



DEPARTMENT OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET  
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

# COVID-19 System Assurance Framework

Report on design, development,  
and implementation

20 April 2021

# COVID-19 System Assurance Framework

## Report on design, development, and implementation - April 2021

This report represents the end of the design and development phase of the System Assurance Framework, and the beginning of its' use as a tool for the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB) to use in their governance of the end-to-end COVID-19 response system.

This report has been created as a resource for DPMC's System Assurance and Continuous Improvement team to show where the SAF has come from, how it has developed, and where the evolution is heading from here. The System Assurance Framework will grow and advance the as the wider COVID-19 response matures, and we want to acknowledge that it has been designed with this ability to expand in mind. The critical next stages for development have been outlined in this report to support this evolution.

With two iterations of the System Assurance Framework having been presented to the CCB, we have tested and seen that the structure is fit for purpose, and that the new team have the skills and knowledge to continue to drive it forward.

Included in this report is;

- Commentary on the history of the SAF
- An overview of the design principles and mechanisms for use
- Signposts and methodology of how to progress the SAF onto the next stage
- Comment on expected resource needs for ongoing use of the SAF
- Observations on the state and maturity of the COVID-19 response and system which will need to be monitored and managed
- Examples of the two first instances of the SAF template which have been used to guide the CCB's discussion (content has been reduced).

# A system assurance framework is required to provide an end-to-end view of the system and improve confidence across it

## Our COVID-19 response has been big, fast, and collaborative

Aotearoa New Zealand's COVID-19 response has been internationally lauded as exemplary, showcasing the gains to be made by taking swift collective action towards a common goal. The strong messaging from Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to "go hard, and go early, and do everything we can to protect New Zealanders' health" inspired new levels of collaboration, innovation, and pace of change, and has seen the public service step into more agile and connected ways of working than ever before.

The scale, pace, and complexity of activity across the response has been unprecedented, and we have now come to a stage of the response where there is a need to collectively take stock of what we are doing, how well we are doing, and where we are going. Until now, there has not been a centralised end-to-end view of all activity across the response, and the risk of diverging pathways of activity, duplication, gaps, and confused accountabilities has been increasing.

There has been an increasingly urgent need to; map, clarify, coordinate, standardise, refine, and check in on progress against our bigger system-level goals, and to continue on with a shared appreciation of progress across the full response.

## The Minister for COVID-19 Response has requested assurance on performance and risk over this complex system

On 13 February 2021, the Minister for COVID-19 Response sent a letter to the leaders of key agencies associated with the COVID-19 Response portfolio (DPMC's COVID-19 Group; Ministry of Health; and Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment) describing his expectations of collective action on performance and risk to be coordinated through DPMC's COVID-19 Group.

The Minister described the need for agencies to work together on "the sharing of performance and risk information with the COVID-19 Group, so that assurance can be provided on a coordinated and systemic basis on the management of risk and performance". The Minister directed that this information be raised with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB) as the governing body with collective accountability for the success of the ongoing response, and who will be held responsible for "gaining visibility of, and providing assurance to myself and other Ministers on, the management of performance and risk in the system, as well as driving the medium-term strategy behind the response".

## DPMC COVID-19 Group has taken responsibility for designing the System Assurance Framework

A centralised and agreed view of how all the parts of the system work together was needed, and the System Assurance Framework (SAF) has been created to address this need.

The System Assurance and Continuous Improvement team of DPMC's COVID-19 Group have led the design and development of the SAF in consultation with agencies. The approach of "visibility and confidence" has been the driver of the collaborative approach with agencies, focusing on the opportunity for agencies to demonstrate their areas of accountability, progress, and risk, and in embracing a platform for identifying and escalating shared concerns.

The design principles, mechanisms, and findings are described in more detail later in this report, however, it should be noted here that the SAF has been designed to reflect the assumption that most agencies have existing risk, assurance, and performance monitoring functions, and that no new information should need to be created to populate the SAF. Whilst some of the information required for the SAF CCB will already exist and be reported on, there was no centralised platform for reporting on performance and risk, and maturity of assurance systems varies across agencies.

Presenting this information in the centralised SAF will give CEs (and by extension, Ministers) a complete view of the end-to-end response system, including allowing agencies visibility and transparency of work undertaken by other agencies so they can identify interdependencies and gaps, reduce duplication, better collaborate and provide support or information between agencies as required.



## Five design principles underpin the framework

The SAF has been designed to improve **visibility and confidence** across the COVID-19 response, and development has been guided by core design principles:



1. **System-wide visibility** – the SAF should provide a “home” for any activity across the five areas which broadly cover the essential activities within the end-to-end COVID-19 response, allowing visibility of governance, progress, risks, and issues. This view will support the identification of system-wide impacts, dependencies, and trends, and will ensure that adequate picture of the state of the response is available before major changes and strategic decisions are made. Transparency drives system performance through providing a lens for self-review, collaboration, cooperation, and informed decision-making.



2. **Clear accountability** – there is a clear line to the accountable agency or agencies that are ultimately responsible for actions, performance and decisions relating to each activity within the COVID-19 response. Identifying accountabilities across these activity areas will help to clarify what work is being done, to avoid duplication, and hold accountable agencies responsible for outcomes as a result of these activities.



3. **Confidence-based approach** – the SAF assumes that detailed risk and assurance activities are, and will continue to be, managed within individual agencies or groups. The SAF will provide the CCB with confidence that an activity or area is being actively managed by appropriate agencies and is working well through demonstrating high-level governance arrangements and progress, and through providing a platform for agencies to comment on risk or issues and to request assistance as needed.



4. **Focused on coordinating, not creating** – agencies are already tasked with a high-volume of response activity and reporting. The SAF should draw on information that already exists or should exist within agencies, and should be updated by exception only. The information provided to the SAF will be only to the level of detail required to provide confidence to the CCB that the area of work is claimed as an accountability, progressing, and working well.



5. **Steps up and drives forward** – providing the CCB with an overview of the foundational work programme of the response allows system-wide impacts, dependencies, and trends to become clearer in context, and drives the focus towards the bigger picture.

# The framework provides a high-level picture of what is happening across the response, how it is tracking, and where focus is needed

## System-level

As the group accountable for the overall success of the COVID-19 response, the CCB need to focus on the system-wide impacts, dependencies, and trends across all response activity, plus how the response moves into the medium-term strategy. The CCB are encouraged to; Look up to the system-level; look across the system at trends; focus in and look more deeply at big issues; and to strategically look ahead at where we are going.

## Response activity areas

The SAF provides a “home” for any activity across the five areas which broadly cover the essential activities within the end-to-end COVID-19 response:

- Border
- Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community
- Community protection
- Vaccination and immunisation
- Resurgence planning and response

**Accountability** - A lead reporting agency for each activity area takes the action to liaise with any other agencies with accountabilities to capture any changes, progress updates, risks, or issues which require escalation to the CCB for noting or action.


**Indicators of progress and performance** – are under development, and will represent meaningful progress on response activities.

**Activity updates** – on key milestones or changes in each activity area.

**Focus topics** – are raised by agencies or CCB members, or through analysis of SAF and response activities by the DPMC COVID-19 Group. Focus areas can include; high-risk areas or current issues, system-wide impacts, dependencies, and trends, or items requiring attention or action by the CCB. Focus topics can be escalated to in-depth agenda items, depending on the situation.

## System Assurance Framework

This framework gives the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB) and Ministers an overview of the New Zealand government's COVID-19 Response activity – highlighting aspects that are **performing well**, and aspects that **need attention**. The data in this framework is supplied by government agencies and accompanied by a scan of public sentiment and commentary from accountable Chief Executives. Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.



# The framework was developed in consultation with agencies


## Design and structure

In order to get end-to-end visibility and confidence of the COVID-19 response system, the SAF needed to provide a platform to:

- Describe key areas of activity in the end-to-end response to ensure a complete view
- Clarify areas of accountability and responsibility
- Present activity, outcomes and effectiveness using metrics
- Identify shared risks, issues, and interdependencies to be addressed
- State the risk and assurance frameworks that activity areas report through
- Determine system-level priorities and actions
- Identify opportunities to collaborate with and support other agencies
- Facilitate strategic discussions with adequate up-to-date context on system-wide performance and potential impacts.

To capture areas of activity across the response system the framework was organised by broad 'activity areas' that represent the end-to-end response system (not including recovery). The aim was to ensure that there was a logical "home" in the SAF for any current or future response activity in the response, to guide key discussions around governance and accountability, performance and progress, and to ensure that adequate and suitable risk and assurance controls are in place. Following consultation with agency representatives, iteration, and testing, these areas have been distilled into:

- Border
- Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community
- Community protection
- Vaccination and immunisation
- Resurgence planning and response



Each process area is reflected on a 'card'. Each card shows a number of key response activities undertaken as part of this process area. The activities listed are high-level and should be broad enough to allow more granular and detailed activities (sub-activities) to sit within an existing category. If a new activity doesn't sit within an existing activity area, a line can either be amended to include it or a new activity line can be created.

In addition to detailing the activities, the cards identify an accountable agency/agencies, stakeholders/partners with responsibilities and provide space for agencies to highlight key items, risks or issues that need to be raised to the CCB.

## Consultation and population of the foundation information for the SAF

Recognising that the initial population of the SAF would be a time-consuming task for agencies, we pre-populated the cards using the five design principles and existing knowledge and resources to identify key activities that sit within each card. The pre-populated cards were a starting point that agencies were welcomed to edit and add to as necessary.

Chief Executives from agencies represented on the CCB were then invited to nominate individuals to represent their agencies in a workshop hosted by DPMC. The purpose of the workshop was to consult and seek feedback on the design of the framework, the level of detail required, to clarify accountabilities, and seek agreement on an approach to populating a baseline for the framework as well as updating it on a regular basis going forward. Feedback from this workshop was incorporated into both the design and approach.

Following this workshop, we worked with agencies in a series of one-on-one meetings to assist them in populating the framework baseline.

The initial populated SAF and a high-level summary of focus areas was sent to the CCB for discussion on the 30<sup>th</sup> of March 2021, and the next instalment is due to be discussed at CCB on the 13<sup>th</sup> of April 2021. The SAF and an accompanying memorandum (prepared by DPMC) will be a standing item on the CCB fortnightly agenda. Once a satisfactory level of information has been populated into the SAF, the effort required by agencies each fortnight will reduce significantly as the framework is only updated when something changes.

## The SAF will continue to evolve

Varying levels of assurance maturity across agencies means that there are elements of the framework that will continue to evolve. The stages are outlined here in order of priority for addition, and the first three are discussed in further detail on the next slides:

**1. Framing strategic questions to CCB** – Going forward, the DPMC memorandum that accompanies the framework will include a series of questions that help CCB centre the discussion at a strategic level. These questions will be developed in consultation with the DPMC COVID-19 Policy Group.

**2. Development of confidence ratings** – Each activity line should have a confidence rating connected to it which is determined through a combination of agency self-reporting, cross-agency and DPMC assessment, and CCB opinion. Confidence ratings will be adjusted for the variability of inherent risk in some activities over others and are designed to reflect areas requiring CCB-level support to address.

**3. Development of performance indicators** – In order to give confidence on an area of activity there must be a way of capturing meaningful indicators of progress and performance. These indicators should be at an appropriately high level for the CCB and help to guide decision-making. An approach to developing a series of indicators that can be used to monitor progress and performance of activities has been developed, and will require work to gain political support and to develop the technical basis of indicators.

**4. Reflection of continuous improvements** – The SAF provides an ideal platform on which to present and share learnings and improvements across the system, both at the response activity level, and more widely in system-level learnings. The COVID-19 experience has been identified as a disruptive accelerator of progress across the world, fast-tracking our learnings of what can be accomplished. The opportunity to demonstrate collaborative improvements across Aotearoa will be supported by use of the SAF. Further development of how the SAF can be used to demonstrate continuous improvement has not been within the scope of the SAF design and establishment, however, the conditions have been set for this work to progress when ready.

In addition to the above, it is important to note that the SAF is a live document and will be continually iteratively developed to ensure it remains useful and evolves to meet the changing needs of the COVID-19 response (and by extension the CCB).

# The SAF connects response activity across the system, to support system-wide perspectives and a platform to ask the “big questions”

## 1. Framing strategic questions to CCB

DPMC have been asked by the Chair of the CCB to facilitate conversation at CCB on strategic policy questions as they apply to the findings of the SAF, beginning at the CCB meeting due to be held on the 13<sup>th</sup> of April 2021. As such, the memorandum that accompanies the SAF will now include a series of questions to structure strategic policy discussion at the CCB.

A series of ‘Big Questions’ identified during the development of the SAF will form the basis of these strategic policy prompts, alongside the DPMC COVID-19 Policy Group. Questions will be positioned for the CCB through assessment of SAF findings, and the connection to strategic and system-level direction required.

A sample of the ‘Big Questions’ is presented (right), and an exemplar of how they can be positioned in context for the CCB here (below);

### e.g. Off-shore certification

As identified in the SAF, there has been a recent trend of people arriving in New Zealand returning positive day 0/day 1 tests, despite having presented certification of pre-departure testing at the port of departure. This indicates a lowered confidence in the practice of pre-departure testing and off-shore compliance from some areas.

How should this experience with off-shore compliance in pre-departure testing inform our approach to off-shore certification of vaccination? How will risk and assurance be impacted and managed with changing border settings and increased global mobility?

## The Big Questions Vaccination and immunisation

How many **people** are we aiming to **vaccinate** to achieve **optimum immunity** in the **population**?

- What is optimum immunity considering the expected efficacy of the vaccine?
- What is optimum immunity considering at-risk populations and population mobility?
- Is the total number of people that need to be vaccinated based on assumptions of risk, location, etc?
- How is the residual risk of the non-immune population able to be managed, considering health service capacity, etc?
- Do we have local or international examples of assumed immunity over time, and across variants and strains? What is the plan for monitoring and managing this?
- What milestones are there in tracking towards optimum immunity? (i.e. beyond total number vaccinated)
- What are the dates that we are working to and how does this impact our public health settings?

What is the **plan** for the **sequencing** of vaccination?

- What approach and rationale has been applied to the sequencing of cohorts for vaccination?
- What identifiable cohorts of people (beyond border workers and frontline health staff) have been identified as having disproportionate risk from COVID-19/benefit from vaccination?
- What consultation has been undertaken with regard to this, and does this include representation from; Māori, at-risk populations, technical experts, and those involved in the operations, logistics, and delivery of the vaccination service?
- Are there alternative plans for sequencing based on different scenarios, and what will the impacts be?
- Is there an expected impact on business-as-usual for vaccine programmes (such as influenza), primary care, or workforce health and safety as a result of sequencing?

What effect will the **vaccination** have on New Zealand's **public health response** to COVID-19?

- What assumptions are being made about the correlates of protection from vaccination at a population level, and what is the residual risk to be managed?
- Would certification of vaccination from other countries be a satisfactory exemption criteria for MIQ? If so, how would this impact New Zealand's BoRA obligations to New Zealanders abroad, with diplomatic relationships, and more widely for immigration and tourism?
- Is exclusive use of the Pfizer vaccine sufficient in managing immunogenicity assumptions, and/or justifiable for the associated time-trade-off/cost of resource and materials required? (i.e. low temperature, double-dose course).
- What level of health service uplift and preparation are we able to achieve in response to residual risk at optimum vaccination coverage, (i.e. ICU beds).



# We need to have confidence in the whole system, and that it can be tested fairly

## 2. Development of confidence ratings

Each activity line should have a confidence rating connected to it which can be determined through a combination of expert judgement, agency self-reporting, cross-agency and DPMC assessment, and CCB opinion.

Confidence can be determined by; visibility of essential governance, assurance processes, and progress indicators, and by confidence in the management of risks and issues. Confidence ratings can be adjusted for the inherent variability of risk in some activities over others, for example, MIQ, and are designed to reflect areas requiring CCB-level support to address.

A confidence rating can be drawn from visibility of several high-level pieces of information; confirmation of **accountability and governance, processes and progress, assurance coverage, and risk and issues.**

The confidence rating produced will be used to signal to the CCB which areas of the cross-government response to COVID-19 require attention or more work.



# Meaningful indicators of progress and performance across the system can be developed

## 3. Development of performance and progress indicators

Meaningful indicators of progress aim to provide a snapshot of the system response to inform the CCB of how well each horizontal area of the system is working towards the system goal and strategy.

These indicators will be comprised of meaningful (and often composite) metrics, milestones, qualitative information, and insights. The intention isn't to have an indicator for each vertical risk area of the response, but to provide a set of indicators that encompass the entirety of the response, and to provide visibility and insight into the performance and direction of important areas of the response.

Ultimately, combining assurance and governance with meaningful indicators of progress will enable confidence rating to be attached to each area of the response, aiding in the SAF purpose of providing confidence and visibility in a clear and easy way.

It is recommended that progressing the development of indicators begins with endorsement from senior leaders in the response, giving the mandate to progress with the establishment of a piece of work which will require; a commitment to shared expectations of performance and progress across the system; technical expertise in performance measurement; data collection and consolidation from across many agencies; and readiness to present information on performance and progress.

### The recipe for a meaningful indicator

The recommended approach to developing a series of meaningful indicators is to begin with "top-down" thinking on what performance and progress across the response looks like, across a multitude of system-level domains. Many of the 'Big Questions' will provide guidance on meaningful indicators of performance and progress, for example;

#### e.g. Surveillance testing

What is the optimum sentinel testing regime to give confidence of non-transmission in the community? (e.g. Demographics, regionality, identification of test subjects).

First, a clear purpose of the activity area needs to be developed. This is a high-level strategic purpose which details the optimum future state of the activity. The purpose should not focus solely on a single vertical risk topic, but rather encompass multiple vertical risk topics in order to give a higher-level view of the topic.

For example, 'Surveillance testing' is designed to identify any and all instances of COVID-19 in the community. This work is undertaken using epidemiological methodology to systematically scan for disease in the population to the point that there is confidence that no disease can be identified. The scientific tools to determine this confidence will include a number of assumptions and data sources, including (but not limited to); higher-risk areas and demographics, correlation with influenza-like illness data, and environmental testing.

Secondly, it is recommended that key questions regarding benefits, costs, harms and avoided harms endured within the activity area are developed. These key questions aid in moulding the meaningful indicator as the indicator should be able to answer some, if not all, of the key questions described. This will enable the indicator to reflect the current state and progress of an area against the high-level strategic direction for the activity, either providing confidence or prompting development of the current state. Key questions may include:

- **How can we track whether this activity is working towards its purpose?**
- **Does it have a current state and ideal state, if so, how can we measure them?**
- **What are the unintended consequences that we are seeing or could anticipate?**
- **What are the benefits (and avoided harms) and costs (and potential harms) of this activity, and how can we measure that the benefits outweigh the costs?**

These questions enable the indicators of progress to provide context and insight into the direction and state of activity areas within the response. Through expert judgement, the CCB should be able to determine whether the current state and direction is appropriate, and whether the progress being made aligns with the system direction.

A single indicator of performance and progress will usually represent a composite metric which has been strategically aligned and presented in a way which gives an "at a glance" perspective on performance and progress. It will very rarely involve a single metric, and will never be presented without a target, denominator, or trend to contextualise the finding. For the above example, an indicator of the success of surveillance testing would likely involve presentation of a simple statement of confidence regarding existence of COVID-19 in the community, but will be the result of a robust epidemiological analysis of a number of data sets and insights which can be evidenced and repeated.

# The framework will require a dedicated function to support and maintain it, and will need ongoing investment from agencies

The SAF has already been demonstrating value as a platform for identifying activity across the end-to-end of the response, and in identifying critical areas of shared risk, system-wide impacts, dependencies, and trends, and in the need to clarify accountabilities. The SAF will be a valuable asset in maintaining visibility and improving confidence across the system, and the need to adequately resource the administration of the SAF from both DPMC and across agencies is essential.

Coordination across agencies, collation of material, preparation of the fortnightly update to CCB and development of the framework as needs evolve, will likely require the support of a dedicated function within the DPMC System Assurance and Continuous Improvement (SACI) team.


Core capabilities required to support the ongoing functioning and development of the SAF include:

- Coordination
- Writing and an understanding of the machinery of Government
- Data analytics and interpretation
- An understanding of risk and assurance functions
- Strategic policy (for the development of strategic questions for consideration at CCB)\*
- Oversight/team management

Assuming that updates to the SAF and reporting to CCB continue, we envisage 2-3 FTE would be required to maintain this function going forward. This function will continue to report to the Head of Continuous Improvement and System Assurance.

The investment of time and resource from contributing agencies will need to be prioritised, as the centralised coordination of activity, governance, performance, progress, and risk does not sit elsewhere in the response, and has been identified as an essential factor in the success of New Zealand's COVID-19 response.

\*Access to this capability is recommended, but this may be sought through contributions from existing teams within DPMC rather than dedicated resource – e.g. COVID-19 Policy may support the development of strategic questions for CCB.



# Through the design, development and establishment of the SAF, we have made initial observations on system performance

## Governance across the COVID-19 response is complex, confused, and requires review

Varying levels of governance across the response have created additional complexity in the development and continual updating of the SAF. For example, the Border Executive Board (BEB) is a legislated governance group that holds accountability for all border-related activity including activities undertaken by MoH, MBIE, Customs, MFAT, MPI and MoT. Other areas of the response system have not had comparable levels of governance identified.

## Agencies have organised their COVID-19 risk and assurance functions in a range of ways

Existing BAU practices and the level of contribution some agencies make in relation to others, means there is variability in the way agencies have organised their assurance functions. For example, some agencies have chosen to build their COVID-19 assurance functions into existing agency functions, others have arranged it based on subject matter and can be cross-agency, and for some areas of response activity, it was unclear. There is a risk of over-reliance on externally commissioned independent reviews in place of standard assurance functions and continuous improvement.

## There is a need for coordination of activities across the response

Due to the complex and inter-related nature of work across the response, as well as the pace at which activities change, there were few examples of artefacts available to describe response activity consolidated at either the agency or cross-agency activity level. It is suggested that the CCB, and each layer of accountability and responsibility below CCB would benefit greatly by being able to see the portfolio of work under their care, and how it fits in the response.

## There is a sense of fatigue and frustration with change across the response

A consistent theme throughout the development of the SAF was that agencies are tired of the ongoing requests for information and change. There was understandable resistance to add more governance and reporting requirements on top of a system which has experienced significant and ongoing upheaval, and which continues to experience heavy workloads. In our interactions with agencies, we heard many comments about duplication of effort in reporting, yet visibility of key pieces of information was often difficult to gain. It has remained front of mind throughout the development of the SAF that the impact on agencies needs to be considered and minimised.

## The framework has successfully helped to identify and articulate system-level trends and topics to be noted and discussed at CCB level

In its first presentation to the CCB (30 March 2021), the framework supported the identification and articulation of the following system-level trends for noting by the CCB:

- Understanding and managing demand and supply for MIQ
- Operationalising the vaccine roll-out, and the risks and impacts associated with the known and unknown complexities
- Impacts and limitations of vaccination as a public health measure, and communications around these
- The public service and health delivery workforces are under pressure, fatigued, and have minimal capacity to scale up if needed.


The framework also identified two key areas that required further discussion at CCB level:

- Settings and preparations for border reopening, and impact on the response business-as-usual
- Quarantine-free travel impact on risk and operations

Border settings and quarantine-free travel were added as agenda items and were discussed during the meeting. The CCB commented that the level of detail and format it was presented in was helpful in framing strategic conversations and presenting a system-wide view of the response across agencies.

# Appendices

Presentation title | 1



# Appendix A: System Assurance Framework update provided to CCB (30 March 2021)

The below is the first SAF update that was provided to the CCB for discussion. The framework will continue to be refined as an iterative process depending on the level of information required by CCB.

Macro system-level impacts and implications				
Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). These considerations are essential to the success of the COVID-19 response, yet do not apply to specific activities or processes, and are beyond the mandate of any one agency or Ministerial portfolio. They require collaboration to monitor and manage, and success or failure on any one area will have implications beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications (below), in every System Assurance Framework discussion.				
Treaty of Waitangi			Economic and financial impacts	
Workforce implications			Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts	
Impact on BAU and other priorities			Diplomatic and international relations, and international insights	
Public confidence and social licence			Communications, data and privacy	
Inter-agency ways of working			Strategic direction and innovation	
1. Border	2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine, and return to the community	3. Community protection	4. Vaccination and immunisation	5 Resurgence planning and response
<i>All activity related to defending the border, including; planning for and travel to New Zealand, and border and customs activity.</i>	<i>Individuals are required to stay in managed isolation or quarantine facilities. During this time, people are tested, monitored and unable to leave the facility until a negative test has been produced.</i>	<i>Community protection and surveillance includes measures such as symptomatic and sentinel testing, use of the COVID-19 Tracer app, and alert level requirements that ensure the safety of the general public.</i>	<i>The programme of work undertaken to promote protection from the effects of COVID-19 through vaccination.</i>	<i>When a case is identified outside of the managed isolation or quarantine environment, a series of investigations and response activities occur to identify, contain and stamp out the chain of transmission.</i>

# System Assurance Framework – Focus Areas

## System-level trends and focus areas for CCB

- Settings and preparations for border reopening, and impact on the response BAU
- Quarantine-free travel impact on risk and operations
- Demand and supply for MIQ
- Vaccine operations
- Impacts and limitations of vaccination as a public health measure
- The public service and health delivery workforces are under pressure, fatigued, and have minimal capacity to scale up if needed

## For CCB to apply to each cell

Who is accountable?	Who is involved?
What needs to happen?	Who can help?
Actions?	

## Macro system-level impacts and implications

## System Overview of Response Activity - critical indicators

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB).

The following considerations are applied to all activity within the SAF

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

1. Border	2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine, and return to the community	3. Community protection	4. Vaccination and immunisation	5. Resurgence planning and response
<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>
<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>
<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>
<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>

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1. Border

## 1. Border

**Description:**

All activity related to defending the border, including; planning for and travel to New Zealand, and border and customs activity.

**Macro system-level impacts and implications:**

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

**Lead Agency:**

Border Executive Board (BEB)

**Accountable Agencies:**

Border Executive Board (Customs, MBIE (MIQ and INZ), MFAT, MoH, MoT, MPI)

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**


DPMC  
Aviation and maritime sector organisations (approx. 300)  
District Health Boards including Public Health Units  
WorkSafe

What activities within this area are you aware of?	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
<p>All activity within the end-end border process. Includes aviation and maritime, and passengers, crew and border workers. Commences prior to travel and concludes after any MIQ requirements met (note MIQ is a separate sheet)</p> <p>Activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre-departure testing</li> <li>• Quarantine-free travel</li> <li>• Border workforce – testing</li> <li>• Border workforce – vaccination and vaccination requirements</li> <li>• Border workforce - vaccination of workers and household contacts</li> <li>• Development of health travel passes</li> <li>• Maintenance of physical distancing and use of PPE</li> <li>• Arrival processing (including health assessment, Customs, Immigration and MPI processing)</li> <li>• Specific requirements on organisations, crew and border workers (e.g. testing; vaccination; infection, prevention and control)</li> <li>• Additional international health measures which are used to inform WHO. (WHO provides transparency around the additional measures provided around the world.</li> </ul>		

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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**2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community**

**2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community**

**Description:**

Individuals are required to stay in managed isolation or quarantine facilities. During this time, people are tested, monitored and unable to leave the facility until a negative test has been produced.

**Macro system-level impacts and implications:**

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

**Lead Agency:**

Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment

**Accountable Agencies:**

MBIE (MIQ)

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**

MoH (IPC Standards)	Police
NZDF	Third party providers, e.g. hotels,
DHBs	security, transport
AvSec	

What activities within this area are you aware of?

What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?

Key items to be raised to CCB

*(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)*

Activities include:

- Transmission prevention
- Length of stay in managed isolation or quarantine
- Place and conditions of stay
- Management of post-infection and safety
- Post-managed isolation testing, screening, conditions or limitations
- Business continuity and administration
- Day 0, Day 3, Day 12 testing

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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3. Community protection

### 3. Community protection

**Description:**

Community protection and surveillance includes measures such as symptomatic and sentinel testing, vaccines, use of the COVID-19 Tracer app, and alert level requirements that ensure the safety of the general public.

**Macro system-level impacts and implications:**

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

**Lead Agency:**

Ministry of Health

**Accountable Agencies:**

MoH  
 Border Executive Board (Customs, MBIE (MIQ and INZ), MFAT, MoH, MoT, MPI)  
 DPMC  
 Customs

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**

MBIE (MIQ)

What activities within this area are you aware of?	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
Activities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public health communications</li> <li>Symptomatic testing and influenza-like illness (ILI)</li> <li>Sentinel testing</li> <li>Environmental controls and testing</li> <li>COVID-19 Tracer App</li> <li>Border workforce testing database</li> <li>Centralisation of the supply of PPE to the health and disability sector</li> <li>Centralised coordination of laboratory testing, and the supply of laboratory consumables</li> </ul>		

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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**4. Vaccination and immunisation**

**4. Vaccination and immunisation**

**Description:**

The programme of work undertaken to promote protection from the effects of COVID-19 through vaccination. Vaccination and immunisation includes measures such as product preference, supply agreements, distribution and storage of the vaccine within New Zealand, workforce training and management, data collection and application.

**Macro system-level impacts and implications:**

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

**Lead Agency:**

Ministry of Health

**Accountable Agencies:**

MoH

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**

MBIE (MIQ) for MIQ workforce

MoJ

MoT

MPI

MoH

BEB/Customs

**What activities within this area are you aware of?**

Activities include:

- Vaccine procurement
- Immunisation strategy and sequencing
- Distribution and administration of vaccine
- Post vaccination
- Design of rollout
- Operation of rollout

**What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?**

**Key items to be raised to CCB**

*(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)*

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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**5. Resurgence planning and response**

## 5. Resurgence planning and response

**Description:**

When a case is identified outside of the managed isolation or quarantine environment, a series of investigations and response activities occur to identify, contain and stamp out the chain of transmission.

**Macro system-level impacts and implications:**

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB). The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

**Lead Agency:**

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

**Accountable Agencies:**

MoH  
DPMC  
MBIE

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**

MoJ  
MSD  
DPMC (SACI)

**What activities within this area are you aware of?**

Activities include:

- Case identification and confirmation
- Contact tracing
- Case and contact management
- Source investigation and genome sequencing
- Transfer to quarantine or alternative arrangements
- Communications
- Alert level changes and supports
- Resurgence workforce
- Clearance to life restrictions
- Review of the response and incorporations of learnings
- Work in train for national capacity building for SOP and Contact Tracing
- Review of the National Resurgence Response Plan
- Development of the quarantine-free travel response framework and implementation plan

**What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?**

**Key items to be raised to CCB**

*(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)*

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

## Appendix B: System Assurance Framework update provided to CCB (13 April 2021)

The below is the second SAF update that was provided to the CCB for discussion. The framework will continue to be refined as an iterative process depending on the level of information required by CCB.

### Macro system-level impacts and implications

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB).

These considerations are essential to the success of the COVID-19 response, yet do not apply to specific activities or processes, and are beyond the mandate of any one agency or Ministerial portfolio. They require collaboration to monitor and manage, and success or failure on any one area will have implications beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. The CCB is asked to consider the macro system-level impacts and implications (below), in every System Assurance Framework discussion.

Treaty of Waitangi	Economic and financial impacts
Workforce implications	Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
Impact on BAU and other priorities	Diplomatic and international relations, and international insights
Public confidence and social licence	Communications, data and privacy
Inter-agency ways of working	Strategic direction and innovation

1. Border	2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine, and return to the community	3. Community protection	4. Vaccination and immunisation	5. Resurgence planning and response
<i>All activity related to defending the border, including; planning for and travel to New Zealand, and border and customs activity.</i>	<i>Individuals are required to stay in managed isolation or quarantine facilities. During this time, people are tested, monitored and unable to leave the facility until a negative test has been produced.</i>	<i>Community protection and surveillance includes measures such as symptomatic and sentinel testing, use of the COVID-19 Tracer app, and alert level requirements that ensure the safety of the general public.</i>	<i>The programme of work undertaken to promote protection from the effects of COVID-19 through vaccination.</i>	<i>When a case is identified outside of the managed isolation or quarantine environment, a series of investigations and response activities occur to identify, contain and stamp out the chain of transmission.</i>

# System Assurance Framework – Focus Areas

## System-level trends and focus areas for CCB

- **Clarity and completeness of governance structures and reporting lines**
- **Border workforce testing and vaccination**
- **Operationalising the vaccine roll-out, and the risks and impacts associated with the known and unknown complexities**
- **System-level considerations relating to travellers from high-risk countries**
- Settings and preparations for border reopening, and impact on the response business-as-usual
- Quarantine-free travel impact on risk and operations
- Understanding and managing demand and supply for MIQ
- Impacts and limitations of vaccination as a public health measure, and communications around these
- The public service and health delivery workforces are under pressure, fatigued, and have minimal capacity to scale up if needed.

## For CCB to apply to each cell

Who is accountable?	Who is involved?
What needs to happen?	Who can help?
Actions?	

## Macro system-level impacts and implications

## System Overview of Response Activity - critical indicators

Macro system-level impacts and implications involve all agencies and apply to every part of the response. These processes and assurances require inter-agency collaboration to manage, and accountability for outcomes sits with the COVID-19 Chief Executives Board (CCB).

The following considerations are applied to all activity within the SAF

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

1. Border	2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine, and return to the community	3. Community protection	4. Vaccination and immunisation	5. Resurgence planning and response
<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Governance</b>
<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>	<b>Progress</b>
<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk</b>
<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Issues</b>



## 1. Border

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

## 1. Border (page 1/2)

### Description:

All activity within the end-end border process. Includes aviation and maritime, and passengers, crew and border workers. Commences prior to travel and concludes after any MIQ requirements met (note MIQ is a separate sheet)

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
Impact on BAU and other priorities	The <b>speed at which advice is being developed and implemented</b> – there are still challenges with being able to operationalise policy decisions and ensuring that stakeholders are involved / informed.
Economic and financial impacts	The <b>financial sustainability of the border sector</b> , as third party revenue plummets and future trends are uncertain

**Agency/Group accountable for reporting:**  
Border Executive Board

**Agencies/Groups with accountabilities:**  
Customs, MBIE (MIQ and INZ), MFAT, MoH, MoT, MPI)

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**  
DPMC  
Aviation and maritime sector organisations (approx. 300)  
District Health Boards including Public Health Units  
WorkSafe

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB (changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)
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**NOTE:** All activity within Border is;  
**Governed by:** the Border Executive Board.

[placeholder for future ratings]	Eligibility to enter New Zealand	BEB Immigration NZ		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Booking managed isolation	BEB MBIE (MIQ)		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Pre-departure screening, testing and vaccination	BEB MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Exemptions and special circumstances to enter New Zealand	BEB		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Border Processing (Air)	BEB		

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1. Border

1. Border (page 2/2)

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Accountable agency	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Border Processing (Sea)	BEB		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Quarantine-free travel	BEB MFAT		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Border workforce – testing and screening	BEB		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Border workforce - vaccination of workers and household contacts	BEB MoH		

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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## 2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community

### 2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community (page 1/2)

**Description:**

Individuals are required to stay in managed isolation or quarantine facilities. During this time, people are tested, monitored and unable to leave the facility until a negative test has been produced.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
Workforce implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The health and safety of all staff working within the facilities is paramount, fatigue and resourcing continues to be a priority.</li> <li>Workforce retention and management of the multi-employer environment.</li> <li>Workforce risk deep dive has been completed to assist with the development of the MIQ workforce strategy.</li> </ul>
Public confidence and social licence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial themes and recommendations from the Assessment of MIQ review (commissioned by MBIE's CE) are being worked through to identify efficiencies within the MIQ system and identify opportunities for improvement.</li> </ul>

**Agency/Group accountable for reporting:**  
MBIE (MIQ)

**Agencies/Groups with accountabilities:**  
MBIE (MIQ), MoH, NZDF

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**  
MoH (IPC Standards) Police  
NZDF Third party providers, e.g. hotels, security, transport  
DHBS  
AvSec

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB (changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)
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**NOTE:** All activity within Managed Isolation and Quarantine is;  
**Governed by:** the Border Executive Board, MIQ CE Assurance Group, and MIQ Leadership Team.  
**Advised by:** the MIQ Risk, Quality and Assurance Advisory Group, MIQ Community of Practice, MIQ Technical Advisory Group  
**Working to:**


- MBIE Risk Management Framework - (incl. risk management discussions with MIQ LT, MIQ CE Assurance Group, and MIQ Risk, Quality and Assurance Advisory Group).
- MIQ Risk, Assurance and Quality Framework, Plan and Maturity Road map.
- MIQ Assurance Plan 2020/21, based on the Three Lines of Defence model.

[placeholder for future ratings]	Place and conditions of stay	MBIE (MIQ)		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Transmission prevention Including: IPC, compliance, testing and health checks	MBIE (MIQ)		

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social licence
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation





## 2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community

### 2. Managed Isolation and Quarantine and return to the community (page 2/2)

**Description:**

Individuals are required to stay in managed isolation or quarantine facilities. During this time, people are tested, monitored and unable to leave the facility until a negative test has been produced.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Length of stay in managed isolation or quarantine	MBIE (MIQ) MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Management of infection, health and safety	MBIE (MIQ) MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Post-managed isolation testing, screening, conditions or limitations	MBIE (MIQ) MoH		

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### 3. Community protection

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

## 3. Community protection 1/2

### Description:

Community protection and surveillance includes measures such as symptomatic and sentinel testing, vaccines, use of the COVID-19 Tracer app, and alert level requirements that ensure the safety of the general public.

**Agency/Group accountable for reporting:**  
Ministry of Health

**Agencies/Groups with accountabilities:**  
MoH, MoT, MPI

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**  
ESR, DHBs (including; PHOs, PHUs, and regional public health services), third party providers.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB (changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)
[placeholder for future ratings]	<b>Case investigation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Case identification, reporting and management</li> <li>• Sequencing and history of the infection</li> <li>• Communications</li> </ul>	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	<b>Surveillance and testing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Testing guidelines and guidance</li> <li>• Symptomatic testing and influenza-like illness (ILI)</li> <li>• Sentinel testing</li> <li>• Environmental controls and testing (e.g. wastewater testing, surface swabbing)</li> <li>• Border workforce testing (and database)</li> </ul>	MoH		



### 3. Community protection 2/2

**Description:**

Community protection and surveillance includes measures such as symptomatic and sentinel testing, vaccines, use of the COVID-19 Tracer app, and alert level requirements that ensure the safety of the general public.

#### 3. Community protection

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	<p><b>Ongoing Public Health Measures:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COVID-19 Tracer App – (utilisation and monitoring)</li> <li>• Public and sector communications and advice</li> <li>• Further work on self isolation options in light of QFT</li> <li>• Supply of PPE to the health and disability sector</li> <li>• Compliance with required measures (e.g. masks on public transport, mass gatherings)</li> </ul> <p>• Supply of PPE to the health and disability sector</p>	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	<p><b>Contract management and stakeholder relationships</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communication channels</li> <li>• ESR</li> <li>• DHBs and regional public health services</li> <li>• Laboratories</li> <li>• Primary care</li> <li>• Communities, including Māori, disability, aged care, etc.</li> </ul>	MoH		



#### 4. Vaccination and immunisation

### 4. Vaccination and immunisation 1/2

**Description:**

The programme of work undertaken to promote protection from the effects of COVID-19 through vaccination. Vaccination and immunisation includes measures such as product preference, supply agreements, distribution and storage of the vaccine within New Zealand, workforce training and management, data collection and application.

**Agency/Group accountable for reporting:**  
Ministry of Health

**Agencies/Groups with accountabilities:**  
MoH, MBIE, MFAT

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**  
MBIE (MIQ) for MIQ workforce, MoJ, MoT, MPI, MoH, Customs, third party providers.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Vaccine portfolio and procurement	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Immunisation strategy	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Design of vaccination and immunisation programme	MoH		



#### 4. Vaccination and immunisation

## 4. Vaccination and immunisation 2/2

### Description:

The programme of work undertaken to promote protection from the effects of COVID-19 through vaccination. Vaccination and immunisation includes measures such as product preference, supply agreements, distribution and storage of the vaccine within New Zealand, workforce training and management, data collection and application.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Implementation and operation of vaccination and immunisation programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribution</li> <li>• Vaccination event (two doses)</li> <li>• Data capture</li> <li>• Health and safety</li> <li>• Clinical response</li> </ul>	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Assessment, review, and update of vaccination and immunisation programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immunogenicity assessment</li> <li>• Review and learnings from programme</li> <li>• Planning for changes to strains, variants, effectiveness of vaccine</li> <li>• Certification from overseas vaccination</li> <li>• Duration of immunity and future planning</li> </ul>	MoH		

## 5. Resurgence planning and response 1/2

**Description:**

When a case is identified outside of the managed isolation or quarantine environment, a series of investigations and response activities occur to identify, contain and stamp out the chain of transmission.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

**Agency/Group accountable for reporting:**  
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

**Agencies/Groups with accountabilities:**  
DPMC, MoH, Customs, MBIE (MIQ and INZ), MFAT, MoT, MPI, MSD

**Key Stakeholders/Partners with responsibilities:**  
MoJ, MSD, DPMC (SACI)

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Resurgence planning and review - Now including Quarantine-free travel (QFT)	DPMC MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Case identification and confirmation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Source investigation</li> <li>• Genome sequencing</li> </ul>	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Contact tracing	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Case and contact management	MoH		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Transfer to quarantine or alternative arrangements	MoH DHB's		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Public and sector communications	DPMC MoH		



### 5. Resurgence planning and response

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation

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## 5. Resurgence planning and response 2/2

**Description:**

When a case is identified outside of the managed isolation or quarantine environment, a series of investigations and response activities occur to identify, contain and stamp out the chain of transmission.

Macro Category	Macro system-level impacts and implications to be raised to CCB
<i>E.g. Workforce implications</i>	

Confidence Rating	What activities within this area are you aware of?	Agency accountable for activity	What indicators and evidence do you have to give the CCB confidence that this is working?	Key items to be raised to CCB <i>(changes, risks or issues, milestones or indicators of progress)</i>
[placeholder for future ratings]	Alert level changes and supports - Including clearance to lift restrictions/change alert levels	DPMC		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Review of the response and incorporations of learnings	DPMC		
[placeholder for future ratings]	Development of the quarantine-free travel response framework and implementation plan	DPMC		

### 5. Resurgence planning and response

Macro system-level impacts and implications are applied to all activity within the SAF.

These can be raised through a specific activity, or generally across the card in the macro table above.

- Treaty of Waitangi
- Workforce implications
- Impact on BAU and other priorities
- Public confidence and social license
- Inter-agency ways of working
- Economic and financial impacts
- Socio-economic and wellbeing impacts
- Diplomatic and international relations
- Communications, data and privacy
- Strategic direction and innovation



Released under the Official Information Act 1982