Te Tari Taiwhenua
Department of Internal Affairs
Purpose
1.
This briefing seeks your feedback ahead of potential Ministerial, coalition, and support
party consultation in respect of the attached draft Cabinet paper:
The potential for
Bluetooth solutions to improve contact tracing in New Zealand (attached as
Appendix A).
Background
2.
The draft Cabinet paper is the report back on the assessment of Bluetooth technologies for
COVID-19 contact tracing, as agreed by Cabinet on 20 April 2020 [CAB-20-MIN-0175
refers]. The paper provides an overview of the Bluetooth technologies and recommends
continuing to assess the technologies, rather than implement them at this stage.
3.
On 29 May 2020 officials briefed you on the results of the initial tests of the CovidCard (the
cards) conducted by the Public Private Partnership group (PPP). Officials recommended
that a larger trial of the cards be determined by Cabinet in conjunction with whether
further investigation of the cards is desired.
4.
The PPP have provided officials with their report on the feasibility of the cards for contact
tracing in New Zealand (attached as
Appendix B). These findings are based on a small-scale
field trial at Nelson Hospital and extensive product development testing in Waikato. This
report was considered in the assessment of Bluetooth technologies.
5.
The initial proposed timeline was to lodge a final version of the draft Cabinet paper on 18
June 2020 for consideration by the Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee on 24 June 2020.
We will discuss this timing with you at the officials’ meeting on 15 June 2020.
Summary of the Cabinet paper
Technology can support contact tracing
6.
Contact tracing, along with other public health measures, is one of the most effective ways
to contain COVID-19 without a vaccine. While there are currently no active cases of
COVID-19 in the country, it is inevitable that New Zealand will have active cases as the
border reopens.
7.
Contact tracing is a manual process carried out by experienced investigators. Although
technology can support this process, it can also provide false positives (showing someone
as a close contact when they are not) and false negatives (not capturing a close contact).
People are needed to identify false positives and negatives through manual contact tracing
processes.
8.
Technology can complement contact tracing by speeding up the process, filling in memory
gaps, and identifying strangers as close contacts. It also allows contact tracers to collect
information more rapidly, which can improve the chances of self-isolating potential cases
of COVID-19 quickly.
9.
The Government has already deployed technology to assist contact tracing for COVID-19.
On 20 May 2020 the Ministry of Health launched an app, NZ COVID Tracer, which includes
the ability for people to scan Quick Response (QR) codes.
10. Officials have assessed two Bluetooth options to assist with contact tracing:
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Department of Internal Affairs
10.1
Bluetooth-enabled cards; and
10.2
Bluetooth functionality for the NZ COVID Tracer app.
Bluetooth technology could improve contact tracing, but it has limitations
11. Bluetooth is a widely used wireless technology that is used to exchange data between
devices over a short distance. In this context, Bluetooth would be used to share
information between devices (phones or cards) to create a secure log of someone’s close
contacts. This log can be used for contact tracing if someone tests positive.
12. This technology has limitations for contact tracing, such as its ability to accurately
determine measures of distance. This could lead to a Bluetooth solution falsely recording
another person as a close contact (false positive) or not recording a person as a close
contact (false negative).
13. The uptake and correct use of this technology is crucial to its success. The usefulness of
the technology increases as more people use it. Available evidence says that an adoption
rate of between 60 percent and 80 percent would see the greatest returns, although a
solution with a lower adoption rate may still provide some protection.
NZ COVID Tracer app Bluetooth functionality
14. Bluetooth functionality through the NZ COVID Tracer app would mean that a phone with
the app installed would record the unique anonymous identifier (ID) of any other phone it
came into contact with. This ID would be matched with the contact information provided
and shared with contact tracers. Contact tracers would then contact close contacts of a
confirmed COVID-19 case.
15. Bluetooth app functionality has two possible designs:
15.1
Centralised – If someone tests positive, their anonymous ID and the IDs of the
person’s close contacts are uploaded to a central database. The IDs from the
phone are matched with those on the database and people are contacted; and
15.2
Decentralised – If someone tests positive only their anonymous ID is uploaded to
the database. Phones with the app would download the database each day and, if
a positive case ID matches with one of the close contacts stored on the phone, it
sends an alert notifying the owner that they have been in contact with someone
who has tested positive.
16. Singapore’s TraceTogether app, and Australia’s CovidSafe app are centralised apps. So far,
these apps have not had the required adoption rates to enable effective contact tracing.
There have also been technical issues with the Apple iOS version of the app which has
limited its effectiveness.
17. Apple and Google’s Exposure Application Programming Interface (API) is an example of a
decentralised app. This would mean that an app should work well on both Apple and
Google mobile devices. Various countries are developing apps using this API. However, as
none of these apps have been released yet, it has not been possible to determine how well
it would function.
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Bluetooth-enabled cards
18. The other Bluetooth option being assessed is a Bluetooth-enabled card. This would be a
card attached to lanyard and worn around the neck. Its functionality is similar to the app
solution, but it does not require a mobile device, making it accessible to everyone.
19. The PPP has carried out product development testing on the cards in New Zealand and
outline in their final report confidence that these would work. However, questions remain
regarding how well the card would perform on a larger scale.
20. The card would require a high adoption rate by New Zealanders to be effective. The PPP
estimate that the adoption rate would have to be 80%. They suggest the cards may need
to be mandated by the Government to ensure this adoption rate is met. This would create
some significant human rights, privacy, and Tiriti o Waitangi challenges which would need
to be considered and resolved.
21. The cards would likely cost $98.5 million to manufacture, publicise, and distribute. Key
drawbacks are:
21.1
long lead in time - it would take 5-6 months to make and distribute the cards;
21.2
unproven - there has been some limited testing but no large-scale trial of
feasibility; and
21.3
limited lifespan – the cards would only work for one year (could be extended to
two years, at an extra cost of $64 million).
PPP report on the feasibility of the CovidCard for contact tracing
22. Attached as Appendix B is the report the PPP has produced on the CovidCard. This report
details the findings from the card trial and testing makes recommendations on the
implementation of the cards to accelerate contact tracing.
23. The report states that a limited rollout, such as only to high-risk workplaces, would not be
effective. With the cards needing to be implemented nation-wide to be effective.
24. Officials are uncertain of the benefits outlined in the report, as they depend on many
factors, including making the cards mandatory, and significant changes to the public health
contact tracing system. However, we consider that the card, or a combination of a card
and an app, does have some potential.
The draft Cabinet paper recommends monitoring developments with Bluetooth solutions
25. As officials cannot determine the effectiveness of Bluetooth solutions currently, we
recommend that we continue to monitor the developments of this technology, rather than
implement them right now. This would give officials more time to assess how effective this
technology could be for contact tracing.
26. The draft Cabinet paper suggests four options to implementing these technologies:
26.1
Continue to monitor – no Bluetooth technologies are deployed but officials
continue to and
monitoring Bluetooth technology for contact tracing overseas and
in New Zealand; or
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Department of Internal Affairs
26.2
Continue to monitor and investigate CovidCard – Continue monitoring
developments in Bluetooth technology while also investigating the CovidCard
further. This would include a larger-scale test; or
26.3
Work on a national rollout of the CovidCard – work towards implementing the
CovidCard national-wide. This would include conducting a larger trial as soon as
feasible, as well as policy work on deployment options; or
26.4
Stop work on Bluetooth solutions – work on assessing Bluetooth solutions stops.
Officials will report back to Cabinet if there is a case for deploying a Bluetooth solution
27. Depending on the option agreed by Cabinet, officials would report back to Cabinet in the
case of a significant development that warrants reconsidering a Bluetooth option for
implementation. For example, if there is another COVID-19 outbreak.
28. Officials propose that the Minister of Finance, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of
Health, Minister of Justice, and the Minister for Government Digital Services continue to
oversee the work on Bluetooth technologies, including making decisions on further trials
of the cards.
Next steps
29. Officials will discuss the feedback received from other agencies as well as timeframes with
you at the next officials meeting on Monday 15 June 2020.
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Department of Internal Affairs
Appendix A: Draft Cabinet paper: The potential for Bluetooth solutions to improve
contact tracing in New Zealand
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Te Tari Taiwhenua
Department of Internal Affairs
Appendix B: PPP Report: Sustaining elimination with CovidCard and enhance digital
contact tracing
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