133 Molesworth
Street
PO Box 5013
Wellington 6140
New Zealand
T+64 4 496 2000
22 April 2021
Ryan Potts
By email:
[FYI request #14743 email]
Ref:
H202103376
Dear Ryan Potts
Response to your request for official information Thank you for your request under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) which was
transferred from the Prime Minister, Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, to the Ministry of Health (the
Ministry) on 23 March 2021 for:
“I'm seeking any officials reports or briefing material that include reference to the
subject of undetected community transmission, particularly in relation to the
"Valentine's Day" cluster.”
A case investigation report for the February 2021 Auckland cluster has been identified within
the scope of your request and an excerpt of the most recent report has been released to you
under section 16(1)(e) of the Act.
I trust this information fulfils your request. Under section 28(3) of the Act you have the right
to ask the Ombudsman to review any decisions made under this request. The Ombudsman
may be contacted by email at:
[email address] or by calling 0800 802 602.
Yours sincerely
pp
Gill Hall
Group Manager COVID-19 Science and Insights
COVID-19 Health System Response
Excerpt of Case Investigation Report: February Auckland Cluster dated 25 February 2021 released under section 16(1)(e) of the Act
IN CONFIDENCE
Source investigation
A source investigation is ongoing. A number of working hypotheses have been outlined below. At this stage the leading hypothesis based on ESRs advice regarding the
genome of cases A and B is that it is likely a new border incursion.
Possible Hypothesis
Implications
Evidence
Actions
index
case
Case B
- Infected at workplace - possible fomite
Case B reports symptom onset on 12 February
Testing of all workplace contacts including 9 other
- Infected by another
transmission
which could be consistent with an exposure
laundry room workers if not surveillance swabbed in
border worker
- possible droplet/aerosol
event at work (last day at work was 5 February).
last 48 hours. Ongoing. Workmates PCR negative.
from shaking off laundry
LSG Sky Chefs (employer) – Case B does laundry Serology will also be done for the laundry workers to
NOTE: It is considered
- infected co-worker
from international flights including Emirates and rule out recent infection. Investigation into overseas
that
(undetected community
Qatar airways who fly high risk routes. Case B
cases who transited through NZ or aircrew is ongoing.
fomite/environmental
transmission)
could have infected Cases A and C, but Case A’s As of 19 February, investigation into this hypothesis as
transmission is
symptom onset is earlier than case Bs. Case A
not resulted in a conclusion.
unlikely.
has negative serology.
Co-workers have returned negative tests – so
there is less evidence that there is transmission
in the workplace or that there the source of
infection for case A (if it was in the workplace)
infected others there.
Case A
-Infected in 14 days
Undetected community
No evidence of community transmission in
Thorough source investigation into case’s movements
prior to symptom
transmission
Auckland in late Jan or early Feb, however case
and testing of school contacts. Exposure history being
onset (8th Feb) –
A has earlier symptom onset than case B.
investigated. Ongoing.
possibly school (first
Symptom onset - muscle aches from 8 February
day at school during
which ARPHS consider to be COVID-19
potential exposure
symptoms but not definitive (went for long walk
period was 3rd Feb)
on 7 February). Respiratory symptoms started
under the Official Information Act 1982
11 February. Negative serology received. A close
contact of Case A (teacher) reported symptoms
of anosmia on 1 February – PCR negative on 15
February. Serology requested. Following up
household.
17
Released
IN CONFIDENCE
Case C
Case C infected first
Undetected community
Negative serology received but case tested
Continuing investigations. Workmates have tested
and infected case A
transmission
negative on re-swab – serology and swab will be negative. Case C is now displaying symptoms but has
1982
and B
repeated later this week but cannot rule out
returned a negative third PCR result.
historic infection at this point.
Case A,
Cases A B or C infected Undetected community
Four Points case is genomically similar but there A plan to contact returnees who were in the Four Points
Act
B or C
by Four Points case
transmission
is no epidemiological link and the timelines do
at the same time as the case is underway. Contact
(via intermediaries)
not match. There could be intermediaries
Tracing have so far identified and contacted 149
Undetected MIQ
between.
returnees. 19 of these returnees have reported as being
transmission
previously symptomatic and have been referred to
PHUs. Work is underway to contact outstanding
returnees. Returnees from the same floor as the case
will be subject to serology. Any returnees who report
having been symptomatic will also be subject to
serology. Confirming all staff were appropriately tested.
Information
On 20 February were around 50 outstanding returnees
yet to be followed up and tested. Attempts to contact
these people have been made without success. ARPHS
have highlighted these outstanding, uncontactable
returnees as an issue for source investigation. The
Ministry of Health is developing public messaging early
Official
next week to attempt to contact these people. Also,
attempts to locate the remaining returnees through
ethnic communities will be made. On 21 February
there are 21 outstanding returnees yet to be followed
the
up and tested. Of these, 10 are believed to have
accurate contact details and will be attempted to be
contacted. The other 11 remaining returnees have
been referred to finders service. Of these, 2 have
alternative contact numbers believed to be accurate
under
and will be attempted to be contacted, some have
been contacted via email and the returnee has
provided contact numbers. These will be attempted to
be contacted.
18
Released
IN CONFIDENCE
ARPHS have re-interviewed the case and he was not
unwell after leaving the quarantine facility. He had two
1982
household contacts, one who reported symptoms and
was tested with a negative result. Both household
contacts will have serology done. The history of the
Act
cases movements since leaving the MIQ was
ascertained and there are no crossovers with cases A,
B or C.
On 22 February it was confirmed that there were 265
returnees who were in the Four Points at the same time
as the case. Of these, 36 returnees have since travelled
overseas and will not be followed up.
Of the remaining 229 returnees in New Zealand, 219
returnees have been contacted for symptom check
Information
during the period of interest.
Of the 219 returnees contacted:
-
40 returnees have reported they were
symptomatic during the period of interest and
have been referred to their local PHU for
follow-up.
Official
-
All returnees have been contacted and 1
person has refused a test.
-
15 returnees or their family members have
the
been referred for serology. Of these, 8 have
returned a negative result, 3 results are
pending and 4 are yet to have a sample taken
and will be followed up by the local PHU.
under
10 remaining returnees have not had a call completed
and are currently assigned to NITC for initial contact. Of
these,
-
4 returnees have arranged scheduled calls for
22 February.
19
Released
IN CONFIDENCE
-
5 returnees (3 within same family bubble) have
been emailed again today requesting the best
1982
phone number and time to call
-
1 returnee is outstanding. Contact details for a
person with the same surname in the same
Act
location has been identified as a possible next
of kin and will be called today to try to reach
their family member.
Case A
Case B and/or A
Undetected community
Case A infectious from Sat 6 February (symptom Taranaki DHB increased CTC testing and messaging
or B
infected in New
transmission in New
onset 8 February) so would require a very short
Plymouth
Plymouth (6 – 8 February) incubation period.
Information
The following table outlines modes of transmission currently hypothesised to be possible.
Mode
Notes
Person to person
Person-to-person is the most common mode of transmission of COVID-19. In this scenario there has been no contact
Official
transmission
identified with known cases of COVID-19 in New Zealand.
Fomite transmission from
It is possible that the laundry that Case B handled in the course of her work acted as a source of transmission of COVID-19.
laundry
The case wore gloves while touching the laundry. SARS-CoV-2 does not persist well on fabric. There have never been any
confirmed cases of infection transmitted through fomites from laundry.
the
Aerosol transmission from
It is possible that in the course of disturbing the fabric (shaking out blankets etc) aerosols or droplets could have been
laundry
released into the air. Given Case B does not wear a mask in the course of her duties this is considered a possible mode of
transmission. However there have been negative tests received on other staff working in the same manner. However, SARS-
CoV-2 does not persist well on fabric. There have never been any confirmed cases of infection transmitted through fomites
from laundry (which could then be aerosolised through shaking the fabric).
under
20
Released
Document Outline
