Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Whakaari White Island Eruption 9 December 2019 Post Event Report.pdf

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Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
Post Event Report
Whakaari / White Island Eruption
9 December 2019

Bay of Plenty CDEM Group – Whakaari White Island Eruption Post Event Report – Objective # A3475647
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Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
COVID-19 Post Event Report

December 2020

Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
c/- Bay of Plenty Regional Council
5 Quay Street
PO Box 364
Whakatāne 3158
New Zealand

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1.  Intent of Report
This report is intended to provide The Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)
Group with an understanding of the overarching issues that shaped the Group’s response to the
Whakaari / White Island Eruption on 9 December 2019.
This report has been prepared with reference to the following:
   Conversations with people directly involved in the event
  Records from the event
  Multiple debrief sessions with staff involved in the response
This report intended to proactively identify opportunities for improvement.
Scope
This report is focused on the coordination function of CDEM and does not address the search and
rescue and recovery operation led by New Zealand Police nor does it address the response
activities at the national level by Central Government.
2.  Summary of Event
Whakaari / White Island erupted at 1411hrs on Monday, 9 December, 2019. 47 people were on or
around  the  island  at  the  time  of  the  eruption.  An  initial  response  operation  was  undertaken  by
emergency services and the tour operators. By the evening of 9 December, 2019 it was confirmed
that all survivors had been rescued from the island. Eight deceased people remained on the island.
At this time, Central Government directed that Civil Defence Emergency Management would lead the
response,  with  New  Zealand  Police  leading  the  recovery  operation  (to  retrieve  the  remaining
deceased from  the Island). Injured  patients  were  transferred to  hospitals across  New  Zealand.  On
Friday, 13 December 2019, New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) began
a recovery operation to retrieve the eight deceased. Six of the deceased were retrieved, but despite
ongoing marine and aerial search operations, two deceased were not found. Those two people have
since been confirmed dead by the coroner. At the time of writing, a total of 21 people had lost their
lives as a result of the eruption. A number of others received life-changing injuries.
The Whakatāne Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and Group Emergency Coordination Centre
(GECC) were activated and combined. The joint centre operated from the Whakatāne District Council
(WDC). The following agencies/organisations supported the response:
  Auckland Emergency Management (AEM)
  Australian High Commission
  Bay of Plenty District Health Board (Bay of Plenty DHB)
  Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BOPRC)
  Coastguard
  Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ)
  GNS Science
  Ministry of Health (MoH)
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  Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI)
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
  Ministry of Social Development (MSD)
  National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
  New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)
  New Zealand Police (NZ Police)
  New Zealand Red Cross (NZ Red Cross)
  Ngāti Awa Social and Health Services
  Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines (RCCL)
  Salvation Army
  St John Ambulance
  Ministry of Māori Development-Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK)
  Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa
  Tourism Bay of Plenty
The Whakaari / White Island response was characterised by two distinct objectives:
  The  search  and  rescue  of  those  injured  and  recovery  of  deceased  persons  (led  by  New
Zealand Police).
  The provision of ongoing welfare support to victims, families, and others affected by the event
(led by the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group).
It is important to note that considerable support and coordination was required by a large number of
other  agencies  to  support  both  objectives.  The  response  commenced  9  December  2019  and
transitioned to the CDEM recovery phase on Friday, 20 December, 2019.
2.1  Extraordinary powers
No declaration of a state of emergency was made in relation to the eruption Whakaari / White Island.
2.2  Unique Contributing Factors
There were a number of factors that made this response unique:
  A number of victims were international visitors. This generated international media attention
and required local, regional, national and international coordination.
  Whakaari / White Island falls under the jurisdiction of the Minister for Local Government as the
Territorial Authority, administered by the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA).   The island is
within the boundaries of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group.
  The search and rescue and recovery operation led by New Zealand Police was a significant
aspect of the response.
  The provision of welfare support was primarily around victim support for injured, deceased,
whānau and others affected, rather than the “traditional” CDEM welfare support.
2.3  Overall
Overarching  feedback  from  the  response  was  that  it  was  led  and  coordinated  successfully.  The
collaborative efforts of all response partners was seen as a critical factor to success.

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3.  Factors Supporting the Response
A number of factors have been identified as contributing to the success of the overall response.
3.1  Relationships and Teamwork
The collegial efforts of all agencies involved was identified as a significant factor in the response. The
nature  of  the  event  meant  there  was  an  overall  commitment  to  care  in  all  agencies’  approaches.
Support  and  guidance  were  proactively  made  available  within  individual  agencies  and  across
agencies. This ranged from technical support and guidance on specific actions or plans through to
mentoring and coaching across agencies.
In  the  initial  stages  of  the  rescue  effort,  collaborative  effort  and  relationships  were  important  in
supporting response activities.  There was rapid early activation and mobilisation  of personnel both
through  emergency  services  and  commercial  operators.  Existing  relationships  enabled  the  New
Zealand Police coordination. They were supported in the early rescue and recovery by St John, Bay
of Plenty District Health Board, Coastguard and the commercial operators.
The strength of existing local relationships was an important factor. This was particularly evident in
the early stages where shared knowledge and understanding allowed actions to be performed quickly
and efficiently. Examples were the establishment of the EOC in Whakatāne to support New Zealand
Police operations and early engagement with GNS to support New Zealand Police decision-making.
As  the  response  continued,  strong  relationship-building  and  teamwork  supported  a  collaborative
approach to coordinating and managing the response.
Making use of local knowledge to support operational planning and decision-making was seen as a
significant  factor  in  the  overall  operation.  Involvement  of  Te  Rūnanga  o  Ngāti  Awa  in  this  process
strengthened the overall understanding of the situation and helped ensure the best decisions were
made within the wider context.
3.2  Iwi Collaboration and Support
Throughout the response, Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa (as tangata whenua) were significantly involved
and had multiple roles in the response:
  Liaison  into  the  EOC  to  promote  understanding  of  how  Iwi  partners  were  supporting  the
response.
  Coordinating  and  supporting  a  larger  Iwi  response-  including  mobilising  rapidly  to  provide
cultural support and aroha.
  Providing technical and cultural advice around tikanga.
  Supporting planning and decision-making with organisations like Ngāti Awa Social and Health
Services and Te Whare Wānanga o Awanuiārangi.
In addition to the  elements above, Te  Rūnanga o Ngāti  Awa was a  commercial  entity  significantly
affected by, and involved with the disaster.
The extent of the iwi involvement and support in the response was considerable, and greater than in
many previous events. The Rūnanga structure is dynamic but comprises of a mix of community and
commercial  structures. This  event  demonstrated the  ability  of Te  Rūnanga  o  Ngāti  Awa  to  provide
considerable leadership and valuable input.
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Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa was involved from the first day of the response, and an Iwi advisor role was
established  in  the  EOC.  All  agencies  involved  commented  on  the  positive  contribution  that  the
partnership brought to the response. Involving Te Rūnanga in the planning process made for a more
effective response and gave Bay of Plenty CDEM Group staff a better understanding of the human
environment and the potential consequences of their decision making. An example of this was  the
collaborative planning of the New Zealand Police led recovery operation to the island. This ensured
kaumatua  were  able  to  perform  a  blessing  on  Whakaari  prior  to  the  final  recovery  operation.  The
challenge  was  ensuring  Te  Rūnanga  had  the  opportunity  to  be  involved  in  the  decision-making
process across all aspects of the response.
The  Manaakitanga  demonstrated  by  Te  Rūnanga  o  Ngāti  Awa  throughout  the  event  provided
considerable  support  those  directly  impacted,  families,  the  wider  community  and  responders.  Te
Mānuka  Tuatahi  was  established  as  a  place  where  people  could  gather,  support  each  other  and
receive information away from the eye of the media. This was an important aspect of the response
that enabled information sharing and support to those that needed it.
3.3  Coordinated Response
The response was generally well-coordinated and managed across the board. Specific actions were
driven by clear objectives and situational awareness. The action plans and situation reports from the
EOC support this coordinated approach. New Zealand Police were the lead agency of the rescue and
recovery  operation.  Response  coordination,  which  was  required  across  a  wider  range  of
responsibilities was led by CDEM (as per legislation).
In effect, a unified command model was established with the Group Controller  (responsible for the
overall  response  coordination)  working  alongside  the  Deputy  Commissioner  New  Zealand  Police
(responsible for the rescue and recovery operation). The primary focus of public and media attention
was on the rescue and recovery operation, and the demand for public information was focussed on
this part of the response.
Rapid activation and resource support was provided by all agencies (coordinated by the CDEM Group
and  New  Zealand  Police).The  provision  of  specialists  from  a  range  of  backgrounds  and  agencies
across  the  country  contributed  to  a  comprehensive  response  operation.  Appointing  police  family
liaison  officers  to  each  of  the  victims  and  their  families  was  an  important  part  in  ensuring  that  the
necessary  support  and care  was given  to  those  that most  needed  it.  New  Zealand  Defence  Force
provided  significant  support  in  terms  of  assets,  personnel  and  specialist  planning  advice  that
significantly  reinforced  the  response  operation.  The  planning  and  execution  of  the  body  recovery
operation demonstrated the multi-agency coordinated approach (including New Zealand Police, New
Zealand Defence Force, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, CDEM, GNS Science and New Zealand
Mines Rescue Service) to achieve a specific objective. Of note was the use of a range of skills and
experience  across  the  country  to  plan  for  and  undertake  a  significant  operation  with  a  sound
understanding of the risks and risk management.
At  an  early  stage,  tracking  and  management  of  victim  information  was  identified  as  a  critical
component of the response. Sensitive information (held by multiple agencies) needed to be collated,
coordinated  and  shared  in  a  way  that  respected  the  privacy  of  those  involved.  This  presented
challenges throughout the response. However, the coordinated approach to managing and sharing
this information was seen as an important factor in ensuring the latest information was current and
consistent.  More  importantly,  it  ensured  that  support  was  able  to  be  channelled  to  where  it  was
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required. Coordinated information management was important to ensure a single source of truth and
careful release of timely information.
3.4  Whakatāne Based Response
Early on the afternoon of 9 December, 2019 both New Zealand Police and the Bay of Plenty CDEM
Group made the decision to coordinate the response from Whakatāne. Whakaari sits outside of the
Whakatāne  District,  however  Whakatāne  was  where  the  majority  of  the  impacts  were  felt  and
managed, and where the community needed to be supported. Whakatāne harbour was the key staging
area  for  those  returning  from  the  island  by  boat.  Coordinating  and  managing  the  response  from
Whakatāne brought a number factors that contributed to the response.
The competence and knowledge of the staff in the EOC were recognised by response agencies as a
contributing success factor. Processes and products were practiced and proficient. The Whakatāne
District  Council  facilities  offered  an  effective  space  for  response  operations  to  be  coordinated.
Catering and logistical support were described positively a number of debriefs. Refinements to the
EOC layout and facilities improved the workflow of the response.
Local  knowledge  was  readily-sourced  to  enable  efficient  and  effective  decision  making.  Skills  and
relationships established within the local area were used to support and supplement the knowledge
of people who had come from outside the region. Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa was able to be integrated
into response operations. This helped ensure a collaborative and positive partnership with Iwi.
4.  Challenges to the Response
The Whakaari / White Island eruption was a unique response and differs from the traditional natural
hazard  response  CDEM  are  accustomed  to.  There  have  been  a  number  of  factors  raised  that
presented a challenge to managing the response. The following is a summary of the key challenges
that were identified through the debrief process.
4.1   Structure
A common and shared understanding of roles and the structure was identified as a challenge across
the  response.  In  the  early  stages  of  the response  New  Zealand  Police  were  managing the  rescue
operation through the District Command Centre (DCC) in Rotorua. It was quickly recognised that there
was a need to coordinate this from Whakatāne. At this point New Zealand Police, the Group Controller
and the local Controller agreed that New Zealand Police should operate out of the EOC in Whakatāne.
Throughout  the  response  there  was  a  Local  Controller  overseeing  the  Whakatāne  EOC,  a  Police
commander  overseeing  the  search  and  rescue  and  recovery  operation  and  the  Group  Controller
leading the overall response. The structure was determined by the scale and needs of the response,
it also evolved over the period of the response.
Communicating this unique structure -and its roles and responsibilities- in a more deliberate manner
would have benefited the response. In several elements of the response, individuals and groups were
unclear on their responsibilities in relation to others. Understanding of roles and responsibilities was
clear within the leadership of the response however as it filtered down through the structure, clarity
and understanding appears to have been less universal.
Among different agencies, leadership was set at different levels.   In time, New Zealand Police and
New Zealand Defence Force efforts were escalated to a national-level led response; health matters
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were dealt with at the national level by Ministry of Health and regional level by Bay of Plenty District
Health Board; and CDEM matters were led at the regional level.
As the designated Lead Agency, working and coordinating with agencies at a national level created
challenges for the CDEM Group. In particular, some discussions and decisions occurred in Wellington
without the involvement or consultation of the Group Controller or the Coordinating Executive Group
(CEG).
Conversely, coordination and planning between agencies and the leads present in Whakatāne was
viewed as being very effective.
In the Welfare context the EOC and Local Welfare Manager were responsible for delivering welfare
support  directly  to  the  Whakatāne  Community.  A  ‘strategic’  welfare  team  was  established  to
coordinate the support to victims and families beyond the Whakatāne District including management
of sensitive information. A large proportion of this work involved coordination of information sharing
and liaison with multiple agencies involved including National Emergency Management Agency, New
Zealand Police, Bay of Plenty District Health Board, Ministry of Health, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade and others.
Due to the sensitivity of the data being handled by this Strategic Welfare Team, access to information
was limited. Feedback suggests that this inadvertently led to some reduction in situational awareness
for the Local Welfare Team.
4.2   Communication
Communication and information sharing is a common theme in post event reports. Sharing information
and  communication  within  and  between  agencies  was  seen  as  one  of  the  key  challenges  in  the
response. There are some key contributing factors. Respondents described information flowing well
‘up’ the response model, but it was not always as effective coming ‘down’ from the national to CDEM
Group level  (and therefore to local level). Greater alignment or channelling of information between
agencies would have helped to ensure directions or guidance came down to all applicable agencies
at the same time.
Briefings were held within individual agencies and there was also a regular daily EOC briefings (with
key  stakeholders  represented).  However,  multiple  operational  schedules  meant  the  key  leadership
roles within the response were not consistently present. The EOC briefing was seen as a briefing for
the EOC staff only and not for everyone involved in the response. This meant important information
wasn’t  always  shared  with  the  right  people.  A  regular,  scheduled,  coordinated  briefing  for  all  staff
would  have  increased  understanding  of  the  common  operating  picture  across  all  levels  of  the
response. Where agencies were on the ground and represented in Whakatāne, the communication
challenges appear to have been less significant than for agencies not present in Whakatāne.
Situation  reports generated  throughout  the  response  were  well-written  and  concise. The  challenge
was ensuring that these were distributed to those who needed them, and that the reports were read,
and fed back to the intelligence team. Working to disseminate information as far ‘down’ the structure
as possible will support information sharing.
While  it  is  noted  that  one  of  the  key  factors  supporting  the  response  was  the  process  and  team
established to manage the victim information, this also presented challenges. Constraints under the
Privacy  Act,  and  managing  sensitive  personal  information,  presented  a  significant  challenge  to
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creating a cohesive picture of the impacts and the effective sharing of that information. A significant
amount of effort and resource was committed to collating, confirming and sharing victim information
throughout the response. A lack of understanding between agencies on how and  what information
could  be  shared  reduced  information  flow.  Until  a  single  source  of  information  management  and
sharing was established, there was difficulty in collating a comprehensive common operating picture.
Once a team and process was established to manage the information, this was easier. It was noted
that  where  agencies  were  present  in  Whakatāne  and  involved  in  the  team,  information  flowed
smoothly. The Ministry of Health (also dealing with a measles outbreak) had limited resources and
was unable to locate a person in the Whakatāne office. This presented a challenge to establishing a
consistent information sharing approach.
Coordination  of  media  messaging  and  media  management  was  a  challenge  because  of  the
involvement  of  multiple  agencies  working  at  national,  regional  and  local  levels.  It  took  time  for  the
public information management (PIM) teams to become effectively connected and coordinated in this
space.
4.3   Capacity
The response occurred over 12 days and in the lead-up to Christmas, which is already a busy period
for organisations. The duration and timing of the response presented challenges for all agencies to
ensure capacity over the 12 day period.
The  three-tiered  response  model  stretched  resources  across  a  number  of  organisations,  which
struggled to have sufficient representation at all levels. Two 12-hour shifts were initially implemented
but this was later changed to three 8-hour shifts, with a skeleton shift overnight. Consistent feedback
has been received that it is not sustainable for staff to operate on a 12-hour shift cycle. Taking into
account handovers, the longer shift meant many staff were working 13+ hour days.
The scale and nature of the event were significant and difficult for staff of a number of organisations.
Fatigue management was a challenge for all agencies. There were a number of tired people working
throughout the event. This was a result of a number of varying factors including:
  The high pressure and significant emotional toll of the event
  Working long shifts
  Exceeding capacity within the organisation
  Limited additional resources to bring in
For the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group, there was a limited number of Group Controllers available. This
meant the Group Controller was supported by only one deputy for the duration of the event.
Appointment  of  a  Health  and  Safety  function  within  the  GECC  would  have  been  beneficial  by
identifying some of these issues at the time.
This  event  highlighted  the  importance  and  involvement  of  liaisons  within  different  aspects  of  the
response.  Where  liaisons  were  established,  shared  understanding  and  cohesive  response  actions
were supported However, it placed additional stress on the capacity of the organisations to staff the
roles. Notably, appointing police family liaison officers to families of those deceased and injured was
an important component to ensure the right support was given to those that needed it most. However
the  number  of  people  involved  necessitated  a  significant  resource  commitment  from  New  Zealand
Police  to  establish  and  maintain.  Two  further  examples  were  where  Auckland  Emergency
Management were able to establish a liaison in the incident management team at Middlemore. This
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ensured  effective  information  sharing  and  an  appreciation  of  emerging  issues.  Secondly,  GNS
Science established a technical expert in Whakatāne to provide immediate specialist advice on the
volcanic hazard and risk. This was critical to successfully achieving the response objectives.
There  were  some  areas  of  the  response  operations  where  liaisons  were  appointed  with  limited
understanding of their role and function. An improved understanding of the role of liaisons to provide
a  two-way  path  of  information flow,  input  into  planning  and  decision making  and  identify  emerging
issues would have increased the capacity of agencies to work together.
As noted above, the level of involvement and support from Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa for this event
was significant and important. A considerable amount of effort during the event was undertaken by Te
Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa to outline the structure of the Rūnanga and its various roles for the benefit of
response  teams.  As  the  understanding  and  appreciation  of  the  role  of  the  Rūnanga  grew  within
response  agencies,  so  did  the  demand  on  Ngāti  Awa  resources.  The  consequence  of  this  was  a
substantial draw on resources for a relatively small Rūnanga. There are opportunities to ensure that
partnership with Iwi is undertaken in a way that supports effective and efficient participation.  Through
deliberate  planning  and  scheduling,  response  activities  can  be  undertaken  to  minimise  duplication
and draw on limited resources.
4.4   Process/Facilities
There  were  a  number  of  process  and  facility  related  factors  that  presented  a  challenge  to  the
response.
Security, access and identification is an ongoing challenge. Whakatāne District Council established
and maintained a sign in desk to the EOC. This provided a level of oversight as to who was accessing
the area. However, there was an ongoing challenge with a range of groups and individuals accessing
areas. Clear guidance around accessibility of various areas for different groups of people would have
ensured better overall security of information. The sensitive information was well-managed through a
second level of identification required and sign in. However, it is still important to be aware of who is
in the areas when having unguarded conversations.
The  New  Zealand  Police  operations room  had to  consider  the  balance of  having  an  open  door  (to
share information and collaborate) against discussing sensitive operations and reviewing intelligence
products that were particularly distressing (and did not need to be shared with a wider audience). To
some in the response this presented a view of isolated working which was not necessarily the case.
A collegial approach was taken to ensure the right activities were delivered as quickly and efficiently
as possible. On occasion, time was not taken to clarify the purpose, need and function of logistics
requests. As a consequence, additional work has been required post-event to identify where costs lie
and how they will be resolved.
During  these  types  of  events  there  is  an  ongoing  tension  between  undertaking  formal  needs
assessments  to  ensure  that  the  relevant  support  can  be  directed  to  those  that  need  it,  against
minimising the requirement for already stressed individuals to go through what is seen as additional
administrative hurdles. Collaboration and connection between welfare agencies is an area for future
progress.  Local  and  Group  Welfare  Committees  were  not  convened  during  the  response  and  this
presented a missed opportunity to identify and manage emerging issues.
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Provisions within the National CDEM Plan are focussed around providing support to those that have
been  displaced  or  impacted  by  an  emergency.  There  is  a  gap  in  the  system  that  does  not  enable
victims  and  their  family  to  access  financial  assistance  quickly,  particularly  if  they  have  not  been
physically displaced by an event. This resulted in additional pressure on families to travel to support
their loved ones impacted by a disaster.
5
Opportunities for improvement
5.1  Confirm structure and responsibilities
Understanding the response structure, roles, and responsibilities is important across all levels of the
response. There is an opportunity to increase understanding of the response model set in place for
the  Bay  of  Plenty  and  how  it  will  be  applied  in  certain  events.  The  development  of  a  Concept  of
Operations for the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group is seen as an important tool to confirming the response
model employed by the CDEM Group. This should inform training and exercises delivered across the
CDEM Group and its partners.
Whatever the response model, at the early stages of an event and throughout the event it is important
to confirm the response structure in place for all agencies involved, the roles of key individuals and
groups,  and communicate these clearly to all people involved.  It is necessary to bring in the leads
from the key agencies involved early on to confirm the structure and key responsibilities. Reinforcing
this at regular briefings and within the action plan will reduce the opportunity for confusion and overlap
of responsibilities and tasks. Throughout the Whakaari / White Island Eruption this was achieved well
within individual organisations but could have been improved across agencies.
In other events regular controllers or commanders meetings have been established between the lead
agencies  where  emerging  issues  can  be  identified  and  addressed,  as  well  as  any  areas  of
responsibility clarified. This is a model that would have improved the coordination of the response and
addressed some challenges in achieving objectives in this event identified earlier in the report.
There is an opportunity for the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group to work with NEMA to better understand
how NEMA can support and advocate on behalf of CDEM Groups when other agencies are leading
their response  from the national  level.  Improving  the  connection  between  regionally  led  responses
and the planning and coordination undertaken at a national level is an area of future development that
needs to be considered in the establishment of the new NEMA structure.
5.2  Communication and information sharing
A single, coordinated, ‘all of response’ briefing is important throughout the response. This should be
given  priority  in  operational  scheduling  and  be  seen  as  the  key  focus  for  all  involved  to  gain  an
understanding of the current situation and emerging issues. An inter-agency, all of response briefing
helps all parties understand the current situation, what the objectives are for the next operation period,
and any challenges facing the response. It confirms a common operating picture and reinforces the
roles and responsibilities of all involved. It also gives an opportunity for the leadership team to share
information  across  and  down  the  response  structure  as  far  as  possible,  show  a  coordinated  and
connected leadership model, and hear any emerging issues on the ground.
The EOC developed sound action plans and situation reports throughout the response. However, the
debrief process has identified an opportunity to improve how these are shared among agencies and
utilised to better effect, including assessing and updating distribution lists.
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Understanding  among  agencies  of  the  Privacy  Act  and  its  constraints  needs  to  be  addressed  at a
national and regional level. A significant amount of time and effort was put into establishing a process
to coordinate and manage sensitive information. Agencies require assurance that shared information
will be managed in confidential manner.
5.3  Pause and reset
With the benefit of hindsight there were occasions that the flow of the response would have benefited
from a deliberate ‘pause and reset’ moment. These are windows of opportunity within the response to
take time to reflect on the situation, weigh up the current activities and review the objectives to ensure
the successful achievement of the mission.
A ‘pause and reset’ give the opportunity to scan the operational activities, resources deployed and
emerging issues. It allows better understanding of the current situation and to confirm or adjust the
intended  approach.  This  did  happen  on  occasion  throughout  the  response,  however  doing  so  in  a
more deliberate manner will support a more coordinated response and maximise  efficient resource
use.
5.4  Liaison support
Liaisons play an important role in connecting partners within the response. There are opportunities to
better support the role of liaisons in a response. Agencies providing liaisons need to ensure that there
is capacity to sustain their presence throughout the response: relying on a single individual is unlikely
to be sustainable. It is important that liaisons are located where the response is  being coordinated.
This event highlighted potential for a gap in communication and coordination of effort where agencies
were not able to be physically represented in the response. Role definition and expectations of liaisons
will enhance the coordination of effort. For example, it is important that the parent agency is clear what
their liaison’s scope and responsibility is on their deployment. Likewise, liaisons should be inducted
into  the  EOC,  briefed  on  the  situation  and  introduced  to  the  key  parties.  The  controller/response
manager needs to clearly explain expectation of the liaison and how they intend to integrate them into
the response.
5.5  Enabling access to support quickly and effectively
The CDEM system  allows for people impacted by the response to access support from a range of
agencies. In order to do this they need to go through a comprehensive needs assessment process. If
people meet the criteria, they can then access support.  The needs assessment process is often seen
as an unnecessary barrier for affected people to get the support needed. Similarly the system creates
an  outcome  where  local  authorities  and  CDEM  Groups  are  hesitant  about  expenditure.  There  is  a
focus on ensuring that where possible response costs can be claimed back from central government.
Administrative barriers at a central government level put additional pressure on the local response.
For example when the Minister of Civil Defence provided financial resource to Te Rūnanga o Ngāti
Awa  in  recognition  of  their  support  and  involvement  in  the  response  NEMA  were  prevented  by
legislative restrictions from supporting the Rūnanga directly. Instead WDC was required to manage
the payment through the Mayoral Relief Fund. This required an amendment of the terms of reference
for the fund and caused significant delay in getting this money to where it was intended. Additional
time and effort was also required by WDC to enable this to happen. The ideal solution would be that
this is resolved at a national level through the establishment of NEMA and the CDEM Act reforms.
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There is an opportunity for the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group to clarify its process on how it will support
immediate response costs and welfare needs. One suggestion was to establish an emergency pūtea
or fund that is readily available to support the immediate response costs. It is important to have an
agreed understanding as to how and what the funding would be used for before an event occurs to
enable the resources to get to where they are needed quickly. It will also be important for the CDEM
Group  to  understand  and  agree  that  this  money  may  not  be  recoverable.  The  benefit  would  be
ensuring urgent support is given to those that most need it. Care would need to be taken to ensure
that this does not replace or bypass established support through the appropriate channels such as
Ministry for Social Development and Mayoral Relief Funds.
5.6  Confirm arrangements and capacity for welfare delivery
Coordination and delivery of welfare services (including the associated sub-functions) is a substantial
part of the response. The collaborative development of sub-function plans should be seen as a priority
for all sub-function leads. There is an increasing societal expectation on the level of welfare services
provided in CDEM responses: the “wrap around” support model is becoming the standard approach.
The supportive approach provides a coordinated and connected delivery of welfare services and there
is a need to understand the capacity of agencies to meet the increasing expectations in this space.
Developing a common understanding of agencies’ capability, capacity and planned level of service is
important to ensure that a deliverable level of service can be established and managed.
5.7  Continue to build partnerships with iwi
Te  Rūnanga  o  Ngāti  Awa  demonstrated  once  again  the  value  and  capacity  of  Iwi  to  partner  in  a
response. Progress has been made in Iwi partnership within the CDEM Group - in particular  Ngāti
Awa - however there is much more to achieve in this space. For the CDEM Group, increasing cultural
knowledge and understanding is an important area for development. Building understanding of tikanga
Māori and integrating this into the work of the CDEM Group is a fundamental step in developing the
relationship  with  Iwi.  Beyond  this,  developing  an  understanding  of  the  structure  and  roles  and
responsibilities within Rūnanga is important. The development of a Te ao Māori CDEM framework
should  be  seen  as  a  priority  to formalise  and  explore  opportunities to  support  and  partner  with  Iwi
across the region. Supporting Iwi to build their knowledge of CDEM and understanding of capacity to
partner with the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group in this mahi is an important part of ensuring a sustainable
approach. The capacity of Iwi to participate and partner in CDEM varies across the region, so it is
important for the CDEM Group to understand and support Iwi involvement in CDEM at various levels.
Clarifying and confirming partnership arrangements is an important element of future work between
the CDEM Group and individual local authority members and Iwi.
5.8  Establish and maintain robust processes
Coordination centre staff are developing and growing in their capability. However, it is important to
ensure that the commitment to training and exercising continues. This will ensure the development of
staff  capability.  As  competency  moves  from  foundational  understanding  and  knowledge  to  a  more
comprehensive level, focus will be able to shift towards establishing and maintaining robust systems
and  processes  in  the  response. Whakatāne  District  Council  staff  have  already  taken  ownership  of
their  functions  within  the  coordination  centre  and  identified  opportunities  to  develop  process  and
competency within their team.
Recently CDEM Group members have moved towards 12-hour rosters for their coordination centre
rosters. This is not sustainable for responses that extend beyond two days. A sustainable coordination
centre shift regime is vital to ensure staff are supported and able to perform their functions at a high
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level over sustained response periods. There is an opportunity for CDEM Group members to revisit
their approach to establishing 12-hour rosters and consider a model that enables and supports
response staff over a sustained response and ensure effective decision making.

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