

NZIIP Speech

STARTS

Tēnā tātou katoa. Ko Antonia toku ingoa.....and yes, that is my real name.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.

I am the Engagement Manager for the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.

As the Engagement Manager for the NZSIS, I am responsible for the NZSIS' strategic approach to domestic engagement. I also lead a team of engagement professionals, whose job is the opposite of many in the intelligence community. We engage openly as members of the intelligence community, and work with communities, business, educators, local government and other sectors across New Zealand to share and receive intelligence insights.

I have been with the NZSIS for just over a year. Prior to this I worked in local government policy and strategy for over a decade, followed by a number of years as a Strategic Advisor for Fire and Emergency NZ.

Despite keeping my Canadian, not American, accent, I have been in New Zealand nearly 20 years, engaging with New Zealand communities on social issues, community development, and safety. I have seen first-hand that communities, if empowered with the right information, and given appropriate tools and methods to share their views and perspective, can effect positive change and have significant impact.

As intelligence professionals, many of us spend our time keeping information under tight control. Working to ensure decision makers have the right intelligence, at the right time, in order to make the right decisions for their organisations and ultimately for New Zealand.

We also, however, need to ensure the wider New Zealand public also has the right information, at the right time, so they too can make appropriate decisions for themselves and their communities on how to manage risk and contribute to national security outcomes.

At the Service one of our goals is to realise the potential of engagement to enhance the impact of services. Today I hope to give you a bit of insight on how we are working towards this goal.

Last year the NZSIS published its organisational strategy

The mission of the NZSIS is to keep New Zealand and New Zealanders safe and secure – and we know that this is not something we at the service or wider government can achieve on our own.

We seek to protect New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society for future generations and we aim to do that by staying ahead of the threats we face. We know we can't be everywhere, or see everything, nor would that be appropriate if we want New Zealand to actually be a free, open and democratic society.

Some of our key strategic objectives are to:

- Foster trust and confidence across New Zealanders and partners in our services
- Maximise our impact through relationships
- Discover unknown threats
- Delivering impact with and for others

Engagement is a key tool to achieving these objectives.

When I am talking about engagement, I am referring to it in the broadest sense. In that engagement is any interaction we have in delivering our work. It can be formal or informal, it can be one off or repeated over a long period of time. It might focus on a particular issue or threat or on the bigger picture of national security. The key aspect of engagement is that it's a two-way communication and interaction.

At the NZSIS we engage because it helps us to discover, understand, and share information to support national security outcomes.

I want to acknowledge in our engagement space that we have also been on a journey as an agency to engage with Māori. Whilst in its infancy, this too is a strong focus for both the Service and the Bureau. This will be touched on in more depth at the panel session following my presentation by our Chief Advisor Māori.

Intelligence at some level should be accessible

You may think that because we tend to operate in the shadows, we don't engage much. At least this was my misconception when I first joined the NZSIS. To the contrary, the NZSIS as a whole is constantly engaging.

We partner and engage constantly with our sister agency the GCSB and with the New Zealand Police, Customs and others across the intelligence community.

We work with our 5-eyes partners, and other like-minded countries to share insights and engagement approaches.

We engage with wider government through our protective security team, and policy team to strengthen New Zealand's wider resilience to threats.

By doing this we are better placed to solve some of the biggest challenges in security intelligence, by drawing on wider experience and expertise to co-create solutions.

Involving those outside the world of intelligence and security is equally crucial to achieving better national security outcomes. My work focuses on domestic engagement, primarily with different communities and sectors across New Zealand, so this is what I will predominately speak to.

On average, in a domestic capacity, we are participating in over 50 different engagements a month. In each of these interactions we are seeking to positively impact national security.

So how do we go about it

Although we may not have spoken about engagement in the past, as an agency we have been engaging with communities for many years, because we know offering a level of transparency and insights on intelligence is needed to be successful in our primary role of mitigating threats.

We want to do our part to respond to the recommendations from the Royal Commission of Inquiry that followed the Christchurch Terror Attacks, to engage with communities and make intelligence information more accessible.

We are also alert to the fact that the New Zealand national security public survey 2023 identified that over 50% of New Zealanders want more

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information on the threats we face, and 1/3 of New Zealanders want to engage in public discussions.

The nature of our engagement is both push and pull

- On the push side we seek to raise awareness about the nature of the threat we face and demonstrate ways we can help manage risk. Increasing the knowledge on national security will help to make New Zealand and New Zealanders a harder target to threats. We also seek to build trust and confidence so people know about who we are as an organisation, and are confident that when they report information or a concern they will be taken seriously.
- On the pull side, through establishing trusted relationships with different sectors and communities, we seek to improve the level of information and insights that is shared with us. Helping us to uncover the unknown and our wider discovery efforts.

More broadly we aim to be part of a positive cycle of engagement, whereby raising greater awareness, more people will develop an understanding of the kind of threats we find most concerning. They then report those threats as they see them, which in turn helps to further develop our internal understanding of threats. We can then use our increased understanding to keep New Zealanders better informed.

The engagement landscape

Over the last year I have found that in many of the engagements I or members of our team have had, they go one of two ways. Either it is the first time that a person or organisation has engaged with someone from the Intelligence Community. Many people are not aware of the work we do, they have misconceptions about how we work, or minimal awareness of threats we find concerning. Alternatively, we are engaging with communities that unfortunately, may have had negative experiences with security agencies, or negative perceptions of our agency and the work we do. Either way we have to work to establish trust and confidence.

I think it's fair to say that New Zealanders, in general, have probably struggled with the concept that a foreign state could be interested in our affairs or that a threat of violent extremism or terrorism could occur in our communities.

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Nowadays, there is growing awareness that our region is a place where some of the biggest strategic rivalries play out and that we are far from immune from the impacts. We are also aware that some parts of our community or institutions are at greater risk of national security threats than others. Foreign states are conducting espionage and interference within New Zealand in an attempt to disrupt our democratic way of life and New Zealanders are observing a level of foreign interference and threats to economic security. The NZ national security survey showed 27% of respondents, who identified foreign interference as a threat, did so because they had observed it. We are also seeing more media reporting on the subject.

We have witnessed abhorrent acts of terrorism, and divisions within our society that have stoked violent extremist sentiment. The tragic events of 15 March 2019, and the Royal Commission of Inquiry that followed, showed that an attack can come with no intelligence warning, and how important it is to have a more mature discussion about national security threats in our society, to further awareness and understand wider perspectives.

A mature discussion, however, is about being alert to the threats rather than being alarmed. In order to do this successfully we need to make intelligence accessible in a way that works for those we are seeking to engage with.

Engagement

As the NZSIS seeks to talk more openly about the threats we observe and how to mitigate them, we also need to be seen as trusted and credible. A big part of that is being visible.

As I said earlier the engagement team engages openly as members of the intelligence community. I am a declared person within the NZSIS, and we leverage off other declared personnel to enhance our engagements.

Our engagement programme is greatly enhanced by a high level of participation by our Director General, Andrew Hampton and our Deputy Director Generals of Intelligence and Protective Security.

If we do not speak about our work, in today's information landscape, someone else will speak on our behalf – and that someone is less likely to have the intelligence insights we hold – and may fill in the gaps with some creative guess work.

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Our domestic engagement at the NZSIS seeks to be collaborative, intelligence led and innovative.

- By collaborative we seek to work with others and share insights where we can. We recognise that communities are experts in their own lives, our partners are experts in their own fields, and colleagues are experts in national security, and we welcome their insights.
- By intelligence led we seek to use evidence and information to support and guide our engagement, and constantly review what we are doing to improve future engagements
- Through innovation we seek to use a range of channels and approach methods to reach different groups beyond traditional methods. We are attempting to align our material with the needs of our different communities, stakeholders and partners. We are also working to align our engagements and the language we use to be recognisable, accessible and relevant to those we engage with.

We engage in a variety of ways including:

- 1:1 meetings
- 1 to many presentations
- Community meetings
- Advisory groups
- Speeches and printed material

Some example of 1 to many engagements include our participation at conferences and events, such as LGNZ, or presentations to high school or university students.

The Director General of both the GCSB and NZSIS met with the Iwi Chairs Forum earlier this year.

A few months ago we partnered with community for an evening meeting. This was attended by our Director General, Deputy Director General of Intelligence, and supported by representatives from MFAT and DPMC. We provided insight on how we operate and the threats we found most concerning. There was a question-and-answer session, where community members could ask their questions and raise their concerns directly with us.

While there was an element of formality to part of the event, there was also opportunity for informal discussions over kai at the end of the evening.

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This engagement was about fostering mutual understanding and took us a step closer to building trust and confidence.

The quality of the intelligence and advice we share is very important.

Our Protective Security team has often led the way in producing information and guidance to New Zealand. Although their mandate is for government, they have made their information relevant and accessible to a wide range of audiences. More recently the wider NZSIS has been taking this approach.

In August 2023, the NZSIS published its first ever comprehensive assessment on the threats of violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage against New Zealand.

This resource - New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2023 - also referred to as the Threat Assessment, is perhaps the most significant intelligence report we have ever put into the public domain. It is significant because it advanced our ability to have conversations around domestic intelligence and security.

The Threat Environment 2023 is an analytical report.

It provides more detail than what has previously been reported at an unclassified level

The assessment has been a game changer as a starting point for us to engage in conversations to grow New Zealand's understanding of national security threats and help communities and sectors think about how the risks from these threats can be managed in their domains.

Towards the end of August this year we will publish the second iteration, New Zealand Security Threat Environment 2024.

We believe that by providing the public with as much information as possible about threats, including what they look like, how they manifest and the behaviours and activities we find most concerning, it will lead to a heightened awareness and promote a sense of confidence and inclusion when it comes to national security.

We do however need to choose our messages carefully and be aware of potential unintended impacts

A key consideration when issuing the Threat Assessment report was to ensure our messaging around foreign interference and violent extremism did not "stigmatise" or place any negative inference or alienate the well-established

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ethnic communities and new migrant communities. In relation to foreign interference, we are finding it is our migrant communities that are most susceptible to foreign interference.

This was something that was explicitly spelt out in the report and the press material that accompanied the report on its release. It is also something we continue to reiterate in all our engagements and receive feedback on any impacts it might have.

The assessment's impact

Government and the intelligence communities have perhaps in the past underestimated the ability of the public to absorb intelligence information and use it to grow their understanding, resilience, and risk reduction. Through our engagements, however, we are increasingly finding new sectors of our community that are interested in engaging with us, because they see we have actual information to share with them, rather than just seeking them to share information with us.

A year on from the last report, and in the wake of the next release of the threat assessment report, we are beginning to realise some of the impacts.

One of the biggest challenges we have faced in the past, is to help people discern between interference, which is bad, and influence, which can be managed acceptably.

Things that are not foreign interference include:

- Normal diplomatic efforts – all countries participate in this
- Normal advocacy, dissent or protest– everyone has the right to freedom of expression

Influence becomes interference when it occurs through deceptive, corruptive or coercive means.

Again in relation to violent extremism, clearly being able to explain what we mean by this is important. Non-violent forms of extremism, no matter how objectionable lie outside of NZSIS's area of focus.

The Threat Assessment report provides tangible examples on activities and behaviours associated with threats with actual case studies. We have found the document has been used by others in the intelligence community in their

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engagements, and used through different media with stakeholders to make it accessible to a variety of audiences.

This year we are seeking to increase the number of case studies in the report, because we realise they help New Zealanders across many different sectors understand threats in a tangible way.

Know the signs

The success of the *Threat Environment Report* is owed, in part to another key document we produced.

Know the signs, a guide for identifying signs of violent extremism – this is a public guide detailing observable behaviours and activities intelligence professionals find most concerning in individuals on a pathway to violent extremism.

This indicators guide was developed in response to a recommendation from the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch terrorist attacks.

Each indicator was identified from analysis of terrorism-related investigations and incidents in New Zealand dating back to 2006. There are almost 50 examples of concerning behaviours or activities listed in the guide. All are ideology neutral and none relate to, or reference, a particular group or community.

We have had several positive impacts associated with engagement on this document.

One impact has been other entities using the material to reach new audiences in a way that is accessible to them, and from a voice that is already trusted. For example Explore NZ (part of the New Zealand Health Group), together with Carers NZ and Autism NZ, is developing content that is specifically targeted to the family carer, using the Know the Signs indicators, to help carers mitigate the risk of radical groups targeting vulnerable adults online.

A second impact we have observed is that in the years following our engagement with this document across communities and subsequent discussions on violent extremism, our public reporting grew. At one point around 20 percent of our counter terrorism leads came from information provided by the public.

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Such leads are increasingly vital in a world where harmful activity can be carried out anonymously and without detection.

Lone actors pose the most likely violent extremist threat and the public may be better placed than authorities to see that threat, particularly at its early stages.

Espionage and Insider Threat and new areas of engagement

A number of foreign intelligence states persistently and opportunistically undertake espionage against New Zealand and New Zealanders both domestically and abroad.

Historically, espionage targeted government and classified information but today we see information or individuals targeted on the margins of government. This includes corporate New Zealand, academics, research institutions and others.

New Zealand's innovators are key to our economic advantage but also face particular risks and vulnerability. There are bad actors who will try to use New Zealand's openness to their advantage, along with our willingness to share and our need for investment.

New Zealand's critical infrastructure is a particular area of concern as the impact of any malicious activity would likely be significant.

New Zealand's technology sector is one of New Zealand's biggest export earners and is a key engine of growth in times of economic uncertainty. This makes it even more important that we are doing what we can to protect it and the innovators who are behind that success.

We are working with our Australian, Canadian, British and American intelligence partners to share guidance around secure innovation principles and associated resources to help our tech industries grow in a secure way. We hope this new area of engagement will enable New Zealand business to grow and develop, but in a way that does not comprise or put at risk their people, property or assets.

Conclusion:

As a small country, we achieve our best results when we work together, with our international partners, our intelligence community, and the communities that make up Aotearoa New Zealand.

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To work together, we need to have trusted relationships. Relationships are a two-way interaction which require the sharing of information and collaboration. We achieve this through effective engagement.

As security professionals we all want to make an impact – and the challenge for all of us is how we broaden that impact – including breaking traditional moulds and not being afraid to do things differently.

Intelligence engagement requires making intelligence available and impactful for a wider audience, but it does not mean grabbing classified material and declassifying it – some secrets will always remain secret. It means making appropriate and relevant information accessible.

It is also not just about pushing information into the public domain. It is also about reaching out to build meaningful relationships, listening to communities and receiving their insights to inform the intelligence picture.

It is about creating, as much as we can, a reciprocal relationship of connecting, sharing, understanding and responding.

Ngā mihi nui, thank you.

ENDS

6) Change how we engage – transparent and robust debate

7) everyone has a role in make NZ safe – build trust and confidence and improve information sharing

12) accessible reporting system

13) develop and publish indicators, and update regularly on the threat landscape

15) improve public understanding

33) workforce diversity

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Subject: Panelist – Engaging with Public

1. *(Robynleigh) How has the NZ Intelligence Community's Māori capability and engagement journey demystified intelligence in Aotearoa New Zealand public spaces?*
2. *(Robynleigh & Chris) What are some of the greatest benefits and challenges you face, or have previously faced, in your roles?*

Notes: Demystifying Intelligence - Mā te Mōhio o te Whakakitenga, Ka Mārama

- Demystifying Intelligence is about making Intelligence more accessible. This hasn't always been the case between our agencies and Māori.
- My role was established to help equip the agencies to do this better.
 - *Security gets done with people, not against. It's about the WITH and FOR not the TO*
- In my context as the CAM of the NZIC we began this journey of meaningful engagement with Māori in 2022.

A lot of agencies tend to dive straight into the 'do', our approach has been slightly different. I want to acknowledge Rebecca Kitteridge, Andrew Hampton in supporting the establishment of the Māori capability within the IC in 2021. Recognising that having Māori voice at the decision-making table has taken the agencies on a positive Māori capability uplift journey.

- *We started with understanding our current state vs our desired state*
- *We re-set both organisational strategies to acknowledge Māori*
- *We began building bridges with Māori and Iwi leaders inviting them into conversations with leadership and staff*
- *I want to acknowledge Chris Kumeroa (who was part of this process)*
- *We leaned into understanding what an honourable Treaty partner looks like in terms of National Security*
- *We developed our first Treaty framework alongside Māori and Iwi leaders*
- *We developed our first Māori Outcomes Strategy*
- *And we have had our Director Generals present at Iwi Chairs Forums*

This has laid a solid foundation for us to now build upon. To engage Māori on a deeper level knowing we have built the foundations right. Māori Engagement features as a key priority for both the NZSIS and GCSB.

This has also enabled the establishment of the s6(a) Indigenous network

- It's about...
 - *Delivering the right Intelligence to the right people at the right time for Iwi Māori*
 - *Telling Māori about a threats so they can manage risk*
 - *Helping Māori understand what are the threats? What do they look like?*
 - *How can we equip our people with the right protective security advice so they are better prepared to manage risks themselves?*
 - *How do we raise awareness of the common behaviours and activities associated with national security threats?*
- When we can answer those questions we will make significant progress in helping to improve national security outcomes with and for iwi Māori.
- The Māori economy is valued at more than NZD\$70bn, and estimates \$100bn by 2030
- Our efforts to make our intelligence more accessible is about achieving a shared understanding.
- We want to work alongside iwi Māori to build trust and confidence and share our respective insights as we jointly grapple with shared challenges across the motu.
 - We want iwi Māori to feel we are enhancing national security with them, not for them.
 - We want to make sure iwi Māori have access to the best protective security advice to protect their knowledge, their assets, their people from those that may wish to cause harm.
 - Sharing threat information allows our people to make informed decisions based on factual and current information.

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- We use the Treaty to frame our mahi
- The best intelligence you can provide is that which helps your decision maker stay ahead of a threat
- Stay ahead of a problem or issue – that's the unique insight of which we as intelligence professionals
- This is exemplified our name in Te Reo – Te Pā Whakamarumarū – the fortified village. We see ourselves at the Pā on top of the hill in that strategic location looking out for the threats and risk we see below and providing the insight and practical advice to help our leaders and decision makers manage those risks.

There are insights to be gained from working with international partners too.

- I am part of an indigenous network with ^{s6(a)} [REDACTED] to learn from our shared experiences and how we can develop a community of practice.
- Security is a shared responsibility both at home and from a global perspective. This is about learning from each other to understand how we can best make ourselves harder targets for acts of foreign interference, espionage and violent extremism.

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