



INTELLIGENCE REPORT

MIU-20-188

26 March 2021

TITLE	Intelligence Report of Assessment of External and Internal Security Threats to s 6(c)
PRIMARY CUSTOMERS	s 9(2)(a), Lead National Security System Advisor, Protective Security Team
WRITTEN BY	MIU039 (Analyst), s 6(c) (Analyst), MIU040
REVIEWED BY	MIU034 (Principal)
RELEASED BY	MIU043 (Manager)

Executive Summary

- (R) There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that the 2019 Christchurch attacks could inspire a copycat or retaliatory terrorist attack in New Zealand in the medium¹ to long-term².
- (R) An attack on s 6(c)³ would LIKELY be intended to cause extensive harm, s 6(c)
- s 6(c)
- (R) There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that White Identity Extremism (WIE) supporters in New Zealand who pursue WIE ideologies could be incited to carry out attacks against s 6(c)
- (R) Any potential attack targeting s 6(c)

¹ Six months to three years

² A period that is over three years

³ s 6(c)



- (R) s 6(c)

Purpose

1. (R) The purpose of this report is to identify potential actors of security concern who may target occupants and staff at s 6(c), as well as providing Protective Security with an understanding of their potential behaviour and capabilities. This will enable Protective Security to inform security settings, operational planning and responses at s 6(c). This will be additional to and independent from the physical security assessment of the facility that was carried out in June 2020.

Context

2. (R) A physical security assessment⁴ was undertaken by the government at s 6(c) following the 15 March 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings (the Christchurch attacks). The assessment found that there was an increased level of risk following the change in the environment as a result of the attacks. s 6(c)


Scope

3. (R) This assessment identifies the following:
- a. Possible long term external threats posed by groups or individuals who could target the facility.
 - b. s 6(c)
 - c.
 - d.

⁴ s 6(c)




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White Identity Extremism's Global Reach and Online Presence

There has been a shift from affiliated to unaffiliated terrorism and online rather than in person radicalisation across most forms of ideological terrorism in the West over the past two decades.

7. (R) It is **LIKELY** that New Zealand based individuals are contributing to and participating in discussions and content creation, including anti-refugee sentiment, on white identity extremist websites. The existence of a WIE movement with a global reach was highlighted by the Christchurch attacker¹¹ in his online manifesto where he took inspiration from white supremacists in Norway, the United States of America (USA), Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK), all of whom carried out racist attacks in recent years.¹² s 6(c)

[REDACTED]

8. (R) There is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that the rapid development of the internet and social media will facilitate the radicalisation of WIE individuals who may consider s 6(c)

[REDACTED] Far-right terrorist incidents in the West have increased by 250 percent over the past five years. There was just one recorded far-right terrorist attack in 2010, compared to 49 in 2019. The number of deaths from far-right motivated terrorism in the West has increased by 709 percent over the past five years, rising from 11 deaths in 2014 to 89 deaths in 2019. There have been at least 35 far-right terrorist attacks every year for the past five years. Far-right terrorism is more likely to be carried out by individuals unaffiliated with specific terrorist groups compared to other types of terrorism (chiefly Islamist terrorism and far-left terrorism). The majority of far right terrorist attacks have been carried out by lone actors who are not affiliated with a specific terrorist group or far-right organization, even though they may had contact with other far-right individuals, or been inspired by other far right attacks (see Appendix One).¹⁴ s 6(c)

The Christchurch terrorist attacks on 15 March 2019 are predicted to have a long-term influence on the terrorism threat environment in New Zealand.

9. (R) There is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that the Christchurch attacks could inspire a copycat or retaliatory terrorist attack in the medium to long-term. Video footage of the attacks and the terrorist's manifesto continue to circulate online and are still discussed by New Zealand-based

¹¹ Identity anonymised to align with the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 Report

¹² The New York Times, 15 March 2019, *New Zealand Massacre Highlights Global Reach of White Extremism* <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/asia/christchurch-mass-shooting-extremism.html> [accessed 17 December 2020]

¹³ s 6(c)

¹⁴ Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2020. <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/reports> [accessed 13 January 2021].



Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)¹⁵, supporters. s 6(c)
[Redacted] . IMVE affiliation is LIKELY to increase in the medium-term, due to: rising nationalism, a global increase in IMVE, COVID-19-linked conspiracy theories, and crisis narratives emerging from international events such as the US election. These developments could possibly be exploited by IMVE supporters to promote their ideologies.¹⁶

10. (R) s 6(c)
[Redacted] This follows the formation of more violent extremist groups internationally over the last five years. s 6(c)
[Redacted] s 6(c)
[Redacted] s 6(c)
[Redacted] s 6(c)
[Redacted] s 6(c)
[Redacted] It is LIKELY that there are other violent extremists in New Zealand whose level of radicalisation and mobilisation to violence is unknown to law enforcement and security agencies.¹⁶

Out of Scope
[Large redacted area]

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¹⁵ s 6(c)
[Redacted]
¹⁶ s 6(c)
[Redacted]

¹⁷ Fratzke, Susan and Lena Kainz. 2020. *The Next Generation of Refugee Resettlement in Europe: Ambitions for the future and how to realise them*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Out of Scope
[Redacted]



s 6(c)

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External Security Threats to s 6(c)

16. (R) s 6(c)

s 6(c)

The potential risk to members of the New Zealand refugee community was highlighted by the Christchurch attacks involving a WIE who targeted Muslims due to a racist belief known as the Great Replacement. s 6(c)

17. (R) s 6(c)

s 6(c)

28

There is, however, no information (at the time of writing) suggesting that New Zealand-based extremists have a current and credible intent to attack any particular individual or community.

18. (R) s 6(c)

s 6(c)

Recent right-wing extremist terrorist attacks have demonstrated a tendency of IMVE terrorists who are hostile to minorities or adherents of a particular religion to target their places of gathering or worship (see Appendix One).

²⁴ The Great Replacement is an Identitarianism belief that white people in Western countries are being replaced by non-white people and certain religious groups (primarily Muslims).

²⁵ s 6(c)

²⁶ The Conversation, 11 March 2020. *Far-right extremists still threaten New Zealand, a year on from the Christchurch attacks*. <https://theconversation.com/far-right-extremists-still-threaten-new-zealand-a-year-on-from-the-christchurch-attacks-133050> [accessed 2 February 2021]

²⁷ This is an ideology concerned with the preservation of the 'white race' in reaction to a conspiratorial belief that Muslims or foreigners are displacing white people in western countries.

²⁸ s 6(c)



19. (R) s 6(c)

[Redacted text block]

20. (R) s 6(c)

[Redacted text block]

Current Strengths and Vulnerabilities of Te Āhuru Mōwai o Aotearoa

s 6(c)

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
29 s 6(c)

30 s 6(c)

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


s 6(c)



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s 6(c)



³¹ s 6(c)



25 s 6(c)

[Redacted content]

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s 6(c)



Information Gaps

26. (R) The extent of WIE sentiment in New Zealand is hard to quantify. s 6(c)
27. (R) The Refugee Quota was supposed to have increased from 1,000 to 1,500 places annually from July 2020, but this did not happen as the Refugee Quota programme was suspended in 2020 due to the global impact of COVID-19. s 6(c)
28. (R) Population and migration trends prior to COVID-19 have been given as a reason that WIE has found traction in New Zealand s 6(c)
29. (R) s 6(c)

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³³ s 6(c)

RESTRICTED



**MINISTRY OF BUSINESS,
INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT**
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI



APPENDIX ONE TO
INTELLIGENCE REPORT MIU-20-188
DATE 26 March 21

s 6(c)

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³⁴ Identity anonymised to align with the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 Report

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Administration

Additional distribution [delete and add as appropriate]

Name	Title, Organisation

Document Control

Version	Date	Author	Description of change
1.0	26 March 2021	MIU039, s 6(c) [redacted], [redacted], MIU040	Original

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Classification	Abbreviation	Description
UNCLASSIFIED	(U)	The compromise of information does not have the potential to cause harm or breach a person's privacy.
IN-CONFIDENCE	(IC)	The compromise of official information could damage the reputation of the Ministry or the Government, breach the privacy of a citizen or cause problems with law and order
SENSITIVE	(SEN)	The compromise of information is likely to damage New Zealand's interests or endanger the safety of its citizens
RESTRICTED	(R)	The compromise of information would be likely to adversely affect the national interest.

The use of probabilistic language in this document

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Probabilistic language

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Remote / High Unlikely	<10%
Improbable / Unlikely	15 – 20%
Realistic Possibility	25 – 50%
Probable / Likely	55 – 70%
Highly / Very Probable / Likely	75 – 85%
Almost Certain	>90%



Analytic Confidence

High confidence	Generally indicates judgments based on high-quality information, and/or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A "high confidence" judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and still carries a risk of being incorrect.
Moderate confidence	Generally means credibly sourced and plausible information, but not of sufficient quality or corroboration to warrant a higher level of confidence.
Low confidence	Generally means questionable or implausible information was used, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or significant concerns or problems with sources existed.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT: MIU-21-223

08 September 2021

TITLE	Intelligence Report on Immigration New Zealand Counter Terrorism Persons of Interest
PRIMARY CUSTOMERS	<p>Catriona Robinson, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration New Zealand</p> <p>Jacqui Ellis - General Manager – Intelligence Data and Insights</p> <p>§ 9(2)(a) – National Manager - Targeting Analytics and Insights, Intelligence</p> <p>Stephen Vaughan – Acting GM Operations, Associate DCE for Immigration New Zealand</p> <p>§ 9(2)(a) – National Manager Risk and Verification</p> <p>§ 9(2)(a) - Principal Advisor to General Manager, Operations, Tasking and Improvement</p>
WRITTEN BY	MIU034
REVIEWED BY	MIU004
RELEASED BY	MIU089

Executive Summary

- (R) § individuals of possible counter terrorism concern were identified in this report. Immigration New Zealand regularly engages with the New Zealand Intelligence Community in relation to leads of national security concern. § 6(c)

- § 6(c)

- § 6(c)



- s 6(c)

- s 6(c)

This report is subject to section 151 of the Immigration Act 2009. Any breach of section 151 may constitute an offence under section 354 of the Immigration Act 2009.

This document contains RESTRICTED information that is not to be disclosed or disseminated further without authority from the MBIE Intelligence Unit.

Purpose

1. (R) The purpose of this report is to provide the Immigration Leadership Team with an overview of current persons of counter terrorism concern who have engaged with the immigration system and who are assessed to pose a potential threat to national security.

Context

2. (R) On 3 September 2021 an individual known operationally as ACRE conducted an attack at a supermarket in New Lynn using a knife he obtained from within the store. He attacked and injured seven people before being shot and killed. The individual was the subject of a counter terrorism investigation as a long-term adherent of faith-motivated violent extremism in support of ISIL. He had recently been released from prison.
3. (R) The individual had a long history with Immigration New Zealand (INZ), and was most recently contesting an INZ decision with respect to his refugee status, which he had appealed with the Immigration Protection Tribunal (IPT). The Immigration leadership team have requested a product to inform their understanding of whether any cases exist where individuals who pose a national security threat could be engaging with the immigration system in a similar manner.

Scope

4. (R) The report will provide an overview of persons of interest, their basic biographic information and s 6(c)
5. (R) The report will focus s 6(c), or persons who have engaged with the immigration system in the process of obtaining



New Zealand citizenship. s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]).

Currency of information

6. s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted].

7. s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]

Findings

8. (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted].

9. (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

10. (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted].

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s 6(c) [redacted]

⁴ s 6(c) [redacted] citizen has been subject to a deportation liability notice and this is currently with resolutions awaiting a decision

⁵ New Zealand Immigration Operational Manual. SZ1.5.



s 6(c) [Redacted]

11. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] 7

12. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

13. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- a) s 6(c) [Redacted]
- b) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- c) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted] 10

s 6(c) [Redacted]

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14. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

15. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Summary of immigration status for individuals of possible counter terrorism concern

16. (R) Of s 6(c) [Redacted] persons who have engaged with the immigration system and who are assessed to pose a potential threat to national security:

- a) s 6(c) [Redacted] citizens.
- b) s 6(c) [Redacted] who travelled to New Zealand as minors, s 6(c) [Redacted] who travelled as an adult.
- c) s 6(c) [Redacted] permanent resident who arrived as a s 6(c) [Redacted] as a minor.
- d) s 6(c) [Redacted] one of whom entered as a minor.
- e) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- f) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- g) s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

¹¹ s 6(c) [Redacted]
[Redacted]



Pages redacted under s 6 c)

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Annex II: Historic cases of national security concern, for your situational awareness.

17. (R) INZ has engaged with a number of individuals who we historically held information on that suggested they could be of potential national security concern. It is not possible to compile a fulsome list of these individuals in a concise format. Due to their potentially complex or sensitive nature, a number of these have been summarised below for general situational awareness. These individuals are **not** assessed to pose a current threat to national security concern based on informational available at the time.

- a) (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted] The applicant provided no explanation for the paraphernalia but claimed the firearms were family heirlooms. s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted] The INZ Risk Assessment Team (RAT) are seeking legal advice to determine if the s 6(c) [redacted]
- b) (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted] a subsequent IPT appeal was dismissed. The following year a statutory declaration by the applicant was received, which declared in s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted] s [redacted]
- c) (s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted] is a s 6(c) [redacted] In s 6(c) [redacted], INZ was advised by s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]. No additional actions are being taken in relation to this case.
- d) (R) [redacted]¹⁵ has been the subject of extensive allegations from his [redacted] alleging he adheres to an extremist interpretation of Islam and had made threats s 6(c) [redacted]. s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

s 6(c) [redacted]



security threat. It is LIKELY the allegations around the national security risk are vexatious in nature. s 6(c)

[REDACTED] s 6(c)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] s 6(c)
[REDACTED]

e) (R) s 6(c) ¹⁷ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. These offences are not on his s 6(c)
[REDACTED] s he was found not guilty due to lack of evidence. Open source
information indicates these charges s 6(c)
[REDACTED] s 6(c)
[REDACTED]

f) s 6(c) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was interviewed by
the INZ RAT and Specialist Assessment Team however the decision was made there
was not enough information to justify a decline. s 6(c)
[REDACTED].

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s 6(c) [REDACTED]



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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

MI-22-082

Date 7 June 2022

TITLE	Intelligence Report on Anti-Government Sentiment – Risks to MBIE
PRIMARY CUSTOMERS	Jacqui Ellis – General Manager Data, Insights and Intelligence
WRITTEN BY	MI097 (Analyst)
REVIEWED BY	MI004 (Principal)
RELEASED BY	MI088 (Manager)

Executive Summary

- (U) Anti-government rhetoric in New Zealand society has increased significantly in the aftermath of the February Parliament protest. The language employed by Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE) influenced individuals and groups has escalated from resistance against government mandates, to advocating for vengeance and retribution against those deemed responsible for the COVID-19 mitigation programs.
- (R) The steadily increasing volume and nature of PMVE threatening rhetoric regarding the government is has created an environment that normalises, justifies and socialises violence as a legitimate response to changes in public policy. This, combined with individuals' personal grievances against the government, increases the likelihood that individuals will be radicalised and inspired to mobilise to violence, particularly against government agencies responsible for aspects of the COVID-19 mitigation program, such as MBIE.¹

- (R) s 6(c) [Redacted text] .²

- (R) s 6(c) [Redacted text] .³

- (IC) s 6(c) [Redacted text]

¹ s 6(c) [Redacted text] df

² s 6(c) [Redacted text]

s 6(c) [Redacted text]



Purpose

1. (U) The purpose of this report is to assist relevant MBIE leadership in conducting risk assessment, mitigation, and management processes for the organisation’s personnel, operations and infrastructure in relation to the risk from PMVE’s. The report will inform those responsible for operational risk management across MBIE.

Caveat

2. Assessments contained within this report are of MODERATE CONFIDENCE due to limited collection as a result of time constraints. This effected MBIE Intelligences ability to gain the required authority for conducting s 6(c)
[Redacted]
3. (R) This report is not a conclusive statement of the levels of harm to MBIE personnel, operations and infrastructure from anti-government activists and groups. Each business unit/department is responsible for their own risk management, which can be informed by targeted threat assessments and policies, including health and safety obligations and the Protective Security Requirements (PSR) framework.

Context

4. (U) PMVE influenced groups and individuals are those who threaten or conduct activities that risk violence, are in violation of the Crimes Act 1961; appearing to be intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population; and influence New Zealand government policy by intimidation or coercion and effect the conduct of a government by acts of violence, sabotage or disruption of its operations.⁴
5. (R) The increase in anti-government rhetoric in New Zealand society has coincided with the emergence of PMVE influenced groups and individuals organising s 6(c)
[Redacted]
6. (U) The New Zealand PMVE space has seen a rapid coalescence of various ideologies around a considerable range of issues.⁶ There is a dense, overlapping mixture of far right, far left and centrist belief systems constituting the philosophical makeup of the PMVE influenced space.⁷

⁴ s 6(c)
[Redacted]

⁵ s 6(c)
[Redacted]

⁶ These include: gun control; rural land rights and 1080 drops; Māori sovereignty and water/land rights; 'free speech'; faith (Christian evangelical or Pentecostal); abortion; euthanasia; cannabis law reform; families and family structure; LGBTQIA+ rights, including conversion therapy; immigration; race; and gender, anti-vax and anti-mandate

⁷ s 6(c)
[Redacted]



- 7. (U) Mere advocacy for political and social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric or generalised embrace of nonviolent protest tactics doesn't necessarily constitute politically motivated violent extremism.

Scope ⁸

- 8. (IC) The identification of push/pull factors for PMVE activists and groups that pose a risk to MBIE personnel, operations and infrastructure.
- 9. (IC) The analysis of possible vulnerabilities that may have historically affected MBIE's personnel, operations and infrastructure.
- 10. (IC) The analysis and identification of possible future vulnerabilities to MBIE personnel, operations and infrastructure.
- 11. (IC) The identification of the potential methodologies employed by PMVE activists and groups against MBIE personnel, operations and infrastructure.

Analysis

(IC) Harm to MBIE personnel from PMVE influenced individuals and groups is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY.

- 12. (IC) The potential for violence being directed towards MBIE personnel by PMVE influenced individuals or groups is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY. **§ 6(c)**
 [Redacted text block]

- 13. (IC) MBIE personnel fit the criteria promulgated by anti vax/anti mandate individuals and groups targeting government personnel. This criteria, although vague and broad, is summed up as anyone in New Zealand society who has played an active part in implementing and maintaining both the policies and programs employed in the Government's COVID-19 mitigation programs. This criteria would capture certain middle and senior MBIE managers and leadership team members. The publicly stated targets include politicians from all parties (including Ministers holding MBIE related portfolios), journalists, public service personnel, lawyers, police, New Zealand Defence Force, medical clinicians, corporate executives, teachers and local government personnel/elected officials.¹¹

§ 6(c)
[Redacted text block]

¹¹ Ibid



14. (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted] Common Law Sheriffs, who are an adjunct of the Sovereign Citizen movement, are an PMVE group that have been particularly active in organising themselves to carry out arrests and subsequent prosecutions of those deemed guilty of these supposed crimes against humanity. s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted], drawing up "death warrants" with preordained sentences of death having already been passed by "grand jury", and having these pseudo-official documents authorised by legitimate Justices of the Peace. s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted] 12 13 14

15. (R) s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted]. A large amount of the disinformation/misinformation being published online by individuals and groups with anti-government ideologies is extremely agitative in nature, with the likely intent of inciting individuals or groups to conduct violent actions against government individuals or groups. This messaging influenced an individual with acute disaffection from society and complex mental health issues to directly threaten Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted] 15 16

16. (IC) s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted]. Individuals holding such beliefs could potentially resort to desperate behaviour, s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted]. Such an action would possibly compromise the safety of the MBIE personnel involved and potentially have a detrimental effect on their ability to work free of intimidation or coercion.¹⁸

(IC) Disruption by PMVE influenced individuals and groups to MBIE operations is LIKELY.

17. (IC) s 6(c) [redacted]
 [redacted]. Front facing MBIE personnel such as Labour Inspectors, Immigration New Zealand officers, call centre operators, etc. are at risk of exposure to intimidation and coercion as their work is often engaging directly with the

¹² <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/coronavirus/300555020/the-selfproclaimed-sheriffs-who-want-to-arrest-the-authorities>

¹³ Sovereign Sheriffs vs. the New World Order - by Dylan Reeve (substack.com) [accessed 7 April 2022]

¹⁴ s 6(c) [redacted]

¹⁵ <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/466611/taranaki-man-pleads-guilty-for-threat-to-kill-the-prime-minister> [accessed 10 May 2022]

¹⁶ s 6(c) [redacted]

¹⁷ "s 6(c) [redacted]"

¹⁸ s 6(c) [redacted]



public. s 6(c)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].¹⁹

(IC) Damage to MBIE infrastructure by PMVE influenced individuals and groups is HIGHLY LIKELY.

18. (IC) s 6(c)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

19. (R) s 6(c)
[Redacted] s 6(c)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].²¹

20. (IC) Extinction Rebellion have also previously conducted protests at MBIE's Stout Street location. In a 2021 protest against the New Zealand governments gas and oil extraction policies, Extinction Rebellion physically glued themselves to the building near the rear entrance which caused relatively minor disruption to operations for a short period of time.

(IC) The New Zealand PMVE themed misinformation and disinformation is sophisticated, motivated, adaptive, resilient, increasingly violent and significantly volatile.

21. (U) Social media posts and engagement in the PMVE mis/disinformation space have drastically increased since August 2021 and show a trajectory of growth and spread that is increasing, widening, and deepening. s 6(c)
[Redacted]. Content shared into one platform is quickly shared amongst other accounts within the same platform and also transmits across different social media platforms. A narrative, particularly one aimed at an individual or organisation, such as MBIE and its personnel, can generate very quickly, spread

¹⁹ s 6(c)
[Redacted]

²⁰ s 6(c)
[Redacted]

²¹ s 6(c)
[Redacted]



widely and with little forewarning. s 6(c) [redacted] .²²

22. (IC) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]. As a platform, s 6(c) [redacted] is encrypted and anonymous to use. It does not feature oversight of, or policies around, mis and disinformation. Information moves rapidly and with very little oversight across the platform. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the emergence of communications s 6(c) [redacted] .²⁴

23. (U) **A small number of accounts generate the majority of mis and disinformation product in NZ, which is then shared far more widely.** These accounts are increasingly coordinated in the production of content, and the selection of frames, subjects, issues, topics and offline events. There are complex network effects as a consequence of this strategic, sophisticated production of harmful content by a few highly motivated actors that tens of thousands of others go on to share. The passive inciting of violence against government employees, such as MBIE personnel, is one of these intentional network effects.²⁵

24. (U) s 6(c) [redacted] and groups in particular proliferate content, which is violent, largely far right, and related to the conspiracy theory QAnon.²⁶ This constitutes a near-seamless shifting of PMVE campaign to influence susceptible individuals focus from vaccine hesitancy, through vaccine resistance, and then to content reflective of wider conspiratorial ideologies and the inciting of violence to seek vengeance and retribution against those perceived responsible for the alleged conspiracies, such as MBIE personnel.²⁷

Information Gaps

25. (R) MBIE Intelligence are currently unsighted on any other intelligence product available that discusses the risk to critical New Zealand government infrastructure from sabotage or violent extremism and further collections is required.

26. (IC) s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

²² Working Paper: Mis- and disinformation in Aotearoa New Zealand from 17 August to 5 November 2021. Kate Hannah, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Kayli Taylor <https://cpb-ap-se2.wpmucdn.com/blogs.auckland.ac.nz/dist/d/75/files/2017/01/working-paper-disinformation.pdf> [accessed 3 May 2022]

²³ s 6(c) [redacted]
[redacted]

²⁴ The-murmuration-of-information-disorders-May-2022-Report-FULL-VERSION.pdf. Kate Hannah, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Kayli Taylor

²⁵ 'Tectonic shift': How Parliament protest supercharged NZ's misinfodemic - NZ Herald. [accessed 18 May 2022]

²⁶ Amarasingam, A., & Argentino, M. A. (2020). The QAnon conspiracy theory: A security threat in the making. *CTC Sentinel*, 13(7), 37-44.

²⁷ The-murmuration-of-information-disorders-May-2022-Report-FULL-VERSION.pdf. Kate Hannah, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Kayli Taylor



27. (IC) s 6(c)

[Redacted text block]

Opportunities

28. s 6(c)

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²⁸ Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, Social Media for Verification and Investigation procedures.



Administration

Document Control

Version	Date	Author	Description of change
1.0	7 June 2022	MI097	Original

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Low confidence	Generally means questionable or implausible information was used, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or significant concerns or problems with sources existed.



INTELLIGENCE REPORT / RIPOATA

MOTEATEA:

MI-23-3146

Date 09 August 2023

TITLE / TAITARA	Assessment of External and Internal Security Threats to s 6(c)
PRIMARY CUSTOMERS	s 6(c), Business Support Manager, Refugee and Migrant Services s 9(2)(a), Principal Advisor, Protective Security
WRITTEN BY	MI107 (Analyst)
REVIEWED BY	MI004 (Principal)
RELEASED BY	MI119 (Manager)

Executive Summary / Whakarāpopototanga Whakahaere

- (R) There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY of a violent ideologically motivated act being carried out at s 6(c).
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)
- (R) s 6(c)



Purpose / Kaupapa

1. (R) The purpose of this product is to assess how the threat environment to s 6(c) [REDACTED] has changed in the period following the 2021 assessment.¹ This will inform security settings, operational planning and responses at s 6(c) [REDACTED].

Context / Horopaki

2. (R) Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) Protective Security undertook a security assessment of s 6(c) [REDACTED] following the March 2019 Christchurch Mosque shootings. The assessment found there was an increased level of risk following the change in environment that had resulted s 6(c) [REDACTED]. MBIE Intelligence completed an assessment of the external and internal security threats to s 6(c) [REDACTED] in March 2021.² This assessment seeks to update the findings of the 2021 assessment based on the changing threat environment and recent MBIE led security initiatives.

Scope / Te Whānuitanga

3. (R) The product seeks to identify groups or individuals who may present a threat to the security of s 6(c) [REDACTED].

In Scope:

- Identification of external groups and individuals who may present a threat to s 6(c) [REDACTED]
- Identification of s 6(c) [REDACTED]
- Assessment of the nature of the overall threat environment as it relates to s 6(c) [REDACTED],
- Assessment of the international threat environment and recent incidents of relevance, and
- Assessment of the internal security environment at s 6(c) [REDACTED] including risk mitigation methods, opportunity for enhancement and recent incidents of relevance.

Out of scope:

- Classified material relating to specific groups and/or individuals,
- s 6(c) [REDACTED], and



s 6(c)

7. (R) There is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** s 6(c) [redacted], is a symbolic target for violent anti-immigration and anti-refugee influenced individuals. s 6(c) [redacted] who arrive in New Zealand with capacity to house up to s 6(c) [redacted] at a time (under normal occupancy levels). Quota refugees spend their first five weeks at the centre and are provided assistance with transitioning into New Zealand society including English language classes, health screening and mental health support. The purpose and address of the centre are publicly available. s 6(c) [redacted] t.

8. (R) Following the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attack s 6(c) [redacted] s 6(c) [redacted].¹¹ Since 2020, in New Zealand and internationally, there has been a growth in the number of people involved in or sympathising with white-identity groups. COVID-19 restrictions were exploited by extreme right-wing narratives with groups drawing in younger people and conspiracy theorists. s 6(c) [redacted] r.¹²

⁹ s 6(c) [redacted]

s 6(c) [redacted]

¹¹ s 6(c) [redacted]



9. s 6(c)

[Redacted]

10 s 6(c)

[Redacted]

11 s 6(c)

[Redacted]

12 s 6(c)

[Redacted]

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¹³ s 6(c)

¹⁴ Ibid, search period covering January 2021 to July 2023

¹⁵ s 6(c)

¹⁶ s 6(c)



s 6(c)

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

¹⁷ Royal Commission, 26 November 2020, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019, [accessed 13 June 2023]

¹⁸ MBIE, June 2023, Health, Safety and Security Awareness - s 6(c)

¹⁹ Refer Appendix One

²⁰ s 6(c)

²¹ s 6(c)



18. (IC) s 6(c)

[Redacted text block]

19. (IC) International attacks and offshore anti-immigration narratives will HIGHLY LIKELY influence the actions of IMVE individuals in New Zealand. The Christchurch Mosque shooter drew inspiration from The Great Replacement, originating from the French far-right and propagated by the Europe-wide movement Generation Identity. A number of offshore white extremist attacks and planned attacks have taken inspiration from the Christchurch Mosque Shooting including in the United States and Norway.²⁴ s 6(c)

[Redacted text block]

20 s 6(c)

[Large redacted text block]

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

22 s 6(c)

23

²⁴ Friederike Wegener, 16 March 2020, The Globalisation of Right-Wing Copycat Attacks, Global Network on Extremism and Technology, [The Globalisation of Right-Wing Copycat Attacks – GNET \(gnet-research.org\)](https://www.gnet-research.org/), [accessed: 27 July 2023].

25 s 6(c)

26 s 6(c)



21 s 6(c)

22

23. s 6(c)

24 s 6(c)

25. s 6(c)

27 s 6(c)

28 Ibid

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s 6(c)

26. s 6(c)

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

²⁹ For example, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, 'Know the Signs; A guide for identifying signs of violent extremism' [Know-the-signs.pdf \(nzsis.govt.nz\)](https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/know-the-signs.pdf)

s 6(c)



Information Gaps / Nga Waahi Korero

27. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]

28. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]

29. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]

30. (R) s 6(c) [Redacted]

Opportunities

31 s 6(c) [Redacted]

32 [Redacted]

33 [Redacted]

34 [Redacted]

35 [Redacted]

36 [Redacted]

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



s 6(c)

DATED 09 August 2023

s 6(c)

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Administration / Whakahaerenga

Document Control

Version	Date	Author	Description of change
1.0	09 August 2023	MI107	Original

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INTELLIGENCE NOTIFICATION / PANUI RONGO

RAUTAKI:

MI-24-49676

15 November 2024

TITLE	Threat posed by individuals aligned or associated with the s 6(a)
PRIMARY CUSTOMER	Risk Assessment Team, Immigration New Zealand
WRITTEN BY	MI017 (Principal Intelligence Analyst)
REVIEWED BY	MI176 (Principal Intelligence Analyst)
RELEASED BY	MI119 (Intelligence Manager)

Executive Summary / Whakarāpototanga Whakahaere

- s 6(c)
- (R) New Zealand's current immigration settings – namely the use of terrorism watchlists – will LIKELY prevent known s 6(a) violent extremists from travelling to New Zealand.
- s 6(a)



Purpose / Kaupapa

1. s 6(a)

Context / Horopaki

2. s 6(a)

- 4.3 What are emerging threats in the form of terrorism and violent extremism?
- 4.3.1 How might emerging threats in the form of terrorism and violent extremism impact New Zealand?

3. (U) The s 6(a)

groups are not monolithic, with advocates for both violent and non-violent tactics, to achieve this aim. Historically, s 6(a)

Today, open-source reporting notes that while s 6(a) is a high-salience issue among certain s 6(a) -s 6(a)

, who are more likely to emphasise economic issues.²

4. s 6(c)

5.

¹ Section 16 of the Immigration Act 2009 uses the wording “threat or risk” to security, public order, or the public interest for determining eligibility for a visa or entry permission to New Zealand.

s 6(a)



s 6(c), s 6(a)

6.

Findings / Nga Kitenga

s 6(a)

7. s 6(c)

8. s 6(c)

9. s 6(c)

s 6(c)

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s 6(c)

(R) New Zealand's current immigration settings – namely the use of terrorism watchlists – will LIKELY prevent known s 6(a) violent extremists from entering the country.

10. (R) s 6(a), s 6(c)

[REDACTED] In October s [REDACTED] MI and INZ acted to prevent the travel to New Zealand by a s 6(c)

Immigration New Zealand withdrew the individual's New Zealand electronic travel authority (NZeTA) and suspended visa-waiver status.⁹ s 6(c)

11. (R) s 6(c)

s 6(a)

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s 6(c), s 6(a)

⁹ s 6(c)

s 6(c), s 6(a)



s 6(a)

Information gaps

13. s 6(a)

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s 6(c)



Administration

Additional distribution

s 6(c)

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Document Control

Version	Date	Author	Description of change
1.0	8 November 2024	MI017	Original
1.1	15 November 2024	MI017	Para 5 revised to conform with agreed form of words. Para 12 minor editing.

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MBIE Intelligence and Country Research

COVER NOTE FOR THE

s 6(c)

20 August 2025



MINISTRY OF BUSINESS,
INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI

Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa
New Zealand Government



Executive Summary

1. Out of Scope

2.

3.

4.

5. s 6(c)

Introduction

6. Out of Scope

7.

8.

9.

10

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Out of Scope

Out of Scope

11. Out of Scope

12.

13.

14.

15.

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National Security

16. Out of Scope

17.

18. (R) s 6(c)

Violent extremist threat actors are increasingly influenced by overlapping grievances in online virtual spaces, resulting in “multi-narrative extremism” wherein threat actors may not subscribe to a single motivation, s 6(c)

19. (R) Immigration New Zealand (INZ) has increasingly interdicted a small number of identity and politically motivated violent extremists, s 6(a), s 6(c)

20. (R) s 6(c)

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Implications and Opportunities

21. Out of Scope

22.

23.

24.



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Administration / Whakahaerenga

Distribution

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Alison McDonald	Deputy Secretary Immigration, Immigration New Zealand
Richard Owen	General Manager Immigration Risk and Border, Immigration New Zealand
Jacqui Ellis	General Manager Data Insights and Intelligence, Corporate and Digital Shared Services
s 9(2)(a)	Principal Business Advisor, Allocation and Coordination
s 9(2)(a)	Workstream Delivery Manager, Futures Services Programme
s 9(2)(a)	National Manager Risk and Verification, Risk and Verification
Steve Watson	General Manager Immigration and Investigations, Immigration New Zealand
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Kylie Seumanu	Head of Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons, Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons

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Version	Date	Author	Description of change
1.0	20 August 2025	MICR039	Original

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Probabilistic language

Qualitative Statement	Associated Probability Range	Qualitative Statement	Associated Probability Range
Remote / Highly Unlikely	<10%	Probable / Likely	55 – 70%
Improbable / Unlikely	15 – 20%	Very Probable / Highly Likely	75 – 85%
Realistic Possibility / Possibly	25 – 50%	Almost Certain	>90%

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