OPERATIONAL
A
REVIEW
Level 2 Vegetation Incident
F3138746
Matakana Island, Tauranga
Created by: Operational Efficiency
13 December 2020 – 26 January 2021
& Readiness
Mā te mōhio ka anga whakamua
Through knowledge we improve
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Information
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Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 3
Findings ................................................................................................................................................... 4
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 5
Operational Efficiency and Readiness ................................................................................................... 5
Purpose of Review .................................................................................................................................. 6
Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 6
Environment Description ....................................................................................................................... 7
The Event ................................................................................................................................................ 9
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Review .................................................................................................................................................. 23
Reduction .............................................................................................................................................. 23
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Inter-agency and Stakeholder Relationships .................................................................................... 23
Fire Cause and Determination .......................................................................................................... 23
Fire Season Promotion ...................................................................................................................... 24
Community Preparedness ................................................................................................................. 24
Readiness .............................................................................................................................................. 25
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Operational Skills Maintenance (OSM) compliance ......................................................................... 25
Pre-incident Planning and Intel igence ............................................................................................. 25
Water Supplies .................................................................................................................................. 25
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Response ............................................................................................................................................... 26
Initial Mobilisation and Comcen actions ........................................................................................... 26
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Safety, Health, and Wellbeing........................................................................................................... 26
Incident Management and Team Structure (IMT) ............................................................................ 27
Firefighting Mediums ........................................................................................................................ 29
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Operational Competence .................................................................................................................. 29
Incident Ground Facilities and Cordons ............................................................................................ 30
Incident Ground Communications .................................................................................................... 30
Senior Officer Notification and Response ......................................................................................... 31
Personal Protective Eq
Released uipment (PPE) ............................................................................................... 31
Recovery ............................................................................................................................................... 31
Recovery Plan .................................................................................................................................... 31
Incident Debrief ................................................................................................................................ 32
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 32
Review Authorisation ............................................................................................................................ 34
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Executive Summary
On 13 December 2020, a fire was reported at 5 Hume Highway South, Matakana Island.
The local Matakana Island Brigade deemed the fire too risky for a ground attack and
requested helicopters for an aerial attack. The fire appeared to have been successful y
suppressed using three helicopters, ground crews and heavy machinery overhauling and
mopping up the next day.
A change in weather conditions and the incomplete overhaul resulted in the fire rekindling
a week later. This resulted in a campaign fire lasting for an additional ten days requiring
significant resources, including helicopters, firefighters from forestry companies and Fire
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and Emergency personnel from throughout the Region and beyond.
Access to the island was by a Forestry vessel running between Sulphur Poi
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Manganui and the Southern tip of Matakana Island. Al personnel, appliances and
equipment were transported via this route. After the fire was extinguished, patrols
continued throughout January 2021, with no formal declaration of the fire being out.
An IMT suited to this incident was not formed, and when one was established, it was ad-
hoc and very lean. This resulted in several key factors being overlooked, such as an
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Incident Action Plan, resource rotation, welfare facilities, communication plan and
expense tracking, to name a few.
Concern was expressed to the review team regarding incompatibility between natural and
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built incident management systems and procedures. There was also concern about those
managing the initial incident, in particul
the ar, the lack of understanding of the risk posed by
buried smouldering organic material in a sandy environment. This requires specialist
machinery and thermal imaging capability to detect deep-seated hotspots. Furthermore,
the creation of firebreaks is a spec
under ialist skil that, in this case, wasn't employed, thereby
allowing fire spread. The review team also found there was an unwil ingness from the IC
to engage with and accept offers of support and advice. This contributed significantly to
the delay in establishing a properly formed IMT, getting expert advice, and utilising the
support from the Region Coordinating Centre.
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It wasn't until a Service Delivery Advisor with expert knowledge of these events arrived at
the island that things started to improve. He introduced a more robust IMT and reviewed
the current tactics and adjusted where needed.
This event took place over approximately 45 days over the Christmas and New Year
period. There was very little documention captured for use by the review team. This
included no Incident Action Plans and no formal Situation Reports being developed during
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the first few days of the fire. There was also a minimal amount of information shared with
the Communication Centre. They were struggling to understand the extent of the fire and
resources being cal ed for as often requests for resources were done outside normal
processes through the ComCen. But more importantly this contributed to a lack of
communication and cohesive tactics confusing both firefighters and contractors utilised.
Findings
The review team found;
• A lack of Leadership and Command & Control was evident at this event. Most personnel
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interviewed, whether Fire and Emergency personnel, contractors, Matakana Island
brigade members, or other stakeholders involved mentioned that a lack of structure led
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to several critical functions being overlooked and poor tactics being implemented. These
functions and tactics include and are not restricted to; creating an Incident Action Plan,
managing assets and personnel, staff welfare and employing the correct tactics to
extinguish the fire including the efficient use of aircraft, making promises and
commitments to personnel outside of FENZ policy, and financial delegations.
• The lack of a suitably skil ed IMT contributed to the re-ignition after the I
Information C believing the
fire was out. This was through a lack of an effective IAP with commensurate strategy and
tactics, limited expertise in understanding the behaviour of the fuels in the sandy soil
conditions, and not realising how to properly mop up after the fire was thought to be out.
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This resulted in a prolonged campaign, at considerable expense to FENZ.
• Many Fire and Emergency Natural Environment brigades are presumed to have
the
knowledge and experience in firefighting a forestry plantation type incident. The skil s
required to manage such an incident are very specialised and require specialist
intervention very early. This is not to say our brigades shouldn't be at ending these events
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to gain the skil s and experience, they need to be mentored and work alongside those
with the skills. In this instance the forest contractors who attended this fire brought that
knowledge and skil to the incident, but this was not initially understood nor fully
appreciated by the IC.
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• Most of those who attended the incident, including Senior officers, were not familiar with
the island. The forestry company managing the forest on the island established the
Matakana Volunteer Brigade and it is only partially supported by Fire and Emergency.
The review team found no evidence of the Senior FENZ Officer who had responsibility on
behalf of FENZ either visiting the island or being engaged with key stakeholders. Fire and
Emergency do provide good VSO support and this person visits regularly, and is
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appreciated by the Matakana brigade team. Being an island, it has its idiosyncrasies, so
it deserves a specific section in the fire plan tailored to their needs.
• A person who is not authorised as per the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017
was appointed as the Incident Controller during an operational phase of the incident.
• The Ngaruawahia Operational Support Unit Canteen and Hamilton Operational Support
Unit Welfare Facility were well received by those in attendance. But they were left to fend
for themselves initially, with no accommodation or sleeping arrnagements considered.
This would have been avoided if a functional IMT had been established, supported by the
RCC.
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Recommendations
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The review team is very aware that the Fire and Emergency (September 2021) Tranche 2
stand-up will rectify some of these recommendations that result from the lack of unification of
leadership teams within the Bay of Plenty at the time. However, at the time the review was
completed the recommendations were;
• Ngā Tai ki te Puku Region and Bay of Plenty District Managers ensure all Senior officers
in a response role attend SIMEX training at least annually and role play
Information in the roles they
are expected to perform at an actual event. The IMT must include functions such as
finance that introduces a process to track expenses.
• Brigades that are not specialists in campaign fires or mop-up after a wildfire work
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alongside or are mentored by those who have the skil s.
• The Bay of Plenty Group Manager
the s, Community Readiness, and Recovery person
responsible for the island are to make themselves familiar with the Brigade, form
relationships with key stakeholders and the Community and refine the Wildfire Response
Pan to the needs of the island.
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Operational Efficiency and Readiness
The purpose of Operational Efficiency and Readiness (OER) is to provide operational
assurance advice to the Deputy Chief Executive Service Delivery (the National Commander)
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to ensure they achieve their responsibilities for the operational efficiency and operational
readiness of Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ).
OER is independent, objective and provides quality operational assurance advice to support
continuous improvement regarding the operational efficiency and readiness of Fire and
Emergency New Zealand.
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Purpose of Review
An Operational Review examines how Fire and Emergency responded to substantial,
significant or unusual incidents to enable continuous improvement. While it considers the
application of policies, procedures and operational instructions (as they applied to the event),
its primary focus is to assist Of icers’ and Firefighters’ learning by sharing knowledge and
experiences gained through real incidents.
A review focuses on the facts and does not provide conjecture or alternative opinions. The
review identifies critical findings to inform senior managers where improvements are needed
or there is a need to develop corrective actions. It identifies general findings related to strategy,
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tactics, leadership, agency and community engagement and/or activities that worked well to
support organisational learning.
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Al incidents should have a hot debrief, and significant incidents wil get a formal debrief
facilitated by a suitably qualified person. This debrief is required to be written down in the form
of an After-Action Review (AAR) and wil be used as evidence by the review team.
Few reviews of emergencies, undertaken with the benefit of hindsight, would not identify
lessons for the future, and this is one of the main reasons to carry out reviews of this nature.
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Therefore, our comments and observations should be read in the spirit that they are intended,
which is to support continuous improvement of service delivery to the people of New Zealand.
Once approved by the sponsor, all reports are published on the Operational Efficiency
Official
webpage for all to read and share.
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Methodology
The review team use the Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM) as a guide to conduct
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operational reviews.
The content contained within this report reflects the information provided to the team through
debriefs, interviews, and data collected through Fire and Emergency reporting systems.
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Note, a Fire and Emergency New Zealand login is required to access most links within this
document.
Review Requested by
Region Manager Ngā Tai ki te Puku, David Guard
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Review Team
Review Lead:
Trevor Brown
Review Team:
Darryl Papesch
Review Team:
Mark Neville
Review Team:
Graeme Still
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Links
ICad Report
F3138746
Media Articles
Sunlive NZ Herald Stuff
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Environment Description
Matakana Island is in the western Bay of Plenty. A long, flat barrier island it is 20 kilometres
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in length but barely more than 3 kilometres wide. The Island has been continuously populated
for centuries by Māori mostly associated with
Ngāi Te Rangi.
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The Island has two distinct parts: 5,000 acres (2,023 ha) of farm and orchard land on the inner
harbour, (where most of the population lives) and 10,000 acres (4,047 ha) of forest-covered
coastal land exposed to the Pacific
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located just offshore from Matakana's southern coast. It has a population of approximately
200 people, and there are around 90 homes.
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Figure-1, Matakana Island viewed form Mt Maunganui (Mauao)
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The Island has three marae and protects the entrance to Tauranga. It is primarily covered with
pine trees, although some land is cleared for the residents and has farmland and orchards.
The Island's long, white sandy beach is popular with surfers and recreational boats who may
BBQ on the shore. Public access to the island is via a ferry service out of Omokoroa on the
western side of the Island. In addition, the forestry company operates its own ferry service
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between Sulphur Point, Port of Tauranga and a private wharf located on the southern end of
the island. Fire and Emergency used this wharf and the forestry vessel to transfer assets to
and from the Island.
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The fire occurred in first and second rotation forestry blocks, the second rotation block
containing four to five year old seedlings.
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The Event
Matakana Island. Day 1 (Sunday, 13 December 2020)
At 15:20 on Sunday 13 December 2020, a 111 call was received at the Northern
Communications Centre (Comcen) reporting a fire at the beachfront near Panepane point on
Matakana Island. Additional 111 calls were received from people aboard boats and the
mainland.
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Information
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Figure-2, Southern end of Matakana Island showing vegetation fire approximately 1 km
north of Panepane point
Comcen despatched the predetermined attendance (PDA) to a first alarm vegetation fire on
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Matakana Island. Matakana Volunteer Rural Fire Force (MVRFF) and one Rural Fire Officer
(RFO
) responded. Around the same time, a Fire and Emergency contractor (DPRF ),
who saw smoke coming from the island, placed a helicopter on standby. The Regional
Manager's Advisor (REGION ) was attached to the incident, and a neighbouring Area
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Manager advised.
On arrival, the
of MVRFF located the fire in a slash pile approximately
100m from the beach. There were members of the public on the beach and recreational boats
nearby. His risk assessment determined the fire was beyond the capabilities of his Brigade,
requiring an air attack to suppress it before he could safely commit ground crews. As of the
Incident Controller (IC), he provided a SitRep stating the fire was on the coastal margin and,
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although the wind was SW, fire was spreading fast toward the forest. He advised that he would
not be commit ing his crew until an air attack had reduced the risk.
At about 15:45, the Greerton pump (GREE751), water tanker (GREE7511) and command unit
(GREE7518) were despatched and proceeded to Omokoroa to access the Island via the
commercial ferry service. RFO
received a call from the MVRFF
to fire on the island
and had Comcen commit him to the incident. Responding from Whakatane, he instructed
Comcen to stand down the Fire and Emergency appliances as he thought they would have no
access to the island.
The local procedure for responses to Matakana Island (pre-Fire and Emergency) requires the
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SSO at Tauranga Station to contact the Deputy Principal RFO Pumicelands, to ensure both
organisations are aware of the response and processes to be followed. The SSO Tauranga
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was not notified of the Greerton appliances' responding, thereby no contact was made. The
Interim Fire and Emergency, Bay of Plenty Fire Plan - Part B Response -1 October 2020
section 6 specifies the fol owing PDA during High Fire Danger.
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the
RFO
arranged for an Oceanea Air helicopter to standby and proceeded to Sulphur Point
to set up initial Air Ops. Seeing the smoke, he deployed three helicopters, Oceanea Air,
Volcanic Air, and Heli Resources Murupara. They began firefighting operations, dipping from
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the ocean as RFO
performed the role of Air At ack Supervisor (AAS). He was only
communicating with the Lead Pilot as he could not establish communication with the IC using
Incident Ground Radio Communication (IGC). The IC was amongst the forest on the Island,
across the harbour, some distance away. RFO
also contacted Tauranga Airport Air
Traffic control to advise them of the aerial firefighting operation. The third helicopter was
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requested as one helicopter pilot was having dif iculties with his firefighting bucket.
Coastguard took RFO
and REGION to the island. They met with the IC, and after
receiving a briefing, RFO
assumed the role of IC. He provided a Sitrep updating the fire
size, progress and tactics. He planned to contain the fire using only air attacks. Ground crews
and heavy machinery would be brought in the next day to mop up. A forestry company on the
island,
offered to provide some heavy machinery, so one of their "Skidders"
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was used to create firebreaks. Embers from the fire in the slash pile spread fire to scrub and
stumps over a two-hectare area in multiple locations. These were suppressed using the three-
helicopters, which were stood down at dusk (21:00hrs). RFO
and REGION left the
island at approximately 19:30, transferring command to the local
. MVRFF patrolled the
area, monitoring the fire during the night.
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under the Official Information Act 1982
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Figure-3, Fire weather data on the day of the fire, there had been no rainfal , the relative humidity was
low and the temperature high. These conditions combined with light fuel and moderate breeze led to
rapid fire spread and ember transfer.
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Figure-4, change to an on-shore breeze driving the fire towards the forest and ash towards the
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city.
Day 2 (Monday 14 December)
Early the following day, the MRVFF reported the fire had flared up and jumped the containment
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lines. At about 06:30, the RFO
put two helicopters on standby. RFO
reported a
wind change to SE direction and reconnai
the ssance would be conducted after 07:00 before
firefighting recommenced. He requested the Eastern Bays tanker from Whakatane
(EAST6071). Comcen also responded GREE7518 and GREE7511. REGION returned with
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RFO
to advise on the availability of urban resources including the RCC. The use of the
RCC was declined at this time. REGION then queried whether the PRFO was going to
attend, however RFO
stated he had been in contact with the PRFO and they wont be
attending. REGION then contacted the Area Commander to requesting some Senior
officers to attend as he was concerned there was a lack of senior personnel on the incident
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ground.
RFO
deployed to the island as the Planning/Intel Officer using Fire Mapper to track fire
progress and fire lines. He also wanted to make contact and work with Machinery Operators
and Forestry Crews.
The Area Commander directed two other Senior officers to respond with GREE7518 to the
island to fulfil the Safety Of icer (ISO) and Logistics (LOGS) functions. Upon arriving, they
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could not locate the IC to obtain a briefing, so they conducted their incident reconnaissance
before updating the GREE7518 (ICP) hazard board. They established Matakana Command
on Hume Highway. The ICP could not establish IGC contact with the IC so they resorted to
cell phone communication. They also began the electronic Incident Action Plan (eIAP).
At about 11:00, they located RFO
and REGION who were not wearing jerkins, so
they were initially unsure of who was IC. The Senior officers at the ICP were surprised there
was no IAP, hazard list or command structure documented anywhere. The ISO briefed them
on the hazards and requested the IC initial the hazard board. The IC asked, "how often do I
have to do this?" and was told he needed to review it approximately every hour. 1982
The LOGS Officer was surprised to find lots of rural people turning up in vehicles. He struggled
to record and account for the large number of rural volunteer personnel arriving. He took
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photographs of licence plates as no system of personnel accounting had been established.
LOGS asked IC what resources he wanted and got no answer. It transpired that IC had
sourced resources by phone. No records of what was coming was provided to LOGS or the
ICP staf . It appeared that requests for additional resources were ad-hoc and did not use the
greater alarm system or refer to the fire plan.
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The IC requested an additional helicopter and a higher qualified AAS who arrived just after
midday.
RFO
, RFO
and REGION did a recce by helicopter. Incident ground mapping
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was done during this flight, however the information was not shared with the ICP staff on
return, resulting in nothing being documented.
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The ICP staff had difficulty displaying the incident ground layout and crew deployment on a
map as RFO's appeared to be using a mixture of Avenza and Firemapper. Firemapper was
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not functioning within the ICP.
The IC's Sitrep stated; the fire involved four hectares of mixed vegetation and was being fought
by three helicopters and two ground crews with heavy machinery cutting firebreaks.
RFO
as AAS was stood down at noon and replaced by another air attack supervisor
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who had higher qualifications as there would soon be four helicopters in the circuit.
The Ngaruawahia tanker NGAR3311, GREER7511 and other pumping appliances were used
for water shuttles. The crews said they were frustrated by the lack of CIMS structure, frequent
command changes, and varying priorities. The entire scene was very disorganised.
LOGS called the Waikato Area Commander to request the Canteen from Ngaruawahia. At
about 16:00, people began leaving the island. LOGS and ISO were not aware of any plan for
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the night. At about 17:30, the command changed from RFO
back to the CFO of MVRFF.
P&I left at 18:00. At about this time, the Ngaruawahia Canteen unit arrived to provide meals
for the 28 firefighters and support staff until 0200m. At about 19:00, ground operations ceased.
Helicopters continued their aerial attack and were stood down at the end of the day at
approximately 21:00. On hearing this, RF
recommended that air operations continue
for two to three hours each day at dawn to prevent re-ignition. The IC ignored this.
At 20:20 command changed to an authorised contractor, with a Timberland crew remaining
overnight. This was not recorded in the IC log.
There was concern that no Welfare Sector was established for an incident of this size. The
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ICP remained staffed by two firefighters who stayed overnight within the vehicle, and the
Ngaruawahia crew slept under their vehicle. They did this for four nights until their CFO
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purchased a tent and stretchers.
Day 3 (Tuesday 15 December)
The ISO returned to the island in the morning. He and the ICP crew established an IGC
repeater near the southern end of the Hume Highway to boost IGC communications which
had been questionable. This seemed to be due to undulating terrain, very dense forest and
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large distances. It was also noted there was a lack of understanding about radio procedure
and usage and the local Brigade was using forestry provided IGC's.
RFO
returned to the island and assumed the IC role. His log reports no fire activity
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overnight. The IC's log ceases at 08:30 and refers to eIAP for ongoing logging of information.
the
Ground operations continued with crews working alongside heavy machinery to extinguish
hotspots and widen firebreaks. Helicopters were placed on standby, and the skidder returned
to logging work.
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Some IMT members were not wearing identification, confusing as to who was IC. At times
both the RFO
and REGION would give instructions to ICP staff. A Sitrep stated the
RFO
was IC and the REGION was OPS. The message also noted that the incident
was a controlled burn.
felt a lack of command
unity as people in dif er
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RFO
as LOGS/PLAN, organised forestry crews for the next day and requested the IC
provide them with PPE. These crews did not have the same level of PPE as Fire and
Emergency personnel and expected it to be provided. This has ramifications such as correct
sizing and the number of items required.
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Each evening IC responsibility would resort to the CFO of the MVRFF. His crews patrolled the
area and monitored the fire overnight. The ICP would remain on the island each night;
however, communications were redirected to the MVRFF fire station.
Day 4 (Wednesday 16 December)
RFO
returned to the island and assumed the IC role for the morning briefing before
passing command to RFO
. RFO
left the island later that morning.
RFO
tasked crews and appointed the ISO and sector supervisors. Ground operations
resumed with forestry crews turning over hot spots, widening and blackening out fire breaks.
A Sitrep from IC stated We have 30 personnel working out of two sectors, supported by two
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bulldozers, a command unit and a tanker. RFO
reported appliances getting stuck in the
sand and requiring the assistance of bulldozers.
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Cellphone communication was patchy, making communication between the mainland and the
resources on island very difficult. A VSO brought drinking water and hygiene supplies to the
island. GREE7511 left the island that evening, returning the next day. Command again
transferred to the CFO with MVRFF monitoring fire overnight.
Day 5 (Thursday 17 December)
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RFO
continued as the IC.
GREE7511 returned to island. Although there were no ICAD entries for this day as no
messages were passed to Comcen, the eIAP states 13
Official firefighters were on site with one rural
appliance and one bulldozer. In addition, the VSO delivered resources and the
the
visited for a short time.
At approximately 17:10, the Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS or drone) team travelled
to the island on the forestry barge from Sulphur Point. A drone was deployed to identify and
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locate hotspots. These operations ceased at 20:00, with no major issues encountered. The
data the drones collected was shared with the IC and emailed to other interested parties.
GREER7511 left the island to return the following day.
Day 6 (Friday 18 December)
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At about 09:33 command changed from CFO back to RFO
. However, this wasn't
recorded in the incident log.
The drones were re-deployed with the RPAS team report stated the following,
"The following day(18th) the task was conducted promptly as per RPAS SOPs for these tasks
and data was shown to the local contact and "sent out" to all relevant persons. RTU conducted
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with no issues of note". The drone team also mentioned the valuable assistance that the
MVRFF provided.
The ICP was disestablished and returned to Greerton Station along with GREE7511.
The bulldozer operator, forestry crews, and EAST6071 continued overturning hotspots before
transferring command to an RFO, a
contractor. MRVFF continued with patrolling
the site.
Day 7 (Saturday 19 December 2020)
At 13:06, calls were being received by Comcen suggesting the fire had flared up. 1982
MVRFF reported they had a few hotspots they were dampening down, but about an hour later
requested two helicopters as fire had jumped the firebreak. RFO
noted that there was a
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two-hour delay in the arrival of the first helicopter.
At 16:48, RFO
, EAST6701 and GREE7518 arrived back on the island, with the ICP
being established on Hume highway at 18:00 with RFO
as IC. However, with no AAS
available and four helicopters now on site, only three were permit ed to fly.
There were now three ground crews and bulldozers working in sectors A and C and helicopters
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dropping water. An RFO raised safety concerns about water bombing with crews working in
the vicinity. Water drops alone (hundreds of kilograms in weight) can cause severe injury if it
lands on someone or can cause trees to become unsafe by breaking branches that crews
unbeknown to them are working beneath.
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At 19:15, Comcen received reports from the public of smoke blowing over Tauranga and ash
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falling onto properties. Also, a small fire broke out near the estuary, probably due to ember
transfer, and was extinguished spontaneously by a crew.
At 20:09 REGION rang RFO
under after having been notified from personnel on the island
that the incident had escalated. REGION advised RFO
that he had made contact with
the
, now Service Delivery Advisor
and vegetation SME and requested that the
attend the Incident as REGION had
serious concerns regarding the escalation of the incident. The
was somewhat reluctant
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at first due to not wanting to “stand on anyones toes” as there was already a structure and IC
in place.
Air operations ceased at 21:00, but bulldozers and ground crews worked through the night.
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Day 8 (Sunday 20 December)
RFO
returned to the island and assumed the IC role.
A diesel tanker was requested due to several appliances running low on fuel.
At 11:00, a Sitrep was transmit ed stating two helicopters were operating in sector Yankee,
with three ground crews, two bulldozers, one excavator. A spot fire was reported 200m SW of
Hume highway and was extinguished.
At 12:15, The
along with REGION , arrived at the incident with
becoming IC.
Under his command the scene changed dramatically as he instigated the following: 1982
• Reorganised the sectors to reflect the tactics and used natural boundaries as borders such
as forestry roads
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• Redirected ground crew tactics to focus on a direct attack
• Established a continuous water supply by positioning and using portable dams
• Had the VHF repeater moved from Hume road on the island and erected on Mt Maunganui
itself. This allowed excellent radio communications across all the island and beyond back
to Tauranga fire station. This wil likely be adopted into the local procedure.
• Ordered a log processing machine and got it to work. This allowed for d
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be felled and used as per normal, minimising wastage and allowing some costs to be
recovered by the forestry company and at the same time removing a hazard.
• Stopped some of the pointless bulldozer work on roadside
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• Populated an IAP and prepared basic mapping for the next day
• Organised a "short" IMT for the next f
the ew operational periods that consisted of an IC, ISO,
LOGS, OPS and three Sector Commanders. Planning was done by ICP staff, with
improved mapping done remotely by a specialist.
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A
Senior Of icer took on the LOGS role. He located the IC, engaged with
ICP crew and ISO. He sent Sitreps to other Area Commanders outlining the resources likely
to be requested from their stations.
The LOGS Officer identified the following:
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• Volunteers had been sleeping in their vehicles and there were no ablutions or canteen
facilities available other than back at MVRFF some kilometres away, which was not viable.
• There was no tracking of the contractor's equipment being used, so no costs could be
estimated or controlled.
• ICP staff reported being told by the previous IC to make Sitreps up
• Handovers were poor or non-existent and weren't documented
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• There was no continuity in a plan as there were many changes of IC, nor was there a plan
• Apart from Daily Time Sheets (DTS) there was no system for tracking personnel or
resources.
• There are two access points, the public ferry service out of Omokoroa and the forestry
vessel via their own wharf, both many kms apart. Nobody was recording arrival or
departures and no cordon was established to keep the public out. The public were still
bringing their private craft to the island.
• There was no medical evacuation plan if the case of urgent medical treatment was
required by those working on the island. One person stated they'd used one of the
firefighting helicopters. This is not appropriate as commercial helicopters are not equipped
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for such an event, and furthermore, it was never discussed with the pilots.
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At 13:30 LOGS requested the Hamilton Operational Support Welfare Facility. This trailer has
hot showers, washing facilities and comes with two portable toilets.
At 18:20, command change from
back to RFO
Air Operations ceased at 21:00, but ground crews continued to patrol the fireground.
Day 9 (Monday 21 December)
Information
RFO
returned to the island to fulfil the OPS role tasked with managing heavy machinery
and Firemapper data.
RFO
attended the incident for the first time and took command at 08:43. He
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immediately transmit ed a Sitrep st aing: the fireground is quiet, crews being tasked and
the
dispatched, current hazards are generic rural firefighting, using ground crews, bulldozers and
air attack with five helicopters. We have nil requirements, external direct on the hot spots. It
then explained the current IMT structure, including OIC Fire, OPS, LOGS, ISO and Air Ops.
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At 14:38, another team arrived on the island and at 18:54 command changed again.
A Sitrep was sent at 21:09, stating that ground crews were dampening down hotspots
throughout the night.
Day 10 (Tuesday 22 December)
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At 09:58, a Sitrep from the IC, stated that night crews made good progress. 75 firefighters are
at the incident targeting hot spots identified by drone. They are assessing in preparation for
Air Operations later in the morning. Have three tankers, multiple dams, six rural appliances,
eight five-person ground crews and heavy machinery at work.
At 13:00, a portable pump was taken to the airport to be flown to the island at quite some
expense.
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Comcen requested a contact number for media enquiries and an update on fire size at 14:48.
At 15:42, a Sitrep from the fireground stated "40 hectares blacking out" with ground crews and
helicopter support.
RFO
took command as IC night shift managing night crews and activities.
Air Operations ceased at 20:45 that evening.
Day 11 (Wednesday 23 December) 08:29 RFO
took command.
At 11:38, a Sitrep stated that there was a 40-hectare perimeter containing multiple hotspots
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and subterranean fuel. One helicopter and two diggers were working. 62 personnel on-site in
three sectors, two helicopters and one digger on standby on the mainland. It then detailed the
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IMT structure, hazards and welfare situation.
This was followed by another one approximately one hour later stating that all aerial operations
had ceased, three helicopters remained on standby at Tauranga Airport
At 16:55, crews were rotated, and all firefighting activities had ceased.
Information
RFO
took command 18:15 as IC night shift, with crews then patrolling and dampening
hot spots until 07:00 the next day.
Day 12 (24 December)
Official
The RPAS team started their operations at 00:50. During these flights' hotspot management
ceased.
the
At 0700, incident command changed to a contractor
who is not recorded as
an "Authorised" person under the Fire and Emergency Act 2017. This issue was raised during
review team interviews as being a point of concern.
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RFO
resumed command at 08:23.
By approximately 10:00, day crews and heavy machinery was operating in three sectors, and
a first-aid area was established at the Matakana Island fire station.
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At16:06 RFO
took command for the nightshift.
Day 13 (25 December) RFO
took on the role of Deputy IC and was to manage the heavy machinery.
At 10:02 a message was sent by phone to Comcen stating: Change of IC at 18:00, K45 IC
(RFO
), a crew of nine on the island and wil be patrolling, monitoring and extinguishing
any hotspots. Wil give further update mid-afternoon, wil be staying on the island for 24 hours.
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A Sitrep at 12:24 from RFO
stated: wind forecast 45km/hr SW, RFO
and
RFO
on-site, a crew of four hot spotting, three diggers and two forestry crews on
standby.
Day 14 (26 December)
The activities focused on managing the hotspots from this point of the fire until its end date of
26 January 2021. Resources were slowly sent home, although several crews would still be
rotated, consisting of Fire and Emergency staff and private contractors. There was also heavy
machinery in use however, aircraft operations had ceased.
For the last two - three weeks, after all resources had left the island, the MRVFF maintained
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the monitoring of the fireground regularly.
There was minimal information passed onto Comcen during this period and
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message was transmit ed.
Operations - use of Aircraft
On the first day of the incident a suitably qualified person performed the role of AAS. He was
unable to establish radio or phone communication with the IC on the island so he received no
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briefing. He was unable to observe the incident ground, from his location at Sulphur Point, so
his only reference was via his communication with the lead pilot (praised by RN). This raises
the question of tactical coordination as the AAS may not know whether ground crews and
heavy machinery were also deployed. (5.5 Operations Handbook)
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RFO
and RFO
expressed opinions that aerial operations should have continued
the
longer for a few hours each day for the next five days with ground crews to ensure complete
extinguishment. In addition, some RFOs had concerns regarding the effective use of
helicopters as lines carrying monsoon buckets were too short. This made it dif icult for pilots
under
to gauge the effectiveness of their drops. There were also some safety concerns raised related
to water-bombing trees causing "hang-ups" by damaging branches creating a danger for
ground crews. It is also an inefficient use of water as it is disbursed by branches and may not
reach the intended target.
Feedback also mentione
Released d the inappropriate use of helicopters to transport a portable pump
from Sulphur Point to the fireground and extinguish small fires beside the roadway. This was
seen as an expensive way to transport equipment, primarily as the forestry vessel was still
operating and was close. As for the roadside extinguishment, this could have been achieved
with handlines. There was also concern about the number of helicopters placed on "standby"
versus their practical use and its costs.
Other feedback
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The review team were told of several other issues from various people interviewed, they were:
• There was an Ineffective and uncoordinated use of resources. An example was the
Murupara rural crews who were ready to respond but told to stand-down. They were then
requested to be prepared for the next day. Meanwhile,
Forestry crews worked
for up to 23 hours due to poor resource coordination.
• Machinery and vehicles were unsuitable for tasks. For example, the review team was told
the bulldozers were too large and skidders were used to create fire breaks. However they
spread and buried burning material.
• Helicopter bucket lines were not set up correctly for the intended use resulting in ineffective
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water drops.
• Several Fire and Emergency vehicles lacked ground clearance or didn't have four-wheel
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drive capability.
• USAR has resources that could have been quickly deployed for habitat and welfare,
however, these were not requested. A poor briefing to the Ngaruawahia Fire Brigade who
provided the canteen made it very difficult for them to cater as they were not advised
numbers they needed to cater for and for how long. In addition, there was dif iculty locating
a suitable vehicle to tow the ablutions and welfare trailer from Char
Information twell Station in
Hamilton.
• Most of the feedback received was focused on the poor management of the incident. The
CIMS format wasn't properly adopted and the incomplete IMT structure led to functions
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not being performed. There was also a lack of accountability. Gaps in the command
structure (and lack of formally assigned roles) meant that briefings were poor or non-
the
existent. There was confusion over who was in charge and when. Resources were not
recorded or tasked effectively; therefore they were not catered for in terms of welfare and
safety and their relief was poorly coordinated.
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• There was no expense tracking system implemented, resulting in invoices being sent for
payment that region staff had no idea what they were for.
• Communication was poor. Sitreps to Comcen and the ICP were irregular and incomplete.
Resource requests did not use the appropriate methods and were therefore ad-hoc and
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uncoordinated.
• Several Fire and Emergency Volunteer personnel who attended for prolonged periods
were promised payment for their work that was not within policy. Some of these people
changed or cancelled holidays and work plans to assist at the event on the understanding
they would be paid.
• Comcen Managers and Operators were frustrated with the lack of information provided to
them. They didn’t get regular Sitreps and had to try to contact Senior officers themselves
22
to get updates that had to be passed on to others that requested it. This also hampered
the media being able to give accurate media releases. In this case, they had no idea what
appliances (except those fitted with ALPS) and other resources were on the island. Nor
did they know when the last appliances left or when the event had closed.
Review
This section outlines the findings from the operational review investigation based on the
investigation's terms of reference and expectations. Generally, the findings are grouped
chronologically under the "4Rs" headings Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.
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The Operational Review team measures compliance against Fire and Emergency Operational
Instructions and Policy.
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Reduction
Inter-agency and Stakeholder Relationships
Our findings
Information
Prior to the formation of Fire and Emergency, the rural fire authority managed relationships
with landowners, forestry companies and service providers, including owners of heavy
machinery and aircraft used for firefighting. Since then, there has been very lit le contact
between Fire and Emergency and the island except for VSO support to the Brigade.
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The local Iwi were engaged through the Matakana brigade. However, the review team found
the
no evidence of other agencies being involved or briefed despite concern about smoke drift
from the island to the city of Tauranga. Also,some of the local Senior officers were not fully
aware of the situation. Furthermore, the review team found an unwil ingness by a number of
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the RFO’s to share intelligence gathered during reconnaissance flights.This information
should have gone to the ICP crew for documenting and populating a IAP. Further concerns
emerged when the fire outbreak occurred, and the
struck resistance from the
rather
than a wil ingness to engage.
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Fire Cause and Determination
Our findings
A suitably qualified fire investigator was assigned, and an investigation carried out. The report
was not completed at the time of the debrief. The interim findings agreed with statements from
of the MVRFF, i.e.the fire had a single point of origin and started in a slash pile 100m
23
from the beach and close to where members of the public often land. The investigator
mentioned there was no attempt made to protect the suspected area of origin.
Fire Season Promotion
Our findings
The review team found "Check it's alright before you light" website information was constantly
updated for the entire zone. However, the information on the website dif ered from the private
notices displayed on the island intended for the public. The private notices were erected by
the Forestry Management Company and determined what activities could take place.
Nonetheless, it was a high fire danger and any ignition sources needed to be managed
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accordingly.
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Information
Official
Figure-5, Fire condit
the
ions on the day of the fire starting
Community Preparedness
under
Our findings
A project had been undertaken to ensure all homes on the island had working smoke alarms.
The MVRFF was established by the forestry company on the island and supported by the
National Rural Fire Authority prior to the formation of Fire and Emergency. Since then, Fire
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and Emergency have established a relationship with the forestry company and provided
support to the fire force with vehicles, PPE, some training and VSO support.
The main community isn't located within or close to the forest, but on adjacent orchards and
farmland. However, there are a few occupied dwellings in and around the old timber mil site
quite close to the plantation. There was concern during the incident regarding this small
24
community and its proximity to the fire if the wind changed direction; however, the IC didn't
deem an evacuation necessary and kept them informed of any progress.
Readiness
Operational Skills Maintenance (OSM) compliance
Our findings
The team found that the local Brigade had only recently completed some unit standard training
to respond to wildfire and other emergencies such as medical response. Although the CFO
and DCFO are "Authorised" persons there was no evidence of training maintenance records.
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It was assumed forestry crews had the appropriate training for the tasks they were performing;
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however, the review team didn't have access to these.
As for the Senior officers who performed IMT roles, there was no available evidence of the
skil s other than their participation (or not) in Region simulated exercises (SIMEX).
Those performing firefighting roles and other support positions performed their tasks to a high
standard.
Information
Pre-incident Planning and Intel igence
Our findings
Matakana Island had a tactical plan, "Tauranga Kawerau Fire District – Local Procedure No.
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8 Matakana Island Response" for accessing the island, which has no date. The Interim Fire
the
and Emergency Bay of Plenty District Fire Plan – Part B – Response – 1 October 2020 was
known to at least one RFO and he consulted it regularly. Other Senior officers were unsure of
its contents.
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The Region ran a plantation fire SIMEX prior to the fire season, however, several Pumicelands
staff opted not to participate fully and left after a short time on the first day. The management
process, structure and learnings from this SIMEX could have been easily adopted for this
incident.
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Water Supplies
Our findings
The island has minimal freshwater supplies but is surrounded by the sea. There is no
electronic record of the location of freshwater static water supplies. A water shuttle was
established using a portable pump from the ocean adjacent to the forest company's wharf to
fil and maintain static water supply points constructed by crews during the incident. These
25
were positioned depending on fire location and transport routes. It was reported to the review
team that some vehicles became stuck in sand, requiring assistance from a bulldozer. It
appears the driver of one tanker refused to enter a soft sandy track when instructed to by the
IC, and when a replacement went instead, it got severely stuck. Due to the sandy nature of
the terrain, four-wheel-drive vehicles were best suited for water shuttle duties.
The review team was also made aware of helicopters being tasked to fil dams with their
buckets, which was inefficient. In addition, some believed it brought unnecessary risk to those
working below.
A Water Supply Of icer was never appointed to manage supplies, and it was all done ad-hoc.
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Response
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Initial Mobilisation and Comcen actions
Our findings
Comcen processed the call and responded appliances in a timely manner as and when
requested. All notifications were actioned appropriately. The IC did not use the greater alarm
system to request additional resources which is often the case in the natur
Information al environment.
However, the various IC's didn't adhere to the BOP Response Plan and asked for any
resources ad-hoc. There were times when some resources responded from greater distances
when closer appliances and crews stayed on their stations. This resulted in gaps in resourcing,
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delays, and aspects of incident management being overlooked.
the
Sitreps to Comcen were irregular, and many were passed by phone or email rather than by
LMR. There were some days when no messages were sent from the incident ground, so no
one other than those present had any idea of progress being made or any activities taking
under
place.
Safety, Health, and Wellbeing
Our findings
No injuries or near misses were recorded in the safe@work system, nor were the review team
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advised of any injuries or near misses
Although ISO's were appointed at various stages of the incident, they were not necessarily
the right personnel for the task. The review team heard from several people who did the role
that they were also given other duties to complete concurrently. In addition, the first ISO
appointed had little engagement with the IC and did not feel that hazards identified were taken
seriously.
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Due to the lack of a formal structure being implemented, for the scale and duration of this
incident, welfare was not managed effectively. The team received several examples of
personnel not being able to access ablution facilities, no sleeping arrangements for personnel
who had to stay on the island overnight, no monitoring of hours being worked and so on.
There was no evidence of a safety plan being developed nor consideration of first aid if an
injury occurred. The review team were advised that the thought was, if something happened,
they would use a helicopter to ferry the injured or unwell person to the mainland.
The review team could find no evidence of applying the "safe person concept" or LACES or
any other risk analysis. At one stage, an expert in forest firefighting refused an instruction that
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would have put his team at risk within the plantation due to the IC not understanding the risks
this fire involved.
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Two-wheel drive vehicles were ferried to the island to support fire operations. Due to the nature
of the roads, these vehicles were not suitable, and some got stuck in soft sand. When arriving
on the island, drivers were not briefed, provided a comprehensive map of the location of the
fire or warned of potential hazards. Two vehicle collisions were captured on ICP video,
however, there is evidence these were reported.
Information
The RPAS team mentioned the proximity of the unstaffed ICP to the fire on 17 & 18 December.
Incident Management and Team Structur
Official e (IMT)
Our findings
the
of the MVRFF was the first to arrive at the scene and very quickly determined his
brigade and their resources were inadequate for the quickly spreading fire they confronted.
under
Understanding their capability, the
then rightly requested assistance.
From this stage onwards until many days later, the incident was managed on an ad-hoc basis
with no proper management structure put in place that reflected the incident at hand. This led
to confusion as other responders arrived on the island. They expected to find a management
Released
structure and that personnel would be appointed into IMT roles and be appropriately identified.
They also expected to see an incident action plan and a personnel accounting system in place.
Furthermore, arrivals expected to receive a briefing that included the strategy, record of the
resources assigned to the incident, hazards and hazard mitigation steps, however, they
weren't briefed at all.
27
In fact, they got a fireground with individuals working in their area with no strategy or plan to
provide guidance, doing what they thought was best at the time.
There were Sector Commanders in place, but there wasn't any communication between them
or the helicopters operating within the various sectors. Some noted that because the pilots
weren't briefed or presented a plan, they dropped water where they assumed it was required.
The lack of a plan and management structure also confused replacement Senior officers.
Having no plan or documentation of events resulted in many assumptions of things being
done, crew location, resources on the island, and what was required going forward.
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Information
Official
the
Figure-6, Aerial footage of the fire
The
did not consider it necessary to support the
. Unfortunately, this was
under
probably an error as the
did not have the knowledge and experience to make the right
tactical decisions. There did not appear to be a strategy other than to extinguish the fire using
firefighting buckets. Water drops alone wil not extinguish a fire; it relies on skil ed ground
crews who have a good understanding of deep-seated fires to follow the drops and turnover
the ground. However, the fast deployment crew with these skills from
based in
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Murupara were stood down on day one. If they had attended, they could have commenced
this work and supported the original suppression activities. The review team were told these
actions alone could have had the fire fully extinguished in a couple of days saving considerable
expense.
At one stage the on-call
for Bay of Plenty Coast became so concerned due to
the information from the island not aligning to what he could visually see and public reports of
28
ash falling on properties within the city of Tauranga. He elected to visit the island. It wasn't
until the arrival of the
that things started to change. Being an extremely experienced
campaign fire person, the
immediately established an IMT structure with the resources
he had at hand. The first role he appointed was LOGS who immediately set about managing
the crew rotation and habitat facilities for those staying on the island.
There appear to be minimal field notes, and very few Sitreps. This lack of information meant
that Comcen did not escalate the incident above a first alarm level despite numerous
appliances and approximatley 100 firefighters on the ground at one stage of the event.
Normally at a large incident like this a finance person would be allocated a position within the
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IMT to allocate a subledger, manage bil ing, invoicing, and track expenses. No such person
was given this task resulting in Region staff paying contractors, aircraft operators, heavy
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machinery providers and so on weeks and months after the event. There was no way to
confirm the legitimacy of the claims. The total cost for this event was considerable.
Firefighting Mediums
Our findings
Information
The initial choice to suppress the fire using an aerial attack was the correct option considering
the dry conditions, isolated location, variable breezes and proximity to the pine forest.
However, this tactic needs to be followed up by crews with handlines and proper tools who
Official
understand the mop up process, particularly in the island sandy soil terrain that allows for
deep-seated fires to burn and maintain its high temperatures. It seems a lack of experience
the
dealing with a subterranean fire in tree roots in windy conditions allowed fire to rekindle and
spread days after it was considered extinguished. Some of the heavy machinery was not fit
for the work intended for them and some of the operators had not been trained in firefighting
under
or been adequately supervised. This resulted in the careless construction of firebreaks, where
burning material was buried or moved to the wrong side of the breaks, allowing for fire spread.
Operational Competence
Our findings
Released
Forestry firefighters were experienced and demonstrated a high level of competence. The
Matakana Volunteer Rural Fire Force were among those that did not have the same level of
experience or training.
made sound risk management decisions and called for
appropriate assistance.
29
Generally built and natural environment Officers showed a lack of familiarity with each other
and their respective incident management systems and procedures. They had difficulty
communicating and tended to operate in isolation.
It also appears that at least one unauthorised person who is not part of Fire and Emergency
was appointed as IC.
A Senior Of icer accompanied the IC on the initial response. However, it is unclear what advice
he gave the IC about structuring the incident and working with Fire and Emergency.
Incident Ground Facilities and Cordons
1982
Our findings
Act
The initial ICP was established on day two by Senior officers that travelled to the island with
the HCU at the direction of their Area Commander. They received no direction from the IC as
he could not be contacted. When the IC and OPS arrived at the ICP the Senior officers were
surprised to hear there was no IAP, hazard list or organisational chart. One of the Senior
officers had done a risk assessment and asked the IC to sign it. The IC was unfamiliar with
this requirement.
Information
Access to the island was by commercial ferry, yet no one was assigned to record resources
coming and going or restrict access by the general public. In addition, welfare, including
emergency medical, rehabilitation, ablutions and accommodation for responders, was
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inadequate for the duration of the initial incident.
the
Incident Ground Communications
Our findings
under
Communication with the island was mainly by cellphone as attempts to contact the IC by radio
were unsuccessful. Radio communication on the island was hampered by either handhelds
not being used correctly, i.e. being on the wrong channel, a mix of both Fire and Emergency
and Forestry company radios being used simultaneously, and the high density of trees.
Released
A repeater was set up near the initial ICP location close to the old timber mil site; however,
the terrain meant it wasn't a suitable location for repeater coverage. Eventually, a VHF
repeater was positioned on the summit of Mount Maunganui, which enabled effective radio
communication throughout the incident ground and covered the whole island and beyond.
During the testing phase of this site, Omokoroa (mainland from the western side of the island)
and the Tauranga fire station communicated on handheld IG radios very clearly. However, the
30
investigation team found no evidence of a communication plan being formulated for the
incident.
Senior Officer Notification and Response
Our findings
Appropriate notifications were made to the on-call Senior officers, and their response was
timely. Senior officersSenior officers, REGION (although not on initial response) and
RFO
responded to the incident on day one. It appears RFO
occupied the role of
IC however, REGION was omit ed from any command role. Furthermore, other responses
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by Senior officers were delayed as the extent of the incident was not apparent due to a lack
of information being passed from the incident ground. It also appears the Senior Officer
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responses were mainly organised between themselves via phone calls.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Our findings
The PPE worn by Fire and Emergency staff performed as expected with no issues reported
Information
except for the weight of structural helmets being worn by some for prolonged periods.
There were two other concerns raised to the review team;
Non-Fire and Emergency personnel such as forestry teams not having the appropriate PPE
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and having Fire and Emergency provide it. Fire and Emergency don't have a cache of spare
vegetation PPE available and have no w
the ay of knowing the sizes non-Fire and Emergency
crews require. These teams should arrive with their own kit, including radios.
There were several reports of firefighters returning home wearing contaminated PPE. No
under
decontamination or replacement PPE was available for crews who were leaving the
fireground. They mostly returned wearing soiled clothing in their appliances and washing it at
home.
Recovery
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Recovery Plan
Our findings
There was no written recovery plan for this event, nor was a Recovery Manager appointed
within the IMT. In some way, recovery occurred at the forestry company's initiative when they
31
started harvesting the trees affected by fire while operations were stil occurring. This is not
uncommon as trees begin to deteriorate after a short time when affected by fire and become
no longer useable or have no monetary value.
Incident Debrief
Our findings
The review team found no evidence of an appropriate debrief occurring involving
representation from all of those involved in the event. It appears some individual teams were
debriefed, but there was no invitation extended to the built environment crews who had made
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a significant contribution to this incident.
MVRFF and Fire and Emergency requested a debrief but nothing was arranged. MVRFF had
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their own in-house debrief and published document for each brigade member.
Conclusion
The fire occurred on Matakana Island, near a place the locals know is well used by those
visiting on their private craft. The ignition point is considered to have been in a pile of slash
Information
approximately 100 meters from the beach on the north-eastern coast near Panepane Point.
On arrival at the scene,
of the MVRFF considered the fire to be well beyond his
brigades' capability and rightly ordered an aerial attack using helicopters with buckets. The
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success of the initial aerial attack gave the impression the fire would be easily extinguished,
and the incident would remain small. How
the ever, the plan for ground crews to complete mop-up
in one day was ambitious, and the risk of rekindling was underestimated.
The
who took command did not establish an appropriate incident management
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structure or incident ground facilities due to a poor risk assessment and a lack of experience
of fires of this type. Advice to extend the duration of aerial operations and use thermal imaging
was ignored. A week later, the wind speed increased, the fire rekindled and grew rapidly,
moving into the pine tree plantation. The review team heard from a number of officers
interviewed that advice they tried to provide was ignored. This lead to frustration and further
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disconnect between teams – rural, urban, support and forestry teams.
The lack of a suitable IMT meant several key actions and tactics were overlooked, resulting in
a prolonged event lasting some weeks that involved assets and personnel responding Region-
wide and beyond. It also caused disgruntlement amongst crews who were lacking
refreshments, welfare facilities and somewhere to sleep. Some of those attending opted to
cancel or move holidays to ensure continuity of the service they provided and were promised
32
payment or employment subsidy to do so. This was later retracted; however, the Region
Manager rectified the situation and settled all claims.
The impact of the subsequent fire was not limited to the island as there were complaints of
smoke and ash affecting parts of Tauranga City.
The crews that attended worked extremely hard under challenging conditions when they
should have been with their families. The review team believe from the evidence gathered and
expert advice that had a suitable IMT been established this incident would have been resolved
in a few days. This would have put an IAP in place, had the appropriately skil ed people there
in a timely manner, had the welfare, habitat and other resources needed to support the
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incident, and ensured teams were fully rested between operational periods. The personnel
involved would have been home earlier as the fire would not have flared up a second time.
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Information
Official
the
under
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33
Review Authorisation
This report has been authorised by Operational Efficiency and Readiness:
Everything in this statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I made the
statement knowing that it might be admitted as evidence for the purposes of the standard
committal or at a committal hearing and that I could be prosecuted for perjury if the statement
is.
ANC Trevor Brown
ANC David Guard
National Manager Operational Efficiency
Manager Ngā Tai ki te Puku Region 1982
Review Sponsor
Act
Information
Approved for Publishing
Official
the
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Document Outline
