of individual circumstances complicates NZP prevention and enforcement activity.** For example, it is often publicly assumed that ISIL inspired individuals can be disengaged by an approach based on faith or involving faith. In reality, this is only sometimes the case, given the wide range of factors at play in radicalisation.

Politically Motivated Violent Extremism

17. All individuals identified as adhering to PMVE in the NSP adhere to Anti-authority PMVE, with a small number of individuals also adhering to Sovereign Citizen-inspired PMVE.

An offshore example of PMVE includes the attack on the United States Capitol on 6 January 2021

18. **The number of individuals adhering to anti-authority PMVE has increased since COVID-19, with a number of PMVE individuals in the NSP identified as anti-Police.** s 6(c) OIA

19. **Following the resignation of New Zealand's former Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, and the relaxation of New Zealand's COVID-19 mitigation measures, PMVE narratives continued to be observed online and on the fringes of in-person public political events.** Over the past 12 months, PMVE individuals have been observed sharing conspiracy theories online, including blaming events on a group to achieve change within an existing political system.¹⁷ Examples include blaming events such as terrorist attacks, mass shootings in the United States, and COVID-19 on Rainbow Communities in New Zealand.¹⁸ s 6(c) OIA

Mixed, Unstable and Unclear Ideologies

20. **A shift has been observed in the domestic and broader international VE environment toward highly individualised ideological narratives that often include elements from a range of ideologies, some of which contradict one another.** Many of the individuals referred to NZP have highly personalised ideologies, often based on a fundamental interest in violence, which may be wider than, or precede their interest in an ideology or cause. Individuals drawn to violence for

¹⁷ 22-123-TI Anti-Rainbow Communities Sentiment in VE.

¹⁸ 22-123-TI Anti-Rainbow Communities Sentiment in VE.

example, may consume Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant propaganda alongside material from the 2019 Christchurch attacks.

21. **The primary threat in New Zealand remains the risk of lone actors, with basic, but effective levels of attack capability.**¹⁹ The increasingly individualised nature of New Zealand's VE landscape, coupled with the ongoing prevalence of MUU ideologies, alongside a more unpredictable, attractive, and harder to recognise landscape will *likely* exacerbate the threat lone actors pose to New Zealand, and continue to create an unpredictable VE environment.²⁰

Single Issue Motivated Violent Extremism

22. SMVE is defined as promoting violence to achieve a desired outcome related to a specific issue.²¹ No individuals have been identified in the NSP as currently holding beliefs that are primarily motivated by SMVE. An example of someone with SMVE would be someone who opposes the use of 1080, and those who adhere to Environmentalism-Inspired SMVE (E-SMVE).²²
23. It is *possible* individuals who may have previously met the threshold for SMVE would now be categorised within MUU, due to New Zealand's increasingly individualised VE landscape whereby individuals are appearing to adhere to a combination of ideologies or have fluidity or instability in their adherence.
24. **There are several difficulties in determining whether an individual adheres to SMVE as opposed to being motivated by other VE ideologies, personal grievances, or a combination of factors.**²³ s 6(c) OIA
[REDACTED]
25. No individuals who adhere to E-SMVE have been identified in the NSP. However, given extreme weather events²⁴ are expected to increase,²⁵ alongside the subsequent possibility of increased climate related policies and legislation, it is *possible* New Zealand will observe an increase in E-SMVE. Despite international trends indicating individuals who adhere to E-SMVE are less likely to use violence against groups or individuals to advance their cause, individuals who adhere to E-SMVE often hold strong environmental views as part of wider political and ideological positions, and as such, ongoing monitoring of E-SMVE is necessary, both to support existing efforts and to inform consideration of whether a change in approach is required.

Violent Extremist Causes in New Zealand

26. **VE causes often sit on the edge of different ideologies.** The Khalistani Movement²⁶ is an example of a VE cause that often sits on the edge of different ideologies. For example, some individuals who support the Khalistani Movement may fall into the realms of PMVE when they promote violence to re-establish an independent Sikh homeland, yet aspects of the Khalistani Movement may fall into the realm of FMVE. It is possible the upcoming trial of the individuals

¹⁹ NZP National Security Group Quarterly Report, Quarter Two 2023.

²⁰ SITG is currently in the process of completing an Intelligence Report which will provide insight into New Zealand's Lone Actor Grievance Fuelled Violence.

²¹ CTAG Glossary – 2022 Update. 22-121-TI. Page 4.

²² Defined as promoting violence to achieve political change to the benefit of the environment and planet.

²³ CTA Glossary – New Zealand Single-Issue Motivated VE Page 4.

²⁴ Cyclones, increased rainfall, and coastal flooding.

²⁵ Public Health Communication Centre Aotearoa, Accessed on 21/04/23 via <https://www.phcc.org.nz/briefing/seven-decades-severe-weather-events-aotearoa-new-zealand-what-are-human-health-impacts>.

²⁶ The Khalistani Movement is a separatist movement seeking to create a homeland for Sikhs by establishing an ethno-religious sovereign state called Khalistan in the Punjab region.

involved in the attack of Harnek SINGH, which occurred in Auckland, December 2020,²⁷ will increase rhetoric regarding Khalistani PMVE.

27. A range of polarising issues have been observed across New Zealand society in the last 12 months, including transgender-rights, co-governance, and climate change. **There has been a perceived increase in VE rhetoric relating to political causes, with many individuals finding a common cause in opposing New Zealand's former Prime Minister, and the Governments' COVID-19 Response Plan.** Following the resignation of New Zealand's former Prime Minister, and the relaxation of New Zealand's COVID-19 mitigation measures, narratives relating to political causes continue to be observed online.
28. **It is likely conversation and attention on political related causes will continue for the next 12 months, given the upcoming election, and the possibility of post-election controversial policies, will exacerbate an already polarised political landscape.** It is possible this will result in VEs mobilising towards violence, possibly in the form of violent protest, in an attempt to advance related causes. Increased conversation and attention on such issues can also take time to manifest. As such, on-going monitoring of political causes where there is a VE risk will be useful when informing awareness of possible emerging narratives.
29. **Whilst some causes and ideologies are indicators of VE, it is important that identification and management of VE is not narrowly focused on specific ideologies.** VE ideologies are increasingly unclear and mixed, and range from complex ideologies to relatively simple causes, with their threat based upon individual intent and capability. The VE environment in New Zealand has the ability to change rapidly, and narrow focus on specific ideologies is unlikely to be beneficial to detection and intervention efforts. Ongoing monitoring of New Zealand's VE environment is necessary to ensure existing efforts are supported, and to inform consideration of whether a change in approach is required, should New Zealand's VE environment begin to change.

Outlook

30. **Some other countries have identified specific ideologies, movements and groups as their priority threat to National Security. However, rather than focusing on an ideology, a threat actor approach suggests that the primary threat in New Zealand remains the risk of lone actors, with basic, but effective levels of attack capability, rather than a particular ideology.**²⁸ The increasingly individualised nature of New Zealand's VE landscape, often involving a fixation on violence, coupled with the ongoing prevalence of individuals with MUU ideologies, will possibly exacerbate the threat lone actors pose to New Zealand's landscape, and continue to create an unpredictable VE environment. **s 6(c) OIA**
[REDACTED]
31. **A range of international and domestic events, alongside key economic and societal changes, have the potential to influence New Zealand's VE ideologies and causes.** For instance, fixation on New Zealand's Prime Minister Christopher Hipkins following the resignation of the Right Honourable Jacinda Ardern, the upcoming 2023 New Zealand General Election, the 2024 United States Presidential Election, increasing inequality,²⁹ polarisation, and societal discontent. **The**

²⁷ New Zealand Herald, 26 May 2022 <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/crime/wattle-downs-attempted-murder-jaspal-singh-sentenced-for-stabbing-radio-host-harnek-singh/6MZCHNDWF6LQSHR4K3RUVETLMI/>

²⁸ NZP National Security Group Quarterly Report, Quarter Two 2023.

²⁹ Horizontal inequalities (economic, political, social, cultural) are linked to a lack of identity and perceptions of injustice and have been identified as drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism. The risk of violence increases when groups witness inequality across a range of dimensions such as political exclusion, lack of access to; assets, land, jobs, social services, and/or

globalisation of the VE landscape, and increased use of the internet to share and access information, will *almost certainly* continue to exacerbate the influence international causes will have on New Zealand's VE landscape.

32. A galvanizing event that specifically impacts a group within society has the potential to significantly influence New Zealand's VE landscape. Galvanizing events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent mitigation measures imposed by the New Zealand Government, have the potential to emerge very quickly, and significantly influence and exacerbate individual and group grievances, ideologies, causes, and the way members of New Zealand society perceive NZP, the Government, and other parts of society.
33. Extreme weather events³⁰ are expected to increase,³¹ alongside the subsequent possibility of increased climate related policies and legislation. Despite no individuals who adhere to E-SMVE being identified in New Zealand, it is *possible* New Zealand will observe an increase in E-SMVE, alongside an increase in VE individuals advocating for causes against climate related policies and legislation. International trends indicate individuals who adhere to E-SMVE are more likely to use violence against infrastructure as opposed to individuals or groups to advance their cause. However, given the VE landscape is complex and dynamic, tactics and targets used by those adhering to VE ideologies and causes have the potential to change rapidly.
34. Accusations of what is commonly referred to as left-wing VE is becoming more frequent within New Zealand. However, there is very little to suggest left-wing VE is occurring in New Zealand, with research suggesting several politico-social factors known to influence left-wing VE, remain absent within New Zealand.^{32,33} Despite this, as attention to right-wing VE intensifies, it is *likely* accusations of left-wing VE will become more frequent. Similar to E-SMVE, despite those who adhere to left-wing VE causes internationally, such as gender equity and animal rights, being less likely to use violence against groups or individuals to advance their cause, tactics and targets used by those adhering to VE ideologies or causes in New Zealand have the potential to change rapidly.

Considerations

35. Consideration could be given to Police maintaining an ideologically agnostic approach and work with both internal and external partners, alongside the public, to emphasise that VE can take many forms, and involve many ideologies and causes, which could be both individual or idiosyncratic.

s 6(c) OIA

discrimination based on culture or language.

<https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgkq326/files/publications/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20Development.pdf>

³⁰ Cyclones, increased rainfall, and coastal flooding.

³¹ Public Health Communication Centre Aotearoa, Accessed on 21/04/2-23 via <https://www.phcc.org.nz/briefing/seven-decades-severe-weather-events-aotearoa-new-zealand-what-are-human-health-impacts>.

³² National Security Journal, Left-wing VE: Identifying precursors and growth in New Zealand. s 9(2)(g)(ii) OIA
19 March 2023.

³³ Many of the issues typically attached to left-wing violent extremism such as income re-distribution and accessible social services are "business as usual topics" canvassed in government policy and are assessed as unlikely to become violently contested issues without significant socio-political-cultural change.

36. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

Appendix A - Methodology

37. Quantitative and qualitative data was extracted from the NZP IMT NSP. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

38. The information in this product reflects NZP's best current understanding of causes and issues in the NSP. However, given the NSP is a living portal, causes and issues may change based on new information and the re-assessment of cases. As such, limits to accurate reporting and the data used throughout this product should be noted.

39. Information from internal and external workgroups, and open source and academic sources were also used to supplement IMT data and help inform understanding of the broader domestic VE environment.

40. A range of Structured Analytical Techniques were used to inform this product, including a Key Assumptions Check, Structured Brainstorms, Key Drivers Generation, and Cone of Plausibility.

41. s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED]

³⁴ From September 2022 to March 2023. The 6-month time period was chosen to ensure that s 6(c) OIA [REDACTED] assessments and enquires completed within 3 months.


~~RESTRICTED~~

All NZ Police staff are approved to access and handle information classified as ~~RESTRICTED~~ if it is needed to fulfil their role. It must never be accessed or shared for personal use or be shared outside NZ Police unless a formal sharing and protection agreement is in place.

METHOD	RULES
Electronic transmission	ALL RESTRICTED information transmitted across public networks within New Zealand or across any networks overseas must be encrypted using a system approved by the GCSB. Internally the NZP email system is approved. When sending outside NZP, use SEEMAIL
Manual transmission	For transfer within New Zealand, it may be carried by ordinary postal service or commercial courier firms by 'double enveloping'. The outer envelope/package should be closed, and the classification label should not be visible. It should be addressed to an individual by name and title. RESTRICTED mail for or from overseas posts should be carried by diplomatic airfreight via MFAT. The outer envelope must clearly show a return address in case delivery is unsuccessful. In some cases, due to the nature of the contents, identifying NZ Police may be inappropriate so a return PO Box alone should be used.
Storage and disposal	In an office environment, RESTRICTED material should be held in a lockable storage area or cabinet. In a storage facility, all material should be protected through controlled access to the storage areas, and through a secure physical environment. Must be disposed of by approved shredders or, as a second choice, the secure destruction services (i.e. Blue Bins)
More information	https://tenone.police.govt.nz/pi/information-classification-and-protection

Probabilistic Language

Probability Statement	Qualitative Statement	Percentage Probability
ALMOST CERTAIN	The event will occur in most circumstances	>95%
LIKELY	The event will probably occur in most circumstances	>65%
POSSIBLE	The event might occur some of the time	>35%
UNLIKELY	The event could occur in some circumstances	<35%
RARE	The event has remote chance of occurring	<5%



Case Categories

November 2023



S 6(c) OIA

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