



THREAT ASSESSMENT

The New Zealand terrorism threat environment

Issued: 18 December 2019

83/20/TA

DMS6-14-435

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(R) This Threat Assessment provides an update to CTAG's Threat Assessment: 'New Zealand terrorism threat environment following the Christchurch attack', issued on 9 April 2019 [136/19/TA refers]. It identifies potential threat actors, ideologies, pathways to radicalisation, terrorist targets, methods of attack and a 12 month outlook, based on our current understanding of the terrorism threat environment.

(R) This Threat Assessment is current as of the date of publication, and we note the terrorism threat environment is subject to change at short notice. CTAG continually monitors the terrorism threat environment and issues reporting as necessary. This Threat Assessment does not review the New Zealand terrorism threat level, which will be undertaken separately. CTAG has moderate confidence in our assessments, which are informed by a range of domestic and international sources. CTAG has consulted with a range of agencies in preparing this Threat Assessment.

Key points

1. (R) The Christchurch attacks on 15 March 2019 significantly affected New Zealand's terrorism threat environment, establishing precedent for a major terrorist attack comparable with some of the most significant that have occurred in the West. This will likely have a long-term impact on the environment.
2. (R) There have been no subsequent successful attacks of a terrorist nature in New Zealand since 15 March. However, we assess the widespread inspirational effect of the Christchurch attack, including the associated manifesto and livestreamed video, has at least partially inspired and influenced offshore extreme right-wing terrorist attacks, and there remains the potential for onshore inspired attacks in New Zealand. The Christchurch attacks may also provide motivation for Islamist extremist retaliatory terrorist attacks offshore, either against New Zealand interests or in general, and could lead to future revenge attacks in New Zealand.
3. (R) The radicalising effect of global online extremist narratives means terrorist actors inspired by various ideologies can emerge with little or no forewarning, and previous attacks show that lower levels of capability are not a significant barrier to a successful attack. Unknown lone actors pose a latent and pervasive threat.
4. (R) CTAG assesses the most likely scenario for a terrorist attack in New Zealand in the next 12 months is an attack using readily available weapons conducted by a New Zealand-based self-radicalised lone actor, either Islamist or extreme right-wing, in a public or crowded location.

Threat actors

5. (R) Assessed potential terrorist threat actors are outlined below. However, we note it is possible activity is occurring in New Zealand which has not been detected by our sources and of which we are unaware. We continue to assess there is a realistic possibility extremists inspired by any ideology, who are unknown to security and law enforcement agencies, could mobilise to violence with little or no forewarning. The Christchurch attacks have highlighted the difficulty in detecting such individuals.

Known individuals and groups

6. (R) CTAG is aware of a small number of Islamist extremist individuals whose activities are of particular concern, but who are not currently undertaking any attack planning and are assessed to have low capability to conduct an attack. We have not sighted any indication the Christchurch attacks, or statements and propaganda referencing New Zealand and revenge for the attack by Islamist extremist groups, have resonated with known New Zealand-based individuals of security concern. However, we acknowledge the potential long term radicalising impact the events of 15 March may have in New Zealand. We are not aware of any current, specific intent by known Islamist extremists to conduct a terrorist attack in New Zealand.
7. (R) Increased investigative activity, leads generation and public sensitivity to extremist behaviour prompted more information on individuals adhering to an extreme right-wing ideology to come to New Zealand security agencies' attention in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks. Some of these individuals possess higher levels of capability in the form of firearms than previously observed in persons of interest. We are not aware of any current, specific intent by these individuals to conduct a terrorist attack. We note that the long-term implications of potential perceptions of being discriminated against since 15 March that may be held by these individuals remain unknown. Should they develop intent to conduct a terrorist attack, we note the existing higher level of capability means these individuals could likely mobilise to violence with little forewarning.
8. (R) There are a small number of white identity extremist groups in New Zealand which are generally assessed to be fragmented and disorganised, receive little support, and do not openly advocate for the use of violence. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Lone actors

9. (R) CTAG assesses an attack conducted by a lone actor continues to represent the most likely scenario of a terrorist attack in New Zealand. The mobilisation to violence of lone actors can be very difficult to detect. This may be due to:
 - a. their individualised pathways to radicalisation
 - b. a lack of security indicators
 - c. their ability to acquire capability without attracting attention
 - d. the diverse range of potential attack targets
 - e. the use of anonymous online forums
 - f. operational security measures such as communications security and not revealing attack plans to others.

International terrorist groups

10. (R) CTAG assesses international Islamist extremist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qa'ida (AQ), including affiliate groups, highly likely retain the intent to conduct attacks against the West. However, it is likely they have placed a lesser priority on conducting sophisticated operations against the West since 2017, and have a lower capability to do so. The deaths of key leaders and operatives, persistent CT pressure, loss of territory in Iraq/Syria, and weakened capability both kinetic and non-kinetic, has likely caused these groups to re-focus their efforts regionally.
11. (R) CTAG assesses the Christchurch attacks have raised the profile of New Zealand among Islamist extremist operatives and supporters worldwide. However, we assess an externally directed or enabled attack by an Islamist extremist group specifically targeting New Zealand is less likely to occur in the next 12 months, and we are not aware of any credible attack plans. We assess New Zealand remains a less appealing terrorist target than other Western countries.

Foreign nationals

12. (R) We acknowledge the potential for foreign nationals to travel to New Zealand to conduct a terrorist attack, and that attacks have occurred in Western countries by individuals who travelled specifically to conduct an attack. We note the Christchurch attacks were conducted by an Australian citizen. Perceived difficulties in entering the country for certain nationalities or those who are subject to security watchlists could discourage attempted travel. However, this may not be the case for individuals who have no history of activities of security concern or who can enter the country on visa-free arrangements. We also note the alleged Christchurch attacker considered New Zealand to be a desirable target due to its multiculturalism and perceived acceptance of minorities.

Returning foreign terrorist fighters

13. (R) s6(a) [REDACTED] New Zealanders are known to have travelled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to join or support ISIL or other terrorist groups since 2014. s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We assess these individuals likely remain generally committed to their Islamist extremist ideology. We note it is possible further New Zealand citizens who are unknown to authorities have travelled to conflict zones undetected. While the dispersal of foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and Iraq has been anticipated for some time, it has not been as significant as expected, despite Turkish military action in northern Syria. However, we note the situation could change at short notice.
14. (R) s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] we note the situation in Syria is fluid and the circumstances of New Zealand citizens in the conflict zone could change with little forewarning. The threat each individual would pose to New Zealand national security should they return is specific to their own circumstances. CTAG will closely monitor the threat posed by these individuals if we become aware of their impending return, and will report as necessary. We assess it is likely the return of a foreign terrorist fighter to New Zealand would affect the domestic terrorism threat environment. The specific effect would depend on the nature of the individual, particularly their commitment to an extremist ideology, their

capabilities, whether or not their return was publicly announced, and the impact of any mitigating arrangements. We note such individuals may have been exposed to combat training, increasing their capability to conduct an attack; or logistical, organisational and leadership capability and media skills which could be used to influence or radicalise others.

Extremist ideologies in New Zealand

15. (R) We assess the most likely extremist ideologies to inspire a terrorist attack in New Zealand are right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism, but we are aware of the potential for other extremist ideologies and issues-motivated trends. CTAG notes individuals' specific ideologies can be highly idiosyncratic, depending on their own interpretation and pathway to radicalisation. This may involve only some elements of an ideology, or a combination of different ideologies. CTAG also notes some ideologies are not inherently violent or extreme, but become so when an individual believes in undertaking an act of violence in support of their ideological views. We note that for some individuals, a propensity for violence may precede the development of an extremist ideology.

Right-wing extremism

16. (R) In New Zealand and many other Western countries, right-wing extremism usually takes the form of white nationalist and supremacist groups focussed on real or perceived threats to concepts of a white or ethnic-European culture and identity. It encompasses a broad range of views, including but not limited to identitarian, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, anti-Semitic, anti-Maori and anti-left wing views, which are often combined with advocacy for violence. We note a concerning trend of the extreme right-wing phenomena across the West is the incidence of military and law enforcement personnel holding an extreme right-wing ideology.
17. (R) The impact of the Christchurch attacks on individuals and groups holding an extreme right-wing ideology in New Zealand remains unclear. In the period following the attack some New Zealand-based extreme right-wing groups have ostensibly disbanded, removed their online presence, s6(a) and re-branded. CTAG assesses this was likely due to increased scrutiny of such groups by authorities and the media and public awareness in the aftermath of the attacks. s6(a)
18. (R) While the alleged Christchurch attacker was motivated by an extreme right-wing ideology with a particular focus on white nationalist, anti-immigration and anti-Islam issues, we assess it is likely that any inspired extreme right-wing attack in New Zealand may use a similar modus operandi while harnessing the individuals' own particular grievances and extremist ideology. Such inspiration and emulation could continue to be reflected into the long term.
19. (R) We note several issues of public concern arising from the response to the Christchurch attacks have the potential to provide evidence of perceived grievances for issues that may fuel further extreme right-wing sentiment in New Zealand. This includes censorship of objectionable material and the perception of limiting free speech, concerns about gun ownership, and community and government support for the Muslim community.

Islamist extremism

20. (R) s6(a) [REDACTED] The Christchurch attacks do not appear to have altered the level of support for Islamist extremism in New Zealand in the short term, despite Islamic extremist propaganda specifically referencing New Zealand. CTAG continues to assess this is likely at least partly due to positive perceptions of the New Zealand government and community response to the attacks, which emphasised compassion and community togetherness. Developments in the Syria and Iraq, including ISIL's loss of the physical Caliphate, also do not appear to have greatly affected the level of support observed in New Zealand. Other possible explanations for the unchanged levels of support could include individuals' potential awareness of security agency monitoring efforts, or the reflection of a more general extremist worldview rather than viewing New Zealand as a legitimate and religiously sanctioned terrorist target.
21. (R) CTAG assesses the most likely scenario for an Islamist extremist attack in New Zealand would involve an inspired lone actor, who has self-radicalised online by consuming extremist material or communicating with radicalised individuals offshore. We note both ISIL and AQ have actively encouraged lone actor attacks in the West, providing English-language propaganda including online videos and magazines which contain instructional guides. While we cannot discount the possibility, we assess it is less likely offshore Islamist extremist operatives would attempt to travel to New Zealand to conduct an attack due to perceived difficulties in travel, acquiring weapons in New Zealand and/or the importation of weapons into the country.

Other

22. (R) CTAG is aware of the growth of potentially extreme fringes of other ideologies and issue-motivated groups offshore. Currently we are not aware of any terrorist threat posed in New Zealand; however, we note other possible ideologies which could have the potential to inspire an act of violence. Such ideologies could also inspire other non-terrorist activity, such as unlawful or disruptive protest or organised crime, the threats of which are not covered in this Threat Assessment.
- a. (R) Left-wing extremism, encompassing a broad range of views including social progressivism, anti-right-wing, anarchism and socialism.
 - b. (R) Environmental extremism, which can align with extreme left- or right-wing ideologies. This may be influenced by increasing alarm about human-caused degradation of the environment and climate change.
 - c. (R) Issue-motivated groups, who may advocate issues such as being against the use of 1080 pest control poison, anti-firearms reform, anti-abortion, anti-indigenous Maori sovereignty, or anti-government generally.
 - d. (R) Other extremist ideologies observed offshore, including other forms of religious extremism, gender-based extremism, ethno-nationalism and separatism.

Radicalisation

Online environment

23. (R) The online environment continues to provide a platform for extremist material across ideologies and for users who can post material, communicate, provide encouragement, and facilitate radicalising discourse, often anonymously. Online extremist communities have appropriated and modified content, including terminology and meme culture, from other online communities and subcultures, leading to a significant crossover between extremist and non-extremist material online. For example, right-wing extremist discourse often overlaps with online gaming culture, including the “gamification” of attacks. The increasing availability of a broad range of extremist content online enables individuals to compile their own idiosyncratic ideologies while establishing a sense of community and belonging with other like-minded individuals.
24. (R) Right-wing extremist content is easily accessible and widely shared on the internet. Materials associated with the Christchurch attacks further added to this, provoking a global social media reaction. This includes the alleged attacker’s manifesto, which outlined his extreme right-wing ideology and advocacy for the use of violence, photos of the weapons and equipment he used to undertake the attacks inscribed with extreme right-wing symbols and historical European figures and conflicts, and the livestreamed video of the attacks posted to social media. The materials and their content made use of terminology, memes and humour in a way that was effective in appealing to an extreme right-wing audience. They have been subsequently mirrored in other extreme right-wing attacks, such as the attacks against synagogues in Poway, California and Halle, Germany, which have in turn resulted in further extremist material related to those attacks being shared online.
25. (R) Despite material associated with the Christchurch attacks being classified as objectionable material in New Zealand, many New Zealand-based individuals have nonetheless consumed the material and over 30 individuals have been prosecuted in relation to the manifesto and livestream video. The material has also been widely shared and consumed offshore, and remains accessible despite containment efforts.
26. (R) The use of the internet to facilitate terrorism is not a new trend, especially on the part of Islamist extremists. In particular, ISIL have made use of the internet and social media to great effect, including video, audio and text content and propaganda in efforts to inspire and unite supporters, and they continue to embrace new technology. We note that the removal of radicalising Islamist extremist content on major mainstream platforms has been relatively successful where attempted; however, banned users likely switch to other platforms, including the dark web.
27. (R) Extremists often use encrypted messaging applications to communicate. Such applications are widely available and impede security detection. ISIL and AQ continue to use various social media platforms to facilitate Islamist extremist messaging and propaganda promoting radicalisation to violence, often targeting the West and Westerners. Such materials have inspired lone actors to conduct attacks.

Personal associations

28. (R) Individuals with extremist ideologies have the potential to radicalise others and provide likeminded individuals with real world and online companionship and

encouragement, as well as training to increase capability. We note individuals could become radicalised through personal associations which could take place in New Zealand or offshore. Extremist groups, forums and ideologies can provide individuals, especially those who may already be prone to violence, with a sense of belonging and purpose.

Offshore radicalisation

29. (R) We note the ongoing potential for New Zealand-based individuals who travel offshore, or for New Zealand citizens living abroad, to train or fight with terrorist groups or simply come into contact with extremist ideologies. s6(a)

[REDACTED]. Such individuals can form international networks and increase their capability, including physical training and use of weaponry, to undertake an act of violence. This could pose a significant threat to New Zealand if they were to return. We note multiple instances of New Zealand individuals having travelled offshore to join Islamist extremist groups.

Prisons

30. s6(a) [REDACTED]

31. s6(a) [REDACTED]

32. (R) CTAG notes imprisonment of returning foreign terrorist fighters has occurred in some Western countries including Europe and poses particular issues regarding the possible radicalisation of other prisoners as well as reintegration into society following their release. s6(a)

Targets and locations

33. (R) We assess crowded places – including major events, places of worship and the transport sector – government premises/personnel, and critical national infrastructure are the most likely targets of a terrorist attack in New Zealand. s6(a)

34. s6(a) [REDACTED]

35. (R) Further, insiders who have access to certain locations subject to security control or who have specialised knowledge or training may have a greater ability to conduct a terrorist attack, or provide support to others to do so, especially against a target with higher levels of security. s6(a) [REDACTED]

36. (R) We note hoax threats are regularly made to a range of locations around New Zealand, s6(a) [REDACTED]
We also note an increase in hoax threats is often observed in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack.

37. (R) Many attackers conduct wide research into previous attacks and may seek to emulate successful attacks or "continue" previous partially completed attack plans. Other factors influencing terrorist target selection may include:
- a. the ability to cause mass casualties
 - b. the target's perceived symbolic or ideological value
 - c. the potential economic impact of an attack
 - d. an individual's own specific grievances and ideology
 - e. accessibility of the target
 - f. proximity and familiarity of the target, requiring less planning and surveillance.

Crowded places

38. (R) We assess crowded places present an attractive terrorist target. s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We assess any such attack would likely involve the use of readily available weapons. s6(a) [REDACTED]

39. s6(a) [REDACTED]

s6(a)

- 40. (R) Attacks offshore have demonstrated the effectiveness of causing mass casualties in crowded places, such as: the Bataclan concert venue attack in Paris, France in 2015 (138 fatalities); the Pulse nightclub attack in Florida in 2016 (49 fatalities); and the Manchester Arena attack in the UK in 2017 (23 fatalities).

Places of worship

- 41. (R) The Christchurch attacks have created precedent for terrorist targeting of places of worship in New Zealand; however, this is not a new phenomenon globally. The number of casualties caused in the Christchurch attacks demonstrates the potential consequences of a lone actor attack against a crowded place s6(a)

[Redacted]

- 42. s6(a)

- 43. (R) Places of worship have featured in recent terrorist attacks in the West, including several lone gunman attacks assessed to have been inspired by the Christchurch attacks. These include a synagogue in Poway, California in April 2019, a mosque in Baerum, Norway in August 2019, and a synagogue in Halle, Germany in October 2019. Islamist extremist attacks against Christian churches in Sri Lanka in April 2019 were claimed as acts of retaliation for the Christchurch attacks, and although they had likely been planned in advance, the Christchurch attacks possibly influenced the final timing and targets. Islamist extremist propaganda has explicitly encouraged followers to conduct attacks against churches following the Christchurch attacks.

Civil aviation

- 44. (R) CTAG continues to assess aviation remains an attractive and symbolic terrorist target for Islamist extremist groups s6(a)

[Redacted]

- 45. s6(a)
- [Redacted] We note that the perceived higher level of security in the aviation sector

may serve as a deterrent factor for individuals seeking to conduct a terrorist attack. For further details on the terrorist threat to New Zealand civil aviation, see 141/19/TA.

Surface and maritime transport

46. s6(a) [Redacted]

47. s6(a) [Redacted]

48. (R) Land transport is a prominent target for terrorists internationally. Calls for lone actor terrorist attacks targeting rail transportation have featured in Islamist extremist propaganda published by ISIL and AQ media outlets. Several terrorist attacks have occurred against land transport targets in Western countries in recent years. In September 2017 an Islamist extremist lone actor conducted an IED attack in the Parsons Green underground train station in London, injuring 30 people. s6(a) [Redacted] We note numerous attacks on trains using knives or firearms have also occurred internationally, with varying levels of success.

49. s6(a) [Redacted]

Government and critical national infrastructure

50. (R) CTAG and partner agencies have identified government premises and personnel, and critical national infrastructure, as possible terrorist targets for a range of extremist ideologies. s6(a) [Redacted]

51. (R) Uniformed law enforcement and military personnel are highly visible and have featured as legitimate targets in Islamist extremist propaganda. s6(a) [Redacted]

s6(a) [REDACTED] We note that individuals with such grievances could adhere to a range of different ideologies, including Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism.

52. s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Attack methods

53. (R) We continue to assess the most likely scenario for a terrorist attack in New Zealand would involve the use of readily available capability, such as knives, vehicles or lawfully possessed firearms. We note various factors may influence terrorist weapon selection, including, but not limited to:
- a. weapons already in possession
 - b. the weapon's ease of use
 - c. the individual's skillset, knowledge and capabilities
 - d. the ability to avoid detection in acquisition
 - e. the ideological and tactical objectives of the intended attack.

Knives, blunt force weapons, vehicles

54. (R) Knives, blunt force weapons and vehicles are readily available in New Zealand, and are within the capability of most people to use with minimal planning. They include everyday objects that do not require specific training or skills to use as a weapon. s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

55. (R) Previous terrorist events have demonstrated that attacks with readily available weapons can still cause substantial casualties; such as the vehicle ramming in Nice, France in 2016 which caused 87 fatalities when a truck drove through a large crowd. s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. We note attacks using knives, blunt force weapons and vehicles have been explicitly encouraged in Islamist extremist media, and are more easily achievable by lone actors.

Firearms

56. (R) We assess firearms are a likely terrorist weapon in New Zealand, due to their widespread availability and demonstrated effectiveness. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] s6(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

57. (R) The Christchurch attacks have highlighted the effectiveness of using semi-automatic firearms to conduct mass shootings, which could inspire others to do so.

We note attacks internationally assessed as inspired by the Christchurch attacks, including in California, Texas and Norway, involved the use of assault rifles. CTAG is aware that the Halle, Germany synagogue shootings in October 2019, which was highly likely inspired by the Christchurch attacks, involved the use of homemade 3D printed weapons. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

58. (R) Ongoing firearms legislation reform in New Zealand during 2019 has resulted in some pushback and increased anti-Government rhetoric, likely from a small number of New Zealand-based individuals. Despite legislative changes and a buy-back scheme for now banned weapons, s6(a) some individuals will almost certainly unlawfully retain semi-automatic weapons, and that a black market for such weapons already exists.

59. (R) The long-term impact of firearms legislation reform in New Zealand is unable to be assessed at this time. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. For some extreme right-wing individuals, the legislative changes may play into the narrative of being deprived of perceived civil liberties. s6(a)

Drones

60. (R) We assess drones are more likely to be used as tools for target reconnaissance, or to cause disruption, rather than as a weapon in a terrorist attack. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, we note the alleged Christchurch attacker used a drone to conduct reconnaissance of the planned attack locations several months prior to the attacks. s6(a)

61. (R) We note drones can be used to survey or target less accessible locations such as critical national infrastructure including government or military premises and airports, as well as major public events such as sporting or entertainment events. We also assess it is possible drones could be used to cause mass disruption rather than an act of terrorism, with the success of this tactic demonstrated at Gatwick Airport in London in December 2018.

62. (R) CTAG notes that commercial drones have been used internationally to carry small explosive devices, and could be used to release chemical or biological material. However, we are not aware of any successful attacks or late-stage disruptions in the West which have involved weaponised drones. s6(a)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

63. (R) IEDs are a popular terrorist weapon internationally due to their proven effectiveness in causing mass casualties and economic disruption, and can be easily concealed. Various terrorist attacks and disruptions in the West in recent years have involved the use of IEDs. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

64. (R) s6(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We also note some terrorist attacks have involved the use of hoax IED suicide vests, such as the November 2019 central London stabbings and the June 2017 London Bridge attack.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weaponry

65. (R) Terrorists globally continue to show interest in some forms of CBRN attack plotting. s6(a)

[REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED] s6(a)

[REDACTED]

Outlook

66. (R) We assess terrorism globally will remain a significant security threat over the next 12 months. Global trends likely to affect the international terrorism environment include consequences from the fall of ISIL's Caliphate such as foreign fighter dispersal, the imprisonment or re-integration into Western societies of returned fighters, including women and children from the conflict zone, as well as the resilience of both ISIL and AQ's global affiliate network and violent ideology.

67. (R) Further, right-wing extremism will remain a threat in the West. s6(a)

[REDACTED]

68. (R) We assess the proliferation of online material promoting extremist ideologies and terrorist propaganda will continue to radicalise individuals online.

69. (R) The growth of polarising nationalist and populist narratives in mainstream politics in the West may also provide a pathway to radicalisation.

70. (R) We note that any major terrorist incidents that occur globally over the next 12 months may well function as a trigger for retaliatory or inspired attacks. High profile

global events may also serve as provocation for radicalisation or mobilisation to violence in New Zealand.

71. (R) New Zealand will continue to be influenced by global trends in extremism, especially via online means, for which geographical isolation provides much less of a protective factor. The ability for individuals to self-radicalise means that terrorist attacks, especially by unknown lone actors, can occur with little or no forewarning. We assess the Christchurch attacks embody the manifestation of this wider global phenomenon.
72. (R) Over the next 12 months, domestic events have the potential to affect the New Zealand terrorism threat environment, such as the 15 March anniversary and the trial of the alleged Christchurch attacker scheduled for June 2020. We note the latter in particular will likely result in extensive media coverage, online commentary and discussion. We assess this has the potential to inflame views or spur action of those supportive of, or desiring revenge for the attacks.
73. (R) We assess the more likely terrorist attack scenario in New Zealand in the next 12 months would involve an attack conducted by a New Zealand-based self-radicalised lone actor, either Islamist extremist or right-wing extremist, in a public or crowded location and using readily available weapons.
74. (R) We assess the Christchurch attacks will continue to provide a source of inspiration or emulation for extreme right-wing individuals and groups around the world. This inspirational effect will likely continue long-term. However, the threat of retaliatory violence may decrease over time as the attention of Islamist extremist groups is drawn to other more recent global events and conflicts.
75. (R) The full consequences of the Christchurch attacks on the New Zealand terrorism threat environment will continue to manifest and evolve over time. The attacks have established precedent for a major terrorist attack in New Zealand; and we assess this will have an enduring impact on the environment.

s6(a)



Intelligence cut off date: 13 December 2019

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