



New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

NZDDP-3.20

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS (NZDDP-3.20)

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication *Humanitarian Operations* (NZDDP-3.20) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.



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Introduction

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PREFACE

Scope

New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication *Humanitarian Operations* (NZDDP–3.20) describes the types of humanitarian operations, the operational environment and key humanitarian stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities, and the mechanisms at the national and international level for New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) involvement in humanitarian operations.

Purpose

The purpose of NZDDP–3.20 is to:

- clearly define humanitarian operations; differentiate between disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention operations; and detail their specific aims and characteristics
- detail the national and international organisations involved in humanitarian operations
- provide guidance on the NZDF approach and contribution to humanitarian operations
- inform commanders and their staff of the overarching principles and the operational environment
- assist New Zealand Government departments, international organisations, non-government organisations and private volunteer organisations, both foreign and domestic, in understanding the NZDF's roles, responsibilities and contribution to humanitarian operations.

Application

This publication is for use by commanders and staff at the strategic and operational level in the planning or conduct of the military contribution to humanitarian operations. Whilst focussed at the operational level, NZDDP–3.20 includes appropriate strategic and tactical issues and considerations. Additionally, NZDDP–3.20 is aimed to provide guidance to other government organisations, international organisations, non-government organisations and private volunteer organisations on the NZDF's roles and responsibilities in the contribution to humanitarian operations.

Structure

NZDDP–3.20 is structured as follows:

- Chapter 1: *Overview of Humanitarian Operations*
- Chapter 2: *The Role of the International Community*
- Chapter 3: *The New Zealand Approach to Humanitarian Crises*
- Chapter 4: *Planning and Conduct*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of military doctrinal publications listed below.

- ADDP–3.20 *Humanitarian Operations*, 2013, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia.
- JDP–3.52 *Disaster Relief Operations* (2nd Ed), 2008, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom.
- JP–3.29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 2014, Department of Defense, Washington D.C., United States.
- *Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Aide-Memoire*, 2012, Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand.

Other works used in preparing this publication:

- *Guidelines for Responding to Natural Disasters in the Pacific*, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, New Zealand.
- *Sphere Project Handbook*, 2011, Southampton, United Kingdom.
- *Inter-Agency Standing Committee Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment Manual*, 2012, Geneva, Switzerland.
- *Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military*, 2014, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Geneva, Switzerland.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter One: Overview of Humanitarian Operations

A humanitarian operation is an operation specifically mounted to save lives and alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable to support a population. A humanitarian operation can take the form of a disaster relief operation, a humanitarian assistance operation, or a humanitarian intervention operation.

The subject of humanitarian intervention is a provocative subject, both in law and international relationships. International humanitarian law and international human rights law are complementary bodies of law that are concerned with the protection of the life, health, and dignity of individuals. International humanitarian law applies in armed conflict, while international human rights law applies at all times – in peace and in armed conflict. Under international human rights law, the primary responsibility for the wellbeing of a population rests with the lawful government or de facto authorities of the affected state.

Chapter Two: The Role of the International Community

The humanitarian consequences of disasters often exceed the coping mechanisms and aid resources of individual nations. Most often, in the countries most vulnerable to these events, United Nations (UN) agencies, regional and international organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and private volunteer organisations (PVOs) will already be employed on development projects prior to the onset of a disaster or complex emergency. The UN is a major provider of emergency relief and development assistance, a catalyst for action by governments, and an advocate on behalf of people affected by emergencies. The role of humanitarian agencies is to provide assistance,

regardless of who controls the territory, or who are the people in need. Humanitarian agencies must have unrestrained access to all affected civilian populations and hence must be accepted by all parties, including all sides in any conflict, as impartial agents of assistance not associated with any military or political force.

Chapter Three: The New Zealand Approach to Humanitarian Crises

The impact of some emergencies could be severe and exceed the capability of a single local authority to manage. New Zealand's emergency management arrangements bring together the efforts of all governments and private and volunteer agencies to deliver coordinated emergency management. At the national level, there is a range of plans and committees to coordinate effort and ensure a consistent approach. In the international arena, New Zealand is increasingly being invited to form strategic partnerships to reduce the impact of emergencies globally. The all-of-government response is often in the context of a longer term plan involving other government agencies and international governments. In order to coordinate the national response to either a domestic or international humanitarian crisis, New Zealand requires an effective national framework for the high level of collaboration disaster management. New Zealand is able to assist other nations in times of distress, particularly those within our immediate region and especially the Cook Islands, Nioua, and Tokelau. New Zealand has particular responsibilities in assisting geographical neighbours and those within the immediate region with disaster relief and humanitarian needs.

Chapter Four: Planning and Conduct

Planning for humanitarian operations is a complex, all-of-government activity drawing upon the elements of national power to achieve government-directed national strategic objectives. Humanitarian operations may be conducted independently, forms a component of another operation or deployed force, nationally or internationally,

consist of force elements redirected from other operations, such as peace operations. Coordination and liaison will be complex, involving a number of agencies, including the affected state's government, international organisations (IOs), international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private volunteer organisations (PVOs). Humanitarian crises can be classified into immediate and long-term needs. Early assessment of the nature of a humanitarian crisis and the type of action required is an essential to good planning.

The NZDF planning for all types of humanitarian operations is the same as that for other military operations. Planning for disaster relief operations is

supported by a number of New Zealand Government plans and joint service plans. The planning levels coincide with the three levels of command and operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. Under all but exceptional circumstances, NZDF forces will be deployed in a supporting role and will not assume leadership of the overall response. This does not preclude NZDF forces supporting civil command and control or providing command and control infrastructure when necessary. A coherent transition and exit strategy should be formulated at an early stage of planning for all humanitarian operations. Transition of responsibilities may occur by function or by location of the operational force.

CHAPTER 1:

OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS



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Introduction

1.01 At regular but unpredictable intervals, people around the world are affected by disasters and conflicts. Disasters and conflicts can kill startlingly high numbers of people while displacing millions each year and keeping many more living in poverty and on the edge of survival. Currently there are more than 90 per cent of disaster-affected persons living in developing countries – an indicator of the degree to which poverty, population pressures and environmental degradation contribute to human suffering.

1.02 A humanitarian crisis is an event, or series of events, which represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security, or wellbeing of a community or other large groups of people, usually over a wide area. Humanitarian crises, whether caused by disaster or conflict, can inflict untold suffering and hardship.

1.03 Human suffering must be addressed whenever and wherever it occurs, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as the sick and injured, children, women, the displaced, and the elderly. The dignity and human rights of all those in need of humanitarian action must be respected and protected. The humanitarian imperative implies a right to receive humanitarian action and a right to offer it. At times, humanitarian access to populations may be denied by authorities for political or security reasons. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain and sustain access to all vulnerable populations and to negotiate such access with all parties in the situation. Saving lives and protecting people is at the heart of New Zealand's humanitarian programmes.

1.04 Humanitarian operations will occur in a unique, complicated, unpredictable and dysfunctional operational environment with varying degrees of chaos and security. There will be a mismatch between the situational needs and the required resources, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. The government of the affected state may well be overwhelmed by the effects of the humanitarian crisis and paralysed by the scale of the necessary response.

1.05 Humanitarian operations require extensive planning and cooperation between the New Zealand Government, foreign governments and militaries, international organisations (IOs), non-government organisations (NGOs), private volunteer organisations (PVOs), and commercial sector entities.

1.06 The New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) role, as part of an all-of-government response in providing assistance to affected nations in a humanitarian crisis, is not a new phenomenon. Over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in military support to populations affected by humanitarian crises. The NZDF's involvement in future humanitarian operations is expected to increase in frequency and will continue to remain integral to New Zealand's national strategic objectives.

Definitions

1.07 **Humanitarian Operation.** Humanitarian operation is defined as an operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may precede, run parallel, or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian organisations.

1.08 **Disaster.** Disaster is defined as a serious disruption to the functioning of society which poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes, but excluding armed conflict.

1.09 **Disaster Relief.** Disaster relief is defined as goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities.

1.10 **Complex Emergency.** A complex emergency is defined as a multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires a

multi-sectoral, international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country programme. Such emergencies have, in particular, a devastating effect on children and women, and call for a complex range of responses.

1.11 **Humanitarian Assistance.** Humanitarian assistance is defined by the NZDF as support provided to humanitarian or development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid.

1.12 **Humanitarian Intervention.** Humanitarian intervention is defined as coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government, with or without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.

Range of Humanitarian Operations

The Aims of Humanitarian Operations

1.13 A humanitarian operation is an operation specifically mounted to save lives and alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may precede, run parallel, or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian organisations. A humanitarian operation may take the form of one of the following:

- a disaster relief operation
- a humanitarian assistance operation
- a humanitarian intervention operation.

1.14 **Figure 1-1** shows the range of humanitarian operations. Details of the various types of humanitarian crises and the typical needs post-crisis onset are outlined in [Annex A](#).

Key Terms

Disaster

Disaster is defined as a serious disruption to the functioning of society which poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes, but excluding armed conflict.

Disaster Relief

Disaster relief is defined as goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities.

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Humanitarian intervention is defined as coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government, with or without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.

Disasters

1.15 At unpredictable intervals, people around the world are affected by natural and human hazards. These events become disasters when people's homes and livelihoods are destroyed. Poverty, population pressures and environmental degradation mean that increasing numbers of people are vulnerable to natural hazards. Population growth and urbanisation are increasing the world's exposure to natural hazards, especially in coastal areas.




Figure 1-1: Range of Humanitarian Operations.

1.16 Disasters can impact on entire communities. Disasters, regardless of the cause, generate humanitarian needs that often exceed the local capacity to address. Human vulnerability and the lack of appropriate emergency management impacts the social, economic, built and natural environments. The resulting losses depend on the capacity of the population to support or resist the disaster. This understanding is concentrated in the formulation: disasters occur when hazards meet vulnerability.

1.17 Disasters repeatedly strike many of the same regions and countries in an unpredictable manner. They can have devastating effects on both urban and rural populations. The material losses in output, means of production, income generation, and infrastructure are extremely significant, as they undermine the ability of survivors to subsist and recover. This is most prominent in agricultural communities, where the destruction of crops and livestock results in a reduced food supply, limiting food security – all of which often translates into poor health, famine, and death.

Characteristics of Disasters

1.18 The nature and characteristics of an event, its magnitude, frequency, duration, velocity of occurrence, and origin create particular types of damage. Each disaster is unique in the way it affects the population and the physical characteristics of the impact zone.

1.19 Disasters originating from climatic and hydro-meteorological conditions generally have a cyclical and seasonal behaviour and allow, to a certain extent, activities of preparedness, monitoring, and early warning that will determine the efficiency of the response actions.

1.20 There are also derived or associated events, that require prior consideration due to the possibility of chain effects that successively increment damages and their derivations. It is important to observe and identify these during the joint operational planning process.

1.21 There are diverse ways of classifying disasters, by their origin, magnitude, or the manner that the

disaster starts. Generally the manner in which a disaster starts also determines the speed at which the humanitarian needs assessment and response actions should be implemented.

1.22 The impact of a disaster is based on the level of damage and impact, which is visible in different elements:

- the population and its humanitarian condition
- large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons
- large numbers of persons left temporarily or permanently homeless
- destruction and/or damage to critical infrastructure such as electricity, water, sewerage, gas and fuel supplies, and telecommunications
- the effective functioning of government
- the inability to achieve a detailed and reliable operational picture of the impacts of the disaster
- a need for a broader national coordination of inter-state and international assistance
- economic development
- environmental damage.

Vulnerabilities and Capacities of Disaster-affected Populations

1.23 It is important to understand that to be young or old, a woman, or a person with a disability, does not, of itself, make a person vulnerable or at increased risk. Rather it is the interplay of factors that does so, for example, someone who is over 70 years of age, lives alone and has poor health is likely to be more vulnerable than someone of a similar age and health status living within an extended family and with sufficient income.

1.24 Disasters can make pre-existing inequalities worse. Support for people's coping strategies, resilience, and recovery capacities is essential. Their knowledge, skills and strategies need to be supported and their access to social, legal, financial,

Chapter 1

and psychosocial support advocated for. The various physical, cultural, economic, and social barriers they may face in accessing these services in an equitable manner also need to be addressed.

Aims of Disaster Relief

1.25 The aims of disaster relief are the rescue from immediate danger and stabilisation of the physical and emotional condition of survivors. These go hand in hand with the recovery of the dead and the restoration of essential services such as water, power, and telecommunications.

Onset of Disasters

1.26 Disasters may occur suddenly or develop over a period of time. Speed of onset has important

consequences for action that can be taken. Prevention, preparedness, and early warning measures are much less developed for rapid onset disasters. Disasters may be either rapid onset or slow onset disasters.

1.27 **Rapid Onset Disasters.** Rapid onset disasters are usually the result of sudden, natural events such as cyclones, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes or volcanic eruption. They may also be caused by accidental or human-caused incidents such as acts of terrorism or industrial accidents.

1.28 **Slow Onset Disasters.** Slow onset disasters include those resulting from crop failure due to drought, environmental degradation, toxic pollution of the environment, epidemic or infectious diseases, or the spread of an agricultural pest or disease.




Figure 1-2: Rapid onset disasters are usually the result of sudden, natural events such as cyclones, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes or volcanic eruption.

Categories of Disasters

1.29 Disasters are commonly categorised as either a natural disaster or a human disaster.

1.30 **Natural Disaster.** A natural disaster is the consequence when a natural hazard affects populations, the built environment and/or the environment. Natural disasters can be divided into the following categories:

- geological: earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruption, and landslides
- climatic: droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, and bushfires
- biological: disease/pandemics/epidemics, insect, or animal plague.

1.31 **Human Disaster.** A human disaster is a consequence when a technological or human hazard affects populations, the built environment and/or the environment. Human disasters can be divided into the following categories:

- accidental/unintentional events
- chemical, biological, radiological industrial accidents, major transport accidents, oil spill, other serious environmental incidents and mass population movements
- intentional/deliberate events
- chemical, biological, or radiological attack, arson, explosives attack or an act of terrorism.

Minimum Standards in the Humanitarian Response to Disasters

1.32 The *Sphere Project Handbook* details internationally recognised minimum standards for humanitarian responses activities during disasters. These minimum standards are principally aimed at aid agencies but also provide useful guidance for military planners. These minimum standards are outlined in the bullet points below:

- **Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Promotion.** This standard outlines good hygiene practices, the provision of safe drinking water, the reduction of environmental health risks, and the conditions that allow people to live with good health, dignity, comfort, and security.
- **Vector Control.** The vector control standard protecting people from getting infected and the necessary environmental protection measures needed to support this.
- **Solid Waste Management.** This covers the collection and disposal of solid waste.
- **Drainage.** This standard is aimed to reduce the risk imposed by standing water and water erosion.

1.33 These standards are discussed in greater detail in the *Sphere Project Handbook*.

Complex Emergencies

1.34 Complex emergencies combine internal conflict with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine or food shortages, and fragile economic, political, and social institutions. Any humanitarian response to such situations has to be conducted in a difficult political and security environment.

1.35 The majority of conflicts today are intra-state rather than inter-state. Most intra-state conflicts result from disaffection by part of the population with the existing structures of governance and authority. In many situations the declared objectives of opposition or rebel groups is either to overthrow the government in power or to secede from the country and establish a new autonomous entity.

1.36 A crisis which threatens international peace and security inevitably endangers civilian populations, and therefore calls for humanitarian action. Such a crisis may spark massive population movements, may be complicated by ongoing armed conflict, may involve risks to public health in the form of pandemics/epidemics, and may be caused or exacerbated by natural or human disasters. The common link however,

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from a humanitarian point of view, is that a population may be dependent upon external assistance to meet basic subsistence needs, and individual lives may be at risk.

1.37 In complex emergencies, affected populations often have little or no access to their traditional sources of income for long periods of time, owing to displacement and insecurity. As a result, the economic opportunities needed to sustain a dignified livelihood become more acute, particularly in protracted emergencies where populations are frequently on the move.

1.38 Prolonged conflict may lead to vulnerability in food, economic and health conditions. The damage to health and sanitation infrastructure and serious reduction in services also has a profound effect on the

community. Vaccination cycles break down, quickening the spread of disease. Worse still, the violence enacted on communities during conflict actually increases the demand for health services¹ and medical treatment, meaning that capacity is overstretched at exactly the time when the fewest resources are available. More than 90 per cent of all affected persons live in developing countries – an indicator of the degree to which poverty, population pressures and environmental degradation increase suffering and destruction.

¹ The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health systems as: 'all the organisations, institutions and resources that are devoted to producing health actions'. This includes the full range of players engaged in the provision, financing and management of health services, efforts to influence determinants of health as well as providing health services, and encompassing all levels: central, regional, district, community, and household.



Figure 1-3: Violence enacted on communities during conflict actually increases the demand for health services and medical treatment.

1.39 Complex emergencies pose important questions about how to protect human life and human rights in crisis situations. Human rights abuses and violent conflict are major contributing factors to mass population movements. Such emergencies require the international community to respond quickly and efficiently with a variety of services. Experience has demonstrated that the effective response to such situations relies upon coordination between governments, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs.

1.40 An integrated multi-agency humanitarian assistance operation will have political, military and humanitarian components. Each operates within its own sphere of competence, although the goals of each may be intertwined. The political component of the operation concentrates on conflict resolution or prevention. The mandate of peacekeeping forces in complex emergencies has usually included direct or indirect support of humanitarian activities. This most typically includes providing security and logistic assistance to international humanitarian action efforts. Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations can take place whether or not a viable peace plan or agreement is in place.

1.41 Complex, multidimensional environments requiring the deployment of a military force will, in most instances, include serious humanitarian and human rights situations. It is probable that United Nations (UN) agencies, NGOs and PVOs specialising in the provision of food, shelter,² water, sanitation, health, and logistics support will be present to deal with the emergency and recovery aspects. In some circumstances, where the threat levels are high, the military force will be the only organisation capable of providing life saving support. This will be necessary but priority of effort should go to establishing conditions that allow the civil humanitarian organisations to perform their role as soon as possible.

² The *Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* covers general standards for use in scenarios for displaced and non-displaced population in the chapter on Shelter and Settlement. The handbook was produced by a group of NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to develop a set of universal minimum standards in the core areas of humanitarian response.

Characteristics of Complex Emergencies

1.42 Characteristics that are likely to prevail in a complex emergency include:

- a collapse of state functions
- difficulty in differentiating between combatants and civilians
- intra-state rather than inter-state conflict
- a multiplicity of actors
- reappearance of nationalistic, territorial, religious or ethnic ambitions or frictions
- fluidity of the situation
- large numbers of civilian victims and human suffering on a major scale
- extensive violence, violations of human rights, and loss of life
- destruction of civil infrastructure
- displacements of populations either internally or to other countries
- widespread damage to societies and economies and the potential development of war economies
- decline in food security and lack of potable water leading to famine, disease and epidemics
- the need for a large-scale humanitarian assistance response beyond the capacity of a single relief organisation
- the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian action by political and military constraints
- significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas
- there is a risk that humanitarian action can have unintended consequences that could prolong or exacerbate aspects of the conflict.

The Importance of Shelter, Settlement and Non-food Items in Complex Emergencies

1.43 Shelter is a critical determinant for survival in the initial stages of a disaster. Beyond survival, shelter is necessary to provide security, personal safety and protection from the climate and to promote resistance to ill health and disease. It is also important for human dignity, to sustain family and community life and to enable affected populations to recover from the impact of disaster. Shelter and associated settlement and non-food item responses should support existing coping strategies and promote self-sufficiency and self-management by those affected by the disaster. Local skills and resources should be maximised where this does not result in adverse effects on the affected population or local economy. Any NZDF response should take into account known disaster risks and minimise the long-term adverse impact on the natural environment, while maximising opportunities for the affected population to maintain or establish livelihood support activities.

1.44 The shelter, settlement and non-food item needs of populations affected by a disaster are determined by the type and scale of the disaster and the extent to which the population is displaced. The NZDF response will also be informed by the ability and desire of displaced populations to return to the site of their original dwelling and to start the recovery process; where they are unable or unwilling to return, they will require temporary or transitional shelter and settlement solutions. The local context of the disaster will inform the response, including whether the affected area is rural or urban, the local climatic and environmental conditions, the political and security situation, and the ability of the affected population to contribute to meeting their shelter needs.

Shelter during Extreme Weather Conditions in a Complex Emergency

1.45 In extreme weather conditions, where shelter may be critical to survival or, as a result of displacement, the affected population may be unable to construct appropriate shelter, rapidly deployable shelter solutions, such as tents or similar will be required, or temporary accommodation provided in existing public buildings.

1.46 Affected populations should be supported where possible to repair or adapt existing dwellings or build new structures. Assistance can include the provision of appropriate construction materials, tools and fixings. Support or technical assistance should be provided to affected populations who do not have the capacity or expertise to undertake construction activities.

1.47 For further detailed information please refer to the *Sphere Handbook*.

Key Term

Complex Emergency

A complex emergency is a multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires a multi-sector, international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.

Applicable Laws and Humanitarian Principles

Applicable Laws

1.48 The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) are two distinct but complementary bodies of law that may apply during humanitarian operations. LOAC, also known as 'International Humanitarian Law' (IHL), is comprised of those rules derived from treaties and customary international law that govern the means and methods of conflict and provide for victims of armed conflict. IHRL is the sum of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and collective rights laid down in international and regional human rights instruments or in customary law.³ IHRL does not cease to apply during armed conflict. Although

³ Manfred Nowak, *Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Brill Academic: Leiden/Boston, 2003), 1 in Kalin, Walter, *The Law of International Human Rights Protection*, Oxford University Press, 2009.

states may derogate from some international human rights obligations in times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation, such as war, states cannot derogate from the most fundamental human rights, even in the course of such an emergency.

1.49 Any humanitarian response must be based on need alone and not shaped by political attitudes or strategic interests to particular crises.

Humanitarian Principles

1.50 Humanitarian principles provide the fundamental foundations for humanitarian action. Humanitarian principles are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected populations whether in the context of a disaster or a complex emergency. Promoting compliance with humanitarian principles in humanitarian operations is an essential element of effective humanitarian coordination.

1.51 **Core Humanitarian Principles.** As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1992 and Resolution 58/114 of 2004, the core humanitarian principles are outlined in the bullets below.

- **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
- **Neutrality.** Humanitarian action must be provided without engaging in hostilities, except in self-defence, and without taking sides in political, religious, or ideological issues.
- **Impartiality.** Humanitarian action must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
- **Operational Independence.** Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or other objectives that any actor may hold

with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

1.52 In addition to these humanitarian principles, the UN seeks to provide humanitarian action with full respect for the sovereignty of states as stated in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1992:

'The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.'

Key Terms

Humanity

Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Neutrality

Humanitarian action provided with absence of conflict, disagreement or strong political expression. It is humanitarian action that does not engage in hostilities, or take sides in political, religious, or ideological issues.

Impartiality

Humanitarian action provided without discrimination to ethnicity origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering guided solely by needs and priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Operational Independence

Humanitarian action that is autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives.

Real-Life Example

Application of Humanitarian Principles: The Pakistan Floods 2010

Unprecedented flooding in Pakistan in 2010 triggered a massive humanitarian response. The Government of Pakistan, the United Nations (UN), foreign governments, and humanitarian actors mobilised to assist more than 20 million people directly affected by the floods. Foreign governments stepped forward to offer cash assistance as well as in-kind aid, including military assets.

For the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), this meant making decisions and issuing policy guidance not just on how to meet massive and urgent humanitarian needs, but also on how to do so in a principled way. The Pakistan Civil–Military Guidelines acknowledged the need for humanitarian and military actors to operate effectively within the same environment, and establish agreed principles and practices. They recognised that the use of military assets in a conflict-affected country such as Pakistan may have a negative impact on the perception of humanitarian actors' impartiality and neutrality, and hence affect their ability to operate safely and effectively. Therefore, as a matter of principle, military, and civil defence assets would not be used to support humanitarian activities. The guidelines also acknowledged, however, that the use of military assets may be warranted in extreme and exceptional circumstances where all of the following five conditions were met:

- use of the asset is based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- it is a last resort, when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or reached by any other means and there is no appropriate civilian alternative
- the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action
- use of the asset is clearly limited in time and scale
- use of the asset is approved by the HCT.

Humanitarian actors raised serious concerns about the lack of access in the northern districts where almost all major bridges and roads had been washed away or severely damaged. While some non-government organisations (NGOs) managed to reach these areas with health supplies and initial relief items after 16 hours on foot or mule, it quickly became clear that the only option for the transport of heavy goods would be by helicopter. The HCT reviewed the situation and found that all five criteria for the use of military assets were met, and approved a request to use military helicopters for

the transport of food.

Despite the existence of a clear policy framework and the efforts the HCT made to develop unified positions on the use of military assets, the practical implementation of principles in the Pakistan flood was not without challenges. One example was an apparent lack of respect for agreed principles among some humanitarian actors as well as UN member states use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air bridge. NATO announced its intention to create a strategic air bridge to transport in-kind donations from its member states to Pakistan. Additionally, and without prior consultation, this capability was offered to humanitarian organisations, and publicised as such. Of key concern to the HCT was the potential security risk to humanitarian actors if they openly associated themselves with a military alliance whose supply convoys to Afghanistan were coming under frequent violent attack within Pakistan (more than 100 attacks were documented against NATO assets inside Pakistan in 2010, killing 37 people and injuring 64).

Following extensive internal discussions, the HCT concluded that it could not approve its members' use of the air bridge as it was not an option of last resort because air and sea transport was available commercially. Despite the clear policy framework, at least two UN agencies decided to make limited use of the air bridge, as did a number of small NGOs who were not members of the HCT. The Pakistan government and several donors challenged the HCT's attempt to maintain a principled position, arguing that no time should be wasted in moving goods into the country and that the use of the NATO air bridge would make the humanitarian operation more cost-efficient. While the emergency response did suffer a number of delays in the delivery of relief goods, cluster leads repeatedly stressed to donors that these were related to supply shortages in items such as tents and tarpaulins, not to any gap in global airlift capacity.

The Pakistan flood response demonstrated that civil–military coordination, including the use of military assets, remains a challenge, both at the political and operational level. This challenge can only be overcome if humanitarian actors and governments are committed to respecting agreed principles and mandates. Pressure from donors on the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and humanitarian organisations in Pakistan was inappropriate and contrary to the coordination architecture and Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative that they support. Such actions threaten the authority of the HC and the role of the HCT, and risk politicising the response.

Controversial Justifications

Humanitarian Intervention/Responsibility to Protect

1.53 At an internally displaced person's camp at Kibeho, Rwanda, in April 1995, an estimated 4,000 native Hutu refugees were murdered by soldiers from the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Army. The massacre at Kibeho and the mass murder of over 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu peoples in 100 days, laid bare the full horror of international inaction due to a lack of international will.

1.54 Although some commentators distinguish the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P), there are sufficient similarities in their use as a legal justification for

intervention and use of force in a third party state for them to be considered together.

1.55 Humanitarian intervention and R2P remain controversial justifications for use of force in another state. As highlighted in Laws New Zealand, Defence: Warfare (Reissue 1), although gaining strength as grounds for the establishment of a United Nations Security Council mandate, when advanced as a basis for unilateral action outside that framework, they remain contentious.

1.56 R2P is often thought of as broader than the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, particularly in light of the support that the UN has given to work on this issue. However, this work by the UN does not imply that military intervention is justified based on R2P grounds. Should an appropriate mandate for




Figure 1-4: The aim of humanitarian intervention is to prevent or end the perpetration of widespread and severe violations made against human rights.

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Humanitarian Intervention/R2P be established, the following operational principles below will apply to such an operation.

- Clear objectives and unambiguous mandate at all times and resources to match.
- Common military approach among involved partners, unity of command, clear and unequivocal communications, and chain of command.
- Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism, and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
- Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept are precise, reflect the principle of proportionality, and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
- Acceptance that forces protection cannot become the principal objective.
- Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organisations.

Aims of Humanitarian Assistance

1.57 The aims of humanitarian assistance operations are to sustain dignified life, to strengthen local institution's efforts to relieve suffering and build self-reliance, and to assure that the first step is taken towards reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development.

1.58 The chief purpose of military forces conducting humanitarian assistance operations is to provide a secure environment to allow humanitarian action to progress. As such, the NZDF contribution to humanitarian assistance operations may cover a broad range of tasks.

The Operational Environment

1.59 The operational environment embraces all the elements, conditions, and circumstances influencing the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the

commander. The chief characteristics of the operational environment are unpredictability, permissiveness, humanitarian space, and constraints.

1.60 **Unpredictability.** Normally humanitarian operations will be undertaken in unpredictable, chaotic and sometimes volatile environments.

1.61 **Permissiveness.** A humanitarian operation will normally be at the request of the affected nation or on the acceptance of an offer of assistance. While humanitarian operations are therefore likely to be conducted in a militarily permissive environment, there are scenarios where a more uncertain security environment exists due to ongoing conflict or unrest following the disaster. Security, including policing, remains the responsibility of the affected nation's stricken state. Exceptionally, depending on the internal situation and taking account of any local tensions and the functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide security for personnel and essential assets. Such assets may include military equipment, accommodation, vehicles, transport aircraft and support helicopters. It may also include relief stores and supplies entrusted to the military if they are deemed to be at risk.

1.62 **Humanitarian Space.** Humanitarian space is the access and freedom for humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs. It can refer to both physical/geographical boundaries and a perceptual space. The concept of humanitarian space includes the distinction between the role and function of civilian humanitarian actors and those with an official, commercial or political agenda, including the military. In an uncertain or hostile security environment, the perceived erosion of humanitarian space can increase the physical risk to civilian humanitarian workers. This perceived erosion could occur through the association of the military with traditional civilian humanitarian roles, the overt relationship between military and humanitarian staffs, and the military use of civilian symbols (for example, civilian clothing and/or vehicles). While a less significant factor in permissive humanitarian operations environments, commanders should be sensitive

to humanitarian space and consult Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) specialists where appropriate.

1.63 **Constraints.** Humanitarian operations will be subject to legal and practical constraints including the availability of personnel, platforms and material. National interest, public expectations or other political considerations may also influence the nature of a response.

1.64 The operational environment in humanitarian operations is significantly different from any other operational environments. Activities involved in this environment are all targeted towards the delivery of humanitarian action in whatever form. There is no single organisation that is able to deliver the assistance adequately on its own, hence the need to coordinate and collaborate with other entities to achieve this objective.

1.65 Maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that

of the military is the determining factor in creating an operational environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely.

Understanding the Operational Environment

1.66 Understanding the operational environment requires a broad perspective during any operation, however, this holistic view is particularly important in humanitarian operations where there are normally no overt military forces, but forces of nature, possibly covert adversary forces, and non-military personnel, organisations, and systems that combine to complicate joint force operations and influence the application of force choices.

Underlying Causes

1.67 Most disasters and complex emergencies will have underlying causes that may demand changes




Figure 1-5: Security Effects on Humanitarian Activities

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in human systems and processes, e.g. tsunami alert systems, better food management, or fragile affected state infrastructure. Normally, forces conducting humanitarian operations are tasked to focus on the event at hand rather than the underlying causes, however, understanding these causes can enhance mission success and force protection.

Security Environment

1.68 The operational environment can be characterised by the degree of control the affected nation's forces have to support and assist in the operation. The type of operational environment will have a direct impact on the decision to conduct humanitarian operations, as well as many planning aspects. Regardless of the operational environment,

force protection will remain of paramount concern. When conducting humanitarian operations, participants may encounter the three following types of security environments:

- **Permissive.** Local authorities, forces and the population are unlikely to oppose or are willing to support NZDF operations. This environment is most likely to be found in more developed countries following rapid onset disasters.
- **Uncertain.** The reactions of local authorities, forces, and/or the population cannot be predicted despite host nation government willingness to support NZDF operations. This environment is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost government control of an area following a disaster, or in areas that traditionally harbour insurgents or




Figure 1-6: An environment in less developed countries that traditionally harbour terrorist elements may oppose the presence of humanitarian workers and military and civil defence assets, regardless of the humanitarian mission.



Figure 1-7: In a humanitarian crisis, immediate needs are those required to save lives and mitigate immediate human suffering.

terrorist elements that may oppose the presence of humanitarian workers and military and civil defence assets, regardless of the humanitarian mission.

- **Hostile.** An environment where NZDF operations are likely to be opposed by local forces and/or the local population. This environment is most likely to be found during complex emergencies or following a complete breakdown of infrastructure. Hostile factions may use violence in an attempt to stop the humanitarian effort. Lack of an infrastructure in the crisis area, possibly due to natural disaster, civil strife, insurgency, terrorism, or combat between nations, can impede the mission.

1.69 The effects of the security environment on humanitarian activities are shown in [Figure 1-5](#). As the operational environment becomes progressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security

increases, while the capability for humanitarian activities, such as food distribution and health assistance, decreases.

Humanitarian Needs

1.70 Regardless of the cause of a humanitarian crisis, humanitarian needs that exceed local capacity are generated. These needs can be classified as below:

- **Immediate Needs.** Immediate needs are those required to save lives and mitigate immediate human suffering, including search and rescue, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shelter, health, security, and safety for affected populations.
- **Long-term Needs.** Long-term needs are those required to restore some sense of normalcy,

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including rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development.

Responsibility for the Humanitarian Response

1.71 Under IHRL, the primary responsibility for the wellbeing of a population rests with the lawful government or de facto authorities of the affected nation. Where the government or authorities are unable or unwilling to protect and support their populations with the appropriate humanitarian action, an international humanitarian response may occur. This may take the form of consensual humanitarian action to a functioning civil infrastructure, usually with the concurrence of the affected nation.

1.72 In complex emergencies, it may take the form of humanitarian action, where consent to humanitarian action is fluid or incomplete. International humanitarian action must address both the humanitarian crisis and the complicating factors, so a multifaceted approach is required. A lawful basis for any intervention must be established prior to involvement.

1.73 See [Chapter 3: The New Zealand Approach to Humanitarian Crises](#) for further detail.

The Humanitarian Response

1.74 The humanitarian response to a humanitarian crisis has three stages, each demanding different types of humanitarian action. These stages are unlikely to be discrete and will often need to be undertaken concurrently requiring a flexible response.

- **Stage 1 – Immediate Life Saving Phase.** This stage includes assessment, search and rescue, saving lives and mitigating direct human suffering, as well as providing medical care, health protection, sanitation/hygiene, potable water, emergency shelter, and the security and safety of the affected population.
- **Stage 2 – Stabilisation Phase.** This stage includes life preserving activities such as the ongoing delivery

of food and the development of local capacity, assistance with water and sanitation, and the construction of emergency shelters.

- **Stage 3 – General Recovery Phase.** This stage includes rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at community self-sufficiency and restoration of local/national governance.

Humanitarian Action

1.75 Humanitarian action is assistance, protection, and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to humanitarian needs resulting from a humanitarian crisis.

1.76 Humanitarian action can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with Defence resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

1.77 The three categories of assistance are:

- direct assistance, which is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services
- indirect assistance, which is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel
- infrastructure support, which involves providing general services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population, such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation.

1.78 The characteristics that distinguish humanitarian action from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid are that it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. It is also intended to

be short-term in nature and provide for activities in the immediate aftermath of a humanitarian crisis.

1.79 If humanitarian action is not based on a human rights framework, it risks having too narrow a focus, and not all basic needs of the affected persons will be integrated into a holistic planning and delivery process.

1.80 Humanitarian action should never be subordinate to military or political actions, goals or objectives. The respective roles of the military and the humanitarian actors should be clearly distinct in their objectives as well as in their implementation and public image.

1.81 Humanitarian action is provided by governments, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, multilateral

organisations, domestic organisations, commercial sector entities, and individuals, and may take the form of:

- material relief and services (water, shelter, medicine, search and rescue)
- emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes)
- relief coordination, protection, and support services
- reconstruction and rehabilitation
- disaster prevention and preparedness
- early warning systems
- contingency stocks and planning.



Figure 1-8: New Zealand's humanitarian action is based on the rights and needs of persons affected by crises.

The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations

1.82 The New Zealand Government has judged that disasters and conflict will be an enduring and common feature on the global landscape. New Zealand's humanitarian action is based on the rights and needs of persons affected by crises and aims to protect the safety, dignity and rights of the most vulnerable.

1.83 The use of military assets in a humanitarian crisis is a situation when:

- a specific capability or asset requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets has been identified
- military assets would help meet the requirement and provide unique advantages in terms of capability, availability and timeliness
- military assets would complement civilian capabilities.

1.84 When the specific requirement no longer exists (or when comparable civilian assets become available to meet the requirement), and hence military assets no longer provide unique advantages, then these assets must be phased out and activities returned to civilian actors at the earliest opportunity. Even if a situation of last resort is determined to exist, the use of military assets should under no circumstances undermine the actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality or operational independence of humanitarian actors, nor jeopardise current or future access to affected populations in need of humanitarian action.

1.85 Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged humanitarian gap between the crisis needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.

1.86 New Zealand Government agencies, including the NZDF, may participate in unilateral or multinational

coordinated responses. Responses consist of multinational (that may not involve the UN) and unilateral responses.

- **Unilateral response.** In this type of operation, the New Zealand Government provides humanitarian action without direct involvement by other nations (other than the affected nation). A unilateral response would normally occur when an immediate response is required. A unilateral response may transition to a multinational operation.
- **Multinational response.** Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by intergovernmental organisations such as the UN.

National Strategic Objectives

1.87 Based on the principles of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, the New Zealand Government has three key strategic objectives:

- protect the life and property of citizens
- provide fast, effective, and coordinated all-of-government assistance to the relevant government and non-government agencies involved
- promote a favourable political view of New Zealand and the NZDF, thereby shaping national and regional perceptions.

Military Strategic Objectives

1.88 When contributing to humanitarian operations, the NZDF is to:

- provide effective support to domestic and international civil authorities to counter the effects of current or forecast disasters or complex emergencies
- minimise environmental threats arising from the advent of a disaster or civil emergency
- demonstrate the reach and capability of the NZDF
- maintain and enhance the NZDF's reputation as a

professional and effective military force, with the flexibility and capability to respond to humanitarian tasks while also meeting the requirements of concurrent operations.

Civil–Military Coordination

1.89 Any civil–military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity, that is, human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardise the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of

providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil–military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

The New Zealand Defence Force’s Role in Humanitarian Operations

1.90 The role of the NZDF in humanitarian operations will be to support either New Zealand or international civilian agencies. The NZDF’s involvement in humanitarian operations will vary depending on the type of response that is required. Outlined are the six basic types of military contribution to humanitarian operations:



Figure 1-9: The role of the New Zealand Defence Force in humanitarian operations will be to support either New Zealand or international civilian agencies.

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- **Relief.** The provision of prompt aid to prevent loss of life, destruction of property, alleviate the suffering of affected persons, and assist or facilitate the dissemination of relief information.
- **Affected Population Support.** Designed to support the return or resettlement of affected persons. Tasks include camp organisation, basic construction, and administration, provision of food, potable water, health care, basic security concerns and placement (movement or relocation to other locations, camps, or countries).
- **Security.** Tasks may include providing security for storage facilities, convoys, and personnel delivering emergency aid. Foreign military forces may provide security of dislocated civilian camps, maintenance of security within the camps themselves, places of worship, facilities for information dissemination, and temporary shelter for threatened persons.
- **Technical Assistance.** Short-term assistance in areas including, communications restoration, relief supply management, health care, provision of emergency transportation of persons at risk, high priority relief supply delivery, establishment of training of search, rescue and recovery teams, and de-mining.
- **Consequence Management Operations.** Involve those essential services and activities required to manage, mitigate or reduce problems resulting from intentional or inadvertent release of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials) or epidemics (infectious disease, biological) and natural disasters. Services may include transportation, communications, urban



Figure 1-10: The New Zealand Defence Force contributes to humanitarian operations in ways that are relevant to immediate and longer term humanitarian needs.

search and rescue, care of mass casualties, health support, and disposal of hazardous materials.

- **Mitigating Damage and Risk.** The NZDF participates in a number of exercises and other training activities in the south west pacific. These are Joint Partnered activities (multi-agency and multinational), which actively seek to mitigate risk to threatened communities through the provision of essential infrastructure development.

1.91 The challenge for the NZDF is to provide humanitarian action that:

- is relevant to immediate and longer term humanitarian needs
- is coordinated with partner governments, other donors, NGOs, PVOs and the affected community
- is implemented quickly, professionally, and flexibly
- is consistent with international humanitarian principles and practice
- shows clear time limits and scale boundaries and involves a transition strategy that shows how the function (the NZDF undertakes) can be carried out by civilian personnel in the future without undermining the efforts of the local responders by appearing too eager to leave the theatre.

Likely New Zealand Defence Force Capabilities

1.92 The NZDF capabilities that are most likely to be requested to contribute to humanitarian operations will be:

- transport elements to move relief items, personnel or equipment to and/or within the affected area
- air, land or maritime survey and assessment, including geospatial information
- search and rescue
- health assistance including field hospital, primary health care teams, medical specialists and environmental health expertise
- medical evacuation
- health intelligence

- logistics, engineering, safety, or communications specialist equipment or capabilities
- emergency support or repairs to vital infrastructure
- subject matter specialists in civil–military coordination and liaison, logistics, engineering damage assessment, critical engineering support, and needs assessment.⁴

1.93 See *Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Aide-memoire* handbook for further information on the likely NZDF capabilities.

Key Terms

Relief

Relief, within the context of NZDF humanitarian operations, is the delivery of prompt aid to prevent loss of life, destruction of property, alleviate the suffering of affected persons, and support or facilitate the dissemination of relief information.

Affected Population Support

Affected population support is designed to support the return or resettlement of affected persons as part of humanitarian operation processes.

Security

1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance, and surprise.
2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance, within the context of humanitarian operations, is defined as temporary short-term assistance from the NZDF in areas including, but not limited to, communications restoration, relief supply management, health care, provision of emergency transportation of persons at risk, high priority relief supply delivery, establishment of training of search, rescue and recovery teams, and de-mining.

⁴ See Chapter 4 – *Planning and Conduct* for further information.

ANNEX A: DETAILS OF HUMANITARIAN CRISES

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Flood	<p>Location of settlements on floodplains.</p> <p>Lack of awareness of flooding hazard.</p> <p>Non-resistant buildings and foundations.</p> <p>High risk infrastructure elements.</p> <p>Unprotected food stocks, livestock and warehoused and standing crops.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – loss of life, but relatively few serious injuries.</p> <p>Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, and viral infections due to contaminated water supplies or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</p> <p>Physical damage – structures damaged and/or washed away, impacted by floating debris and collapsing. Landslides from saturated soils.</p> <p>Water supplies – contamination of wells, water supplies, and ground water.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – loss of harvests, food stocks, and livestock.</p> <p>Reduced ability to travel and trade.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.</p> <p>Assistance with transport and road/rail/bridge/port repairs.</p> <p>Animal husbandry and veterinarian services.</p> <p>Disaster victim identification services.</p>

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Tropical Cyclone/Hurricane	<p>Settlements located in low-lying coastal and adjacent areas.</p> <p>Poor communications or warning system.</p> <p>Lightweight structures, old construction, poor quality masonry.</p> <p>Infrastructure elements, fishing boats and maritime industries.</p>	<p>Casualties and dangers to public health – death/injuries caused by flying debris or flooding.</p> <p>Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, and viral infections due to contaminated water supplies or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</p> <p>Physical damage – structures lost and damaged by wind force, flooding, storm surge and landslide.</p> <p>Water supplies – ground water may be contaminated.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – loss of standing crops, harvests, food stocks, and tree plantations.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.</p>
Bushfire	<p>Location of bushfire-prone areas.</p> <p>Bushfire threat tends to be seasonal.</p> <p>Speed of onset will vary depending on the fire weather conditions.</p> <p>Evacuation of communities may be difficult and dangerous in the face of a major fire front.</p> <p>Ongoing risk as the fire risk may not diminish after the fire.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – loss of life, effects of burns and smoke inhalation.</p> <p>Physical damage – destruction of buildings, infrastructure, environment and livestock.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – loss of harvests, food stocks, and livestock.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Provision of fire fighting resources.</p> <p>Provision of fire spotting transportation.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p>

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Earthquake	<p>Location of settlements in seismic areas.</p> <p>Rigid structures not resistant to ground motion.</p> <p>Dense collections of buildings with high occupancy.</p> <p>Ongoing aftershocks/earthquakes.</p> <p>Local source tsunami triggered by the earthquake.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – high death toll, particularly near epicentre or in highly populated areas.</p> <p>Fracture and crush injuries most widespread problem.</p> <p>Secondary threats of communicable and vector diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, cholera and viral infections due to contaminated water supplies or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</p> <p>Physical damage – damage to key structures and infrastructure.</p> <p>Water supply – severe problems likely due to damage to water systems.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.</p>
Tsunami	<p>Location of settlements in low-lying coastal regions.</p> <p>Lack of tsunami-resistant buildings.</p> <p>Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans.</p> <p>Lack of public awareness of destructive forces of tsunamis.</p> <p>Port and maritime infrastructure.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – deaths principally by drowning and injuries from battering by debris.</p> <p>Physical damage – resulting from the initial force of water and follow-on flooding.</p> <p>Water supply – contamination by salt water, debris and/or sewerage may make water non-potable.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – loss of harvest, food stocks, livestock, farm implements, and fishing boats. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt water incursion.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.</p>

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Drought/Famine	<p>Location in an arid area where dry conditions are increased by drought.</p> <p>Subsistence farming.</p> <p>Lack of seed reserves.</p> <p>Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields.</p> <p>Area dependent on rainfall weather system.</p> <p>Area of low soil moisture retention.</p> <p>Lack of resources to cope with drought.</p> <p>Conflict.</p> <p>Population unbalance.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – deaths principally from deterioration of nutritional status.</p> <p>Secondary threat of disease.</p> <p>Water supply – reduction/loss of drinking water sources.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – reduced income of farmers, reduction of spending on agriculture, increase in price of staple foods, loss of livestock.</p> <p>Mass population movements.</p> <p>Increased dependence on aid programs.</p>	<p>Measures for maintaining food security and food distribution.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance.</p>
Disease/Pandemic	<p>Contaminated water and food supplies.</p> <p>Inadequate excreta disposal facilities.</p> <p>Poor personal hygiene.</p> <p>Concentration of displaced persons in poor living conditions.</p> <p>Pathogens spread by weather systems.</p> <p>Contaminated flood waters.</p> <p>Inadequate or a breakdown of vaccination programmes.</p> <p>Inadequate or a breakdown of infectious disease surveillance and detection.</p> <p>Inadequate or a breakdown in vector control.</p> <p>Global migration.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – deaths principally from contagion. Increased stress on health facilities.</p> <p>Water supply – reduction/loss of drinking water sources if determined to be source of contagion.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – reduced work capacity, reduced income of farmers and loss of livestock/food supplies if determined to be source of contagion. Secondary threat of food shortages.</p> <p>Mass population movements.</p>	<p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.</p> <p>Reduced capacity to rebuild/recover.</p> <p>Ongoing development issues.</p>

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Mass Population Movement	<p>Inability or unwillingness of responsible authorities to take measures to mitigate vulnerability.</p> <p>Inability to act to mitigate their own vulnerability.</p> <p>Limited or late acknowledgement of their plight by the international community.</p> <p>Limited self-sufficiency.</p> <p>No supporting infrastructure.</p> <p>Limited means to generate income and so purchase life-sustaining essentials.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – increased mortality rates due to poor food, sanitary and health conditions.</p> <p>Secondary diseases as a result of conditions. Increased health requirements with worsening situation.</p> <p>Malnutrition.</p> <p>Local destabilisation and increased tensions due to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • overburden on infrastructure, • ethnic imbalances, civil unrest, and inter-communal violence • the impact on economy and staple food supplies. 	<p>Measures for maintaining food security and food distribution.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Support to host infrastructure.</p> <p>Medium-term food security measures.</p> <p>Medium-term feeding programme.</p> <p>Medium-term water and health programmes.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance and vector control.</p>
Landslide	<p>Settlements built on steep slopes, soft soils, and cliff tops.</p> <p>Settlements built at the base of steep slopes, on mouths of streams from mountain valleys.</p> <p>Roads, communication lines in mountain areas.</p> <p>Buildings with weak foundations.</p> <p>Buried pipelines and brittle pipes.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – death from being subsumed by landslide. Fracture and crush injuries most widespread problem</p> <p>Physical damage – damage to key structures and infrastructure on top or in path of landslide.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.</p>

	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY	TYPICAL ADVERSE EFFECTS	TYPICAL NEEDS POST-CRISIS ONSET
Volcanic Eruption	<p>Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes.</p> <p>Settlements in historic paths of lava or mud flows.</p> <p>Structures with roof designs not resistant to ash accumulation.</p> <p>Presence of combustible materials.</p> <p>Lack of evacuation plan or warning systems.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – death from pyroclastic flows, mud flows, lava flows and toxic gases. Injuries from falling rocks, burns, respiratory difficulties from gas or ash.</p> <p>Physical damage – complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows. Collapse of structures under weight of wet ash, flooding, blockage of roads or communication system.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – destruction of livestock and crops in path of flows. Livestock may inhale toxic gas or ash. Grazing lands may be contaminated.</p> <p>Mass population movements possible.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health assistance, particularly breathing and respiratory-related issues.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation, and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Identify secondary hazards including toxic industrial materials.</p>
Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Industrial Accident	<p>Vulnerability of population, structures, livestock and crops closest to the scene of the incident.</p> <p>Large-scale releases of airborne pollutant may spread for hundreds of kilometres.</p> <p>Lack of safety features or lack of evacuation plan.</p> <p>Lack of awareness by vulnerable persons of the potential danger.</p> <p>Reluctance of vulnerable populations to leave homes and livelihoods, especially if danger is not immediately apparent.</p>	<p>Casualties and public health – many people may be killed or injured and require medical treatment. Industrial fires may spread toxic contaminants.</p> <p>Physical damage – may occur due to fire or explosion.</p> <p>Crops and food supplies – may be contaminated. Secondary threat of food shortages.</p> <p>Environmental – contamination of the air, water supply, land and animal life may occur.</p> <p>Mass population movements possible.</p>	<p>Search and rescue.</p> <p>Health care assistance.</p> <p>Provision of CBRN specialists and support.</p> <p>Damage needs and assessment survey.</p> <p>Emergency provision of food, water, sanitation and shelter.</p> <p>Evacuation, relocation and emergency shelter to safe havens.</p> <p>Water purification.</p> <p>Repair and reconstruction of essential services.</p> <p>Epidemiological surveillance.</p> <p>Reduced rebuild capacity.</p>

CHAPTER 2:

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY



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Introduction

2.01 The humanitarian consequences of disasters and complex emergencies often exceed the coping mechanisms and aid resources of individual nations. The immediate effects include loss of life and damage to property and infrastructure, with the survivors, some of whom may have been injured, traumatised by the experience and less able to provide for their own welfare, at least in the short term. More than likely, they are left without adequate shelter, food, water, and other necessities to sustain life. Rapid action is required to prevent further loss of life.

2.02 Most often, in the countries most vulnerable to these events, United Nations (UN) agencies, regional and international organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and private volunteer organisations (PVOs) will already be employed on development projects prior to the onset of a disaster or complex emergency. The scope and scale in such situations may prompt international agencies to refocus from development to emergency relief and may require additional aid.

2.03 NGOs are critical players in assessing needs and providing assistance to affected communities. They are the only players in emergency response that have strong, long-standing links with affected communities and are integrated into civil society networks.

2.04 The international community relies primarily on the UN operational agencies, coordinated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to respond to disasters and complex emergencies that are beyond the capacity of the affected country. The UN is a major provider of emergency relief and development assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people affected by emergencies. Apart from seeking to bring immediate relief to affected persons, the UN encourages disaster mitigation and preparedness.

Key Humanitarian Actors

2.05 Many actors respond to humanitarian crises, including:

- affected nation's government and military agencies
- affected nation's civil organisations
- UN and subordinate UN agencies
- international aid agencies such as the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC)
- humanitarian NGOs and/or PVOs
- human rights organisations
- assisting countries governments and militaries.

2.06 Each actor will have its own objectives, agenda, and operating procedures. As a result, managing expectations and supporting a coordinated approach is critical to humanitarian operations. The potential complexity of coordinating a number of stakeholders with different objectives requires a shared understanding of the required outcomes, a common language and a willingness to coordinate response efforts.

2.07 Unity of effort in humanitarian operations ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. While unity of command may not be possible, the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.

Roles and Responsibilities

2.08 The roles and responsibilities of the affected nation, UN agencies and assisting nations are detailed in:

- The Oslo Guidelines – Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1, November 2007.
- Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003.

The Oslo Guidelines

2.09 **Aim.** The aim of the Oslo Guidelines is to establish the basic framework for formalising and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief operations in times of peace. The Oslo Guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN

humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) commanders, commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of UN humanitarian agencies, and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with foreign military forces.

2.10 **Scope.** The Oslo Guidelines address the use of foreign military and civil defence assets (MCDA) following natural, technological and environmental emergencies.

Military and Civil Defence Assets Guidelines

2.11 **Aim.** The aim of the MCDA Guidelines is to provide guidelines for the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies, and services in support of the UN in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. The MCDA Guidelines provide guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organise, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of military and civil defence assets.

2.12 **Scope.** The MCDA Guidelines cover the use of UN MCDA requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities.

2.13 Both the Oslo Guidelines and MCDA Guidelines state that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged humanitarian gap between disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. At the onset, any use of military assets should be limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy that defines clearly how the function it

undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.

2.14 The guidelines provide guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organise, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of foreign military and civil defence assets.

The Affected Nation

2.15 Each affected nation has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the affected persons of disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. The affected nation has the primary responsibility to ensure disaster risk reduction, relief, and recovery assistance in their territory. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, and domestic civil actors play a key supporting role at the domestic level.

2.16 The affected nation has four main roles and responsibilities regarding humanitarian action:

- they are responsible for 'calling' a crisis and inviting international aid
- they provide assistance and protection
- they are responsible for monitoring and coordinating external assistance
- they set the regulatory and legal frameworks governing relief assistance.

2.17 These responsibilities are critical to initiating and managing a relief response and will shape its effectiveness.

2.18 Seeking to strengthen the coordination of UN humanitarian emergency assistance, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182 in December 1991. This Resolution reaffirms the primary responsibility and obligation of states to care for the affected persons of natural disasters or other emergencies within their borders. The resolution further provides that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national

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unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian action should be provided with the consent of the affected nation and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by the affected nation.

2.19 The affected nation should promptly assess the needs of the situation with consideration given to undertaking a joint needs assessment with the UN and other assisting humanitarian organisations. When the size and impact of a disaster or other crises overwhelms the ability of the affected country to cope, they may initiate requests for international humanitarian action. The response from the affected nation itself includes government and local community structures that work in disaster preparedness organisations.

2.20 Most lives are saved in the first few hours following a disaster, with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies often playing a key role as first responders. Locally established, they can mobilise immediately to assist civil authorities with search and rescue efforts and the distribution of relief items. National societies are supported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

2.21 The affected nation has the sovereign right to coordinate, regulate and monitor disaster relief and recovery assistance provided by assisting actors on their territory consistent with international law, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care, for which access to affected persons is essential.



Figure 2-1: Assisting nations, such as New Zealand, in a humanitarian crisis are required to respect the laws of the affected nations, as well as applicable international law.




Figure 2-2: United Nations Agencies.

2.22 The affected nation should make available to assisting actors adequate information about domestic laws and regulations of particular relevance to the entry and operation of disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.

2.23 An affected nation may refuse to request or accept international assistance even where needs have outstripped national capacities. It may also delay making statements about the need for international relief, or may issue ambiguous and conflicting statements. It can be politically difficult for governments to declare a disaster for fear of appearing weak and damaging national pride. The affected nation may mistrust the motivations behind the provision of international assistance, or it may fear that international actors will usurp their role and challenge their sovereignty.

2.24 The specific roles and responsibilities of the affected nation regarding the use of MCDA during times of disasters and complex emergencies are detailed in both the Oslo and MCDA Guidelines.

Assisting Nations

2.25 Assisting nations and their personnel should abide by the laws of the affected nation as well as applicable international law. The assisting nations also need to coordinate with domestic and international authorities, and respect human dignity of affected persons at all times. Assisting nations should ensure their response to any humanitarian crisis is provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, and in particular:

- priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone
- provided without any adverse distinction (such as in regards to nationality, race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, class, gender, disability, age, and political opinions) to disaster-affected persons
- provided without seeking to further a particular political or religious standpoint, intervene in the internal affairs of the affected nation, or obtain

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commercial gain from charitable assistance

- not used as a means to gather sensitive information of a political, economic, or military nature that is irrelevant to disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.

2.26 The specific roles and responsibilities of the assisting nations during times of disasters and complex emergencies are detailed in the Oslo and MCDA Guidelines.

The Use of Military Assets in International Crises

2.27 Military assets should only be requested for disaster relief or humanitarian assistance operations as a last resort where there is no comparable civilian alternative and when their use can meet a critical humanitarian need. The use of such assets will be subject to a mutually agreed arrangement between the affected nation and assisting nations, including, if applicable, to the appropriate status of forces arrangements.

2.28 Concepts and operational standards for the use of military assets in international humanitarian crises are detailed in [Annex A](#).

The United Nations

2.29 The UN has repeatedly affirmed that each affected nation has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the affected persons of disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. This includes disaster risk reduction, relief, and initial recovery assistance on their territory. The affected nation can meet their responsibility either by directly providing assistance or by arranging for it to be provided by other actors, whether domestic or international. If an affected nation determines that a disaster or emergency situation exceeds national coping capacities, it should seek international and/or regional assistance to address the needs of affected persons.

2.30 The UN agencies involved in emergency relief are shown in [Figure 2.2](#). The UN plays a leading role in coordinating disaster relief efforts across the globe. Through a unique system of specialised agencies with global reach, the UN system as a whole not only coordinates but also plays an integral operational role in disaster relief efforts, working in close collaboration with national governments, NGOs, PVOs, and affected populations. Emergency relief is not a part of the agencies' regular budgets, creating the need to raise funds each year from member states of the UN, private businesses, foundations, and individuals.

Roles and Responsibilities

2.31 A number of UN agencies have key roles and responsibilities in emergency relief activities.

2.32 **United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.** The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was originally established in 1991 as the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). OCHA was born out of a reorganised DHA in 1998. OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA's mission is to:

- mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies
- advocate the rights of people in need
- promote preparedness and prevention
- facilitate sustainable solutions.

2.33 **Office of the Coordinator for Human Affairs Cluster Approach.** The OCHA cluster approach (see [Figure 2-3](#)) has groups of humanitarian organisations (UN and non-UN) working in the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. shelter and health. They are created when clear humanitarian needs exist within a

sector, when there are numerous actors within sectors and when national authorities need coordination support.

2.34 The cluster approach aims to strengthen partnerships and ensure more predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian crises, by clarifying the division of labour among organisations and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the key sectors of the response.

2.35 It strives for a needs-based, rather than capacity-driven, response and aims to ensure a coherent and complementary approach, identifying ways to work together for better collective results.

2.36 Clusters provide a clear point of contact and are accountable for adequate and appropriate

humanitarian assistance. Clusters create partnerships between international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, and civil society.

2.37 The cluster approach can be used in both disasters and complex emergency situations. It should significantly improve the quality of international responses to major new crises. Although not limited to situations of internal displacement, it should make a significant improvement in the quality, level, and predictability of the response to crises of internal displacement, and represents a substantial strengthening of the 'collaborative response'.

2.38 **United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination.** The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), established in 1993, is part of the international emergency response system for




Figure 2-3: The Office of the Coordinator for Human Affairs Cluster Approach.

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sudden-onset emergencies. UNDAC is designed to help the United Nations and governments of disaster-affected countries during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency. UNDAC also assists in the coordination of incoming international relief at national level and/or at the site of the emergency. Assessment, coordination and information management are UNDAC's core mandates in an emergency response mission.

2.39 **Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Operations Coordination Centre.** In situations combining a high number of humanitarian actors and a rapidly evolving emergency situation requiring a high degree of real-time operational coordination, the OCHA field coordination activity may be organised in an Operations Coordination Centre. The Centre serves as the entity for the coordination of the operational activities undertaken by humanitarian organisations responding to the emergency, including the United Nations agencies, the government and NGOs. It provides a clearly visible focal point and meeting place for interaction amongst the organisations carrying out or supporting the humanitarian response operation. The Centre focuses on the multi-sectoral overview of the situation, actors and responses to the emergency. It ensures that sectoral coordination is integrated and presented within a plan for the overall humanitarian response, ideally through cluster coordination carried out from the Centre by the agency designated responsible for a given cluster. In a disaster, the Centre will typically be known as an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) and be located at the disaster site. Sub-OSOCCs may be established at other locations affected by the emergency.

2.40 **United Nations Disaster Management Team.** A UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT), chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator, exists for each disaster-prone country. The purpose of the UN DMT is to ensure a prompt, effective, and concerted country-level response by the UN system in the event of a crisis. The team should ensure coordination of UN assistance to the affected state in respect to rehabilitation, reconstruction and mitigation. The team should coordinate all disaster-related activities, technical advice and material assistance provided by UN agencies, as well as take

steps to avoid wasteful duplication or competition for resources by UN agencies.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

2.41 The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is composed of three elements:

- the International Committee of the Red Cross
- the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
- the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies.

The International Committee of the Red Cross

2.42 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC promotes the importance of international humanitarian law and draws attention to universal humanitarian principles. As the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC has a permanent mandate under international law to visit prisons, organise relief operations, reunite separated families and undertake other humanitarian activities during armed conflicts.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

2.43 The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world's largest humanitarian organisation, providing assistance without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. The IFRC is a global humanitarian organisation, which coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and human disasters in non-conflict situations. The Federation provides support and policy guidance to the 188 Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies that are members of the International Movement. Its relief operations are combined with development work,

including disaster preparedness programmes, health, and care activities, and the promotion of humanitarian values. In particular, it supports programmes on risk reduction and fighting the spread of diseases, such as HIV, tuberculosis, avian influenza, and malaria.

The National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies

2.44 National societies act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services, including disaster relief, health, and social programmes.

controls the territory, or who are the people in need. For this, humanitarian agencies must have unimpeded access to all affected civilian populations. And for this, they must be accepted by all parties, including all sides in any conflict, as impartial agents of assistance not associated with any military or political force. This is based on the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Government Organisations in Disaster Relief. The Code of Conduct highlights the humanitarian imperative, independence, distinction from the affected nation and armed actors, and the need for humanitarian space.

Humanitarian Agencies

2.45 The role of humanitarian agencies is to provide assistance wherever there is need, regardless of who

2.46 UN humanitarian agencies will request the use of MCDA through the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator that has coordination responsibilities for the disaster or complex emergency.




Figure 2-4: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Relationships.

Humanitarian Coordination In-country

2.47 The humanitarian community comprises many actors which are not UN entities, for example other IOs and NGOs. Humanitarian coordination mechanisms are therefore voluntary agreements, based on the conviction that coordination is crucial to be predictable and reliable partners, to avoid gaps and duplications, to improve quality and speed of the response, and to join resources. Most humanitarian coordination tools are developed at the global level through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which comprises 18 major humanitarian organisations, among them UN agencies, with a standing invitation to IOM, ICRC, IFRC, NGOs represented through NGO consortia, and the World Bank. The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who is also the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Head of OCHA. There are no command and control structures; humanitarian leadership is consensus-based.

2.48 If international humanitarian assistance is required, the ERC, in consultation with IASC, appoints a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for a country. HCs are accountable to the ERC for all humanitarian affairs. They are the link between the operational and the global level and chair the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) which brings together all major UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations in a country (see also below). The HC leads humanitarian coordination in cases of international assistance (this does not affect the responsibility of the affected state's government). Some of the HC's tasks are to:

- represent the humanitarian community vis-à-vis the national government and advocate for principled humanitarian action
- oversee inter-cluster coordination and ensure the integration of cross-cutting issues
- propose to the ERC and IASC which clusters to activate at country level, assign cluster leads, and ensure implementation of the cluster system at the sub-national level.

The Humanitarian Country Team

2.49 The HCT, under the leadership of the HC, is the centrepiece of humanitarian coordination in a country. It is composed of organisations that undertake humanitarian action in-country and that commit to humanitarian principles and participate in coordination arrangements. These may include UN agencies, IOM, NGOs and, subject to their individual mandates, components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The size of the HCT is limited to allow for effective decision making. The main membership criterion is operational relevance. Members represent their respective agency at the highest level (country representative or equivalent), as well as the thematic clusters their agency may be leading.

2.50 The HCT ensures that humanitarian action is coordinated, principled, timely, effective, efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery. The HCT might also steer preparedness activities. The HCT holds itself ultimately accountable to the people in need. Whenever possible, the HCT operates in support of and in coordination with national and local authorities.

2.51 For further information on the responsibilities of the HCT, see the OCHA's *A Guide for the Military*.



ANNEX A: CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY ASSETS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CRISES

2.52 The use of military and civil defence assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only provided at the request of or with the consent of the affected nation and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal for international assistance. It is recognised, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs, military assets may be deployed in accordance with:

- *The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – ‘Oslo Guidelines’.*
- *The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies – ‘MCDA Guidelines’.*

Last Resort

2.53 The use of military assets in a humanitarian crisis is a situation when:

- a specific capability or asset requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets has been identified
- foreign military and civil defence assets would help meet the requirement and provide unique advantages in terms of capability, availability, and timeliness
- foreign military and civil defence assets would complement civilian capabilities.

2.54 When the specific requirement no longer exists or when comparable civilian assets become available to meet the requirement and, therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets no longer provide unique advantages, the situation of ‘last resort’ ceases to exist

and these assets should be phased out and activities should be handed back over to civilian actors at an early opportunity. Even if a situation of ‘last resort’ is determined to exist, the use of foreign military and civil defence assets should under no circumstances undermine the actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, or operational independence of humanitarian actors, nor jeopardise current or future access to affected populations in need of humanitarian action.

2.55 ‘Last resort’ is not to be confused with the following responses:

- **First Responders.** Affected nations have the responsibility to use whatever means at their disposal to respond to the needs of their citizens. Their militaries and/or civil defence units can often be the most appropriately equipped and best positioned to respond. The Oslo and the Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Guidelines are not intended to apply in the case of national militaries and/or civil defence units responding to a crisis within its own territory.
- **Bilateral Assistance.** Many requests for assistance by nations, civilian or military, start as bilateral requests, often at the regional or neighbouring level, with (in some cases pre-existing) agreements between the affected and assisting nations on the type of assistance. The Oslo and MCDA Guidelines are not intended to apply to such direct support from one nation to another occurring outside the humanitarian umbrella.
- **Cluster Approach Concept of ‘Provider of Last Resort’.** The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) ‘provider of last resort’ concept is related to the cluster approach and represents a commitment of respective cluster leads to act as ‘providers of last resort’ to ensure an adequate and appropriate response to humanitarian needs wherever there are critical gaps in the humanitarian response.
- **Stabilisation and Reconstruction Missions by Military Actors.** The use of military troops and assets as a tool for development, or so-called stabilisation and reconstruction activities, and as a key component of counter insurgency strategies,

compromises the humanitarian notion of 'last resort' if not managed carefully and effectively. Similarly, the use of military troops and assets for the provision of relief aid for the purposes of winning the sympathy of the population might compromise humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers, and otherwise hamper humanitarian operations.

Categories of Military Resources

2.56 In general, military resources can be divided into two categories:

- military and civil defence assets (MCDA)
- other deployed forces.

2.57 **Military and Civil Defence Assets.** As defined in the Oslo Guidelines, military and defence assets comprises of relief personnel, equipment, supplies, and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organisations for international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence organisation means any organisation that, under the control of a government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. When these assets are under United Nations (UN) control they are referred to as UN MCDA.

2.58 **Other Deployed Forces.** These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA.




Figure 2-5: The mission of a force is the primary factor that determines a military unit's availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial.

Chapter 2, Annex A

2.59 **Other Deployed Forces in Disaster Relief Operations.** These include the forces deployed by the affected nation and any foreign forces deployed under bilateral agreements or under the auspices of organisations other than the UN.

2.60 **Other Deployed Forces in Humanitarian Assistance Operations.** These are divided into four categories based on their missions. These missions are outlined below.

- Peacetime missions include training or exercises in the region with no hostile intent.
- UN-commanded peacekeeping operations include missions under the auspices of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.
- Other peace operation/peace support missions include a range of tasks undertaken by military forces that are not under UN command, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other so-called peace support operations where forces are deployed under operational parameters that dictate a minimum necessary use of force.
- Combat missions are those where the primary purpose of the operational is the defeat of a designated adversary.

2.61 The mission of a force is the primary factor that determines a military unit's availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial. As a matter of principle, the MCDA of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities.

2.62 The principle distinction between these two types of resources are that the UN MCDA have been placed under the control of the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis specifically to support UN humanitarian activities. Other deployed forces are under the direction and/or support of other entities, including foreign forces stated in the affected nation or region, military resources provided

under bilateral or multilateral agreements, and UN peacekeeping forces.

Key Concepts for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets by United Nations Agencies

2.63 In addition to the framework of the humanitarian principles, the use of MCDA by UN agencies in support of disaster relief or humanitarian assistance operations shall be guided by the following standards:

- Requests for MCDA to support UN agencies must be made by the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator with the consent of the affected nation and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- MCDA should be employed by UN humanitarian agencies as a last resort, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.
- A UN humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While MCDA may remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation. This does not infer any civilian command and control over military assets.
- Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organisations. Insofar as military organisations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.
- Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.
- Countries providing MCDA to support UN humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the UN Codes of Conduct and humanitarian principles.

2.64 Implementing and operational partners and members of international civil society are expected to adhere to these core principles and have been encouraged to adopt the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.

Responsibilities of the Assisting Nation and the Military Commander

2.65 Key responsibilities of assisting nations and the military commander are as follows:

- In a humanitarian crisis, prospective assisting nations with military resources deployed in the affected area or in reasonable proximity should facilitate coordination to facilitate humanitarian action. This could include information on any assets available to support essential humanitarian functions, including the transport of relief goods, the movement of persons at risk and the re-establishment of basic human services including health care.
- The commanders of UN MCDA who are assigned specifically to support UN humanitarian activities, and other deployed forces performing humanitarian missions at the request of the UN, will avoid compromising the neutrality and impartiality of these agencies, their implementing and operational partners and other humanitarian actors responding to a crisis. All supporting activities will be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity, culture, religions, and laws of the affected population.
- Military or civil defence organisations dispatched to support humanitarian actions should be self-supporting for the duration of their mission in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications, in order to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors.
- Unless specifically exempted, UN MCDA will abide by the security and movements procedures set by the UN Security Coordinator to ensure the safety of UN personnel and be prepared to provide non-security-related assistance in the relocation or

evacuation of UN personnel should the need arise.

- When military forces have assumed responsibility for vital civilian functions, such as delivery of water, provision of power, or the safe operation of an airfield, regardless of how this responsibility was acquired, they will facilitate a smooth transfer of these functions to the appropriate civilian authority, in coordination with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator as soon as possible. This will be done in a timely manner, well prior to terminating this support, to ensure that any disruption of services will not have an adverse impact on relief and recovery activities.
- The nations providing UN MCDA will not exploit these missions for the purpose of intelligence collection, propaganda, or psychological operations.

Operational Standards for the Use of United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets

2.66 The following operational standards below are provided to ensure that when UN MCDA are used, that they are in concert with the core humanitarian and UN principles as well as international humanitarian law.

- **Civilian Control.** A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets. Nevertheless, the degree of UN control of UN MCDA will be different than the UN direction of other deployed forces performing ad hoc support tasks. In the case of UN MCDA they will normally be in direct support of a UN humanitarian agency. The missions within the agreed Terms of Reference will be assigned by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in consultation with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
- **At No Cost.** UN MCDA, like all UN humanitarian action, are to be provided at no cost to the affected nation or receiving agency. This should not result in assisting nations cutting or reducing other planned

and programmed assistance, such as development aid resources, to recover the cost of UN MCDA or other relief support.

2.67 In principle, unarmed UN MCDA accepted as neutral and impartial and clearly distinguished from other military units can be used to support the full range of humanitarian activities. However, their involvement in direct assistance should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of 'last resort'. Their activities should focus on indirect assistance and infrastructure support missions.

2.68 Military and civil defence personnel employed exclusively in the support of UN humanitarian activities should be clearly distinguished from those forces engaged in other military missions, including the military component of peacekeeping missions, peace operations and peace support, and accorded the appropriate protection by the affected country and any combatants.

2.69 Acceptable means for distinguishing UN MCDA from security and forces engaged in military operations are the markings of the supported UN humanitarian agency or the use of civil defence markings accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions. When UN MCDA are from military organisations, the appropriate white markings and UN symbols may be used. When civil defence assets are employed, they should be marked in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Military forces cannot be marked as civil defence forces. In all cases, movement of UN MCDA, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters.

2.70 Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Security Coordinator. However, if military forces providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support missions must be armed, for their security and/or the safeguarding of their equipment, they will operate under strict rules of engagement based on the Law of Armed Conflict and should take account of advice and

guidance by the Humanitarian Coordinator, Special Representative or other appropriate UN official, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

2.71 Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force, or the violation of state sovereignty.

2.72 Under no circumstance will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A separate security force may, however, be used to ensure security in areas where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance.

Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces

2.73 In the case of other deployed forces, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator will determine what humanitarian tasks need to be done, what modalities must be respected, and request appropriate support. The supporting military or civil defence commander will determine whether they can complete the task within their means and capabilities given their primary mission requirements. Provided that the means indicated by the military or civil defence commander respect the principles of these guidelines, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator will or will not authorise the tasks to be undertaken by the designated unit.

2.74 Under the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, states have obligations under international humanitarian law. These include an obligation not to impede humanitarian activities as well as responsibilities to grant access to the affected populations, and the safeguarding of relief personnel.

2.75 Military forces deployed by member nations or regional organisations whose primary missions are other than humanitarian support may also provide support to UN humanitarian agencies when requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other designated officials. When these forces undertake activities in support of

a UN humanitarian agency or their implementing and operational partners, this support will be on a case-by-case basis, subject to a request. The military resources will remain under the control of the military force commander.

2.76 Military or civil defence forces undertaking missions to support UN humanitarian activities should reconcile their mode of operation with the circumstances of the operational environment. Under these conditions only, and provided the mode of operation in question respects all appropriate humanitarian principles, should the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other responsible UN authority authorise the mission.


2.77 Military forces, other than UN MCDA, performing assistance missions are in principle not granted any special protection nor are they authorised to

display the emblems of the supported UN humanitarian agencies.

2.78 When other deployed forces are UN peacekeeping forces operating under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate, the degree to which these forces can be used to support humanitarian activity will be determined by the head of the UN mission, based on the mandate and capabilities of the peacekeeping force. The mechanisms for coordination between the UN humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping force will also be established by this authority, with careful attention to the coherence of the mission. In all cases, movement of military and civil defence resources supporting humanitarian activities, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters.

CHAPTER 3:

THE NEW ZEALAND APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES





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Introduction

3.01 In New Zealand, all spheres of government acknowledge that the impact of some emergencies could be particularly severe or widespread and exceed the capability of a single local authority to manage. New Zealand's emergency management arrangements bring together the efforts of all governments and private and volunteer agencies to deliver coordinated emergency management across all hazards.

3.02 Generally speaking, the New Zealand Government will:

- have primary responsibility for managing a crisis, for example when an incident occurs in a foreign country
- jointly manage a crisis with an affected local authority or region where national responsibilities have been impacted, for example in response to a terrorist attack
- provide support to local governments that have primary responsibility, for example in response to a disaster.

3.03 **National.** At the national level, there is a range of plans and committees to coordinate effort, including the management of social, economic, environmental, and other likely consequences, and ensuring a consistent national approach to communications. The plans are supported by national legislation that assigns responsibilities of both central government and the local authorities.

3.04 **International.** In the international arena, New Zealand is increasingly being invited to form strategic partnerships to mitigate or reduce the impact of emergencies globally, as well as in New Zealand's region of interest. International emergency management arrangements include:

- assisting other nations affected by emergencies, at their request
- assisting New Zealanders affected by emergencies in other nations

- coordinating overseas assistance offered to New Zealand in a domestic emergency.

3.05 The New Zealand Government has plans and arrangements for dealing with a broad range of potential hazards. While these tend to be developed along hazard-specific lines, taken together they form an all-hazards framework for crisis management. Of special importance for New Zealand's plans and arrangements in the international arena are the non-discretionary requirements that New Zealand has due to its constitutional responsibilities for the Cook Islands, Nihaui, and Tokelau.

All-of-Government

3.06 The all-of-government response is often in the context of a longer-term plan involving other government agencies and international governments that are involved at varying times. As part of implementing an agreed long-term plan, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), while part of the solution, may only be involved in a segment of the plan when civil agencies are unable to respond.

3.07 Within the New Zealand Government there are many agencies involved in the coordination of an all-of-government response in crisis management. This multi-agency coordination may also involve external organisations, international governments, non-government organisations (NGO), private volunteer organisations (PVOs) and other stakeholders who may be involved in the response.

3.08 The roles and responsibilities of key New Zealand Government stakeholders are outlined in the current *National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order* and in the *Guidelines for Responding to Natural Disasters in the Pacific*.

Coordination of the National Response

3.09 In order to effectively coordinate the national response to either a domestic or international

humanitarian crisis, New Zealand requires an effective national framework for the high level of collaboration and coordination of disaster management. This framework applies both within and across all levels of government and with non-government stakeholders, including the community and private sector.

3.10 The role of the New Zealand Government in disaster management is to:

- help coordinate national efforts in disaster research, information management, and mitigation policy and practice
- reduce the risks and costs of disasters to the nation
- mobilise resources when regional council disaster response resources are insufficient
- provide national support for disaster relief and community recovery.

The Domestic and External Security Coordination System

3.11 When a humanitarian crisis or national disaster occurs, the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) system is activated. The DESC system brings together information for Ministers, coordinates analysis and development of options, and assists decision-making in Cabinet. This system does not affect the existing responsibilities of Ministers or departments. The DESC system operates at four levels:

- the Cabinet National Security Committee
- the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC)
- the Readiness and Response Board
- the watch groups.

3.12 **Cabinet National Security Committee.** The roles of the Cabinet National Security Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and whose members include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, include coordination and direction of the national response to a major crisis or to circumstances affecting national

security (such as a natural disaster, biosecurity problem, health emergency or terrorist/military threat) within New Zealand or involving New Zealand's interests overseas.

3.13 **The Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination.** The ODESC may be activated to provide oversight of the Emergency Task Force (ETF) coordinated response. ODESC would report to the Cabinet National Security Committee (if that committee were convened) and/or to relevant Ministers. ODESC membership comprises chief executives or their representatives from a range of government agencies including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Treasury, and others as and when necessary. The Chief Executive of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) chairs the committee.

3.14 **The Readiness and Response Board.** The Readiness and Response Board consists of relevant chief executives focussed on ensuring New Zealand has the systems and capabilities in place to respond to significant emergencies.

3.15 **Watch Groups.** In most major crises, a watch group will also be established. It will be made up of senior staff from the New Zealand Government agencies involved in the response to provide information to ODESC to enable the setting of strategy and priorities.

3.16 Should there be a situation where an event affects both offshore and New Zealand, e.g. a Pacific-wide tsunami, the DESC process would provide overall co-ordination of both offshore and domestic responses as shown in [Figure 3-1](#).

Lead Agency

3.17 A lead agency is the agency with the primary mandate for managing the response to an emergency at the national level. The lead agency's role includes:

- monitoring and assessing the situation
- planning for and coordinating the national response

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- reporting to the ODESC and providing policy advice
- coordinating the dissemination of public information.

3.18 A lead agency also:

- must develop and maintain staff capability and capacity to ensure that it is able to perform its role
- may draw on the advice and expertise of senior emergency managers in doing so.

Response to National Disasters

3.19 In responding to natural disasters, the New Zealand Government has a major role in:

- coordinating national strategic disaster management policy in collaboration with the local authorities

- undertaking natural disaster research of national significance
- identifying national priorities for disaster mitigation in collaboration with other levels of government
- providing support for disaster risk assessment and mitigation measures in conjunction with local authorities
- providing operational support for disaster response to the local authorities when their individual resources are overwhelmed
- providing a national disaster relief and recovery framework and resources on a cost-sharing basis with the other levels of government
- providing vital information services such as meteorological, hydrological, geophysical and other




Figure 3-1: An Indicative Crisis Management Structure.

geo-data services that support warnings and disaster management

- requests for central government assistance by local authorities.

3.20 Local authorities have the responsibility for the protection of lives and property of personnel, and for coordinating and planning the response to and recovery from disasters and civil emergencies within their respective boundaries. When the total resources – government, community, and commercial – of an affected council area cannot reasonably cope with the needs of the situation, and providing key criteria are met, the affected local authority can seek assistance from the New Zealand Government.

3.21 Local authorities have responsibility within their own jurisdiction for disaster planning, preparedness and mitigation in relation to land, property and the environment, assets and infrastructure, and agencies and programmes.

3.22 When the total resources (government, community, and commercial) of an affected local authority cannot reasonably cope with the scale of a disaster, the affected local authority can seek assistance from the New Zealand Government. The New Zealand Government's National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan (NCDEMP) provides the framework for addressing local government requests for New Zealand Government physical assistance arising from any type of disaster or emergency.

3.23 The NCDEMP complements local government's response arrangements. Its effectiveness relies heavily on support from a number of central government agencies. The NCDEMP describes the coordination of physical assistance and recognises that emergency management occurs within a comprehensive framework that encompasses all hazards. The NCDEMP recognises the need for an integrated approach that ensures the involvement of governments, all relevant organisations and agencies, the private sector and the community.

3.24 In a situation where national response capabilities are seriously stretched, inadequate or

insufficient, the New Zealand Government may seek assistance of additional resources from countries with appropriate and available capabilities. The February 2011 earthquake sequence in Canterbury was an example.

3.25 **The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.** For domestic emergencies, the Minister of Civil Defence is designated as the Cabinet Minister with responsibility for disaster-related matters. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating the government's physical assistance to the affected local council. There are four levels of response:

- incident site
- local
- regional
- national.

3.26 MCDEM employs the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) structure in dealing with emergencies, alongside which the NZDF must operate when participating in such tasks. At the top of the command hierarchy for civil defence and emergency management (CDEM) activities sits the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and below that, the Officials' Domestic and External Security Coordination Committee (Emergencies), (ODESC(E)). This body is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and includes the:

- Chief of Defence Force
- Director of MCDEM
- Commissioner of Police
- Chief Executive of the New Zealand Fire Service
- Chief executives of other government departments as the situation requires.

3.27 The Director CDEM is the principal central government executive responsible for the direction

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and coordination of CDEM within New Zealand. The Director CDEM may delegate authority to a national controller (NC) for the operational response to a Civil Defence emergency. This empowers the NC to exercise operational oversight over other government agencies for the CDEM response. The NC establishes a National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) and may assign tasks accordingly. The NC will liaise directly with Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ).

3.28 The CDEM Group Controllers control the activities of CDEM groups. These are groups of territorial local authorities, based on recognised regional boundaries, whose role it is to effectively manage local and regional risks by coordinating their community response to the emergency. At the local level, the Group Controller allocates tasks to support community and other government agencies and will liaise directly with any NZDF Joint Task Force Commander (JTF Comd). NZDF force elements are usually assigned in Direct Support to the CDEM groups.

Response to International Crises

3.29 New Zealand is currently able to assist other nations in times of distress (however within reason and bound by financial constraints and limits), particularly those within our immediate region. New Zealand has particular responsibilities in assisting their geographical neighbours and those within the immediate region with disaster relief and humanitarian needs, and in support of stability and security. On occasion, New Zealand will be expected to take a leadership role within the South Pacific if these states are overwhelmed by a natural or human crisis. The New Zealand Government provides humanitarian responses at the request of the government of the affected country, which is relayed to the New Zealand Government via diplomatic processes.

3.30 New Zealand's international emergency management arrangements include:

- assisting other countries affected by emergencies at their request

- assisting New Zealanders affected by emergencies in other countries
- coordinating overseas assistance offered to Australia in a domestic emergency.

3.31 The International Development Group (IDG) is part of the MFAT. As such, it is responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade for managing New Zealand's overseas aid programme including New Zealand's assistance to overseas developing countries. This assistance may be financial, technical or physical. The Minister will decide the appropriate response to a particular disaster.

3.32 In the event of an international crisis, MFAT will determine the response to a request for assistance from the affected state. MFAT will coordinate the all-of-government response using the ETF and the Interdepartmental Response Network (IRN). All formal requests for NZDF assistance will be issued by MFAT and coordinated by the ETF or IRN. NZDF assistance will be managed through the NZDF Liaison staff on the ETF or IRN.

3.33 New Zealand Government organisations, including the NZDF, may need to respond at short notice to provide timely and effective assistance. The civil authorities retain primacy for any response, but the NZDF must be prepared to lead where this is dictated by the security situation in the crisis area. The NZDF's aim is to provide direct and frank advice to the relevant authority and act in direct support to the lead New Zealand agency as part of a New Zealand all-of-government response, which sets the conditions for long-term recovery and continued stability of the affected country.

3.34 In undertaking support to humanitarian operations, the overriding emphasis should be the empowerment of the affected country and the supporting relief effort to meet the needs of the affected persons. The affected country's government should be in charge and it is important that they are seen to be so. The level of support and advice necessary to achieve this will vary but the affected country should have responsibility for the strategy, end-state, and

setting the priorities for meeting the needs of its people. This principle respects the affected country's ultimate responsibility for humanitarian action, attests to the affected country's authority in time of crisis and will help to keep the NZDF's contribution limited to the provision of support to the relief effort.

3.35 **How New Zealand Determines its Response to International Crises.** For an overseas crisis that involves a significant consular response, the ETF is formed and provides the strategic coordination and management of the New Zealand Government's international response. However, if no significant consular response is required and the crisis occurs in official development assistance (ODA) countries, strategic coordination and management is normally transferred to the International Development Group (IDG). If no significant consular

response is required and the crisis occurs in a non-ODA-eligible country, the ETF retains the strategic coordination and management, for example the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster.

3.36 For an MFAT-led response that requires physical/technical support from other New Zealand Government agencies, MFAT forms and chairs an inter-departmental committee to facilitate the coordination. Because of the New Zealand Government administrative arrangements, the division of responsibility for response management is based on the ODA eligibility of the country involved.

3.37 In the early phase of a crisis, a key responsibility of any ETF is to present response options and recommendations to government. The information is




Figure 3-2: The February 2011 earthquake sequence in Canterbury was an example of when the New Zealand Government required assistance and additional resources.

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compiled after consideration of the needs of the affected country, available capabilities from the New Zealand Government, and other contributions from foreign governments, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs or PVOs.

3.38 Any New Zealand Government response is normally determined by Cabinet, as it has financial implications. But there is no formal guidance on how the government decides on the scale and type of response that New Zealand will provide.

3.39 In determining New Zealand's humanitarian response to an international crisis, MFAT will consider:

- the needs of the affected population
- the scale of the disaster and affected country's state's response capacities, circumstances and preferences, including whether a request for assistance has been made
- the funding and plans of other donors
- the capacity and activities of humanitarian partners on the ground



Figure 3-3: New Zealand Red Cross is one of the core members of the Emergency Task Force.

- New Zealand's national interest, including where its resources will be most efficient and effective
- the geographic location – New Zealand is committed to supporting our near neighbours, while continuing to be responsive to humanitarian requests globally
- good humanitarian donorship, including predictable, flexible, diversified, and longer-term funding arrangements with limited earmarking.

3.40 Within this framework, appropriateness, effectiveness, timeliness, efficiency and accountability are the prime considerations in determining how New Zealand responds.

3.41 **Emergency Task Force.** New Zealand's immediate response to natural disasters is coordinated in Wellington through a cross-agency ETF that is chaired by the MFAT. The ETF also includes representatives from other New Zealand Government Departments, the New Zealand Red Cross and NGO Community, and FRANZ partners (France and Australia).

3.42 New Zealand's response operations in the Pacific are coordinated through the relevant New Zealand High Commission (Pacific Post) under direction from the Wellington-based MFAT Controller.

3.43 The ETF is the first-call inter-agency response group. In order to be prepared, the ETF is generally convened on notice of and immediately following a sizeable disaster. The ETF also meets prior to the start of the annual Pacific cyclone season and immediately after it in order to identify lessons learned and areas for enhancement.

3.44 Core government members of the ETF are:

- MFAT
- Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
- DPMC
- NZDF
- MCDEM
- New Zealand Police

- Ministry of Health (MOH)
- Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs (MPIA)
- New Zealand Fire Service.

3.45 Other core members:

- New Zealand Red Cross
- Non-Government Organisations Disaster Relief Forum (NDRF)
- FRANZ.

3.46 Depending on the severity and nature of the event, the ETF may expand to also include the following New Zealand government agencies or others as required:

- National Assessments Bureau (NAB)
- Ministry of Social Development (MSD)
- New Zealand Customs Service
- Immigration New Zealand
- Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC)
- Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI)
- Maritime New Zealand Regional Coordination Centre.

3.47 The above agencies will be copied into all situation reports.

3.48 **Regional Responsibilities.** It is acknowledged that the Asia-Pacific is the most disaster prone region in the world. As a result of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, New Zealand was one of 30 regional countries and other regional and international humanitarian organisations who developed the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Relief Operations. These guidelines complement other guidelines, e.g. Oslo Guidelines, and aim to contribute to ensuring the effective and principled foreign military assistance to disaster relief operations in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand has statutory responsibilities to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.

3.49 The guidelines do not apply to complex emergencies.

The New Zealand Defence Force Response

3.50 **Legal Basis.** The general legal basis for provision of NZDF support is in accordance with Section 9 of the Defence Act 1990. Section 9 (1) (a) and (b) of the Defence Act enable the NZDF to be used in New Zealand or elsewhere to:

- perform any public service
- provide assistance to the civil power in time of emergency.

3.51 Various other statutory provisions are relevant to NZDF operations in support of law enforcement or public order. Each scenario in which members of the Armed Forces are acting in such a role will be unique, and NZDF legal advice will ensure deploying personnel are appropriately trained and briefed on the use of relevant powers.

3.52 The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2000) is the legal authority for the declaration of an emergency requiring CDEM measures. The NZDF's provision of assistance to a Civil Defence emergency within New Zealand, such as disaster relief, is encompassed under a New Zealand joint service plan.

3.53 The New Zealand Government's policy is that the NZDF will continue to provide a range of specialised capabilities on a scale and of a kind available from no other New Zealand agency to support humanitarian operations as part of an all-of-government response. This is stated in the Defence White Paper where one of the principle tasks of the NZDF is 'to contribute to whole-of-government effort at home and abroad in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance'. The focus of NZDF support would be to provide high-impact, short-duration assistance and relief efforts to establish the humanitarian conditions conducive to deliver effective ongoing relief provisions, provided by specialist government organisations, NGOs and the international community.

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3.54 When responding to overseas crises, the NZDF, as part of an all-of-government response, will establish contact with key stakeholders including United Nations agencies, local population agencies, supporting international response organisations, NGOs, PVOs, and other troop contributing nations. Effective civil–military liaison is crucial in providing the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of humanitarian operations.

New Zealand Defence Force Support Arrangement

3.55 When a humanitarian crisis occurs, a combination of factors will influence the New Zealand Government’s decision regarding what, if any, military assistance should be offered. Military response options should support the mitigation of the impact of the crisis until such time that the affected region, foreign or domestic, is able to take full control of the subsequent recovery effort. The specific requirements for NZDF support will be situation dependent and will be determined by a number of factors, including:

- type and scale of the disaster and the humanitarian needs it creates
- location of the crisis
- impact of the crisis on the affected nation or region’s coping mechanisms
- civil contributions to an international relief effort
- the assessed shortfall between the humanitarian response and the affected persons’ needs
- whether the affected nation has requested military assistance
- whether the New Zealand Government directs military assistance to assist the affected local authority with response efforts
- the availability of NZDF assets that are not engaged in higher priority tasks, and how quickly and easily those assets can reach the crisis site
- national interests
- diplomatic and historical relations with the affected foreign nation
- media coverage of the crisis and the public pressure it generates.

Effectiveness of the Military to Support Humanitarian Crises

3.56 NZDF force elements are effective when used in support of humanitarian crises because of a number of attributes. These are:

- timeliness
- appropriateness and competence
- efficiency
- absorptive capacity
- self deploy
- sustainability
- operate in adverse conditions
- coordination
- costs.

3.57 **Timeliness.** When a humanitarian crisis occurs, certain assets are needed urgently in the surge phase of an operation. If they do not arrive and become operational within a matter of hours or, at most, days, the opportunity to use them effectively is missed. Other force elements may not be as critically needed or are required at a different stage of the operation. In some circumstances, timeliness is perhaps the overriding reason for deploying NZDF force elements. It is generally recognised that one of the biggest comparative advantages of military assets is that they are typically on permanent standby, available in large numbers, ready to deploy at short notice, and thus able to reach the scene quickly.

3.58 Deployment of NZDF force elements that will take some time to reach the scene should only be considered if they can still add a unique value to the operation. The timeliness of the deployment of military

assets may also be affected by external factors, such as the initial needs assessment. Where there are no established procedures and channels between the affected nation and the New Zealand Government, separate negotiations on the use of NZDF assets may have to take place during the planning of each individual crisis response. For NZDF assets deployed in support of humanitarian operations to be effective, they must be deployed promptly, arrive promptly and become operational quickly and smoothly.

3.59 **Appropriateness.** NZDF force elements should only be deployed as part of a humanitarian operation if they offer a unique capability that no available civilian asset can provide.

3.60 **Efficiency.** Whether NZDF force elements operate efficiently and whether they are optimally utilised within the larger relief effort may be impacted by several external factors, including effective planning and coordination. To a large extent, the efficiency of military forces is enhanced by the operational techniques it uses, for example, increasing the quantity of relief supplies delivered by helicopters by use of external (under-slung) payloads.

3.61 **Absorptive Capacity.** The absorptive capacity is the capacity of the affected nation to effectively utilise and coordinate NZDF assets during a humanitarian operation. This may take the form of existing or ad hoc crisis management structures into which the NZDF assets can integrate. Strong governments are generally in a better position to take responsibility for relief efforts than weaker ones. Functioning state structures facilitate the coordination of international assistance and the assessment of needs. The lack of internal coordination mechanisms in an affected nation may mean that international contributors, both military and civilian, will not have a system or structure to integrate into.

3.62 **Self Deploy.** The NZDF has the ability to deploy its relief elements using integral NZDF strategic and tactical transportation capabilities. This results in the least amount of delay.

3.63 **Sustainability.** Sustainability is the ability to support a designated force at operating tempo for the duration of a humanitarian operation. The NZDF has the ability to sustain the assets it deploys during a humanitarian operation. This in turn enables NZDF force elements to maintain their tempo of support for the affected country.

3.64 **Operate in Adverse Conditions.** The operating environment for humanitarian operations usually contains a complex web of participants, bystanders and particularly difficult and adverse conditions that influence the conduct of the humanitarian operation. NZDF force elements are all trained to operate in adverse conditions, both environmental and operational in nature.

3.65 **Coordination.** Coordination and collaboration is critical to the success or failure of a humanitarian operation. The degree of coordination between different actors affects not only the efficient running of the operation, but also the operation's overall effectiveness. Cooperation, coordination and connectivity at all levels will better enable key organisations to orchestrate the total humanitarian effort.

3.66 **Cost.** Humanitarian action is to be provided at no cost to the affected nation or receiving agency, unless otherwise agreed between concerned nations or regulated by international agreements. This should not result in assisting nations cutting or reducing their planned and programmed assistance, such as development aid resources, to recover the cost of their military contributions or other relief support.

New Zealand Defence Force Contributions to National Disasters

3.67 The NZDF is committed to assisting the civil community within New Zealand in both emergency and non-emergency situations. During an emergency, the NZDF is a support agency to the lead agency that has responsibility for managing the response. By nature of NZDF operations, forces can be deployed at short notice to assist with the emergency response.

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3.68 **Intent.** CDF's intent is for the NZDF to provide appropriate support to government authorities during an emergency while maintaining operational outputs and missions. This means that all efforts will be made to support national or local lead agencies, however, the NZDF cannot guarantee certain platforms or equipment will always be available because they may be involved in another government-directed mission.

3.69 **Principles of New Zealand Defence Force Involvement.** The following principles apply to NZDF involvement:

- NZDF personnel deployed to assist the response to an emergency will remain under military command while the lead agency tasks the NZDF units assigned to the response efforts
- ensuring that requests for NZDF assistance are in the form of a general task or a desired effect, rather than a request for a specific resource or piece of equipment
- providing, after analysis of the general task or desired effect, the most suitable personnel and equipment to complete the task or achieve the effect
- in performing general public services or assistance, NZDF personnel are not empowered to exercise police powers. However, Service personnel should not hesitate in acting to save a life in any circumstances, nor should they hesitate to act on specific lawful requests by the police.

3.70 **Role of New Zealand Defence Force during Readiness.** The NZDF undertakes the following tasks to ensure it is prepared to respond in the event of an emergency:

- managing business continuity plans at the necessary levels to ensure defence functions can continue to be delivered during an emergency

- maintaining emergency contingency plans for response to an emergency
- conducting internal training and participating in exercises at the national level to maintain response proficiency
- participating in planning and training sessions with MCDEM and CDEM groups.

3.71 **Role of New Zealand Defence Force during Response.** During an emergency, where MCDEM is the lead agency at the national level, the NZDF will provide liaison officers to the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), the CDEM Group Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), and if necessary, the local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). The liaison officers will advise on potential support options by the NZDF and provide updates on the progress of any tasks that the NZDF is conducting in the respective area or level (however, they are not authorised to accept tasks). The NZDF can have certain forces assigned at short notice to support emergencies. The force elements, including headquarters elements, are held ready for response at the regional and national levels and include land, air and sea assets as necessary.⁵ The NZDF will coordinate force elements at either the local level (CDEM Group ECC) or national level (NCMC) depending on the type and scale of the emergency and the mode of operation of the NCMC.⁶

3.72 Requests for the support of the NZDF beyond local levels of commitment must be made by the CDEM Groups through the national controller in accordance with the agreement between MCDEM and the NZDF.

⁵ See the *NZDF Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Aide Memoire* for further details.

⁶ Detail of this control is contained within *NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control* and *The Guide to the National Civil Defence*.



Figure 3-4: The force elements held ready at short notice to respond to an emergency include sea, land and air assets, along with a deployable Joint Interagency Task Force Headquarters.

New Zealand Defence Force Assistance to the Civil Authority

3.73 It is possible that an unforeseen incident, or series of incidents, may lead to a sudden escalation in violence. Civilian authorities may be unable to deal with such an emergent situation sufficiently to prevent injury, loss of life or widespread damage to property. Under such circumstances, the Defence Act 1990 allows the New Zealand Government to call out the NZDF to assist civilian authorities. Such circumstances may include widespread and violent public disorder or criminal activity resulting from violent groups or individuals exploiting a disaster situation.

3.74 **Search and Rescue Operations.** Search and Rescue (SAR) is the search for and provision of lifesaving assistance to people in distress and imminent danger of loss of life. New Zealand's area of responsibility for SAR spans 30 million square kilometres.

3.75 New Zealand is party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979, and the Convention on International Civilian Aviation 2007. Through such instruments, New Zealand has an obligation to provide an aeronautical, land and maritime SAR coordination service for its territories, territorial seas and the high seas within New Zealand's Search and Rescue Region (SRR).

3.76 The national search and rescue service is provided by the Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ), which is located in Wellington and is part of Maritime New Zealand. RCCNZ is responsible for the national coordination of both maritime and aviation SAR and for the management and operation of the New Zealand ground segment of the Cospas-Sarsat distress beacon detection system.

3.77 NZDF SAR operations include:

- Military SAR – the response for incidents relating to NZDF personnel and assets within the

New Zealand SRR and for deployed NZDF personnel and assets outside the New Zealand SRR, subject to the agreement of the host nation.

- Civilian SAR – the NZDF support to civilian SAR authorities within the New Zealand SRR.

3.78 The NZDF's response to any SAR incident should be governed by the following key attributes:

- timeliness of an effective response
- authorisation of task (including any international legal obligations to undertake the task)
- appropriate asset assignment (including trained personnel and relevant effects).

3.79 Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) has Operation Command (OPCOM) of all NZDF assets involved in civilian SAR missions.

The New Zealand Defence Force Contribution to International Crises

3.80 NZDF assets have been an integral part of the all-of-government and the international community's humanitarian response to many major, rapid-onset crises, and they are likely to remain so. The unique capabilities of these assets and their ability to deploy quickly can save lives, however, their deployment and use need to be carefully considered.

3.81 The NZDF capacity for quick reaction, the special skills and training of its personnel and its capacity to be self-supporting in a disaster environment, mean that there may be considerable reliance on the NZDF during a New Zealand Government response to an overseas humanitarian operation.

3.82 **Support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.** The role of the NZDF in international crises will be in support of the MFAT. The policy and procedures for the provision of NZDF assistance to overseas disasters are detailed in the respective joint service plan.


3.83 **Defence Attachés and Advisors.** Defence Attachés and Advisors in overseas missions may be allocated specific liaison duties by the Head of Mission, but otherwise they have no direct emergency response responsibilities.

3.84 **Task Groups.** The NZDF forms Task Group(s) (TG) to meet the specific operational requirements of an affected area. Once formed, the TG needs to be flexible enough to rapidly deploy in order to assist in shaping the planning of the humanitarian operation and prepare for other contingencies, such as disasters, evacuation

operations or complex emergencies as part of an all-of-government response. The TG will provide military skills, knowledge and experience to the immediate and follow-on responses as a crisis unfolds. The TG will also provide an on-the-ground link between MFAT and the NZDF, ensuring the effective use of military capability. Where applicable, a Joint Reconnaissance Team (JRT) from Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) or the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) will be utilised for conduct of reconnaissance to land-based support operations.

CHAPTER 4:

PLANNING AND CONDUCT



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Introduction

4.01 Planning for humanitarian operations is a complex all-of-government activity drawing upon the elements of national power to achieve government-directed national strategic objectives. Consultation with other organisations in the operational environment is essential to achieve military strategic outcomes within the broader national objectives.

4.02 Humanitarian operations may:

- be conducted independently
- form a component of another operation or deployed force, nationally or internationally
- consist of force elements redirected from other operations, such as peace operations.

4.03 In most instances, these operations are launched in response to rapid-onset disasters and are likely to be conducted in a permissive environment. Subject to the operational environment, a non-combatant evacuation operation may also need to be planned for and executed simultaneously.

4.04 Experience has shown that such a military response to humanitarian crises will be part of an all-of-government response and increasingly, multinational. A response to a crisis requires a comprehensive approach, of which military action may be only one part. When a military response is required, it should be rapid, appropriate and proportional to the situation.

4.05 Coordination and liaison will be complex, involving a number of agencies, including the affected state's government, international organisations (IOs), international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private volunteer organisations (PVOs). Depending on the degree of degradation to the affected country's coping mechanisms and the degree of humanitarian coordination, it may be necessary for the commander to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with individual centres of

humanitarian coordination and other assisting country's military forces.

The Impact of Humanitarian Crises

4.06 Humanitarian crises, regardless of the cause, generate humanitarian needs that often exceed the local capacity to address. These can be classified into immediate and long-term needs.

Immediate Needs

4.07 Immediate needs are those required to save lives and mitigate direct human suffering, including:

- assessment of needs
- safety of the affected population
- search and rescue (SAR)
- potable water, sanitation and hygiene
- food
- shelter
- medical treatment and supplies
- security
- communication
- emotional support.

Long-term or Recovery Needs

4.08 Long-term or recovery needs are those required to restore some sense of normalcy, including:

- rehabilitation
- reconstruction
- development of future security plans.

4.09 **Timeline and Scale.** The timeline and scale of health, nutritional and infrastructure problems that normally occur after the physical impact of a crisis are important factors in assessing the most appropriate

response. In most cases, donors provide humanitarian action through civilian agencies. Their experience, cost-effectiveness, reliability and ability to connect relief to development are superior to that of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as this is their sole focus.

Sharing the Operational Space

4.10 Dialogue is essential in any situation – whether military and humanitarian agencies closely cooperate or just coexist in the same operational space. The key elements of humanitarian civil–military interaction are information sharing, task division and joint planning. These key elements can be scaled up and down according to the context.

Information Sharing

4.11 The sharing of information between military and humanitarian agencies should take place immediately. In natural disasters in peacetime, information sharing creates a common situational awareness to guide planning and decision-making, including on the use of available military assets to support humanitarian activities. In complex emergencies, information sharing is limited to aspects relevant for the safety and security of humanitarian workers and protection of civilians.

4.12 Under no circumstances will humanitarian agencies disclose information to any group involved in an ongoing armed conflict that may give tactical advantage over another group or put civilians at risk. To do so would be a direct violation of humanitarian



Figure 4-1: Experience has shown that a military response to humanitarian crises is one part of the overall crisis response.

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principles and may put humanitarian workers and affected civilians in danger.

4.13 **De-confliction Mechanism.** A best practice from recent complex emergencies is the early establishment of a de-confliction mechanism. For example, a coordination system to share information necessary to ensure the safety of humanitarian convoys and premises.

Task Division

4.14 The division of tasks between military and humanitarian agencies mostly happens during natural disasters. Humanitarian priorities (locations and clusters/ areas of work) are identified through the humanitarian coordination mechanisms. This includes identifying potential or actual capacity gaps and the critical window of delivery of goods and services. All related military activities are ideally coordinated within this system, aligned with the identified priorities, and complementing humanitarian activities. In complex emergencies, task division may not be applicable unless they are immediately life saving, in particular in the context of protection of civilians.

Joint Planning

4.15 Joint planning again depends on the context of the humanitarian crisis. In some natural disasters, like Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, military and humanitarian agencies co-located in a joint operation centre and military staff officers participated in the humanitarian coordination mechanisms. In complex emergencies, joint planning is more applicable in terms of security measures, armed escorts, protection of civilians or de-confliction mechanisms.

Different Planning Approaches

4.16 A distinction between military and civilian agencies is their different approaches to planning. The NZDF employs assumption-based planning, while emergency services and the humanitarian aid sector

conduct needs-based assessments. The difference between these two approaches is that the NZDF will conduct planning based on known information and make documented assumptions about information that is not yet available, with these assumptions validated as the planning continues. The assumption-based approach allows the NZDF to have a plan in place faster than the needs-based approach.

4.17 Prior to any operation being executed, planning with other organisations occurs at the strategic and operational levels to achieve high-level coordination, particularly with the United Nations (UN). Planning with IOs, NGOs and PVOs is much more likely to occur at the operational and tactical levels to achieve in-theatre support.

4.18 Humanitarian operations are inherently complex by their nature. Detailed knowledge and careful consideration of the capability of disparate contributors is essential. Plans should be developed through early and close consultation with operational commanders and contributors likely to be involved in the operation.

4.19 Preparedness and contingency planning are also part of the aid community's crisis management cycle. However, once a crisis occurs, the aid community focuses heavily on needs-based programming and responses. This means that while some programme activities are known prior to the event, the response will always be contextualised by the current situation, the assessed needs of affected populations and the complementarity between agencies and responding government entities. As a result, needs-based planning is a longer process.

4.20 Experience has shown that improved mutual understanding of the roles, mandates, principles, cultures and objectives of the various civil-military stakeholders enhances constructive engagement, dialogue and communication both prior to and during deployments. With this dialogue and communication comes greater opportunity to achieve maximum benefits for people and nations affected by disasters and conflict.

A Multi-agency Approach

4.21 The New Zealand all-of-government response requires a multi-agency, multilateral and multinational collaboration promoting mutual understanding to planning, the use of common terminology and respect for the nuances of the complex operational environment.

4.22 The NZDF approach to planning is inclusive within a comprehensive framework as part of an all-of-government and other organisations response to any humanitarian operation. Therefore, the contribution to humanitarian operations must be planned with due regard to the Government's national strategic end-state, and specifically contribute to achieving the military strategic end-state. Expert liaison officers should be deployed to ensure that the lead agency, the NZDF and the other humanitarian actors objectives are well known and mutually compatible.

4.23 **Effective Interagency Planning.** To facilitate effective interagency planning, a proper cultural competence is needed by all the participants, not just about local culture, but also about the differences between the institutional culture of the military and the civilian organisations. Thus, a culture is required among those wishing to prevent or resolve crises that predispose individuals and organisations to: work proactively; share their understanding of situations; base planning and activities on the basis of desired outcomes in the short, medium, and long-term; and collaborate wherever feasible.

4.24 Planning is not an activity carried out in isolation; it is based, and judged, on the achievement of progress towards agreed objectives. In doing so it must be iterative by carrying out continuous analysis of the operational environment and assessment of the actual consequences of activity. In order for this to be conducted where feasible with other parties, understanding is required of each others' values, capabilities, limitations, and cultures. To the extent possible, measures of effectiveness concerning the progress of the operation should be developed jointly by civilians and the military, identifying indicators relevant

for both; the shared situational awareness should extend to the assessment of the progress of the operation and the degree of achievement of measures of effectiveness.

4.25 **The Operational Environment.** The nature of the operational environment impacts on the conduct of humanitarian operations. Important elements of the operational environment considered during planning and execution include:

- the type of disaster or complex emergency, including the speed of onset and the underlying causes
- the prevailing security environment in the affected country
- the system of international relief already at work
- the all-of-government and/or multinational approach and commitment to the crisis
- the types of operational activities to be conducted within the operational environment.

Humanitarian Needs Assessment

Early Assessment

4.26 Early assessment of the nature and extent of a humanitarian crisis and the type of humanitarian action required is an essential element of any response. The overall purpose of an assessment is to provide information and to make recommendations that will enable timely decisions on appropriate response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. The following types of information need to be collected.

- **Situational Information.** Situational information details the magnitude of the crisis and the extent of its impact on both the population and the infrastructure of society, the environment and expectations of future events.
- **Needs Information.** Needs information identifies resources and services for immediate crisis measures to save and sustain the lives of the affected population.

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- **Planning Information.** Planning information on local capacities, the operations of local crisis management authorities, and the predicted international response of humanitarian agencies is required to assess potential courses of action.

Assessment Factors

4.27 Several factors contribute to the design of a successful and accurate assessment, including, identifying the user, identifying the information needed, timing of the assessment, and use of recognised terminology. Key amongst these factors are:

- distinguishing between emergency and chronic needs
- assessing need and vulnerabilities in relation to capacities.

4.28 **Distinguishing Between Emergency and Chronic Needs.** Virtually all developing countries have longstanding chronic needs in most, if not all, sectors. Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the location and what is occurring as a result of the crisis, so that the relief effort can be directed to those most in need.

4.29 **Assessing Needs and Vulnerabilities in Relation to Capacities.** Needs are immediate requirements for survival. Vulnerabilities are potential areas for harm and include factors that increase the risks to the affected population. Needs are assessed after a crisis has occurred, whereas vulnerabilities can be assessed both before and during a crisis. Needs are expressed in terms of requirements such as food, water and shelter, while vulnerabilities are expressed in terms of their origins such as physical, material, social, organisational or motivational/attitudinal. The solution to needs and vulnerabilities is capacities. Capacities are means and resources that can be mobilised by the affected population to meet their own needs and reduce vulnerability.

4.30 Assessing vulnerabilities and capacities, as well as needs, provides a way of:

- preventing a widening of the emergency in which today's vulnerabilities become tomorrow's needs

- targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups
- affecting a sustainable recovery based on local resources and institutions.

The Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment

4.31 The immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster is a critical period of time when the humanitarian and donor communities need to make key decisions on how to best support the affected country or region and its populations. However, during that brief period, limited comprehensive information on the disaster's impact, scale and severity is typically available to support the identification of strategic humanitarian priorities. In addition, humanitarian actors often begin gathering information independently and with little consolidation, resulting in an incomplete and sometimes conflicting picture of humanitarian needs. The Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) seeks to address this problem, and lay down the foundations for a stronger and better coordinated assessment culture during crises.

4.32 The MIRA, designed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), has been developed from a wealth of experience and knowledge from UN agencies, NGOs, donor, and academic institutions. It reflects a common vision of what is both methodologically sound and realistically feasible in the highly challenging environment in which humanitarian needs assessments occur.

4.33 The MIRA is designed to identify strategic humanitarian priorities during the first weeks following an emergency. The main benefit of the MIRA is the elaboration, from the onset of the crisis, of a concerted operational picture based on the best information available from primary and secondary sources.

4.34 This picture is expressed through two key products: a Preliminary Scenario Definition, issued 72 hours after crisis onset, and a MIRA Report, released after two weeks.

4.35 For further guidance see the IASC, Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment publication.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Consolidated Appeal Process

4.36 Major humanitarian crises require many aid agencies on the ground. To operate effectively, the agencies' independence is critical. However, they also need to coordinate efforts to avoid gaps and duplication, focus on urgent needs, strategically address the crisis and work towards longer-term recovery. A common strategic approach is essential for an efficient response that builds on each organisation's strengths.

4.37 The Consolidated Appeal Process helps to achieve this. It brings aid organisations together to jointly plan, coordinate, implement, and monitor their response to disasters and complex emergencies. It also allows them to appeal for funds cohesively, not competitively. This means people in need can be supported in a timely, predictable and accountable way.

4.38 A consolidated appeal is the humanitarian systems, concerted action plan for large-scale crises that require response from more than one agency. Despite its name, it is only secondarily about fundraising. This action plan includes a needs analysis; a strategic plan (with clear measurable objectives, indicators, and monitoring); and cluster response plans including detailed operational planning and projects.

The Humanitarian Relief Process

4.39 Military planners must understand the humanitarian relief process used by all parties involved in the humanitarian crisis. The overarching relief process, as shown in Figure 4-2, shows the continuous, cyclic nature of the relief process.

4.40 Critical to this process is information sharing among all the participants. Details of the relief process are outlined in the following points:




Figure 4-2: The Overarching Humanitarian Relief Process.

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- **Crisis.** The onset of a disaster or complex humanitarian emergency.
- **Needs.** Regardless of the cause of the crisis, humanitarian needs that exceed local capacity are generated. These needs are classified as immediate and long-term needs.
- **Needs Assessments.** The affected nation and/or agencies (if still functioning), and various humanitarian community organisations conduct needs assessments on the extent of the crisis and needs/requirements. Assessments also include determining the capabilities and resources of various relief organisations, including foreign military forces, if they are part of the humanitarian effort.
- **Needs Analysis.** The essential component of the relief process. Needs assessments may be incomplete, outdated or contradictory. Needs assessments and capabilities are analysed to help update and resolve differences, determine outstanding (unfilled) needs/requirements and reasonably anticipate future needs.
- **Appeals and Requests for Assistance.** Outstanding needs/requirements are converted into appeals to the international community and donors, and to specific requests for assistance (RFA). Foreign military forces may receive RFAs to provide immediate life-saving supplies, transportation or security. The fulfilment of RFAs by military forces is often subject to the policies of the assisting state providing foreign military forces.
- **Relief/Donor Action.** Humanitarian agencies, donors, foreign military forces provide relief based on their ability to respond to appeals and RFAs. Assisting states, regional organisations and the UN may make available immediate funds and other resources very early in the relief cycle. The Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) administers a Central Emergency Response Fund to provide immediate funding to support life-saving activities.
- **The Relief Cycle.** The relief cycle is repeated as needs assessments are updated, requirements refined, additional RFAs made and humanitarian actions continue.

- **Information Sharing.** This is essential to maximise unity of effort among the affected and assisting states and all humanitarian actors.

New Zealand Defence Force Planning

4.41 The NZDF planning for all types of humanitarian operations is the same as that for other military operations. Planning for disaster relief operations is supported by a number of New Zealand Government plans, NZDF policies and joint service plans. Where humanitarian action is required to support international crises, a comprehensive multi-agency planned and coordinated approach is essential. The strategic goals or operating procedures of all concerned will not be identical or even compatible. Collaboration and planning can contribute to success in a complex operational environment. This will better enable key organisations to orchestrate the total humanitarian effort.

4.42 The military planning environment is hierarchical. Government guidance to the NZDF informs strategic planning activities for the range of tasks that the NZDF may be required to undertake.

Levels of Planning

4.43 There are three levels of planning, each of which has different purposes, stakeholders, and processes. The planning levels coincide with the three levels of command and operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.⁷ They are illustrated in [Figure 4-3](#).

4.44 The planning process will involve a detailed situation assessment of the political, cultural, economic, military, geographical, security, environmental and health factors in the crisis area.

- **Strategic Level of Planning.** The strategic level of planning is divided into two levels:

⁷ See NZDDP-D *New Zealand Defence Doctrine (3rd Ed)* for more information.

- national strategic
- military strategic.

4.45 **National Strategic Level.** The national strategic level refers to the macro-level, political dimension of planning. Planning at this level mobilises the instruments of national power to meet the government’s objectives. It is concerned with political independence, national sovereignty and security, and the pursuit of wider national interests. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, articulated through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

4.46 **Military Strategic Level.** The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and for directing military effort. This includes outlining the military strategic end-state and a broad concept of how it will be achieved, in order to support the national

strategic end-state. This level is the domain of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), through Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF).

4.47 **Operational Level of Planning.** Campaigns and major operations are planned, orchestrated, and commanded at the operational level. This level links the military strategic level to the tactical level by translating military strategy into operational objectives, tasks, and end-states. Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) is responsible for operational-level planning within the NZDF, and is supported by the Joint Planning (J5) Branch, the Joint Operations (J3) Branch and the rest of Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ). This level of planning includes the preparation, deployment, conduct, sustainment, and recovery of force elements. Operational-level planning, informed by strategic guidance, includes both deliberate and immediate planning.



Figure 4-3: Levels of Planning.

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4.48 Operational-level plans provide guidance, direction and orders to tactical-level joint task forces for the planning and execution of operations. The NZDF uses the NZDF Operations Planning Process (NZDF OPP). See *NZDDP-5.0 Joint Operations Planning* for further guidance on the NZDF OPP. The NZDF OPP includes the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) as a tool to assist in decision-making and planning.

4.49 A humanitarian operation may generically have four phases, as described below:

- Phase 1 – Reconnaissance/Assessment/Survey.
- Phase 2 – Stabilisation of life-threatening situation.

- Phase 3 – Restoration of infrastructure sufficient to enable the affected country's coping capacities to assume full responsibility for the subsequent mitigation of the crisis effects.
- Phase 4 – Prepare for transition, withdrawal and assumption of tasks undertaken by the affected country and/or other humanitarian actors coping mechanisms.

4.50 The alignment of the key military actions with the generic humanitarian operations phases is outlined in [Figure 4-4](#).

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONAL PHASES	ACTIONS	MILITARY RESPONSE PHASES	ACTIONS
		Phase 0 Promote Resilience and Preparedness	National Emergency Management Plans from high-risk nations collated. Country support packages developed to support possible HADR tasks.
Reconnaissance/ Assessment/Survey		Phase 1 Reconnaissance/Activation/ Mobilisation	LOs deployed as necessary. Joint Reconnaissance Team (JRT) deploys and supports initial assessment, prepares conditions for arrival of immediate response teams. Mobilise/constitute a force.
Stabilisation	Stabilisation of life-threatening situations.	Phase 2 Deployment of Military Response	Deploy immediate response team; provide immediate assistance. Deploy main body. Civil–military coordination centre established (for domestic operations).
Restoration	Restoration of infrastructure sufficient to enable the affected country or local authority capacities to assume full responsibility for the subsequent mitigation of the crises effects.	Phase 3 Operate	Provide more comprehensive capabilities as part of an all-of-government (AOG) response. Sustain military contribution at the humanitarian operation. Third party logistics in support of NZDF elements. Augment the humanitarian operations supply lines of communication (LOC).
Transition	Prepare for transition, withdrawal and assumption of tasks undertaken by the affected country, local authority and/or other humanitarian actors, coping mechanisms.	Phase 4 Redeployment	Hand over/hand back task – civil authorities resume responsibility. Redeploy to New Zealand or return to base.

Figure 4-4: Military Phases to a Humanitarian Operation.

The Military Response Phases

4.51 **Military Phase 0: Promote Resilience and Preparedness.** The main effort during this phase is to influence national and international preparedness through participation in HADR conferences, working groups and training events. The military will seek to understand emergency response plans and likely tasks through participation in HADR conferences, working groups and training events.

4.52 **Military Phase 1: Reconnaissance/Activation/Mobilisation.** The principal activity (or main effort) is to gain an early, accurate appreciation of the humanitarian crisis or disaster. As a general rule, the military will seek to conduct this as a collaborative effort with the affected nation or local authority and use information gained to inform decision making. However, circumstances at the time may lead to military activation and mobilisation being initiated based on best available information, and a more complete reconnaissance and assessment being carried out some days later. The reconnaissance may be divided into three stages:

- **Immediate Reconnaissance.** This involves the rapid deployment of the JRT, including specialist personnel, to quickly gain a picture of the situation and conduct a disaster needs assessment (DNA) to identify those areas in most immediate need. This will most likely be conducted immediately following the disaster and may require military air assets.
- **Establish Liaison.** In theatre, liaison with the New Zealand High Commission or Embassy, local authorities, relevant crises management centres, other forces and/or IOs, PVOs and NGOs should be established at the earliest opportunity. NZDF staff from the deployed JRT may engage with key coordination centres, including the Onsite Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), the Multinational Force Coordination Centre (MNCC) and the Emergency Management Office once they are established.
- **Detailed Reconnaissance.** Although the military may not specifically conduct the detailed reconnaissance, it may assist with transporting the required other

government agencies (OGA) or NGO expertise into the JFAO. This reconnaissance may be conducted some hours or days after the disaster and is a more detailed assessment of the disaster relief requirement – it may include an assessment on key public infrastructure such as water, sanitation, energy, communications, transportation and critical facilities such as hospitals, ports, airfields, and fuel storage facilities.

4.53 **Military Phase 2: Deployment of Military Response.** The size and scope of capabilities to be deployed will flow from the reconnaissance and DNA. Given time imperatives, it is likely that military aircraft, if available, and providing suitable airfields remain operational, will be used to deploy immediate response groups and heavy lift may be conducted with sealift assets. Key tasks are outlined in the points below:

- the provision of appropriate military support to minimise loss of life or injury, and to provide for the welfare of the affected populace
- close liaison with the affected country or local authority to ensure unity of effort, coordinated response, and civil–military cooperation

4.54 **Military Phase 3: Operate.** Key features are outlined in the bullets below:

- the conduct of comprehensive humanitarian operations
- the provision of support to sustain the military contribution (and when directed, OGAs) deployed in Phase 2
- the duration of the military commitment will be influenced by the extent to which local authorities and community support systems have been disrupted, and will be decided by government
- as soon as local authorities and community support systems have been sufficiently restored, the military would commence transfer of responsibility in preparation for Phase 4
- if this phase is a protracted one, military staff rotations will occur in order to rest personnel and deploy in fresh people to ensure continuous engagement in the disaster relief operation.

4.55 **Military Phase 4: Redeployment.** This phase involves:

- the withdrawal and redeployment of the military back to home locations for reconstitution and reassignment to military operations
- the Government may decide that some niche military capabilities remain in the disaster area for an extended period in the event that OGA and NGO systems require extended military capability presence to ensure delivery of essential services.

4.56 **Tactical Level of Planning.** The tactical level is where a campaign or operation is actually executed. Planning at this level considers how to apply force elements, for example; in battles, engagements, and minor operations, to deliver the outcomes required by operational and strategic-level planners.

4.57 During a humanitarian operation, planning at the tactical level is usually conducted by the designated Joint Task Force Headquarters. This headquarters would normally deploy into the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) and its task would be to plan and coordinate tactical operations and as well as an array of activities to deliver the outcomes being sought. NZDF staff are expected to have a thorough understanding of the National Emergency Management architecture, the

Emergency Management Plan, and the agreed regional framework that underpins HADR efforts such as the Asia Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC MADRO).

4.58 See *NZDDP-5.0 Joint Operations Planning* for further guidance and also the NZDF approved *ADFP-5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

Factors That Influence Planning

4.59 The factors to be considered when planning humanitarian operations are numerous and situation dependent. However, there are a number of factors that tend to be common in all operations. The common factors are:

- terminology
- command and support arrangements with other agencies
- command and control
- collaborative planning
- a disaster needs assessment
- a joint reconnaissance team




Figure 4-5: The Joint Military Appreciation Process.

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- health threat and needs assessment
- liaison officers
- deployment considerations
- redeployment considerations
- a civil–military coordination centre
- information management
- media/public information systems
- situational awareness
- a common operation picture
- task transition and transfer
- assessment and assessment criteria
- rapid response
- funding and cost capture
- legal issues, including Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- limitation on health staff
- mortuary affairs
- communications networks.

4.60 For information on these planning factors see the *Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Aide-memoire* handbook.

Geospatial Support

4.61 Integral to military planning is an understanding of the environment, and a major contributor to this understanding is an awareness of the geospatial extent of the operation, the environmental impacts, and considerations in regard to the location.

4.62 Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand is the lead geospatial and imagery intelligence organisation in the NZDF, and provides geospatial intelligence from imagery and other sources that assists with the planning and conduct of operations. Geospatial intelligence is intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of

imagery and geospatial information about features and events, with reference to space and time.

4.63 Geospatial support for humanitarian operations should be available at a number of the operational stages as outlined below:

- **Before.** Geospatial data would be required to define the Joint Force Area of Operation (JFAO), any areas of responsibility in the JFAO, any excluded areas and for an overall understanding of the environment. For any environmental disaster, geospatial data would be essential in the understanding and modelling of the before, during and after of the inundation, fire, chemical or biological cloud etc.
- **During.** Geospatial data would be used to maintain the operational picture, monitor activities of participants, describe routes, access, egress, zones, etc. Geospatial support would be essential for subject matter specialists in civil–military coordination and liaison, logistics, engineering damage assessment, critical engineering support, imagery, and needs assessment.
- **After.** Any geospatial data collected would be of great benefit to the impacted state. It would assist in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and communities, the resettling or return of the population and could become the basis of planning for future disaster preparations.

Strategic Communication

4.64 Media interest in humanitarian crises may well be considerable, particularly during the initial emergency phase, and may well be responsible for government action in inducing military involvement. Media coverage can assist the humanitarian mission and support New Zealand national objectives. The importance of understanding the media is critical in anticipating its impact on the operation and planning.

4.65 Strategic communication will be a key facet in humanitarian operations. It is crucial that the all-of-government strategic communication message

maintains continuity through all agencies and that a coherent message is communicated to the media. Conflicting messages or information may cause scepticism and undermine public trust and support for the operation.

4.66 A Strategic Communication Action and Effects Plan should be implemented to promote national policies, aims and objectives of the operation. Explaining the intentions of the New Zealand Government and the NZDF helps gain public understanding and support for the operation and counters efforts to portray New Zealand and coalition partners' activities and intentions in a negative light.

4.67 At the tactical level, the commander and staff should expect and prepare for extensive media coverage during humanitarian operations. Visual media

in particular can significantly influence public opinion. A positive image is a force multiplier, therefore, media coverage of improved conditions will help sustain public support and also build morale.

Financial Issues

4.68 Funding for all-of government responses is guided by a combination of pre-existing arrangements and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and/or agreements reached at the time of the humanitarian crisis or disaster.

- **Cost Capture.** As a routine, the NZDF will engage cost capture mechanisms to complement subsequent cost apportionment decisions made by government.




Figure 4-6: Geospatial data can be especially useful in any environmental disaster.

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- **Sources of Funding.** The processes for timely expenditure must be resolved early in the planning phase.
- **Identify a Special Purpose Code.** A Special Purpose Code (SPC) needs to be assigned to the humanitarian operation.

Legal Issues

4.69 **Domestic Disasters.** A number of legal issues need to be considered in planning the response to a domestic disaster.

- **Rules of Conduct.** For a domestic crisis, a Rules of Conduct (ROC) card should be issued to provide guidance to NZDF personnel surrounding issues such as use of force, and, as to when they may, or may not, use force or detain civilians. The ROC card may also provide guidance on how to deal successfully with the public.

4.70 **Overseas Humanitarian Crises.** A number of legal issues need to be considered in planning the response to an overseas humanitarian crisis.

- **Status of Forces Agreement.** There may be no standing SOFA with the government of an affected nation or existing arrangements may not cover the requirement. In such circumstances, J09, HQJFNZ will seek to secure appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over deployed New Zealand military personnel and civilians. Given the time imperative, initial agreement will normally be achieved by an Exchange of Letters, or a similar instrument, with the government of the affected state. Wherever possible, these arrangements should be in place before deployment. If there are likely to be forward operating bases (FOB) or other logistic footprints in third countries, similar but separate arrangements will need to be made with each such country. The following issues should be addressed in any SOFA or, should the time available not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated, these issues should be included in the negotiated document, which may take the form of Memorandum of Arrangement (MOA), Military Technical/Implementing Arrangements and/or

exchanges of letters between governments (the list is not exhaustive):

- status of personnel, including privileges and immunities
 - jurisdictional arrangements
 - exemption from taxes and duties
 - exemption from immigration controls and import regulations
 - wearing of uniforms
 - issue and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence)
 - use of New Zealand vehicles and validity of New Zealand driving permits
 - freedom of movement in connection with conduct of humanitarian assistance operation
 - understanding on the resolution of claims and liabilities
 - investigation of accidents
- **Visas.** Notwithstanding the potential negotiations about the status of NZDF forces, which may take some time, the early identification of visa requirements is essential. The NZDF should seek MFAT guidance at the first indication of a potential humanitarian crisis.
 - **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** ROE are defined as the directions endorsed by the New Zealand Government and issued by commanders, which delineate the circumstances and limitations within which military force may be applied to achieve military objectives. Within the humanitarian environment in which civil–military cooperation occurs, understanding of the primacy of the legal framework is crucial to the conduct of operations.
 - Humanitarian operations may be conducted across the full spectrum of security environments. The distinctive characteristics of a disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operation are that they complement the efforts of a multitude of actors with the consent of the affected state. If it is necessary for NZDF personnel to be armed (weapons, riot control agents or batons), appropriate rules of engagement will be developed.

- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator or the UN authority requesting military and civil defence assets (MCDA) should review with MCDA commanders their mode of operation, how they are armed and their rules of engagement. See *NZDDP-06.1 Rules of Engagement* for further guidance.
- **Arrest or Detention.** It is not envisaged that NZDF military personnel will be engaged in arrest or detention activities. Exceptionally, where such a requirement arises, this will ordinarily be at the request of the host nation and legal authority will derive from host nation laws; NZDF military personnel are unlikely to have powers to do any more than assist local authorities.

Multinational Operations

4.71 Although New Zealand has the capability to operate unilaterally in the South Pacific, the potential scale of any necessary crisis response is such that any humanitarian action is likely to be part of a wider international relief effort. Multinational humanitarian operations are likely to occur in response to a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

4.72 This international effort may include other nations' military forces to varying degrees. Whilst potentially not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities to develop multinational support from and for other deployed forces, including affected state support, logistic support and Memoranda of Understanding. Neighbouring countries will have to be consulted over a range of issues such as flight rights or staging of NZDF force elements. All efforts on the ground should be coordinated with other contributors in order to generate the desired unity of effort in addressing the needs of the stricken state.

4.73 Recent lessons learned from Cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 highlighted the importance of the Multinational Coordination Centre (MCC) that enabled

international military assets to be integrated into the Philippines Humanitarian Action plan

4.74 The development of clearly defined command relationships for each coalition is an essential ingredient for a successful operation. Humanitarian operations provide unique and difficult challenges to coordination, which include language, translation, cross-cultural sensitivities, and national perspectives.

New Zealand Defence Force Conduct

Scope of the Military Role

4.75 Under all but exceptional circumstances, NZDF forces will be deployed in a supporting role and will not assume leadership of the overall response. This does not preclude NZDF forces supporting civil command and control or providing command and control infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude NZDF-deployed forces becoming a hub upon which other agencies become reliant, thereby creating dependency and making it more difficult to redeploy.

4.76 **Domestic Crisis.** The NZDF's Joint Task Force (JTF) will be assigned in Direct Support of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Controller. The Group Controller will lodge requests for assistance with the JTF Command (JTF Comd). The JTF Comd will also provide advice to the CDEM Group Controller with regard to the capabilities of his assigned force elements. This will help to ensure that his elements are employed to the best of their capabilities.

4.77 **Overseas Crisis.** The JTF Comd will consult with the senior MFAT representative to determine the effects required from military activities on the ground. Should circumstances require a substantial review of the envisaged operation, or if significant extra costs are likely to be incurred, then the JTF Comd should seek guidance from MFAT and HQJFNZ.



Figure 4-7: Lessons learned from Cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines emphasised the importance of the Multinational Force Coordination Centre.

Do No Harm

4.78 All involved in humanitarian interventions must be guided by the principal to do no harm. The JTF Comd, in consultation with MFAT, should ensure that activities will not exacerbate any existing conflict or tensions, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of assistance, nor undermine other response mechanisms.

Force Preparation

4.79 Humanitarian operations are not training events and untrained and inexperienced personnel may prove a liability. In gaining situational understanding, planners must consider pre-deployment training requirements to ensure personnel are prepared for their tasks. Lessons learned from past operations have identified training requirements specific to the tasks performed, including:

- building and area search procedures
- confined-space search procedures
- toxic industrial materials (TIM) identification, handling and decontamination procedures
- chainsaw operation
- debris removal techniques
- cultural awareness and basic language skills
- health and psychological awareness
- civil–military coordination
- first aid revision
- body handling procedures and cultural considerations
- liaison officer training
- legal considerations.

Deployment and Redeployment

4.80 Deployment is a discrete operation and needs to be planned accordingly. A plan needs to be developed that considers all necessary factors to safely, effectively and efficiently insert the elements

of the JTF into the theatre of operations. Appropriate air/sea platforms, possibly including civilian charter assets, will be required to deploy the JTF to and from the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). Given the time imperative, this is most likely to be strategic airlift, particularly when forces are deployed from New Zealand.

4.81 Redeployment at the end of humanitarian operation involves preparing forces and relocating them to a new destination – either to a new deployment area or more than likely back to home bases. Redeployment is a discrete operation and needs to be planned as such. A plan needs to be developed that considers all necessary factors to safely, effectively and efficiently withdraw the force from the theatre of operations. Redeployment is normally conducted in stages; the entire JTF usually will not redeploy in one short period.

Command and Control

4.82 **Domestic Crisis.** The operational command and control arrangements that should be utilised during a domestic disaster or humanitarian crisis are outlined in *NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control*. Military units deployed in support of disaster relief operations will usually do so as part of a wider national all-of-government contribution; however, the deployed military elements are tasked by the military and remain under military command.

4.83 COMJFNZ will appoint a JTF Comd and likely assign task elements (TEs) or task units (TUs) under Operational Control (OPCON) to the JTF Comd. However, some strategically important assets will always be held centrally (e.g. fixed wing aircraft, major maritime elements, and certain specialised land capabilities).

4.84 The JTF Comd will exercise OPCON by directing assigned TEs/TUs to accomplish specific tasks. The supported local authority may lodge requests for assistance directly to the JTF Comd. On occasion, a JTF Comd may allocate military TEs/TUs in direct support of OGAs/NGOs for specific tasks, and if so, the assigned TEs/TUs remain under military control; the

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supported agency has no authority to direct the military TEs/TUs.

4.85 COMJFNZ coordinates deployment of military resources in conjunction with the local authorities. At the tactical level, the JTFC coordinates the assignment of military TEs/TUs with the local authority area controller. Liaison Officers (LOs) are appointed at each level to facilitate coordination.

4.86 **Overseas Crisis.** The possible operational command and control arrangements for an NZDF force deployed to assist in an overseas humanitarian crisis are outlined in *NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control*. These command and control arrangements will vary depending upon whether the NZDF contribution is part of a wider New Zealand all-of-government effort or an NZDF contribution to a wider multinational effort.

Force Protection During Overseas Operations

4.87 Humanitarian operations bring with them a complex operational environment with an often unique spectrum of operational, environmental and occupational threats and hazards. Situational understanding and awareness of the threats to and vulnerabilities of the force are imperative to ensure the force is informed, trained, prepared and equipped to mitigate all threats. Force protection must include active, passive and recuperative measures to counter assessed threats. It is essential that all personal protective equipment is in good working order, appropriate to the task and personnel have been trained in its use. Force protection is ultimately a balance between risk and finite resources. The successful weighing and judgement of this balance by commanders, and early consideration of force protection issues are key to maintaining freedom of action of the force.



Figure 4-8: Cultural awareness and basic language skills are an important training requirement for New Zealand Defence Force personnel gaining situational understanding.




Figure 4-9: Command and Control Arrangements for a Domestic Disaster.

4.88 **Planning Considerations.** Humanitarian operations often present unique force protection planning considerations and are complicated by the presence of numerous elements that may be providers or recipients of force protection. Threats and hazards are unlikely to be uniform across the area of operation and may be subject to frequent change, therefore risk reduction and mitigation measures are unlikely to be uniform across a joint force. In multi-agency and multinational operations, coordination of force protection measures across nations is a key planning consideration.

4.89 In a deteriorating security situation, an increasing threat of violence against the force may also be accompanied by an increase in hazards. A breakdown in law and order could lead to criminality, public health and sanitation measures failing, and potentially dangerous industrial, agricultural or health facilities becoming neglected. As operations increase in intensity, the number of hazards and threats multiply,

requiring more significant force protection measures to deal with them.

4.90 **Hazardous Material.** Hazardous material such as raw sewerage, asbestos, and Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) must be expected, and commanders must ensure that personnel have access to suitable personal protective equipment. Additionally, awareness of the NZDF policy in regards to exposure to hazardous material must be understood to ensure that post-exposure screening is provided. Screening of civilians at military facilities using man-portable metal and explosive wands should be considered when a heightened security threat state exists.

Multi-agency Operations

4.91 While IOs, NGOs, and PVOs are employed in highly hazardous situations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge that a lack of security is

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preventing them from working effectively. Accordingly, commanders should appreciate the risk appetite of civilian partners, determine their commitment of resources and personnel, and address as an integral part of their planning the consequences of multi-agency support being periodically or conditionally unavailable.

Multinational Operations

4.92 Each contributing nation will determine how its forces are employed, normally based upon its own acceptable levels of risk. Risk mitigation should be addressed through the multinational operational chain of command.

Influence Activities

4.93 **Information Operations.** In humanitarian crisis situations there may be the potential for underlying tensions to be exacerbated by the intervention of New Zealand or other multinational forces. To reduce this risk it is essential to communicate and repeat a clear and simple intent for the NZDF JTF, which will ensure that the purpose of New Zealand's actions are understood by all involved, including:

- the stricken state government
- local population
- humanitarian actors
- JTF personnel.

4.94 The delivery of assistance must be, and be perceived to be, impartial. The impartial distribution of assistance, by needs criteria only, should enhance the perceived legitimacy of the deployed forces amongst the beneficiary population and humanitarian actors. Failure to act and be seen to act impartially is likely to impact adversely on the credibility, and perhaps security, of the wider relief effort.

4.95 **Media Operations.** It is important that the military contribution to a humanitarian crisis is presented in the context of a comprehensive New Zealand Government approach. Media handling in theatre should

emphasise that NZDF assets are present in support of other agencies responding to the relief effort. Media operations staff should consider the dignity of the stricken population at all times.

Security

4.96 **Disaster Relief Operations.** In accordance with the Oslo Guidelines, in principle, foreign military and civil defence personnel deploying on disaster relief operations will do so unarmed and in national uniforms. The overall responsibility for providing adequate security for authorised foreign MCDA support remains with the affected nation.

4.97 **Humanitarian Assistance Operations.** In accordance with the MCDA Guidelines, military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Security Coordinator. If military forces providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support missions must be armed, for their security and/or the safeguarding of their equipment, they will operate under strict rules of engagement based on the Law of Armed Conflict and will take account of advice and guidance from the Humanitarian Coordinator, Special Representative, or other appropriate UN official, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force or the violation of state sovereignty. Under no circumstances will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A separate security force may, however, be used to ensure security in areas where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance.

Assessment

4.98 The assessment of the response to a humanitarian crisis will help gauge the effectiveness of

the action in meeting the needs of affected persons. The assessment will also provide an underlying basis for quantifying progress in moving the continuum of effort forward. The commander and staff should continuously assess the current situation, evaluating progress against the desired operational end-state. Based on that assessment, commanders direct adjustments as required, ensuring that the operation remains focussed towards establishing the conditions that represent the end-state.

4.99 Methods for measuring the effectiveness of humanitarian operations are:

- measures of performance (MOP)
- measures of effectiveness (MOE)
- normality indicators.

Measures of Performance

4.100 MOP are criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOP confirm or deny that the task/s have been correctly performed. MOPs help us answer the question: are we doing things right?

Measures of Effectiveness

4.101 MOE are criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational environments that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end-state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOE help us answer the question: are we doing the right things and achieving success?

Key Term

Assessment

Assessment is the monitoring and evaluation of the progress of the campaign plan at the tactical level. Assessment requires a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events and indicates when the campaign is not progressing as envisioned.

Purpose and Characteristics of Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness

4.102 MOP and MOE help commanders determine when all or part of the mission has been accomplished and when different responsibilities can be transitioned to the affected nation, IOs, NGOs and/or PVOs. The criteria used will depend on the situation. On most occasions, the MOP and MOE will be determined and evaluated by the affected nation. If an effect cannot be measured directly, then indicators of achieving the effect are measured. Characteristics of MOP and MOE are outlined below.

- Measurable – they require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them.
- Discrete – each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. Excessive numbers of MOPs or MOEs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessment.
- Relevant – each MOP and MOE must be relevant to the result or outcome. The key is visualising the desired result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.
- Responsive – MOPs and MOEs must detect changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately and effectively.

4.103 The collection of both military and non-military data is required to ensure that credible and reliable data is available to make informed decisions in support of the operation. This data assists commanders, agency officials, and local authorities to gauge the progress of the operation.

4.104 MOE should be agreed with the affected nation, IOs, NGOs and PVOs and should be based on impact indicators that measure the change in the lives of the affected persons. MOE can help to put a humanitarian crisis into perspective by comparing pre-crisis and post-crisis states. MOE should also alert responding actors to emerging problems, informing decisions on when and where to shift effort or assets; whether more (or less) support is required and where relief efforts are in relation

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to crisis impacts. MOE can assist in establishing and assessing exit criteria and should be tied into operation effectiveness analysis. MOE must be used to determine the success or otherwise of the military contribution in support of national objectives.

Key Terms

Measures of Performance

Measures of performance (MOP) are the assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose. They are an evaluation of what actions have been completed, rather than simply what has been undertaken – are we doing things right?

Measures of Effectiveness

Measures of effectiveness (MOE) help answer the question – are we doing the right things? MOE provide the means for determining progress and successful achievement of the objective or end-state.

Normality Indicators

4.105 Normality indicators (NI) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society towards an improved quality of life. NI measures the level of development within the civil dimension. Awareness of NI assists in reducing the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities.

4.106 Possible NI may include:

- decrease in mortality/morbidity rates below a specified level
- increase in the provision of food, water and health support
- decrease in the incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level
- decrease in the number of dislocated civilians and an

increase in the number of persons returning to their homes

- increased security for non-combatants
- increased presence and capabilities of IOs, NGOs and PVOs
- reduction in the requirement for foreign military forces support
- increased economic growth and increased domestic and foreign investment
- increased capacity of the affected country to deal with the humanitarian crisis.

Standards

4.107 There is no single checklist measuring the effectiveness of humanitarian action. However, a set of minimum standards for the delivery of humanitarian action is detailed in the Sphere Project's *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Wherever possible, taking account of the operational environment, they should be used as the basis for the provision of support to the relief effort, particularly if involved in the direct delivery of aid to a stricken population.

Transition and Termination Strategy

4.108 Transition and termination strategies are often arbitrarily based on timelines imposed by the affected nation but may also be based on events, MOE or availability of resources. Needs assessments are important not just at the start of any operation but also for determining how and when contributing military assets are withdrawn. Transition and termination strategies should be determined according to how much value contributing military assets are currently adding to the relief effort, that is, how easily and successfully they could be replaced by civilian or domestic assets. Because a multitude of actors, civilian and military, are likely to be involved in any humanitarian response, it is important that the assessment and planning for transition and/or termination are shared at the strategic level in order that they can be seen in the wider context.

4.109 Transition in humanitarian operations involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions to other organisations. Transition may occur between components of a combined or joint task force or from the combined or joint task force to the affected nation, IOs, NGOs and/or PVOs. Transition and/or termination are initiated once operational objectives have been met and national authority has been issued.

4.110 A coherent transition and exit strategy should be formulated at an early stage of planning for all humanitarian operations. Transition of responsibilities may occur by function or by location of the operational force. If possible, the transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Transfer of responsibilities should only occur when a similar capability becomes operational or is no longer required. Planners should develop a series of criteria that are able to be measured to determine any transition plan. Criteria may include an acceptable drop in mortality rates, return of internally displaced peoples, restoration of local infrastructure or the establishment of operations of humanitarian aid agencies.

4.111 Mission transition planning will be continuous throughout the operation. A transition plan consists of the four phases outlined below:

- **Phase 1 – Assessment.** This phase identifies the functional tasks that are required to be transferred or terminated along with the organisations that agree to accept the transfer.
- **Phase 2 – Observation and Orientation.** This phase familiarises transfer organisations with the transfer tasks.

- **Phase 3 – Integration.** This phase increases the level of the affected country and/or relief organisations involvement while proportionally decreasing the level of involvement by the NZDF. Use of mutually agreed upon MOE to build support for functional tasks will help expedite this phase.
- **Phase 4 – Hand Over.** This phase consists of a complete transfer of tasks to either the affected Nation or relief organisations. Completion of this phase is the condition for transition to redeployment. An engagement plan for relief organisations supports all four phases of transition to encourage early commitment and participation.

4.112 **Incremental Transition.** While the four-phase transition model may be appropriate in most humanitarian operations, the operational environment may drive a more incremental transition. A gradual transition may occur with a shrinking military footprint across both geographical and humanitarian clusters.

4.113 When the affected country or an assisting country wishes to terminate humanitarian action or initial recovery assistance, it should provide appropriate notification. Upon such notification, the affected country and the assisting country should consult with each other, bearing in mind the impact of any such termination on crisis-affected communities. Any termination of humanitarian action must be assessed against its impact on the risk to human life and the ongoing crisis relief and recovery operations.

GLOSSARY

Terms and Definitions

The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents. The source documents are listed below.

AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions

ADFP- 04.1.1 Glossary

ADDP-3.20 Humanitarian Operations

JDP-0.01.1 United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database

JDP-3.52 Disaster Relief Operations

JP-01-2 Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and associated Terms

Laws New Zealand Defence

Affected Nation (ADDP-3.20 modified)

The nation upon whose territory persons or property is affected by a disaster or complex emergency.

Assisting Nation (ADDP-3.20 modified)

A nation providing disaster relief or initial recovery assistance, whether through civil or military components.

Complex Emergency (JDP-0-01.1)

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.

Crimes against Humanity (International Criminal Court) (Laws New Zealand Defence: Warfare)

A 'crime against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread and

systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- murder
- extermination
- enslavement
- deportation or forcible transfer of population
- imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law
- rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
- persecution against any identifiable group or collective on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law, in connection with any crime against humanity or any other crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
- enforced disappearance of persons
- the crime of apartheid
- other inhumane acts of a similar character, internationally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

Customary International Law (International Committee of the Red Cross)

Customary international law is made up of rules that come from 'a general practice accepted as law' and that exist independent of treaty law. Customary International Humanitarian Law is of crucial importance because it fills gaps left by treaty law and so strengthens the protection offered to victims.

Disaster (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)

A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community's

or society's ability to cope using its own resources. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins.

Disaster Relief (JDP-3-52)

The organised response to alleviate the results of a catastrophe.

Note: The aims are to save life and relieve suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope.

Ethnic Cleansing (ADDP-3.20)

The practice of an ethnic group in military control of a territory seeking to remove members of other ethnic groups through tactics intended to instil a sense of fear, including random or selective killings, sexual violence, and confiscation or destruction of property in order to create ethnically pure enclaves for members of their group.

Gender-based Violence (ADDP-3.20)

Violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, or other deprivations of liberty.

Genocide (International Criminal Court)

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- killing members of the group
- causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Humanitarian Access (ADDP-3.20)

Where protection is not available from national authorities or controlling non-state actors, vulnerable populations have a right to receive international protection and assistance from an impartial humanitarian relief operation. Such action is subject to the consent of the state or parties concerned and does not prescribe coercive measures in the event of refusal, however unwarranted.

Humanitarian Assistance (AAP-6)

As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.

Humanitarian Coordination (ADDP-3.20)

Approaches based on the belief that a coherent response to an emergency will maximise its benefits and minimise potential pitfalls. In each country, the coordination of UN humanitarian assistance is entrusted to the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), under the direction of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, is responsible for the coordination of a humanitarian response in the event of a crisis and carries out this role according to approved policies and structures set by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). This coordination involves developing common strategies with partners both within and outside the UN system, identifying overall humanitarian needs, developing a realistic plan of action, monitoring progress and adjusting programmes as necessary, convening coordination forums, mobilising resources, addressing common problems to humanitarian actors, and administering coordination mechanisms and tools.

Humanitarian Intervention (ADDP-3.20)

Coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government, with or without authorisation from the UN Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.

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Humanitarian Operation (AAP-6)

An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may proceed, parallel or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian organisations.

Human Rights (ADDP-3.20)

All human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person. The concept of human rights acknowledges that every single human being is entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Human rights are legally guaranteed by human rights law, which is expressed in treaties, customary international law, bodies of principles and other sources of law.

Human Security (ADDP-3.20)

A concept concerned with the security of individuals and promoting the protection of:

- individuals' physical safety
- economic and social wellbeing
- human dignity
- human rights
- fundamental freedoms.

Humanitarian Space (JDP-0-01.1)

The establishment and maintenance by deployed humanitarian agencies and organisations of a conducive humanitarian operating environment.

Internally Displaced Person (ADDP-3.20)

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

International Humanitarian Law (Laws New Zealand Defence: Warfare)

A body of rules derived from treaties and customary international law that govern the means and methods of armed conflict and provide for the protection of victims of armed conflict.

International Law (ADDP-3.20)

A body of laws regulating relations between states.

International Organisation (ADDP-3.20)

An intergovernmental, regional or global organisation governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterised, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

Last Resort (ADDP-3.20)

The principle that military force should only be relied upon once all viable non-military options for the prevention or peaceful resolution of a crisis have been reasonably exhausted, including negotiation, arbitration, appeal to international institutions, and economic sanctions.

Measures of Effectiveness (JP-1-02)

A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end-state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE.

Measures of Performance (JP-1-02)

A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP.

Military and Civil Defence Assets (ADDP-3.20)

MCDAs comprise relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organisations for international humanitarian assistance.

Normality Indicators (ADDP-3.20)

Normality indicators serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NI measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically.

Non-governmental Organisation (ADDP-3.20)

A private, not for profit, voluntary organisation with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organised at local, national, regional or international level.

Official Development Assistance (ADDP-3.20)

Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent (using a fixed 10 per cent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries ('bilateral ODA') and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions.

Protected Person (ADDP-3.20)

A person accorded protection under International Humanitarian Law, who takes no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (outside the fight) by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

Refugee (ADDP-3.20)

A person, who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or for reasons owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of, or the whole of their country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave their place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge outside their country of origin or nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail them of the protection of their country of origin or nationality.

Sexual Abuse (ADDP-3.20)

Actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, including inappropriate touching, by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

Sexual Violence (World Health Organisation)

Any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, or other act directed against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting.

State Responsibility (ADDP-3.20)

The principle that states bear primary responsibility for the functions of protecting the physical security and lives of their citizens and promoting their welfare. During complex emergencies occurring within their territories, this includes initiating, organising, coordinating, and implementing humanitarian assistance programmes. State responsibility also means that national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN, and are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.

State Sovereignty (ADDP-3.20)

A concept that signifies the legal identity of states in international law and provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are regarded as equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. Sovereignty is not a grant to states of unlimited power to do all that is not expressly forbidden by international law; rather, it entails the totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law.

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War Crimes (International Criminal Court)

Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, namely, any of the following acts, against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention, committed as part of a plan or policy or part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, including:

- wilful killing
- torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments
- wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
- extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly

- compelling a prisoner of war or other protected persons to serve in the forces of a hostile power
- wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected persons of the rights of fair and regular trial
- unlawful deportation or transfer of unlawful confinement, and taking of hostages.

War crimes also consist of many other serious violations of the international laws and customs applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts, including intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such, against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities or against civilian objects.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AC SCI	Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Intelligence	J3	Joint Operations Branch
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication	JFAO	Joint Force Area of Operations
ADF	Australian Defence Force	JMAP	Joint Military Appreciation Process
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	JRT	Joint Reconnaissance Team
CDEM	Civil Defence and Emergency Management	JTF	Joint Task Force
CDF	Chief of Defence Force	JTF Comd	Joint Task Force Commander
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation	JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
COA	Course of Action	LO	Liaison Officer
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand	LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
DESC	Domestic and External Security Coordination	MCC	Multinational Coordination Centre
DHA	Department of Human Affairs	MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
DNA	Disaster Needs Assessment	MCDEM	Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
DPMC	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	MFA	Minister of Foreign Affairs
ECC	Emergency Coordination Centre	MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre	MIRA	Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator	MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
ETF	Emergency Task Force	MOH	Ministry of Health
FOB	Forward Operating Bases	MOP	Measures of Performance
FRANZ	France, Australia and New Zealand	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief	MPI	Ministry of Primary Industries
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand	MPIA	Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	MSD	Ministry of Social Development
ICC	International Criminal Court	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty	NAB	National Assessment Bureau
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	NC	National Controller
IDG	International Development Group	NCDEMP	National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	NCMC	National Crisis Management Centre
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	NDRF	Non-governmental Organisation Disaster Forum
IHRL	International Human Rights Law	NGO	Non-government Organisation
IO	International Organisation	NI	Normality Indicators
IOM	International Organisation of Migration	NZDDP	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator	NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
		ODA	Official Development Assistance
		ODESC	Officials Domestic and External Security Coordination Committee

Glossary

OHCHR	Office of the High Commission for Human Rights	SCI	Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch
OPCOMD	Operational Command	SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
OPP	Operations Planning Process	SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea
OSOCC	On-site Operations Coordination Centre	SPC	Special Purpose Code
PVO	Private Volunteer Organisation	SRR	Search and Rescue Region
R2P	Responsibility to Protect	TE	Task Element
RCCNZ	Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand	TF	Task Force
RFA	Request for Assistance	TG	Task Group
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force	TIM	Toxic Industrial Materials
ROC	Rules of Conduct	TU	Task Unit
ROE	Rules of Engagement	UN	United Nations
RUF	Revolutionary United Front	UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
SAR	Search and Rescue		

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