



National Hikoi ASM Response Plan

For Wednesday 13 November 2024

Network Operations Team

Network Operations

5 November 2024

Version 0.9 DRAFT

Copyright information

Copyright ©. This copyright work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, distribute and adapt the work, as long as you attribute the work to Waka Kotahi NZ Transport Agency and abide by the other licence terms. To view a copy of this licence, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

Disclaimer

Waka Kotahi has endeavoured to ensure material in this document is technically accurate and reflects legal requirements. However, the document does not override governing legislation. Waka Kotahi does not accept liability for any consequences arising from the use of this document. If the user of this document is unsure whether the material is correct, they should refer directly to the relevant legislation and contact Waka Kotahi.

More information

Waka Kotahi NZ Transport Agency
Published July 2021

If you have further queries, call our contact centre on 0800 699 000 or write to us:

Waka Kotahi NZ Transport Agency
Private Bag 6995
Wellington 6141

DRAFT
RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982

Table of Contents

Copyright information	2
Disclaimer	2
More information	2
PURPOSE	4
BACKGROUND	4
INTELLIGENCE	5
Routes & Timings	5
Identified Risks	6
OPERATIONS PLAN	9
Operational Objectives	9
AHB structure	10
Network Configuration	11
Proposed Closure Plans	12
ASM Specialist Responders	13
ASM Incident Management Team Structure – command/ control	14
Communications	15
APPENDIX A – HIKOI MOVEMENT AND PLAN A.....	16
APPENDIX B – PLAN B LAYOUTS	23
APPENDIX C – LOCATION SHEETS.....	28
APPENDIX D – OPERATIONAL RUNSHEET.....	39
APPENDIX E – CAMERA PROTOCOL AND LIST.....	40
APPENDIX F – SITE CONTACT POINT INDEX.....	41
APPENDIX G - ASM MORNING BRIEFING RUN SHEET	42
APPENDIX H – CLOSURE CHECKLIST	43

RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to outline the intelligence received, operational objectives, planning and process to protect the safe and efficient operation of the strategic Auckland State Highway network in response to a planned hikoi scheduled to occur on 13/11/2024. It is acknowledged this is a nation-wide hikoi and as such other documents and operational plans exist.

Background

- Police has advised a hikoi which may affect the ASM network and Auckland Harbour Bridge (AHB).
- The date and estimated time of the Hikoi movement is Wednesday 13 November 2024 from 08:00 to 14:00.
- The section of the Hikoi is understood to be pedestrian movement from Stafford Park and Onepoto Domain to Bastion Point. This involves pedestrian movements on SH Corridor and crossing over the AHB.
- ASM have worked with NZ Police and the wider ATOC area of operations to understand the response requirements and develop this plan.

The ASM has been asked to produce a TMP / planning document that would facilitate a Hikoi to move across the Auckland Harbour Bridge (AHB) with the following outcomes.

- Keep people (walking on motorway and road users) as safe as possible, this is delivered by:
 - Working collaboratively with NZ Police (Police are the Lead Agency for the Hikoi operation).
 - Utilising temporary traffic management principles to keep traffic and people separate.
 - Identifying and sharing the risks of pedestrian movements across the AHB.
- Ensure the AHB structure is not damaged.
- Deliver what is practical to maintain north and southbound traffic on the Auckland Network.


Intelligence

- Hikoi number uncertain but estimated to be ~5,000 people. It is noted that numbers are difficult to determine with a high level of confidence.
- The Police and NZTA intentions are to ensure the safety of people using SH and Hikoi to walk across AHB from North of AHB (Stafford Park/Onepoto Domain to Bastion Point).
- It is understood that the Hikoi has a well-developed timeline and that they intend to reach Bastion Point for 14:00.

It is important to note that this is a dynamic operation and intelligence will be updated after writing this plan and during the event which may alter the course of the response in order to manage identified or emerging risks.

Routes & Timings

It is understood that this section of Hikoi will involve pedestrian movement from Stafford Park to Bastion Point through AHB NB lanes. The date and estimated time of the Hikoi movement is Wednesday the 13th of November from between 08:00 to 14:00 with the estimated time of the procession setting off at 09:30.



Identified Risks

An initial assessment of risk to the safe and/or efficient operation of the Auckland State Highway network and our people has been undertaken identifying the following risks along with a 3-scale rating pre-mitigation strategy.

Risk	Rating	Mitigation
1. Traffic safety risk associated with mass crowd movement on motorway network	High	Primary risk treatment is the deployment of TTM type separation of people and traffic. NZ Police utilise additional resources to manage. Response teams provide reconnaissance and on standby for full mainline closure if NZ Police require it.
2. Structural risk due to mass pedestrian movement on the Auckland Harbour Bridge	High	NZ Police to manage the hikoi. ASM will deploy a structural inspector to the underside of the AHB in order to monitor the structures' reaction and performance in real time. The inspector will be connected to the ASM Incident Controller Via RT to escalate the condition.
3. Congestion occurs in unexpected places generated by hikoi or secondary protests blocking the carriageway or the slow-moving convoy	Low	ATOC deploy customer VMS messaging. NZTA and AT combined Comms plan to inform customers.
4. A crash occurs due to congestion generated by the hikoi	High	Advanced warning from approaches managed by ATOC Response teams and additional NZ Police units available to rapidly respond, make safe and clear the incident. Hato Hone St Johns Ambulance Service on standby to assist with serious or medical incidents.
5. Customer inability to access off-ramps, on-ramps, or carriageway due to presence of hikoi leading to unsafe driving behaviour or crashes	High	ATOC deploy customer VMS messaging. NZTA Comms strategy to warn motorists and travellers of closures. Briefings provided to Day of Operations Team.
6. Customers become frustrated being stuck behind the hikoi and attempt dangerous overtaking	High	The primary strategy for the management for people and traffic is to enable traffic to travel past the movement of people and remain separate by way of TTM. This will reduce the pressure of a full road closure in any one cardinal direction and therefore the pressure on congestion.
7. Customers are unable to receive real-time updates due to ITS technology outages	Moderate	ATOC deploy customer VMS messaging. ITS technician on standby in the area to readily resolve outages.

8. Public abuse / aggression towards NZTA personnel which may involve situations where weapons or firearms are present

**High
(due to high consequence but low likelihood)**

NZ Police are the lead agency for the hikoi response. NZ Police will be leading any interactions with hikoi participants and are readily available to assist. NZ Police are to be stationed with NZTA personnel to ensure their security is managed or develop agile response plan in the event escalation is required. NZTA personnel are not to engage with hikoi where weapons or firearms are identified and are either presented OR assessment suggests potential for aggravation. Leave site immediately, radio to controller who will request NZ Police to attend via the O/C. Refer to NZTA Auckland System Management Traffic Response SOP Hazard ID and section 39. "PROCEDURE WHEN WEAPONS ARE IDENTIFIED" We will methodologically withdraw TTM staff from vehicles positioned with opportunity to interact with protesters.

9. Public perception of NZTA being present / involved in any way with the hikoi leading to abuse or negative publicity.

Low

Comms to support the NZTA position is to ensure the safety of the people involved, road users and Hikoi participants. NZTA teams will take directions from the Police in managing the hikoi.

10. Hikoi participants or secondary groups deploy flotation beacons on the AHB, resulting in damage to boats underneath

Moderate

Highlight the risk to the Police. Police to manage the hikoi and any movement underneath AHB.

11. Debris or obstacles falling onto the harbour from AHB

Moderate

Police to manage and deploy resources to control areas under AHB.

12. The number of Hikoi participants exceeds the recommendation of pedestrians on clip-on

High

Police to manage and control the number on the clip-on. A Bridge Inspector will be on station in the underside of the structure (away from public access) and have RT Comms to the ASM Controller. This will monitor and relay structural performance.

13. Hikoi participants attempt to access the overarch of the AHB

Moderate

Police to manage and make sure people do not access the overarch of the AHB.

TTM Risks and Mitigations

14. Vehicles not merging properly resulting in flow breakdown or crashes at SH16 links

Moderate

Deploy a plan with LSU and VMS to guide vehicle merges. NZTA response team to assist with crashes or breakdowns. Monitor vehicles merging behaviour.

15. Vehicle merge back into the closed lanes at St Marys Bay due to not aware the lane is closed

Moderate

A TMA is to be placed in lane 2 underneath Shelly Beach overbridge to indicate the lanes are still closed.

16. Risk of collision when personnel coning off the Stafford offramp

Moderate

Coning the offramp is not required behind TMA during the Stafford offramp closure – there will be a TMA at merge and a TMA next to the gore.

17. Steel barriers provide a false sense of security to hikoī or Police on how much it can contain a vehicle

Moderate

Highlight the risk to the Police. Police to advise hikoī of the safety zone behind the barrier and manage the hikoī.

18. Vehicle breaching closure at locations where Police are not present

Low

Any breaches are to be reported to controller who will raise to NZ Police to manage.

19. Injury of participants at the gap between the clip-on and truss structure due to the steel barrier obscuring the gap

Moderate

Highlight the risk to the Police. Police to manage hikoī and advise the participant of the safety zone and the danger of the gap.

RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982

Operations Plan

Operational Objectives

- Protect the safe and efficient operation of the strategic Auckland State Highway network.
- Work together with NZ Police in their management of the hikoi.
 - Working collaboratively with NZ Police (Police are the Lead Agency for the hikoi operation).
 - Utilising a traffic management type approach to keeping traffic and people separate.
 - Identifying and sharing the risks of the AHB environment as a pedestrian route.
- Ensure the Auckland Harbour Bridge structure is not damaged.
- Be ready to respond and manage secondary incidents which may occur from within or around the hikoi/closure.
- Manage impacts of the hikoi on travelling customers to keep them safe and moving. Deliver what is practical to maintain north and southbound traffic on the Auckland Network.
- Provide information to customers where the hikoi may impact their journey by way of advanced warning.

DRAFT
RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982


AHB structure

Approach to Structure preservation.

It is recommended that crowd numbers are limited to 250 people per span, to mitigate the risk of pedestrian induced lateral movements.

The truss bridge has different natural frequencies of vibration and is not likely to be subject to pedestrian induced lateral side-sway. Generally, pedestrian crowd loading is assessed to be lower than design traffic loading and failure of structural members from overloading is not expected when controlled numbers of pedestrians occupy traffic lanes.

In consultation with NZ Police the management of people to deliver this control is to move the Hikoi in groups of 250 with 200m separation. This ground operation will be wholly managed by NZ Police Team and in consultation with the ASM Controller should the approach need review.



The AHB Asset Management team will monitor these risks as follows:

Excessive lateral vibration:

- Three Inspectors required to visually monitor the movement of the west extension bridge deck at span 1 panel point 7 (service platform), span 3 panel point 7 (service platform) & at span 4 panel point 0 (gantry platform).

Potential damage to vulnerable welds, Upper Trestle Rocker Bearings

- One Inspector to visually monitor any potential box girder trestle sway.
- Post event inspection (if deemed necessary) – binoculars from the access walkways to inspect vulnerable welds, if weld cracks are suspected then gantries to be used & magnetic particle inspection will be utilised to check for presence of cracks.

Communications

The AHB Bridge Inspectors will be in direct communication with the ASM Incident Response Team on the day. The Bridge Inspectors will relay the observations via radio from under the deck, (e.g. minor movement, significant movement, structures are impacting). The Bridge Inspectors will carry two radios, one set to the "Harbour Bridge Channel 3" & the other to the "Incident Response Channel 4".

Any significant inspection findings will be escalated to the AHB Bridge Inspection Engineer s 9(2)(a)

The Bridge Inspectors will not be able to provide any guidance on whether additional pedestrian numbers will be acceptable but can advise on trends observed e.g. is vibration stable, getting worse, or getting better. Response to Vibration Lateral vibration of the box girder will cease, if the movement of the crowd can be stopped. Once the vibration has stopped, smaller groups of pedestrians can be let through (say 250 people per span).

Network Configuration

The AHB median lane barrier (MLB) will be pre-set to be in “4/4” from the am peak on the 13 November 2024.

This configuration will support the Hikoi operation with the following approach:

- The southbound am peak will be impacted however the 4/4 configuration will position the congestion loading as a balance between the likely timing of the Hikoi Operation, the safety of the imposed reduced speeds and removing the operational complexity of delivering the MLB move, potentially at the same time as we have pedestrians attempting the AHB crossing.
- The 4/4 configuration offers:

Scenario	Northbound	Southbound
Prior to PLAN A implemented (am peak congestion)	4 lanes	4 lanes
Plan A implementation	2 lanes	4 lanes
Post Plan A (pm peak congestion) MLB shift completed	5 Lanes	3 Lanes
Contingency (PLAN B)	4 lanes (ROAD CLOSED)	4 Lanes (ROAD CLOSED)

Proposed Closure Plans

Plan A will be implemented initially. A backup Plan B will be implemented if required and in coordination with the Police.

PLAN A - Partial closure of SH to accommodate the Hikoi movement across AHB

(Appendix A)

- Closure of the northbound AHB clip-ons from St Marys Bay – Stafford Road offramp (i.e. two lane closure - MLB configuration will be 4/4)
- This approach retains traffic past the movement of people, with separation from TTM.
- Plan includes closure of:
 - SH1 Stafford Road northbound offramp
 - SH1 Curran Street northbound onramp
 - SH1 Shelly Beach Road offramp

This approach retains traffic past the movement of people, with separation from TTM

- **PLAN B - Full closure of the northbound SH1 from central city to Onewa Road interchange**

(Appendix B)

- Closure of SH1 mainline at the SH1/SH16 link northbound (*pushing traffic Westbound on to SH16*).
- Closure of SH16 westbound at the SH16 Port - NBD link (*Pushing Traffic Westbound to SH16*)
- Closure of SH16 eastbound - northbound link (*pushing traffic to CBD*)
- Closure of Wellington Street northbound onramp.
- Closure of Fanshawe Street – northbound
- Closure of Curran Street onramp northbound

ASM Specialist Responders

- 2x Operations Tacticians (TACs) (monitoring, coordinating, reporting).
 - Shift Start 07:00 – onwards.
 - One TAC focus on OP.
 - One TAC focus on outer network demand and incidents.

- 5x Traffic Incident Managers (TIMs) (Patrolling, rapid response)
 - 1 x shift start 05:00 – 13:00 (focus is Western ring route for resilience)
 - 4 x shift start 07:00 – 16:00 (N, S, W, Elephant Shed)

- ASM Command Team [Based at Police Auckland Central Police Station | District Headquarters]
 - DE17 s 9(2)(a) [Redacted] ASM Command
 - DE20 [Redacted] Operations
 - DE14 [Redacted] ASM ATOC Liaison
 - DE15 [Redacted] Logistics / Planning
 - H&S [Redacted] Welfare / Risk / Safety

- ASM Liaison to ATOC Planned Events [Based at ATOC Planned Events Room]
 - DE16 s 9(2)(a) [Redacted] ASM ATOC Liaison
 - DE18 [Redacted] ASM ATOC Liaison Support / Learning & Development
 - Comms Sara Goessi NZTA Communications PIM

- Lead field operations
 - IRM s 9(2)(a) [Redacted] Union St
 - H&S [Redacted] Union St


- DE Resilience (all other escalations) 07:00 – 16:00
 - DE13 s 9(2)(a) [Redacted] Located at ATOC
 - DE10 [Redacted] Located at Ellerslie / Union Street

16x L3 TMAs required – Outriggers required and higher risk environments.

5x L2 TMAs required – These can be strategically located at points of lower risk.

[This is the update as at 15:00 06 Nov 2024, pending Police Operational Order or ASM Risk review on 07 Nov 2024]

ASM Incident Management Team Structure – command/ control



Communications

Radio communications will be used during the operation on a common network channel.

- Callsigns will be established during the operational briefing. For TTM operators a call sign will be attached to each individual deployment sheet (contained below in this document – Appendix C).
- RT protocols will be to minimise RT traffic.
- TTM Ops may operate on a separate channel where a secondary RT is available and an STMS wishes to control TTM manoeuvres.

Channels:

- **Incident Response Channel:** Primary Responders (Command, TIMs, Resource allocation)
- **MLB Channel:** TTM Operations and Welfare checks.

MS Teams:

- An Operational channel will be set up for the duration of the response. This will be the key reportage to Governance (Alliance Manager)

D4H:

- A D4H job will be opened on the day which will keep the response photos and log.

Situational Awareness Board:


- We will develop a situational awareness board for the TTM deployments and the progression of the crowd from the north to the south of AHB.



NZ Police will lead the operation. NZ Police are currently producing an operational order.

NZTA personnel are not to engage with hikoi.

ENDS

Appendix A – Hiko Movement and PLAN A










Shelly Beach Rd offramp closure



Police control Hikoi drop off movements between Stafford Baseball Field and Onepoto Domain





Hikoi vehicle movement post initial drop off


Police Reserve Response Unit






Appendix B – PLAN B Layouts











APPENDIX C – LOCATION SHEETS

Information sheets for resource deployment and locations.

COMMAND / CONTROL LOCATIONS

POLICE COMMS – COLLEGE HILL

Callsign	ASM CONTROL	
ASM Location Lead	NAME	NUMBER
Site Details	<p>Overall Police Operation Command and Control ASM Network Operations Team will be on site with Police in the operations room. This will be the primary location for directions to move to different positions to facilitate movements between all parties. 3x Portable CCTV will be made available for deployment from this location.</p>	

ATOC – SMALES FARM

Callsign	ASM SMALES	
ASM Location Lead	NAME	NUMBER
Site Details	<p>Primary CCTV and VMS control location. ASM Network Operations Team will be on site at ATOC to keep the Incident Management Team updated with all current movements. 1x Portable CCTV will be made available for deployment from this location.</p>	

ELEPHANT HOUSE

Callsign	TIM CALLSIGN TBC	
ASM Location Lead	NAME	NUMBER
Site Details	<p>Primary location for response resources and physical staging area for any additional resources required. ASM Network Operations Team will be on site to facilitate any escalation and resource movement.</p>	

PLAN A


Location 1 - Curran St Mainline

Callsign	L3 TMA - CURRAN MAINLINE 1 / CURRAN MAINLINE 2 L2 TMA - HARBOUR BRIDGE 1 / HARBOUR BRIDGE 2 / HARBOUR BRIDGE 3	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	Standby Location: Fanshawe Bull Run onramp 2x Level3 TMAs and 3x Level 2 TMAs as per image. Position 1: personnel in "HARBOUR BRIDGE" TMAs will be removed from site.	

Standby Location



Position 1



PLAN A

Location 2 – Saint Marys Bay Mainline

Callsign	SAINT MARYS 1 SAINT MARYS 2 SAINT MARYS 3	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a) 	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)

Site Specific Instructions

Standby Location: Fanshawe Bull Run onramp
 Move into position after entering motorway exit to close lanes 1 and 2 before Shelly Beach Overbridge as per image below.
 Third TMA to cover Lane 2 under Shelly Beach Rd.



PLAN A


Location 3 – Stafford Rd Mainline



Callsign	L3 TMA - STAFFORD 1 / STAFFORD 2 / STAFFORD 3	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a) 	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)

Site Specific Instructions

Standby Location: Curran St onramp

Position 1: Stafford Closure with 2x TMAs (cone offramp), 1x TMA standby
 Position 2: personnel from TMAs will be removed from site.



PLAN A	Location 4 – Sarsfield / Curran Intersection	
	Callsign	CURRAN ONRAMP 1
	Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel
	Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a) Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
	Site Specific Instructions	Standby Location: Point Erin Park Level 2 TMA can be used. Move to closure point and layout TTM in support of Police.
	Standby Position	
Position 1		

PLAN A

Location 5 – Shelly Beach Offramp SB

Callsign	SHELLY BEACH 1	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	Standby Location: Weigh Station Merge to lane 1 then close Shelly Beach Offramp.	




Location 6 – Fanshawe St Onramp

Callsign	FANSHAWE 1 FANSHAWE 2	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	Standby Location: Under Victoria Park Flyover Close Fanshawe with support from Police.	

Standby Position



Position 1




Location 7 – Wellington St Onramp



Callsign	WELLINGTON STREET 1	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a) 	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	<p>Standby Location: Union St Yard</p> <p>Move to Wellington St and close ramp. Traffic Signals will be adjusted to support access and closure. Can be a Level 2 TMA</p>	
Standby position		
Position 1		

Location 8 – SH1 NB Mainline

Callsign	NORTHBOUND MAINLINE 1 NORTHBOUND MAINLINE 2 NORTHBOUND MAINLINE 3	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	Standby Location: Greenlane Access Motorway at Northbound Greenlane Onramp. Form a rolling block in full closure formation from Mountain Rd and close SH1 Northbound at the link to SH16 West.	



Location 9 – SH16 EB Link to SH1 NB

Callsign	NEWTON 1	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)
Site Specific Instructions	<p>Standby Location: Gundry Dr Emergency Access Enter motorway at St Lukes Onramp. Continue under Newton Rd OB and close the link to SH1 North.</p>	
Standby Position		
Position 1		

PLAN B

**Location 10 – SH16 WB Link to SH1 NB
(Port to North Link)**

Callsign	PORT 1	
Radio Channel	ASM – MLB Channel	
Contact Numbers	ASM Control s 9(2)(a)	Emergency Escalation s 9(2)(a)

Site Specific Instructions
Standby Location: Auckland Bowling Club Carpark
 Enter Motorway via **Wellesley St SH16 WB Onramp**. Continue in right lane and close link to north.
 Roaming Police may be able to assist with traffic merging behind the TMA



Appendix D – OPERATIONAL RUNSHEET

Runsheets of the day

Responders	Operational Team	TTM Operations
05:30	Tailgate – Elephant Shed	
07:00	Head into standby positions	
07:45	All responders at stations	
07:00		Commencing Stafford Road Closure
(Estimated) 09:00 – 10:00	Set up of Plan A	
+0.5 - +1 hour	Hikoi commencing at Stafford Road	
+ 2 hours	Hikoi completing cross of the AHB – at Westhaven Marina	
+ 3 hours	Hikoi approaching Fanshawe St	
+ 4-5 hours	Hikoi completing journey at Bastion Point	
	Decamp	
Estimated 15:00	Continued management of Hikoi through local arterials.	Motorway Hikoi completed.
Estimated 16:00	Auckland Hikoi movement completed.	

**SET UP OF
PLAN B BY
EXCEPTION**

DRAFT
RELEASED UNDER THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT 1982

Appendix E – CAMERA PROTOCOL AND LIST

Camera protocols to assist operations

Location	Camera
Onepoto Domain	134 – Onewa VMS
Onewa Interchange	132 – Onewa Rd PTZ
	ONEWA ONRAMP - ANA
Stafford Road Offramp	136 - Stafford Road PTZ
Harbour Bridge (Northern)	138 – AHB Gantry 2
	139 – AHB Gantry 3
Harbour Bridge (midspan)	140 – AHB West
	142 – AHB Centre
	145 – AHB Gantry 6
Harbour Bridge (Southern)	146 – AHB Gantry 7
	147 – Point Erin (FIX)
Shelly Beach Road O/B	149 – Point Erin PTZ
Curran Street / Westhaven Dr	148 – Curran St
	2302 – Curran St / Ponsonby School PedX
	2063 – Jervois Rd Curran St
Westhaven Dr	150 – AHB Gantry 8
	152 – Fanshawe St / VPT North
	151 – Westhaven Dr
St Marys Pullover Bay	530 – St Marys Bay / Jacobs Ladder

Appendix F – SITE CONTACT POINT INDEX

LOCATION	NAME	NUMBER	CALLSIGN
Police Command – College Hill	ASM Control	s 9(2)(a)	ASM CONTROL
	Escalation Number		
ATOC – Smales Farm	s 9(2)(a)		ASM SMALES
Elephant House	TIM UNIT		TIM UNIT CALLSIGN
Curran Mainline			CURRAN MAINLINE 1
Saint Marys Bay Mainline			SAINT MARYS 1
Stafford Mainline			STAFFORD 1
Sarsfield/Curran Intersection			CURRAN ONRAMP 1
Shelly Beach Offramp			SHELLY BEACH 1
Fanshawe St Onramp			FANSHAWE 1
Wellington St Onramp			WELLINGTON STREET 1
SH1 Northbound Mainline			NORTHBOUND MAINLINE 1
SH16 EB Link to SH1 NB			PORT 1
SH16 WB Link to SH1 NB			NEWTON 1

APPENDIX G - ASM MORNING BRIEFING RUN SHEET

• The situation:

A Hikoi starting in Northland on Monday the 11 November has been progressing down the north island. Today Wednesday the 13th is the Auckland section of this Hikoi. Participants have indicated they will be marching on foot over the Auckland Harbour Bridge.

ASM is running an operation in support of the NZ Police. Our primary focus is safety for:

- Our team
- Members of the Public (Hikoi participants and general traffic)

• Police Response Resources

We have developed an operations plan to accommodate this. Broadly, the protest movement will start from the northside of the AHB and progress south from Stafford Offramp to Curran Street onramp (Hikoi movement in contraflow).

We will facilitate this movement with TTM. There are temporary steel barriers already installed along the AHB and we have a plan for the installation of cones and positioning of TMA to protect people from traffic and keep them separate.

We also have a contingency plan in the event the situation deteriorates and we sense that there is need to get more control of the traffic environment.

PLAN A

Traffic managed past the site of the protest progression.

PLAN B

Full northbound closure from the top of CMJ to all lanes NBD on SH1.

We will split the TTM operations between these two plans (PLAN A and PLAN B). We also have developed a resource specific deployment sheets so that each TMA will have their component of the plan clarified. This briefing sheet includes numbers for escalation, your RT callsign and your staging location.

• Communications:

Radio communications will be used during the operation on a common network channel.

- For TTM operators a call sign will be attached to each individual deployment sheet.
- TTM Ops may operate on a separate channel where a secondary RT is available and an STMS wishes to control TTM manoeuvres.

Channels:

- **Incident Response Channel:** Primary Responders (Command, TIMs, Resource allocation)
- **MLB Channel:** TTM Operations and Welfare checks.

• Risk Control Plan (RCP)

Refer to RCP for specific controls.

Of note is the recognition that many of our team will have family, friends or contacts who are involved in the Hikoi event.

• TTM specific briefings:

Plan A, Plan B, RT checks, Truck Assignments.

APPENDIX H – CLOSURE CHECKLIST

	Closure Points	At Standby	Time	Closed	Time
PLAN A	Stafford Road northbound Offramp	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Curran Street northbound onramp	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	SH1 Mainline partial lane closure northbound (AHB NB CLIPONS)	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Shelly Beach southbound offramp	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
PLAN B	SH1 Mainline FULL closure northbound	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	SH16 Westbound – SH1 NB Link	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	SH16 Eastbound – SH1 NB link	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Wellington Street northbound onramp	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Fanshawe Street northbound onramp	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	